Shin Bet

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Israeli internal-security and counterintelligence service

Shin Bet / Israel Security Agency

Logo David Zini photographed in 2023
David Zini, photographed in 2023; service director from 5 October 2025. [1]
Type Counterintelligence and internal security service
Founded June 1948, following reorganisation of Shai. [2]
Status Government service; prime minister responsible on behalf of the government. [3]
Location Israel
Area served Israel; responsibility for the occupied territories assigned in June 1967.[4]
Services Security intelligence; counterterrorism; counterespionage; protective security; security assessments. [3]
Key people David Zini — director from 5 October 2025. [1]
Website shabak.gov.il
Remarks Also known as Shabak, General Security Agency and Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali. Sister services: Mossad and Aman. Legal basis: General Security Service Law, 5762–2002. [3]


The Israel Security Agency (ISA) or General Security Agency, known in Hebrew as Shabak (an abbreviation for Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali) or Shin Bet, is the Israeli counterintelligence and internal security service.[5]

History

The Shin Bet was founded as Israel's domestic security service in June 1948, when the new state's intelligence community was organised out of Shai, the intelligence wing of the Haganah militia.[2]

A meeting of the Varash committee of intelligence chiefs on 19 June 1967 gave Shin Bet responsibility for internal security in the occupied territories conquered in the Six Day War.[4]

Security administration after 1967

Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman describe the extension of Shin Bet's work after 1967 as a transformation of a comparatively small counterintelligence service into an agency administering security across the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under Yosef Harmelin, Avraham Ahituv's Arab Affairs department built up its presence in territories where the service initially lacked officers and detailed knowledge of the population. The authors describe a policy combining permission to continue everyday activities with imprisonment, house demolitions and expulsion for people identified as assisting Palestinian armed groups.[6]

Bus 300 Affair

In 1984, two detained Palestinian hijackers were beaten to death by agents in what became known as the Bus 300 Affair. A government report later revealed that the Shin Bet chief at the time, Avraham Shalom, had ordered the two Palestinians killed and then attempted to cover this up.[7]

Ronen Bergman's account adds that the cover-up sought to place responsibility on army officer Yitzhak Mordechai, who was subsequently acquitted. Bergman describes intervention by deputy director Reuven Hazak and other senior officials who challenged Avraham Shalom's version, were dismissed, and eventually approached Attorney General Yitzhak Zamir in March 1986. He presents the affair as a conflict over the service's relationship with the legal system, not simply a dispute about one unsuccessful operation.[8]

Izzat Nafsu case

In 1987, Shin Bet was found to have extracted a false confession of espionage from an Israeli army officer Izzat Nafsu, who had been sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment. He actually served about seven years before the Supreme Court of Israel overturned the espionage and treason conviction in May 1987. Under a plea agreement, he admitted failing to report contacts with senior Palestine Liberation Organisation officials and received a two-year sentence, counted as already served. [9][7]

Landau Commission

Following the Nafsu case a Commission was appointed under supreme court judge Moshe Landau to investigate the intelligence community and its methods. While the committee was deliberating a Palestinian prisoner, Awad Hamdan, died in his cell under Shin Bet interrogation.[10]

The Commission found that Shin Bet had used "physical pressure" as a matter of course in the occupied territories, and had routinely lied to the courts during the directorships of Yosef Harmelin, Avraham Ahituv and Avraham Shalom.[11]

Rabin Assassination

Following the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a right-wing extremist in 1995, the head of Shin Bet, Carmi Gillon resigned.[7] A Shin Bet agent inside the right-wing, Avishai Raviv, was later acquitted of failing to prevent the assassination.[12]

Interrogation ruling, 1999

On 6 September 1999, the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ruled that the General Security Service lacked authority to use physical interrogation methods including shaking, the ‘shabah’ position and the ‘frog crouch’. The ‘necessity’ defence could not serve as advance legal authorisation for such methods; the court distinguished that question from whether an individual interrogator might invoke the defence in a subsequent prosecution. [13]

Legal role and oversight

The General Security Service Law, 5762–2002, places the service under the authority of the government, with the prime minister responsible on its behalf. Section 7 defines its mission as protecting state security and the democratic order and institutions against terrorism, sabotage, subversion, espionage and disclosure of state secrets. Functions include security intelligence, protective security, security assessments and other activities authorised through the statutory framework. [3]

The law establishes a ministerial committee and a Knesset Service Affairs Committee drawn from the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. It also provides for an internal service comptroller and reporting to the prime minister and parliamentary committee. This statutory framework does not negate the historical controversies described above. [3]

Leadership transition, 2025

Ronen Bar left office in June 2025 following a dispute with Benjamin Netanyahu over his removal and the appointment of a successor. His deputy, publicly identified only as ‘S’ or the Hebrew initial ‘Shin’, became acting director at midnight on 15–16 June. David Zini took office on 5 October 2025 after legal challenges delayed the appointment. [14] [1]

Reporting on the appointment distinguished objections to the selection process and concerns about the agency’s independence from assessments of Zini’s military record. Isaac Herzog and Benny Gantz were among officials who argued that he should be given a fair opportunity to perform the role. Bar’s allegations about pressure to misuse surveillance powers were allegations, not findings made by this article. [1]

In a 3 September 2026 account, the Jerusalem Post reported that the High Court of Justice had rejected the substantive challenge to Zini’s appointment in December 2025 by two votes to one. Isaac Amit dissented, favouring further examination by the appointments committee rather than immediate cancellation; Noam Sohlberg and David Mintz found no basis for intervention. The later September 2026 order required the former officials who petitioned to disclose their identities to Zini, while maintaining the ban on public disclosure.[15]

The Shin Bet's investigation of 7 October 2023

On 4 March 2025 the Shin Bet published its own inquiry into the Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023, omitting classified sections on intelligence tools and methods. According to Israel Hayom, it found a failure to give the warning that could have prevented the attack, inadequate handling over several years of intelligence on Hamas's “Jericho Wall” raid plan, which reached the service in 2018 and 2022 but was not made a reference scenario, difficulty recruiting human sources in Gaza, an unclear division of responsibility for war warnings with the Israel Defense Forces, and flaws in intelligence fusion with military intelligence on the night of the attack. It said the service had found “no underestimation of the enemy”, and also criticised policies that had prioritised calm in Gaza, including the transfer of Qatari funds. Ronen Bar said that “had the Shin Bet acted differently, both professionally and administratively”, the attack could have been prevented.[16]

Bar's April 2025 affidavit

In a sworn affidavit submitted to the High Court of Justice on 21 April 2025, Bar said that Benjamin Netanyahu had expected the Shin Bet to act against civilians involved in protests against the government and to identify protest funders, and that he had been told that in a constitutional crisis he should obey the prime minister and not the Supreme Court; he also said he had been pressed to provide an opinion to the court that Netanyahu could not testify in his criminal trial. He said he had refused, that his dismissal was not based on professional grounds, and that the timing, during the investigation of the “Qatargate” affair, carried “a chilling message”. The Prime Minister's Office said the affidavit contained lies and was false.[17]

Qatargate investigation and the security opinion, 2025–26

The “Qatargate” investigation concerns suspicion that people in the circle of the prime minister, including Yonatan Urich and Eli Feldstein, promoted the interests of Qatar in Israel during the war; the suspects have been investigated on suspicion of offences including contact with a foreign agent, bribery, fraud, breach of trust and money laundering.[18] On 7 May 2026 the Jerusalem Post, citing a report in Haaretz, said that the Shin Bet's opinion on whether the activity had endangered state security, in preparation since April 2025, had not been finalised; that drafts had been submitted in December 2025 and February 2026 and returned by prosecutors for further revision; and that law-enforcement officials had criticised a reported softening of the draft, which one described as “completely watered down”. The report said Zini had reportedly been barred from handling the affair, and quoted Bar as saying that the case raised “the gravest suspicions of severe harm to state security”.[19] On 23 October 2026 the Briefing Point reported, citing News 12, that the Mossad's opinion had been completed and passed to the Shin Bet, after which the Shin Bet's final opinion would go to the Attorney General, Gali Baharav-Miara, before any decision on indictments.[18]

Surveillance, permits and political control

Palestinian citizens and the military-government period

In his chapter in Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine, Hillel Cohen describes how Shabak, the police and the military government obtained reports about conversations in cafés, schools and private homes during the 1950s and 1960s. Regional Committees of Arab Affairs, which included a Shabak officer, used personal files when considering employment, movement and other applications by Palestinian citizens. Cohen argues that the connection between surveillance and access to permissions produced a chilling effect on political speech. He also describes counter-surveillance by Palestinian national activists, including intimidation of people regarded as informers, rather than presenting the population as merely passive.[20]

Cohen distinguishes those arrangements west of the Green Line from the system subsequently imposed on non-citizens in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. His account describes the capture of Jordanian intelligence archives in 1967, the recruitment of some existing informers and the expansion of an exchange of permissions for information. These practices involved the military government, police and Civil Administration as well as Shabak; Cohen does not assign the entire apparatus to one agency.[21]

The permit system and private security

Shir Hever discusses the position of the Israel Security Agency within a wider system of occupation administration. Summarising Yael Berda's research, he describes the agency's security decisions as central to the permit regime and distinguishes individualised permissions and databases from the contracting-out of services. He also records a disagreement of emphasis: Berda sees increasingly comprehensive control of individual lives, whereas Neve Gordon and Eyal Weizman emphasise changes in the state's willingness to administer those lives directly. These are interpretations of the system's operation, not interchangeable definitions of privatisation.[22]

Hever also reports the use of private investigators to carry out security investigations for the Israel Security Agency, citing the 2013 disclosure of payments concealed behind a company name used by the Israel Ministry of Finance. In his analysis, secrecy surrounding contracts and the separate intelligence budgets makes the extent of outsourcing difficult to establish. He does not equate the use of contractors with the transfer of the agency's statutory decision-making authority to those companies.[23]

The boundary between commercial provision and state security is also central to Hever's account of El Al. Although the airline was privatised in 2003, the state retained a special share and continued subsidising security. He describes the continuing role of Israel Security Agency guards on flights and disputes over their replacement in a 2012 reform. Hever argues that privatisation could leave security costs and risks with the state while the commercial operator benefited from the protection.[24]

Human sources and technological surveillance

Antony Loewenstein argues in The Palestine Laboratory that Israel's control of the occupied Palestinian territories provides experience subsequently marketed by its security industry. His account nevertheless distinguishes the Shin Bet's human-source networks from the products advertised by private technology firms. He quotes lawyer Eitay Mack warning that companies exaggerate technological effectiveness and that much of the service's intelligence still depends on relatives, friends and other community members. Loewenstein's argument about the commercial use of occupation experience does not establish that every private surveillance product is used by, or belongs to, Shin Bet.[25]

COVID-19 tracking and occupied East Jerusalem

Antony Loewenstein describes the use of Shin Bet telecommunications-surveillance capabilities for COVID-19 contact tracing in 2020 as an extension into public health of techniques associated with security operations. He reports legal challenges by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel and records the Israel Ministry of Health's argument that the service protected privacy better than private suppliers such as NSO Group. Loewenstein interprets the controversy as exposing a distinction in public tolerance of surveillance of Israeli citizens and Palestinians under occupation.[26]

Loewenstein also reports that threatening text messages were sent in May 2021 to Palestinians in occupied East Jerusalem who had been identified through location data as being in the vicinity of Al-Aqsa Mosque. He records the Shin Bet's subsequent acknowledgement that the recipients included people unconnected with violence. His account distinguishes this reported acknowledgement from the broader claim that surveillance was being used to deter political activity.[27]

Monitoring of BDS and "delegitimisation" activity

In August 2015 Haaretz reported that while Military Intelligence monitored overseas organisations affiliated with the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement through its Delegitimization Department, the Shin Bet monitored Israeli citizens involved in what were regarded as "delegitimisation" activities.[28] The same report said left-wing BDS activists had in the past been contacted by a woman from the Shin Bet who called herself "Rona". Re'ut Mor, a media consultant for the Joint Arab List, said in June 2015 that she was questioned by "Rona" after returning from a trip abroad; the questioning covered a flotilla that had attempted to reach Gaza and her positions on the BDS movement, the IDF and Zionism.[28]

Targeted killings and inter-agency operations

The Joint War Room

Ronen Bergman describes the second-intifada assassination programme as a joint enterprise in which Shin Bet, Aman and the Israeli Air Force combined human-source intelligence, intercepted communications and aerial observation. In his reconstruction, the Joint War Room enabled representatives of different agencies to work on the same target in real time rather than merely pass finished reports between offices. He identifies Shin Bet as the leading intelligence organisation in that system, while distinguishing its recommendations from the prime minister's authorisation and the military's execution of attacks.[29]

Bergman argues that the combination of organisations and technology changed the scale of the programme: operations that had previously required long preparation by small overseas teams could be conducted much more frequently in the occupied territories. His account is based on interviews and documents, including sources not publicly identified, and is not an officially confirmed description of every covert operation. He distinguishes the ability to identify a target from the separate problem of protecting surrounding civilians.[30]

Disagreements over targets and political consequences

Ronen Bergman records criticism of the programme from former director Ami Ayalon, who argued that a killing's consequences for ceasefire efforts had to be considered alongside the target's involvement in attacks. He describes Ayalon's objections to the killings of Jamal Mansour and Raed Karmi. In the latter case, Bergman also records director Avi Dichter's response that Karmi remained engaged in planning attacks and that Ayalon did not possess the relevant intelligence. These opposing judgements concerned timing and political effects as well as the assessment of an individual target.[31]

Structure and Personnel

Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch described three operational departments and five for operational support in 2003. The organisational descriptions and historical appointments below are tied to their cited periods, not a verified 2026 establishment.[32]

Directors

Directors
Person Recorded tenure or role
Isser Harel 1948-52
Izi Dorot 1952-53
Amos Manor 1953-63
Yosef Harmelin 1964-74, 1986-88
Avraham Ahituv 1974-80
Avraham Ben-Dor 1980-86
Yaakov Peri 1988-94
Carmi Gillon 1995-96
Ami Ayalon 1996-2000
Avi Dichter 2000-05[33]
Yuval Diskin 2005[34]-2011
Yoram Cohen 2011–8 May 2016. [35]
Nadav Argaman — 8 May 2016–13 October 2021; appointed senior advisor to Cognyte in January 2025.[36] [37] [38]
Ronen Bar — 13 October 2021–June 2025. [38] [14]
‘S’ (‘Shin’) — acting director, June–5 October 2025. [14] [1]
David Zini — from 5 October 2025; also identified as service chief in reporting dated September 2026. [1][15] [39]

Deputy Directors

Deputy Directors
Person Recorded tenure or role
Amos Manor 1952-1953[40]
Yosef Harmelin 1960-1964.[41]
Reuven Hazak c.1985.[42]
Yossi Ginossar c.1987.[43]
Yaakov Peri 1987-1988[44]
Gideon Ezra 1994-95.[45]
Israel Hasson 1997-1999.
Avi Dichter 1999-2000.[46]
Yuval Diskin 2000-03.
Offer Dekel c.2005.
Nadav Argaman c.2013[47]

Operations Division

According to journalists Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, the Operations Division in the early years of Shin Bet had three departments, Arab Affairs, Non-Arab Affairs, and Protective Security.[48] Given Avraham Ben-Dor's move from head of operations to head of security in 1972, it is possible that security became an independent division at some point. [49]

Operations Division
Person Recorded tenure or role
Rafi Eitan c.1952.
Avraham Ben-Dor 1959-c.1972[49]
Uzi Berger - Date not known.[50]
Rafi Malka - Date not known.[50]
Ehud Yatom c.1984.[51]

Arab Affairs

The department of Arab Affairs is responsible for counter-terrorism, counter-subversion and monitoring 'Arab militants'. Its Henza detachments work with Aman Mista'averim units in occupied territories and some neighboring states.[32]

Arab Affairs
Person Recorded tenure or role
Avraham Ahituv , head c.1967.[52]
Nachman Tal c.1980s.
Yuval Diskin c.1994.
Counter-terrorism Department
Counter-terrorism Department
Person Recorded tenure or role
Yuval Diskin 1990-93.

Non-Arab Affairs

The department of Non-Arab Affairs has a wider counter-intelligence role which includes monitoring immigrants and foreign diplomatic missions.[32] At one time it was divided into communist and non-communist departments.[7] Its role includes responsibility for the Jewish Division.[53]

Non-Arab Affairs
Person Recorded tenure or role
Amos Manor , head c.1950.[40]
"K" - c.2010.[53]
Jewish Division

The Jewish division is responsible for investigating subversive activity by far right Jewish militants.[54]

Jewish Division
Person Recorded tenure or role
Carmi Gillon 1982-1987
'D' -c.2000-05[55]
Avigdor Arieli - alleged to be head of the Jewish Division c.2010.[56]

Protective Security

The protective security department is responsible for protecting strategic infrastructure and for the El Al airline.[32]

Heads of Protective Security
Heads of Protective Security
Person Recorded tenure or role
Avraham Ben-Dor 1972-c.1980[49]
Savinoam Avivi - Date not known.[50]
Peleg Radai c.1985.[42]
Ehud Yatom .[57]
Dror Yitzhaki c.1995.[58]
Avi Dichter 1996-1999.[46]
Doron Bergerbest c.2004.[59]
Deputy Heads of Protective Security
Deputy Heads of Protective Security
Person Recorded tenure or role
Jonathan Schoham [60]
Eytan Ben-David [61]
Heads of Protective Security in Europe
Heads of Protective Security in Europe
Person Recorded tenure or role
Rafi Malka - Date not known.[50]
Eytan Ben-David - Date not known.[61]
VIP Security Unit
VIP Security Unit
Person Recorded tenure or role
Benny Lahav - Head of VIP Security Unit c.1995.[58]
'A.T' - Head of the Unit c.1995.[58]
Shlomo Harnoy - Head c.2003.[62]
Eytan Ben-David - Head - Date not known.[61]
Haggai Tal Head of Operations c.1995.[58]
'A.E.' Head of Operations c.1995.[58]
Dror Mor - Deputy Head of the Operations Unit and Head of the Foreign Bureau.[63]
El-Al Security
El-Al Security
Person Recorded tenure or role
Shmuel Sasson - former head of El-Al Security.[60]
Eytan Ben-David - head - Date not known.[61]

Support Divisions

Support branch departments have included administration, interrogation and legal counsel, technology, co-ordination and planning, and logistics.[48]

Administrative Division

Administrative Division
Person Recorded tenure or role
Rafi Malka Date not known.[50]
Ehud Yatom Date not known.[57]
Carmi Gillon 1993-1994.[64]

Interrogation and Legal Counsel Division

Interrogation and Legal Counsel Division
Person Recorded tenure or role
Zvi Aharoni - head c.1956
Victor Cohen - head c.1959
'A' or 'Sheriff' - head c.1999.[65]
Arieh Livne - date unknown.[66]

Legal Advisors

Legal Advisors
Person Recorded tenure or role
Shabtai Ziv - Chief legal advisor c.1999.[65]
Aryeh Roter - Chief legal advisor c.1999.[65]
Eli Bachar
Dani Geva

Training Division

Training Division
Person Recorded tenure or role
Yaakov Peri , head 1975-1978.[44]
Carmi Gillon , head 1989-1990.
'A.B' c.1995.[58]

Regional Commands

Northern Command

Northern Command
Person Recorded tenure or role
Yaakov Peri 1978-1981
Carmi Gillon

Central Command

Central Command
Person Recorded tenure or role
Yaacov Caroz c.1951
Possibly Avraham Ben-Dor 1952-1954
Yehuda Arbel c.1967.
Yaakov Peri 1981-1987
Yuval Diskin 1997-2000.
Offer Dekel c.2000.

Southern Command

Southern Command
Person Recorded tenure or role
Nachman Tal c.1970s
Avi Dichter 1992-1996
Arieh Livne c.2001.

Miscellaneous Staff

Miscellaneous Staff
Person Recorded tenure or role
Reuven Paz former head of Research
Alan Moss - head of international relations, c.2009.[67]
Col. Nir Press - Shin Bet attendee, Rafah Security Working Group, 2007.[68]
"Shimon" - advisor to NSC Counterterrorism Bureau Director General, c.2006.[69]
Szymon Rosenberg , Shin Bet representative at 2006 meeting between National Security Advisor and US diplomat Henry Crumpton. [70]
Arnon Vinceze - liaison officer, c.2004.[71]
Ilan Kosanivich - liaison officer, c.2004.[71]
Yekutiel Hadar Former Chief Legal Counsel for the Northern District[72]
Peri Golan - former director of the agency's counter-terrorism division, later head of its southern region.[72]
Nechama Aloni - former desk researcher, Aloni in charge of liaising between the Israeli intelligence services and the U.S. Department of Justice during the course of several counter-terrorism investigations, notably on the finances of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[72]
Ronit Ashkenazi - Head of Education.[58]
Shabtai Ziv - Legal adviser.[58]
Y.S. Head of Yitzhak Rabin's protection team.[58]
Yoram Rubin - Yitzhak Rabin's bodyguard.[58]
Lior Akerman - Former division chief.[73]
Dan Vesely - Former head of the Vetting Division, Human Resources Department.[74]
Oded Raz - Former head of Cyber-terrorism Unit.[60]
Amir Takomi [75]
Ami Golan [76]
Ram Gilad [77]
Avner Barnea
Zadok Ophir
Reuven Rivlin, Yoram Cohen and Nadav Argaman
Reuven Rivlin with Yoram Cohen and Nadav Argaman at the 2016 leadership transition.

Contact

External Resources

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 Yonah Jeremy Bob, Netanyahu holds first working meeting with new Shin Bet chief David Zini, The Jerusalem Post, 5 October 2025, accessed 7 November 2026.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.16-18.
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 State of Israel, General Security Service Law, 5762–2002, English translation reproduced by VERTIC, 11 February 2002, sections 2–7, 12–14, accessed 7 November 2026.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel’s Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.168.
  5. ↑ Shabak/Shin Bet/Israel Security Agency/Sherut ha-Bitachon ha-Klali, Federation of American Scientists, accessed 9 May 2009.
  6. ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, chapter 8, pp.168–169.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 Profile: Israel's Shin Bet agency Wednesday, 30 January, 2002.
  8. ↑ Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapters 16–17, “Black Flag” and “The Shin Bet Coup”.
  9. ↑ Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Shin Bet, Its Evience Discredited in IDF Officer’s Case, Under Scrutiny, JTA, 26 May 1987, accessed 7 November 2026.
  10. ↑ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.296.
  11. ↑ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.297.
  12. ↑ Moshe Reinfeld, Avishai Raviv acquitted of having failed to prevent Rabin assassination, Haaretz, 30 July 2013.
  13. ↑ Supreme Court of Israel, HCJ 5100/94, Public Committee Against Torture in Israel and others v. Government of Israel and others, Judgment reproduced and summarised by HaMoked, 6 September 1999, accessed 7 November 2026.
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 Yonah Jeremy Bob, ‘S’ takes over as acting Shin Bet chief from Ronen Bar, The Jerusalem Post, 15 June 2025, accessed 7 November 2026.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Sarah Ben-Nun, High Court orders former Shin Bet officials who challenged Zini appointment to reveal names, The Jerusalem Post, 3 September 2026, accessed 7 November 2026.
  16. ↑ Lilach Shoval, Failure in handling intelligence: Shin Bet investigation of October 7 massacre released, Israel Hayom, 4 March 2025, accessed 11 November 2026.
  17. ↑ Netanel Bendel, PM wanted me to obey him, not court and to surveil protest leaders, Shin Bet head tells court, Ynet, April 2025, accessed 11 November 2026.
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 The Briefing Point, Path to Indictment in Security Case Against Orlich and Feldstein Paved, 23 October 2026 (reporting a News 12 broadcast), accessed 11 November 2026.
  19. ↑ Jerusalem Post staff, Shin Bet to change ‘Qatargate’ opinion says Urich, Feldstein didn’t harm state security - report, The Jerusalem Post, 7 May 2026, accessed 11 November 2026.
  20. ↑ Hillel Cohen, “The matrix of surveillance in times of national conflict: the Israeli–Palestinian case”, chapter 5 in Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban (eds), Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp.103–105.
  21. ↑ Hillel Cohen, “The matrix of surveillance in times of national conflict: the Israeli–Palestinian case”, chapter 5 in Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban (eds), Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power, Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, pp.105–106.
  22. ↑ Shir Hever, The Privatization of Israeli Security, London: Pluto Press, 2018, chapter 2, section 2.6.3.1, pp.24–25.
  23. ↑ Shir Hever, The Privatization of Israeli Security, London: Pluto Press, 2018, chapter 2, section 2.7, p.26.
  24. ↑ Shir Hever, The Privatization of Israeli Security, London: Pluto Press, 2018, chapter 3, section 3.1.5, pp.38–39.
  25. ↑ Antony Loewenstein, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation around the World, London: Verso, 2023, chapter 2, “September 11 Was Good for Business”, discussion of Eitay Mack.
  26. ↑ Antony Loewenstein, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation around the World, London: Verso, 2023, chapter 3, “Preventing an Outbreak of Peace”, discussion accompanying notes 59–65.
  27. ↑ Antony Loewenstein, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation around the World, London: Verso, 2023, chapter 3, “Preventing an Outbreak of Peace”, discussion accompanying notes 66–67.
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 Gili Cohen, Israel's Military Intelligence Monitoring Dozens of BDS Groups Around the World Haaretz, 18 August 2015, archived at archive.ph/pIjXP, accessed 9 November 2026.
  29. ↑ Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapters 28–29, “All-Out War” and “More Suicide Bombers Than Explosive Vests”.
  30. ↑ Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, “A Note on the Sources”; chapters 29–30, “More Suicide Bombers Than Explosive Vests” and “The Target Has Been Eliminated, but the Operation Failed”.
  31. ↑ Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapter 29, “More Suicide Bombers Than Explosive Vests”.
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 32.2 32.3 Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today, Zed Books, 2003, p.153.
  33. ↑ ISA Directors Then and Now, ISA Security Agency (Shin Bet), accessed 9 April 2009.
  34. ↑ Yuval Diskin appointed ISA Director, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 February 2005.
  35. ↑ Netanyahu appoints Yoram Cohen as Israel's next Shin Bet chief, Haaretz, 28 March 2011.
  36. ↑ Cognyte Software Ltd., Cognyte Appoints Nadav Argaman, Former Director of the Israel Security Agency, as Senior Advisor, 7 January 2025, accessed 7 November 2026.
  37. ↑ Herb Keinon, As he leaves Shin Bet Yoram Cohen thanks anonymous ‘helpers’, The Jerusalem Post, 8 May 2016, accessed 7 November 2026.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 Yonah Jeremy Bob, New Shin Bet head: Ready to take on Iran, Israeli-Arab violence, The Jerusalem Post, 13 October 2021, accessed 7 November 2026.
  39. ↑ Itamar Eichner, Mossad changes chiefs: Barnea’s legacy and Gofman’s challenges, Ynetnews, undated, accessed 7 November 2026.
  40. ↑ 40.0 40.1 Efrat Weiss, Former Shin Bet chief Amos Manor dies, age 89, Ynet, 5 August 2007.
  41. ↑ Yosef Harmelin, Israel Security Agency, accessed 24 July 2012.
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.284.
  43. ↑ Ephraim Kahana, 'Historical Dictionary of Israeli intelligence', Scarecrow Press, 2006, p.100.
  44. ↑ 44.0 44.1 Yaakov Peri, Israel Security Agency, accessed 24 July 2012.
  45. ↑ Lahav Harkov, Kadima MK Gideon Ezra dies of lung cancer at 74, Jerusalem Post, 17 May 2012.
  46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 Avid Dichter, Israel Security Agency, accessed 24 July 2012
  47. ↑ Richard Silverstein, Deputy Shin Bet, WMD Chiefs Named (and Their Favorite Beverages), Tikun Olam, 13 March 2013.
  48. ↑ 48.0 48.1 Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.50.
  49. ↑ 49.0 49.1 49.2 Avraham (Shalom) Ben-Dor , Israel Security Agency, accessed 24 July 2012.
  50. ↑ 50.0 50.1 50.2 50.3 50.4 Report of Internal GSS Committee on Rabin Assassination, 8 November 1995, archived by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
  51. ↑ Ephraim Kahana, 'Historical Dictionary of Israeli intelligence', Scarecrow Press, 2006, p.112.
  52. ↑ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.169.
  53. ↑ 53.0 53.1 Tomer Zarchin and Amos Harel, Shin Bet deputy suspended for role in lover's promotion, Haaretz, 9 June 2010.
  54. ↑ J.J. Goldberg, IDF Probe: Troops' Hands Tied Controlling Rightist Jewish Extremism, forward.com, 27 June 2011.
  55. ↑ Mitch Ginsburg, Outwitted by a bunch of 12-year-olds, The Times of Israel, 19 June 2013.
  56. ↑ Richard Silverstein, Jewish Terrorist, Charged With Multiple Palestinian Murders, ‘Outs’ Chief of Shin Bet’s Jewish Terror Department, Tikun Olam, 16 July 2010.
  57. ↑ 57.0 57.1 Alan Sipress, Two Hijackers Were Taken Alive. A Photo Proved It. Israeli's Account Of Killing Arabs Renews A Scandal, Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 August 1996.
  58. ↑ 58.0 58.1 58.2 58.3 58.4 58.5 58.6 58.7 58.8 58.9 Yossi Melman, Nothing succeeds like abject failure, Haaretz, 18 October 2002.
  59. ↑ Israeli Security Services Tell Codel Talent That Interagency Connectivity Is Key In The Fight Against Terror, US Embassy Tel Aviv, 21 December 2004, published by Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.
  60. ↑ 60.0 60.1 60.2 LECTURES, Four Troop, accessed 29 July 2013.
  61. ↑ 61.0 61.1 61.2 61.3 Veteran Shin Bet official appointed Israel's head of Counter-Terrorism Bureau, BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2 March 2012, archived at accessmylibrary.com.
  62. ↑ Shlomo Harnoy, Sdema Group, acccessed 28 July 2013.
  63. ↑ Dror Mor, Sdema Group, acccessed 28 July 2013.
  64. ↑ Carmi Gillon, Israel Security Agency, accessed 24 July 2012.
  65. ↑ 65.0 65.1 65.2 Yossi Melman, The 'torture police' - Every Shin Bet move is watched by its legal team, Haaretz, 12 June 2008.
  66. ↑ Mitch Ginsburg, Israel should free 1,000 security prisoners, says ex-Shin Bet official, The Times of Israel, 10 June 2013.
  67. ↑ Deputy Secretary Raises Transit Of Gaza Students With Shin Bet: Followup, US Embassy Tel Aviv, 11 December 2009, published by Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.
  68. ↑ Rafah Security Working Group Meeting, US Consulate Jerusalem, 19 April 2007, published by Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.
  69. ↑ Israeli Ct Officials Discuss Israel-hizballah War, U.s.-israel Ct Cooperation, US Embassy Tel Aviv, 19 September 2006, unredacted publication by Wikileaks, 8 September 2011.
  70. ↑ Jcg: Israel Nsc's 2/23 Session With S/ct Amb. Crumpton, US Embassy Tel Aviv, 17 March, 2006, unredacted publication by Wikileaks, 8 September 2011.
  71. ↑ 71.0 71.1 Goi Info On Ramallah Bank Raid, US Embassy Tel Aviv, 5 March 2004, published by Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.
  72. ↑ 72.0 72.1 72.2 Mann Mairone's private anti-terrorist squad, Intelligence Online, 8 April 2010.
  73. ↑ Lior Akerman, Should the Shin Bet be heard?, 14 March 2013.
  74. ↑ Dan Vesely, Sdema Group, acccessed 28 July 2013.
  75. ↑ Amir Takomi, Sdema Group, acccessed 28 July 2013.
  76. ↑ Ami Golan, Sdema Group, acccessed 28 July 2013.
  77. ↑ Pillar Team, Pillar Group, accessed 29 July 2013.
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