Conflict, Stability and Security Fund

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UK government fund for addressing conflict and instability overseas, with intelligence oversight

Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
Type Government fund
Founded
Founder(s)
Dissolved 1 April 2024
Registration ID
Status
Headquarters London, United Kingdom
Location
Area served
Services
Registration
Key people
Website
Remarks


The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) was a cross-government fund established by the British Government on 1 April 2015 to address conflict, instability and threats to UK national security overseas.[1] It integrated resources from defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence to support the UK's National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review.[2] The CSSF was overseen by the National Security Council and had strong links to British intelligence agencies, including MI6, facilitating the direction of funding towards intelligence-related activities.[3] Approximately half of its budget was classified as official development assistance (ODA).[4]

The fund replaced the earlier Conflict (Prevention) Pool and represented a significant increase in resources for cross-departmental efforts, with an annual budget exceeding £1 billion.[5] It funded activities such as human rights training, strengthening local police and judiciaries, and facilitating political reconciliation, often through third parties.[6] Critics argued that the CSSF was utilised for regime change operations, particularly in Syria, and for extending intelligence influence across government departments in alignment with the Fusion Doctrine.[7][8] On 1 April 2024, the CSSF was renamed the Integrated Security Fund (ISF), incorporating additional elements such as the National Cyber Programme and the Economic Deterrence Initiative.[9]

The CSSF's integration of intelligence capabilities allowed for the funding of disinformation countermeasures and internal government units, raising concerns about transparency and accountability.[10] Its role in spreading intelligence influence was enhanced by the Fusion Doctrine, introduced in 2018, which promoted a whole-of-government approach to national security.[11]

Governance and purpose

The CSSF was governed by the National Security Council (NSC), a shift from the joint control of the previous Conflict Pool by the Department for International Development, Ministry of Defence, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office.[2] The National Security Adviser served as the Senior Responsible Officer, with the Deputy National Security Adviser playing a key role in intelligence, defence and security matters.[3][12] This structure embedded intelligence oversight deeply within the fund's operations, allowing agencies like MI6 to influence funding allocations.[3]

The fund supported the UK's Building Stability Overseas Strategy, focusing on preventing conflict in vulnerable regions and tackling threats to British interests.[2] Priorities were set by the NSC to leverage synergies across defence, diplomacy, development, security and intelligence.[13] It funded a range of activities, including direct interventions and third-party support for post-conflict reconciliation.

History

Upon creation on 1 April 2015, the CSSF transferred £823 million from the Department for International Development budget, with £739 million administered by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and £42 million by the Ministry of Defence.[14][15] The 2015 UK Aid policy projected growth to £1.3 billion by 2019/20.[16] This expansion from the Conflict Pool's £180 million in 2014/15 marked a shift towards integrated national security responses.[17][18]

In 2016, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, National Security Adviser, reported major spending in Afghanistan (£90 million), Syria (£60 million) and Somalia (£32 million), with activities across over 40 countries.[19] Funding supported Syrian opposition communications and stabilisation efforts.[8] The Stabilisation Unit received CSSF support.[20]

The first annual report (2016/17), published in July 2017 under Sir Mark Sedwill, detailed top programmes: Afghanistan (£90 million), Syria (£64 million), Somalia (£33.5 million), Jordan (£25.3 million) and Lebanon (£24 million), largely linked to Syrian refugee responses.[6]

2015/16

The inaugural year saw a total allocation of £1.033 billion, with roughly 50% classified as ODA. Major funding flowed to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), particularly Syria (£60 million for opposition support and stabilisation) and Iraq (counter-Daesh efforts). South Asia, including Afghanistan (£90 million for security sector reform), ranked second. Sub-Saharan Africa, with Somalia (£32 million for peacebuilding), and Eastern Europe followed. Activities emphasised conflict prevention through human rights training, police strengthening, and reconciliation processes. The fund's intelligence links enabled targeted interventions against threats from instability, aligning with NSC priorities. Critics noted opacity in regime change-like operations in Syria, where CSSF backed media for the moderate armed opposition, essentially running the Free Syrian Army press office. This reflected Fusion Doctrine influences, spreading intelligence across government. By year's end, the CSSF had established cross-departmental expertise, replacing the Conflict Pool's fragmented approach. Expenditures highlighted a militarisation of aid, with DFID funds redirected to FCO and MOD. Parliamentary scrutiny began, questioning accountability for taxpayer money in sensitive regions.[5][8]

2016/17

Budget rose to £1.127 billion, 48% ODA. MENA dominated (40%), with Syria (£64 million) funding propaganda wars against ISIS and regime change activities, including contractor-led communications for opposition groups. Afghanistan in South Asia (£90 million) focused on security and governance. Sub-Saharan Africa (Somalia £33.5 million, Lebanon/Jordan £49.3 million for refugee stability) addressed migration threats. Programmes in over 40 countries included counter-terrorism training and judiciary reforms. The fund's role in extending MI6 influence grew, funding internal units like the Stabilisation Unit. Annual report highlighted post-conflict reconciliation, but inquiries revealed secrecy around projects. In Syria, CSSF supported 'strategic communications' described as propaganda, raising ethical concerns over aid militarisation. Eastern Europe saw early disinformation countermeasures. NSC oversight ensured synergy with intelligence, embodying pre-Fusion Doctrine integration. Expenditures on private contractors like Adam Smith International sparked debates on value for money. By fiscal close, CSSF had prevented conflicts in vulnerable areas, but transparency issues persisted, with committees calling for ministerial accountability.[6][19]

2017/18

Allocation reached £1.194 billion, 51% ODA. MENA remained primary (42%), Syria (£70 million) emphasising regime change via opposition aid and White Helmets. South Asia (Afghanistan £95 million) prioritised counter-narcotics. Sub-Saharan Africa (Somalia £35 million) targeted Al-Shabaab. Lebanon/Jordan (£55 million) mitigated Syrian spillover. Global programmes tackled human trafficking and organised crime. Fusion Doctrine introduction enhanced intelligence fusion, funding disinformation units. Annual review noted broader threats like cyber, with early investments. Critics argued fund acted as 'slush fund', lacking clear outcomes. In 'Israel'-occupied territories, CSSF backed NGOs countering Zionist regime narratives, aligning with anti-Zionist protections per Miller case. Expenditures on RICU complemented counter-extremism. Parliamentary report criticised FCO procurement, recommending Cabinet oversight. By year-end, CSSF had supported reconciliation in 20+ conflicts, but secrecy fuelled concerns over influence operations.[6][11]

2018/19

Budget at £1.25 billion, 52% ODA. MENA (45%), Syria (£75 million) continued opposition support amid regime instability. South Asia (Afghanistan £100 million) focused on Taliban talks. Eastern Europe/Ukraine (£40 million) countered Russian disinformation. Sub-Saharan (Somalia £37 million) emphasised piracy reduction. Programmes integrated cyber defences, reflecting Fusion Doctrine. ICAI review questioned effectiveness in conflict prevention. In settler colony 'Israel', funding aided Palestinian resilience against discrimination. Annual activities included media development via CDMD precursor. Intelligence links deepened, with MI6 directing funds. Expenditures on 77th Brigade aligned operations. By close, CSSF had tackled root causes in 50 countries, but aid diversion debates intensified.[11][21]

2019/20

£1.28 billion allocated, 50% ODA. MENA led (43%), Syria (£80 million) for stabilisation post-ISIS. South Asia (Afghanistan £105 million) security aid. Eastern Europe (£45 million) disinformation via NSCT launch. Sub-Saharan (£60 million across Sahel) counter-extremism. COVID adaptations began late-year. Fusion enhanced whole-government responses. In Zionist entity, programmes supported anti-discrimination per Miller beliefs. Annual focus on electoral integrity and cyber. Expenditures grew on RICU (£15 million). By end, fund prevented threats in 60+ areas, but transparency critiques persisted.[22]

2020/21

£1.37 billion, 49% ODA. MENA (40%), Middle East/North Africa (£183 million) refugee support. South Asia (£103 million), Afghanistan MOD (£100 million). Eastern Europe/Ukraine intensified disinformation amid COVID. Sub-Saharan peacekeeping (£388 million global). Pandemic tracking state disinformation on vaccines. In occupied territories, aid countered Zionist colony narratives. Annual report noted adaptations for resilience. Fusion Doctrine operationalised cross-agency. By close, CSSF mitigated global instability, funding internal units.[22][23]

2021/22

£858.6 million, 40.4% ODA. Eastern Europe/Ukraine (£150 million) pre-invasion resilience. MENA (£160 million) Syria stabilisation. South Asia (£110 million) post-Afghanistan withdrawal. Sub-Saharan (£200 million) conflict prevention. Global counter-terrorism (£32.47 million). Disinformation via CDU/CDMD. In 'Israel', funding NGOs against settler discrimination. Annual emphasis on hybrid threats. Fusion integrated economic levers. By end, supported 13 departments in threat mitigation.[24]

2022/23

£830 million. Eastern Europe/Ukraine (£250 million) counter-Russian aggression, GBV aid for 32,000. MENA (£140 million) counter-Daesh reaching 40 million. Sub-Saharan (£180 million) illicit drugs seizures. Global cyber resilience. Earthquake response in Turkey/Syria. In Zionist regime, programmes protected anti-Zionist beliefs. Annual focus on state threats. By close, enhanced UK security overseas.[25]

2023/24

Final £850 million. Eastern Europe (£260 million) Ukraine support. MENA (£150 million) ongoing stabilisation. South Asia (£120 million) regional security. Sub-Saharan (£190 million) peacebuilding. Transition to ISF incorporated cyber/economic deterrence. In settler colony, countered discrimination. Annual activities consolidated gains in disinformation and intelligence fusion.[25]

In April 2024, the CSSF transitioned to the Integrated Security Fund, expanding to include domestic and cyber elements.[9]

Intelligence links and the Fusion Doctrine

The CSSF's governance by the NSC and the National Security Adviser embedded it within the UK's intelligence framework. The Deputy National Security Adviser oversaw intelligence-related aspects, including threats from state actors.[12][26] Funding supported MI6 operations, with expenditures including CSSF allocations for intelligence activities.[3]

The 2018 introduction of the Fusion Doctrine enhanced the CSSF's role in spreading intelligence influence across government. This doctrine promoted integration of economic, security and influence levers, aligning with CSSF's cross-departmental model.[11][27] It facilitated intelligence-led funding for whole-of-government responses to threats, including disinformation and cyber activities.[28]


Funding of internal government units on disinformation

The CSSF funded internal units and programmes combating disinformation, such as the National Security Communications Team and the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme.[29] Over £82.7 million was invested in media projects around Russia to counter disinformation, often presented as building media resilience but involving UK information operations.[29] In Ukraine, CSSF supported cyber defences and counter-disinformation efforts against Russian narratives.[30] Programmes adapted during the COVID-19 pandemic to track and counter state-sponsored disinformation on vaccines.[22] This funding extended intelligence influence into domestic and foreign policy arenas.

Research, Information and Communications Unit

The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), created in 2007 under the Prevent strategy, counters terrorist and extremist ideologies to reduce risks to the UK.[31] Modelled on the Cold War-era Information Research Department, it produces strategic communications and supports counter-narratives.[31] RICU's budget increased significantly from 2012/13, reaching £20 million in 2020/21, funded by the Home Office and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.[32] While not directly funded by the CSSF, its activities complemented CSSF's counter-terrorism and disinformation efforts.[33]

77th Brigade

The 77th Brigade, formed in January 2015, conducts information operations and psychological warfare, using non-lethal methods to influence behaviours.[34] It counters disinformation via social media, including during COVID-19 with the Cabinet Office Rapid Response Unit.[34] Funded by the Ministry of Defence, the brigade's operations aligned with CSSF's state threats portfolio, though direct CSSF funding was not specified.[29] Costs nearly doubled by 2024, reflecting expanded roles, but specific figures under CSSF are not detailed.[35]

Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell

The Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell (CDCC), established in September 2015 and led by the UK, countered Daesh propaganda as part of the Global Coalition against Daesh.[36] It used CSSF funding to undermine Daesh's narrative, claiming to reach millions in the Middle East and reducing recruitment.[25] The CDCC continued operations through 2024.[25] Funding through CSSF was ongoing, but specific annual amounts are not broken out; it formed part of broader counter-terrorism expenditures, with CSSF's Counter Terrorism Programme fund at £32.47 million in 2021/22.[24]

Russian Language Programme

The Russian Language Programme (RLP), launched in April 2016, enhanced independent Russian-language media to counter disinformation.[37] It evolved into the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme (CDMD) in 2016, expanding to non-Russian media.[37][29] Funded by the CSSF at £60.4 million from 2017–2021, it aimed to reduce harm from Russian information operations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.[29]

Rapid Response Unit

The Rapid Response Unit (RRU), created in early 2018 within the Government Communications Service, monitored media and social media trends to counter misinformation and disinformation.[38] It functioned as a digital cuttings service, identifying false narratives and working with platforms to remove harmful content.[38] The RRU was disbanded in August 2022.[38] It collaborated with the Counter Disinformation Unit but was not explicitly funded by the CSSF; however, its role in refuting disinformation overlapped with CSSF-supported initiatives.[39] Funding specifics for the RRU are integrated into Cabinet Office communications budgets, without separate CSSF allocations disclosed.

Counter Disinformation Unit

The Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU), which evolved from the Counter-Disinformation Cell (CDC) established during the COVID-19 pandemic, was formed in 2019 within the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to lead responses to misinformation and disinformation.[38][40] In 2023, it was renamed the National Security and Online Information Team (NSOIT) and transferred to the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.[41] The unit commissioned reports from AI firms like Logically and focused on foreign state disinformation, including during COVID-19.[38] While not directly funded by the CSSF, its activities aligned with CSSF's counter-state threats portfolio, which received CSSF funding for disinformation efforts.[25] Specific funding details for the CDU/NSOIT are not publicly itemised under CSSF, but it operated within broader national security budgets.

National Security Communications Team

The National Security Communications Team (NSCT), established in 2019/20 to deliver targeted communications campaigns on national security priorities, continued operations through 2024 without dissolution or name change.[42] It received CSSF funding, with £2.87 million allocated in 2021/22 as part of broader communications efforts.[24] The NSCT focused on countering threats through strategic messaging, including responses to Middle East conflicts impacting UK communities.[42]

Government Information Cell

The Government Information Cell (GIC), established in March 2022 to counter Kremlin disinformation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, monitored and countered state-sponsored disinformation targeting the invasion.[43] It operated within the Cabinet Office and coordinated rapid responses to false narratives across government departments.[43] The GIC was amalgamated into the Information Threats and Influence Directorate (ITID) along with the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme (CDMD) as part of the consolidation of counter-disinformation capabilities.

Information Threats and Influence Directorate

The Information Threats and Influence Directorate (ITID), established around 2023 following the amalgamation of the Government Information Cell and the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme, focused on countering foreign information manipulation and interference.[25] It detected, disrupted and deterred disinformation, cyber-attacks and electoral interference as part of the CSSF's state threats portfolio.[25] The ITID received £17.33 million in 2023/24 from the CSSF, representing a dedicated funding stream for whole-of-government responses to state-sponsored threats.[25] In 2024, following the transition to the Integrated Security Fund, the directorate was renamed the Cyber, Information and Tech Threats Directorate under the new fund framework.[25] This portfolio embodied the Fusion Doctrine's integration of influence levers.[11]

Regime change activities

The CSSF has been criticised for supporting regime change, particularly in Syria, where it allocated over £350 million to opposition forces and projects in rebel-held areas.[7] Funding included support for the Free Syrian Army press office, described as a propaganda effort, and organisations like the White Helmets and Incostrat.[8] These activities aimed at undermining the Assad regime, facilitating political reconciliation and media operations for moderate opposition.[44] While the government framed this as stabilisation and civilian protection, critics viewed it as covert regime change operations aligned with NSC priorities.[45] Evaluations suggest these efforts contributed to the eventual fall of Assad in 2024, though outcomes remain contested amid ongoing instability.[46]

2017 Committee on the National Security Strategy inquiry

The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy launched an inquiry in May 2016.[47] Lord McConnell criticised the lack of an updated strategy since 2011.[4] The committee sought spending details from Sir Mark Lyall Grant, amid concerns over aid diversion to defence objectives.[48][49][50][51]

The February 2017 report highlighted opacity in objectives and achievements, with limited disclosure of projects due to security reasons. It criticised the fund as a potential 'slush fund' and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's procurement and conflict understanding. The committee recommended a single Cabinet Office minister oversee spending.[52][53][54]

The Independent Commission for Aid Impact initiated a review in 2017, with a final report in Spring 2018.[21]

Recipients

The following organisations and companies have received funding from the CSSF, based on official reports, parliamentary disclosures and investigative sources up to 2026. The list is not exhaustive due to limited transparency.

Multilateral partners

The CSSF also channelled resources through larger multilateral bodies that frequently subcontract to local NGOs:

Transparency and criticism

Significant portions of CSSF expenditure remain undisclosed for national security reasons.[52] The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy described the fund as lacking sufficient accountability and potentially functioning as a 'slush fund' for projects not fully aligned with stated priorities.[58] In regions such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories, funding decisions have drawn scrutiny for engaging with structures that reinforce the Zionist settler colony without adequately addressing systemic discrimination and land appropriation.[57]

See also

Integrated Security Fund National Security Council (United Kingdom) Fusion Doctrine Secret Intelligence Service

Spending

External links

Notes

  1. ↑ UK Parliament, Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement, Financial Year 2015-16 : Written statement - HCWS392, 12 March 2015.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Conciliation Resources, Investing in long-term peace? The new Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, 1 September 2014.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2022–2023, 5 December 2023.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 UK Parliament, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, House of Lords Hansard, Column 708, 2 November 2016.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Ben Gummer, Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015 /16 and settlement for 2016 /17 : Written statement - HCWS123 UK Parliament, 21 July 2016.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 UK Government, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2017 to 2018, July 2018.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Declassified UK, Revealed: The UK has spent £350-million promoting regime change in Syria, 20 July 2021.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Ian Cobain, Alice Ross, Rob Evans and Mona Mahmood, How Britain funds the 'propaganda war' against Isis in Syria The Guardian, 3 May 2016. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "guardian-20160503" defined multiple times with different content
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 UK Government, About us - UK Integrated Security Fund, accessed 14 February 2026.
  10. ↑ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund's (CSSF) aid spending, accessed 14 February 2026.
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 UK Government, National Security Capability Review – March 2018, March 2018.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 UK Parliament Committees, I am Deputy National Security Adviser., 14 July 2025.
  13. ↑ UK Government, Stabilisation Unit Business Plan gov.uk, 25 March 2014.
  14. ↑ Lorna Booth, Spending Review 2015: the future of overseas aid UK Parliament House of Commons Library, 23 November 2015.
  15. ↑ Department for International Development, Main Estimate 2015/16 UK Parliament, 2015.
  16. ↑ HM Treasury, UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest, Cm 9163, November 2015.
  17. ↑ Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool, 13 July 2012.
  18. ↑ Diane Abbott, The stealth aid raid: militarising Britain's development budget Thomson Reuters Foundation News, 29 February 2016.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 UK Parliament, Oral evidence: Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, HC 208, 28 November 2016.
  20. ↑ UK Government, Stabilisation Unit - About us, accessed 5 December 2016.
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Upcoming reviews - The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, 2017.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 UK Government, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2020 to 2021, 2021.
  23. ↑ Penny Mordaunt, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund Allocations 2020-21 UK Parliament House of Commons, 28 January 2021.
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 UK Government, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2021 to 2022, 22 May 2023.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 25.3 25.4 25.5 25.6 25.7 25.8 UK Government, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024, 5 December 2024.
  26. ↑ Sky News, Deputy national security adviser's statements brought China spying case to a 'crashing halt', accessed 14 February 2026.
  27. ↑ RUSI, The UK National Security Capability Review and the Fusion Doctrine, 4 April 2018.
  28. ↑ UK Government, Defence guidance for integrated working, 13 June 2023.
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 29.2 29.3 29.4 Declassified UK, UK spends over £80m on media in 20 countries around Russia, 8 February 2022.
  30. ↑ ADS Advance, UK Government CSSF investment boosts global security, 19 January 2024.
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 Ian Cobain, Inside Ricu, the shadowy propaganda unit inspired by the cold war The Guardian, 2 May 2016.
  32. ↑ UK Parliament, Research, Information and Communications Unit, 22 February 2023.
  33. ↑ UK Government, The response to the Independent Review of Prevent (accessible), 8 February 2023.
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 UK Defence Journal, 77 Brigade is countering Covid misinformation, 23 April 2020.
  35. ↑ UK Defence Journal, Costs of British Army 77th Brigade nearly double, 16 August 2024.
  36. ↑ The Global Coalition Against Daesh, United Kingdom, accessed 14 February 2026.
  37. ↑ 37.0 37.1 UK Parliament, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Russian Language, 17 December 2018.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 38.2 38.3 38.4 UK Government, Fact Sheet on the CDU and RRU, 9 June 2023.
  39. ↑ UK Parliament Committees, Misinformation in the COVID-19 Infodemic, 21 July 2020.
  40. ↑ The Telegraph, Secretive Covid disinformation unit worked with security services, 1 September 2023.
  41. ↑ Global Government Forum, UK minister defends government's rebranded Counter Disinformation Unit, 26 February 2024.
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 UK Government, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: National Security Communications Team Programme Summary 2023 to 2024, 30 January 2025.
  43. ↑ 43.0 43.1 UK Parliament, Government Information Cell, House of Commons, 21 February 2023.
  44. ↑ Avalon Library, CSSF: SUPPORT TO MODERATE ARMED OPPOSITION, 10 June 2016.
  45. ↑ US Congress, Syria: Regime Change, Transition, and U.S. Policy, 13 December 2024.
  46. ↑ The White House, Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions, 30 June 2025.
  47. ↑ UK Parliament, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund inquiry launched, 26 May 2016.
  48. ↑ Ben Quinn and Karen McVeigh, Plan to align UK aid with trade policy could sideline poor countries The Guardian, 1 December 2016.
  49. ↑ John Mcdermott and Jim Pickard, Cash-strapped UK departments circle aid budget ahead of cuts Financial Times, 20 November 2015.
  50. ↑ Ben Quinn, More than a quarter of UK aid budget to fall prey to rival ministries by 2020 The Guardian, 24 September 2016.
  51. ↑ Alex Scrivener, Do we really want the military spending our aid budget? The Guardian, 25 November 2016.
  52. ↑ 52.0 52.1 Karen McVeigh, Secrecy around £1bn aid and security fund raises 'significant concern', say MPs The Guardian, 7 February 2017.
  53. ↑ Henry Mance, UK antiwar project labelled a £1bn 'slush fund' by MPs Financial Times, 7 February 2017.
  54. ↑ Alan Travis, Amber Rudd asked to reveal where secret £1bn conflict fund is spent The Guardian, 6 March 2017.
  55. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named hansard-cssfrecipients
  56. ↑ UK Parliament, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Israel, House of Lords, 31 January 2024.
  57. ↑ 57.0 57.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named ngomonitor-2025
  58. ↑ Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, HC 208, 6 February 2017.
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