Difference between revisions of "Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme"

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Counter Disinformation and Media Development (CDMD) programme 'supports HMG's Russia Strategy's objective to protect UK national security by reducing the harm to democracy and the rules-based international order caused by Russia's information operations.'<ref name="CSSF">[https://web.archive.org/web/20220524084628/https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1003218/Counter_Disinformation_and_Media_Development_programme_summary_2020_to_2021.odt CSSF PROGRAMME SUMMARY: PROGRAMME TITLE: Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme] Retrieved from the Internet Archive of 24 May 2022.</ref>
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Counter Disinformation and Media Development (CDMD) programme 'supports HMG's Russia Strategy's objective to protect UK national security by reducing the harm to democracy and the rules-based international order caused by Russia's information operations.'<ref name="CSSF">[https://web.archive.org/web/20220524084628/https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1003218/Counter_Disinformation_and_Media_Development_programme_summary_2020_to_2021.odt CSSF PROGRAMME SUMMARY: PROGRAMME TITLE: Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme] Retrieved from the Internet Archive of 24 May 2022.</ref> It is funded by the [[Conflict, Stability and Security Fund]] a fund used to support hundred of overt and covert propaganda projects by [[MI6]], the Foreign Office and other government departments.
  
The CSSF Summary state3s:
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The programme was formerly called the [[Russian Language Programme]]<ref>https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630285/Russian_Language_EECAD_2017.pdf</ref>
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The CSSF Summary states:
  
 
:The UK does not seek to fight propaganda with propaganda. Instead, the UK promotes circulation and access to accurate information and positive engagement with those impacted by Russian disinformation. CSSF is best placed to deliver on this, as it brings together skills and resources from across the UK Government, along with external expertise.
 
:The UK does not seek to fight propaganda with propaganda. Instead, the UK promotes circulation and access to accurate information and positive engagement with those impacted by Russian disinformation. CSSF is best placed to deliver on this, as it brings together skills and resources from across the UK Government, along with external expertise.
  
 
:The Russian Government invests heavily in propaganda, and information operations are integral to their foreign and defence strategies and have been utilised regularly e.g. as part of illegal actions in Georgia and Ukraine and in relation to high profile intelligence agency operations exposed in Russia and abroad.<ref name="CSSF"/>
 
:The Russian Government invests heavily in propaganda, and information operations are integral to their foreign and defence strategies and have been utilised regularly e.g. as part of illegal actions in Georgia and Ukraine and in relation to high profile intelligence agency operations exposed in Russia and abroad.<ref name="CSSF"/>
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==Funding==
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*[[Integrity Initiative]]/[[Institute for Statecraft]]
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*[[Understand services for the FCO Counter - Disinformation and media development programme]] - University of Cardiff research project, 2022. Principal Investigator [[Martin Innes|Innes, Martin]], Co-Investigators[[Kate Daunt|Daunt, Kate]]. Net value award figure for Cardiff University: £649,925.00 Start date: 31/03/2022 End date: 30/09/2022.<ref>Cardiff University Research Portal [https://web.archive.org/web/20220501110846/https://research.cardiff.ac.uk/converis/portal/detail/Project/161962798;jsessionid=kzmYIL10rEn8xSBGjZyKCQGKa5d-gNwu-s5wCFmy.cu?lang=en_GB Title: Understand services for the FCO Counter - Disinformation and media development programme]. Retrieved from the Internet Archive of 24 may 2022.</ref>
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*[[Open Information Partnership]]
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*[[EXPOSE Network]]
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*[[BBC Media Action]]
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*[[Aktis Strategy]]
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*[[Thomson Reuters Foundation]]
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*[[Hromadske]]
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*[[Zinc Network]]
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*[[Albany Communications]]
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==People==
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*[[Andy Pryce]]
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==Resources==
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*https://declassifieduk.org/uk-spends-over-80m-on-media-in-20-countries-around-russia/
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*https://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/briefing-note-on-the-integrity-initiative
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*https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/842428/Counter_Disinformation_and_Media_Development_Programme.odt
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*https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/787697/Counter_Disinformation_and_Media_Development_2018-2019.odt
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*https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1003218/Counter_Disinformation_and_Media_Development_programme_summary_2020_to_2021.odt [https://web.archive.org/web/20230000000000*/https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1003218/Counter_Disinformation_and_Media_Development_programme_summary_2020_to_2021.odt Archived]
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*https://devtracker.fcdo.gov.uk/projects/GB-GOV-52-CSSF-05-000006/summary
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*https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/842428/Counter_Disinformation_and_Media_Development_Programme.odt
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*https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/publications/resist-2-counter-disinformation-toolkit/
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*https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/RESIST-2-counter-disinformation-toolkit.pdf
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*https://web.archive.org/web/20220719130407/https://fco.tal.net/vx/mobile-0/appcentre-ext/brand-2/candidate/so/pm/4/pl/1/opp/14821-Counter-Disinformation-Officer-MDA21-325/en-GB
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*https://consortiumnews.com/2021/02/22/reuters-bbc-in-covert-uk-program-to-push-western-agenda/
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==See also==
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===GCHQ===
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*[[National Cyber Security Centre]]
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===DCMS===
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*[[Counter Disinformation Cell]] (AKA [[Disinformation & Misinformation Unit]]) - [[DCMS]] is the lead department.
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===Cabinet Office===
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*[[National Security Council (UK)|National Security Council]]
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*[[Government Communication Service]]
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**[[RESIST 2 Counter Disinformation Toolkit]]
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**[[Rapid Response Unit]]
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**[[National Security Communications Team]]
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===MoD===
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*[[77th Brigade]]
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*[[Military Strategic Effects]]
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*[[Specialist Group Military Intelligence]]
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===FCO/FCDO===
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*[[Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell]]
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*[[Conflict, Stability and Security Fund]]
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**[[Counter Disinformation and Media Development]]
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**[[Central Asia Programme]]
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**[[Eastern Neighbourhood Programme]]
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**[[Western Balkans Media, Cyber and Defence Programme]]
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**[[Good Governance Fund]]
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*[[Government Information Cell]]
  
 
==Notes==
 
==Notes==
 
<references/>
 
<references/>
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[[Category:British Propaganda]]

Latest revision as of 14:43, 24 January 2023

Counter Disinformation and Media Development (CDMD) programme 'supports HMG's Russia Strategy's objective to protect UK national security by reducing the harm to democracy and the rules-based international order caused by Russia's information operations.'[1] It is funded by the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund a fund used to support hundred of overt and covert propaganda projects by MI6, the Foreign Office and other government departments.

The programme was formerly called the Russian Language Programme[2]

The CSSF Summary states:

The UK does not seek to fight propaganda with propaganda. Instead, the UK promotes circulation and access to accurate information and positive engagement with those impacted by Russian disinformation. CSSF is best placed to deliver on this, as it brings together skills and resources from across the UK Government, along with external expertise.
The Russian Government invests heavily in propaganda, and information operations are integral to their foreign and defence strategies and have been utilised regularly e.g. as part of illegal actions in Georgia and Ukraine and in relation to high profile intelligence agency operations exposed in Russia and abroad.[1]


Funding

People

Resources

See also

GCHQ

DCMS

Cabinet Office

MoD

FCO/FCDO

Notes