Counter Disinformation Unit

UK government unit combating disinformation and misinformation

Counter Disinformation Unit
Abbreviation	CDU
Type	Government unit
Formation	March 2019
Predecessor	Counter-Disinformation Cell
Purpose	Countering disinformation and misinformation threats
Headquarters	London, United Kingdom
Parent organization	Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

The Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU) was a British government unit tasked with combating disinformation and misinformation, particularly from foreign states. It evolved from earlier policy efforts and operated within the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport before transitioning to the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. The unit focused on national security risks, including threats to elections, AI-generated deepfakes, and state-sponsored campaigns. Its activities raised concerns about transparency and potential overreach into domestic speech.

Originally formed in response to specific incidents like the 2018 Salisbury poisonings, the CDU integrated resources from multiple departments, including the Home Office, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Cabinet Office, and the UK Intelligence Community. It gained prominence during the COVID-19 pandemic, monitoring and countering false narratives about the virus. In October 2023, it was renamed the National Security and Online Information Team to better reflect its expanded remit, amid growing public scrutiny and revelations about its operations.

The unit's operations were often opaque, with limited public details on staffing, funding, or specific interventions. Parliamentary questions revealed ongoing efforts but withheld operational specifics for security reasons. Its work aligned with broader UK strategies to protect against hybrid threats, though critics questioned its impact on free expression.

Origins

The origins of the Counter Disinformation Unit trace back to March 2018, following the Salisbury poisonings, when a policy team on disinformation was established within the UK government. As Susannah Storey reports in her witness statement, "a policy team leading on disinformation was first established in March 2018, following the Salisbury poisonings." Andy Pryce, then head of counter-disinformation and media development at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, led the initial response to Russian disinformation surrounding the incident.

This team laid the groundwork for formal structures, evolving into the Counter-Disinformation Cell by March 2019. The unit integrated cross-government expertise to address emerging threats, including electoral interference and foreign state campaigns. Its activation for the 2019 European Parliament and UK general elections highlighted its role in safeguarding democratic processes.

Activities

The CDU monitored online content across social media platforms, including posts critical of government policies on COVID-19, foreign affairs and elections. Big Brother Watch documents that the unit "routinely monitored the social media posts of ordinary British people who were critical of lockdown policies" and shared findings with other departments. It flagged narratives deemed misleading, including those questioning official accounts of public health measures and foreign policy.

During the pandemic, the unit tracked disinformation on vaccines and lockdowns, often coordinating with platforms for content removal. It also addressed foreign state campaigns, particularly from Russia and China, while monitoring domestic dissent. The unit's work extended to AI-generated deepfakes and electoral threats by 2023.

Criticism

The Counter Disinformation Unit faced significant criticism for its lack of transparency, potential overreach into domestic surveillance, and impact on free speech. Big Brother Watch argues that the unit operated as a "secretive censorship machine," monitoring journalists, academics, and ordinary citizens critical of government policies, including lockdown measures. Reports suggest the CDU flagged content from figures like MP David Davis and journalist Julia Hartley-Brewer to social media platforms for potential removal.

Critics contended that the unit blurred the distinction between foreign disinformation and legitimate domestic debate. The absence of independent oversight and refusal to disclose operational details via Freedom of Information requests amplified concerns about accountability. As PublicTechnology reports, "the government has withheld information on the unit's activities."

The name change to National Security and Online Information Team in October 2023 was viewed by critics as a response to public exposure of the CDU's operations, effectively rebranding after its cover was blown by investigative reports and parliamentary scrutiny. This shift aimed to distance the unit from controversies while expanding its remit, though transparency issues persisted.

Timeline

• March 2018: Policy team on disinformation established following the Salisbury poisonings, led by Andy Pryce.
• March 2019: Formal establishment of the Counter-Disinformation Cell, multi-departmental structure.
• 2019: Monitoring for European Parliament and UK general elections.
• March 2020: Activation for COVID-19 misinformation response.
• June 2021 – May 2023: Claire Fradley as Head of the unit.
• 2021–2022: Beth Lambert acting as Head within Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.
• October 2023: Renamed National Security and Online Information Team.
• 14 March 2024: Parliamentary confirmation of name change and remit.

Staff

Publicly available information on staffing is limited due to security classifications. The following table lists known personnel:

Known Staff of the Counter Disinformation Unit

Name	Role	Tenure	Notes
Andy Pryce	Head of Counter-Disinformation and Media Development (Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office)	2018	Led initial Salisbury response
Claire Fradley	Head of Counter Disinformation Unit	June 2021 – May 2023	Oversaw monitoring of Ukraine, COVID-19, COP26 and elections
Beth Lambert	Head of Counter Disinformation (DCMS)	2021–2022	Operational leadership during key periods
Sarah Connolly	Head of Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU); Director, Security and Online Harms (DCMS/DSIT)	c. 2020 – at least June 2023 (later Director Security & Online Harms)
Talitha Rowland	Deputy Director Security & Counter Disinformation; later Director for Security and Online Harms (DSIT)	c. 2023 – present

The Counter Disinformation Cell (also called the Counter Disinformation Unit) was officially "stood up" in March 2020, but, according to official admissions, had existed in some form prior to this having been 'activated' to monitor the elections for the European Parliament and UK parliament in 2019.

According to a Written Answer to Dawn Butler MP from Saqib Bhatti on 14 March 2024:

In October 2023 the Counter Disinformation Unit became the National Security and Online Information Team (NSOIT). The name more accurately reflects the team’s revised remit and function, which is to tackle the greatest national security risks facing the UK from mis and disinformation, specifically looking at threats posed by foreign states, risks to elections and from the use of AI and deepfakes. This revised remit is kept under regular review. It would not be appropriate to publicly comment on NSOIT’s funding levels, as doing so would give malign actors insight into the scale of the Government’s capabilities in this area. Nevertheless, DSIT continues to account to parliament for the use of public funds in relation to the NSOIT and other teams within the department.

Started in 2020?

The CDU was “stood up” in the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport in March 2020 – with a particular remit to respond to false information about coronavirus circulating on social networks and other websites. According to the government, the unit had previously been activated to monitor online activity related to the European Parliament election and the UK general election that both took place in 2019. The unit, which brought together resources from the Home Office, Foreign Office, Cabinet Office and the intelligence services, is since understood to have remained in operation and has been responsible for leading government’ response to disinformation – which is defined as the deliberate and malicious dissemination of false or misleading information with the intention to deceive people for political or financial reasons.

The CDU’s remit also includes responding to misinformation, which is considered to be the inadvertent sharing of falsehoods, largely by members of the general public. Since its creation, very little detail has been made available about the CDU or its work. There is no public information on the number of staff or funding for the unit, the volume of disinformation being tackled, where this information has been published, any examples of the false narratives being encountered, and very little detail on the subject of misinformation or the steps being taken to remove or counter it.

In the last two years, ministers have responded to 69 written parliamentary questions – from MPs on all sides of the house – enquiring about the work of the CDU. Three recent examples came from Manchester Central MP Lucy Powell, who asked about the number of pieces of false information that have been “directly rebutted on social media”, the number that have been flagged to each of Twitter, Google, Facebook, and YouTube, and how many staff work at the CDU. The response from minister for tech and the digital economy Chris Philp indicated that the anti-disinformation function is “still fully operational”.

“The CDU is resourced full time and works in close partnership with cross-government teams,” he said. “In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, the size of the team in DCMS has increased. Requirements are continually reviewed to ensure appropriate levels of resourcing, including surge capacity as needed.” The minister added: “When false narratives are identified, the CDU coordinates departments across Whitehall to deploy the appropriate response. This can include a direct rebuttal on social media, flagging content to platforms and ensuring public health campaigns are promoted through reliable sources.”

No detail was provided on the volume of information, where it is being published, or how many staff work at the CDU – reinforcing the minister’s previous comments that “as an operational matter, it is not appropriate for the government to give a running commentary on the amount of disinformation identified”. Philp’s parliamentary responses came as PublicTechnology neared the end of its own six-month quest to find answers to similar questions, or at least a more detailed explanation of why even limited and basic detail has continually been withheld – by an entity whose remit is to point out and combat false and inaccurate information, and promote public bodies as a trusted and reliable source.

Started in 2019? or 2018?

Here is a witness statement from Susannah Storey the Permanent Secretary of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport to the Covid Enquiry:

The CDC was formally established in March 2019… The key departments that made up the CDC alongside DCMS were the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Cabinet Office (CO) and Home Office (HO). The UK Intelligence Community was also involved.

The statement also indicated that prior to this “A policy team leading on disinformation was first established in March 2018, following the Salisbury poisonings”.

People

• Sarah Connolly
• Claire Fradley Head of the Counter Disinformation Unit, Security and Online Harms, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, Jun 2021 - May 2023 "Mitigated UK societal risk from the most significant disinformation risks, leading a cross functional team to shape and deliver HMG’s operational response to Ukraine, COVID-19, COP26 and electoral events."
• Beth Lambert Head of Counter Disinformation in DDCMS in 2021-2.
• Andy Pryce

See also

Resources

• https://web.archive.org/web/20230531180230/https://www.civilservicejobs.service.gov.uk/csr/jobs.cgi?jcode=1857886
• Fact Sheet on the CDU and RRU, 9 June 2023.
• https://archive.is/e56FZ
• https://media.aflegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/13090539/UK-Disinfo-IPC-Briefing-Slides.pdf

British propaganda and/or intelligence and covert action outfits

DSIT

• National Security Online Information Team

Home Office

• Homeland Security Group
• RICU
• MI5
  • Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre

GCHQ

• National Cyber Security Centre
• JTRIG

DCMS

• Counter Disinformation Cell (AKA Disinformation & Misinformation Unit) - DCMS is the lead department. Later called the Counter Disinformation Unit

Cabinet Office

• Joint Intelligence Organisation
• Rapid Response Unit
• National Security Communications Team

MoD

• 77th Brigade
• Specialist Group Military Intelligence
• Military Strategic Effects
• @HutEighteen, Defence Academy
• Intelligence Corps
• Defence Intelligence

FCO/FCDO

• Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell
• Counter Disinformation and Media Development
• Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
• Government Information Cell
• Information Threats and Influence Directorate/Hybrid Threats Directorate
• Public Diplomacy Board
• Information Department
• Information Research Department
• HMG Russia Unit

Resources

• https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/blog/how-we-are-fighting-the-spread-of-false-coronavirus-information-online/

See also

National Security and Online Information Team Research, Information and Communications Unit Rapid Response Unit