Difference between revisions of "Aman"
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| + | {{Infobox organization | ||
| + | | name = [[Aman]] / [[Aman|Military Intelligence Directorate]] | ||
| + | | image = [[File:Shlomi Binder portrait - Powerbase.jpg|250px|alt=Shlomi Binder photographed in 2017]] | ||
| + | | caption = [[Shlomi Binder]], photographed in 2017; director from 21 August 2024. <ref name="Binder2024"/> | ||
| + | | type = Military intelligence directorate | ||
| + | | founded = Military intelligence organisation developed in 1948. <ref name="Origins1948"/> | ||
| + | | status = Part of the [[Israel Defense Forces]] General Staff; reporting to the chief of staff and minister of defence. <ref name="Prince207-8"/> | ||
| + | | headquarters = Glilot, identified as directorate headquarters in reporting on the August 2024 handover. <ref name="Binder2024"/> | ||
| + | | location = Israel | ||
| + | | services = Collection, including human and signals intelligence; analysis and production; military security. <ref name="Prince207-8"/> | ||
| + | | key_people = [[Shlomi Binder]] — director from 21 August 2024. <ref name="Binder2024"/> | ||
| + | | website = [https://www.idf.il/en/ Israel Defense Forces] | ||
| + | | remarks = Also called [[Agaf ha-Modi'in]] and Israeli Defence Intelligence (IDI). Includes [[Unit 8200]]. Sister services: [[Mossad]] and [[Shin Bet]]. | ||
| + | }} | ||
| + | |||
[[Aman]] ([[Agaf ha-Modi'in]]) is Israel's military intelligence agency.<ref>[http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/israel/aman.htm Aman], GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 29 July 2009.</ref> It is known by a number of terms in English, including Israeli Defence Intelligence (IDI).<ref>[http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08TELAVIV592&q=8200%20unit Private Israeli Company Collects Counter-terrorism Intelligence], Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.</ref> | [[Aman]] ([[Agaf ha-Modi'in]]) is Israel's military intelligence agency.<ref>[http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/israel/aman.htm Aman], GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 29 July 2009.</ref> It is known by a number of terms in English, including Israeli Defence Intelligence (IDI).<ref>[http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08TELAVIV592&q=8200%20unit Private Israeli Company Collects Counter-terrorism Intelligence], Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.</ref> | ||
| − | Although often overshadowed by [[Mossad]] and [[Shin Bet]], Aman has historically been the largest Israeli intelligence agency. It is a part of the military general staff, reporting to the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence.<ref name="Prince207-8">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.207-208.</ref> | + | Although often overshadowed by [[Mossad]] and [[Shin Bet]], [[Aman]] has historically been the largest Israeli intelligence agency. It is a part of the military general staff, reporting to the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence.<ref name="Prince207-8">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.207-208.</ref> |
==History== | ==History== | ||
| + | ===Formation and related organisations=== | ||
| + | The military intelligence service developed out of the intelligence arrangements of the [[Haganah]] and the new [[Israel Defense Forces]] in 1948. It is organisationally distinct from [[Mossad]] and [[Shin Bet]], although the agencies share an intelligence-community history and operational relationships. <ref name="Origins1948">Ian Black and Benny Morris, ''[https://groveatlantic.com/book/israels-secret-wars/ Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services]'', Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, pp.54–55, accessed 7 November 2026.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | In 1954, military intelligence’s [[Unit 131]] carried out [[Operation Susannah]], the failed bombing operation in Egypt known as the [[Lavon Affair]]. The [[Israel Ministry of Defence]] archive describes civilian targets and intended false attribution to other groups, the resulting Egyptian trial, and the dispute over responsibility between [[Pinhas Lavon]], [[Binyamin Gibli|Benjamin Gibli]] and other senior officials. Gibli and unit commander [[Motke Ben-Zur]] were dismissed. <ref name="LavonArchive">Israel Ministry of Defence, IDF and Defense Establishment Archives, [https://archives.mod.gov.il/sites/English/Exhibitions/Pages/The-Lavon-affair.aspx The “Unfortunate” or the Lavon affair], ''Ministry of Defence'', accessed 7 November 2026.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
===Six Day War and War of Attrition=== | ===Six Day War and War of Attrition=== | ||
| − | Aman's correct prediction that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Six Day War, strengthened the agency's established view of the late 1960s, that the Soviet Union would not risk a confrontation with the United States in the Middle East.<ref>Dima P. Adamsky, ''American and Israeli Intelligence Failure'', in Nigel John Ashton, ed., ''The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73'', Routledge, 2007, pp.115-116.</ref> As a result, Aman was taken by surprise when Soviet military advisors were attached to Egyptian military units in 1970.<ref name="Prince208">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.208.</ref> | + | [[Aman]]'s correct prediction that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Six Day War, strengthened the agency's established view of the late 1960s, that the Soviet Union would not risk a confrontation with the United States in the Middle East.<ref>Dima P. Adamsky, ''American and Israeli Intelligence Failure'', in Nigel John Ashton, ed., ''The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73'', Routledge, 2007, pp.115-116.</ref> As a result, [[Aman]] was taken by surprise when Soviet military advisors were attached to Egyptian military units in 1970.<ref name="Prince208">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.208.</ref> |
===Yom Kippur War=== | ===Yom Kippur War=== | ||
| − | + | Nevertheless, [[Aman]]'s leadership remained strongly attached to the 'konseptzia', the belief that Egypt was too weak and disorganised to risk attacking Israel.<ref name="Prince209">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.209.</ref> Following the [[Agranat Commission]] into the 1973 Yom Kippur War, [[Aman]] chief [[Eliahu Zeira]] and a number of his subordinates lost their jobs.<ref name="Prince212">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.212.</ref> | |
===1980s - Lebanon and the Intifada=== | ===1980s - Lebanon and the Intifada=== | ||
| − | According a 1985 report in ''The Times'', Aman was wary of Israel's involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s: | + | According to a 1985 report in ''[[The Times]]'', [[Aman]] was wary of Israel's involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s: |
| − | ::It was [[Mossad]], the body responsible for covert operations, that built up Israel's secret links with the Christian [[Phalange]], a policy regarded with scepticism by Aman. But in a rare moment of agreement the heads of both organizations, Major Generals Saguy (Aman) and Hofi (Mossad) advised in 1982 against the invasion. | + | ::It was [[Mossad]], the body responsible for covert operations, that built up Israel's secret links with the Christian [[Phalange]], a policy regarded with scepticism by [[Aman]]. But in a rare moment of agreement the heads of both organizations, Major Generals [[Yehoshua Saguy|Saguy]] ([[Aman]]) and [[Itzhak Hofi|Hofi]] ([[Mossad]]) advised in 1982 against the invasion. |
::The current chief of military intelligence, Major General [[Ehud Barak]], is reportedly prominent among officers who are trying to reestablish the conventional Israeli strategic doctrines that were flouted in the era of [[Ariel Sharon]] and Chief of Staff [[Rafael Eitan]].<ref>Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Lebanon - army and hawks divide / Israeli foreign policy, 11 June 1985.</ref> | ::The current chief of military intelligence, Major General [[Ehud Barak]], is reportedly prominent among officers who are trying to reestablish the conventional Israeli strategic doctrines that were flouted in the era of [[Ariel Sharon]] and Chief of Staff [[Rafael Eitan]].<ref>Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Lebanon - army and hawks divide / Israeli foreign policy, 11 June 1985.</ref> | ||
| − | Although this doctrine held that states rather than non-state actors were the primary threat, Barak and his successor as Aman commander were nevertheless reportedly directing operations from on board a Boeing jet off the coast of Tunisia when Israel assassinated [[Abu Jihad]] of the [[PLO]] in 1988.<ref name="Prince396">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.396.</ref> | + | Although this doctrine held that states rather than non-state actors were the primary threat, [[Ehud Barak|Barak]] and his successor as [[Aman]] commander were nevertheless reportedly directing operations from on board a Boeing jet off the coast of Tunisia when Israel assassinated [[Abu Jihad]] of the [[PLO]] in 1988.<ref name="Prince396">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.396.</ref> |
===2006 Lebanon war=== | ===2006 Lebanon war=== | ||
| − | According to a study by the [[Rand Corporation]], Aman issued | + | According to a study by the [[Rand Corporation]], [[Aman]] issued a 130-page document on '[[Hezbollah]]'s War Conception' in January 2006, which accurately reported the location of many of [[Hezbollah]]'s short-range rockets, but because of classification restrictions, this information did not always reach front-line commanders during the conflict later that year.<ref>Benjamin S. Lambeth, ''Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza'', Rand Corporation, 2011, p.150.</ref> |
===Gaza War=== | ===Gaza War=== | ||
| − | Following the 2006 Lebanon War, according to a Rand Corporation study, Aman began a systematic 'intelligence soak' of the Gaza Strip, which identified a list of 603 allegedly Hamas-related targets for the [[Israeli Air Force]] in the subsequent Gaza War of 2008-2009.<ref>Benjamin S. Lambeth, ''Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza'', Rand Corporation, 2011, p.238.</ref> | + | Following the 2006 Lebanon War, according to a [[RAND Corporation|Rand Corporation]] study, [[Aman]] began a systematic 'intelligence soak' of the Gaza Strip, which identified a list of 603 allegedly [[Hamas]]-related targets for the [[Israeli Air Force]] in the subsequent Gaza War of 2008-2009.<ref>Benjamin S. Lambeth, ''Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza'', Rand Corporation, 2011, p.238.</ref> |
| + | |||
| + | ===7 October 2023 and the 2024 handover=== | ||
| + | At the 21 August 2024 handover, outgoing director [[Aharon Haliva]] accepted responsibility for military intelligence’s failure to warn of the [[Hamas]]-led attack of 7 October 2023 and called for a national investigation. He had announced his resignation in April 2024. Incoming director [[Shlomi Binder]], previously head of the [[Israel Defense Forces|IDF]] Operations Division, undertook to investigate failures and correct mistakes. <ref name="Binder2024">Jerusalem Post staff and Reuters, [https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-815770 Intel. chief in retirement speech: I will have Oct. 7 on my conscience for rest of my life], ''The Jerusalem Post'', 21 August 2024, accessed 7 November 2026.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | Some victims’ families criticised Binder’s appointment, arguing that his own part in the military’s failures had not been sufficiently investigated. Chief of Staff [[Herzi Halevi]] defended the choice and emphasised investigation and institutional learning. These competing assessments are reported as such; the handover reporting is not itself a completed inquiry into individual responsibility. <ref name="Binder2024"/> | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[File:IDF intelligence handover August 2024 - Powerbase.jpeg|thumb|right|300px|alt=Military Intelligence Directorate change of command ceremony in August 2024|The [[Aman|Military Intelligence Directorate]] change-of-command ceremony, August 2024.]] | ||
==Structure and Personnel== | ==Structure and Personnel== | ||
| − | Journalists Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman reported that Aman consisted of six departments in 1991, of which the largest were the collection and production departments.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> | + | Journalists [[Dan Raviv]] and [[Yossi Melman]] reported that [[Aman]] consisted of six departments in 1991, of which the largest were the collection and production departments. The detailed desks and appointments below are historical descriptions associated with their cited dates, not an assertion that every unit or officeholder remained in place in 2026.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> |
===Leadership=== | ===Leadership=== | ||
| Line 45: | Line 72: | ||
*Maj. Gen. [[Aharon Zeevi Farkash]] | *Maj. Gen. [[Aharon Zeevi Farkash]] | ||
*Maj. Gen. [[Amos Yadlin]] 2006-2010. | *Maj. Gen. [[Amos Yadlin]] 2006-2010. | ||
| − | *Maj. Gen. [[Aviv Kochavi]] | + | *Maj. Gen. [[Aviv Kochavi]] 2010–September 2014. <ref>Anshel Pfeffer and Amos Harel, [http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/rising-star-kochavi-to-replace-yadlin-as-idf-intelligence-chief-1.314246 Rising star Kochavi to replace Yadlin as IDF intelligence chief], ''Haaretz'', 17 September 2011.</ref> |
| + | *Maj. Gen. [[Herzi Halevi]] — September 2014–28 March 2018. <ref name="Halevi2014">N12, [https://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security-q3_2014/Article-243731e320e9841004.htm Incoming head of Military Intelligence warns: difficult to be optimistic about calm in the region [Hebrew]], ''N12'', 22 September 2014, accessed 7 November 2026.</ref> <ref name="Hayman2018">i24NEWS, [https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/171024-180328-new-head-of-military-intelligence-tamir-heiman-appointed-in-ceremony Amid growing Iran threat, Israel gets new military intelligence chief], ''i24NEWS'', 28 March 2018, accessed 7 November 2026.</ref> | ||
| + | *Maj. Gen. [[Tamir Hayman]] — 28 March 2018–5 October 2021. <ref name="Hayman2018"/> <ref name="Haliva2021">Israel Defense Forces, [https://idfanc.activetrail.biz/ANC05102021.01 Major General Aharon Haliva Enters His Position as Head of the Intelligence Directorate], ''IDF Spokesperson'', 5 October 2021, accessed 7 November 2026.</ref> | ||
| + | *Maj. Gen. [[Aharon Haliva]] — 5 October 2021–21 August 2024. <ref name="Haliva2021"/> <ref name="Binder2024"/> | ||
| + | *Maj. Gen. [[Shlomi Binder]] — from 21 August 2024; identified as military intelligence chief in reporting dated 5 October 2026. <ref name="Binder2024"/><ref name="BinderOctober2026">Amichai Stein, [https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-910632 IDF killed two-thirds of terrorists who invaded Israel on October 7, intel chief tells cabinet], ''The Jerusalem Post'', 5 October 2026, accessed 7 November 2026.</ref> <ref name="Ynet2026">Itamar Eichner, [https://www.ynetnews.com/article/skc00n2iefe Mossad changes chiefs: Barnea’s legacy and Gofman’s challenges], ''Ynetnews'', undated, accessed 7 November 2026.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
====Deputy Directors of Military Intelligence==== | ====Deputy Directors of Military Intelligence==== | ||
*[[Yehoshafat Harkabi]] 1950-1955<ref>Avi Shlaim, [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-professor-yehoshafat-harkabi-1448686.html Obituary: Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi], ''The independent'', 14 September 1994.</ref> | *[[Yehoshafat Harkabi]] 1950-1955<ref>Avi Shlaim, [http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-professor-yehoshafat-harkabi-1448686.html Obituary: Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi], ''The independent'', 14 September 1994.</ref> | ||
| Line 53: | Line 85: | ||
*[[Zvi Lidor]]<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, v p.192.</ref> | *[[Zvi Lidor]]<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, v p.192.</ref> | ||
*[[Reuven Yerdor]] c.1982.<ref>Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option, Faber and Faber, 1993, p.293.</ref> | *[[Reuven Yerdor]] c.1982.<ref>Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option, Faber and Faber, 1993, p.293.</ref> | ||
| − | *[[Meir Elran]] 1987-1989<ref>[http://www.inss.org.il/experts.php?cat=0&incat=&staff_id=12 Meir Elran], Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 9 July 2012.</ref> | + | *[[Meir Elran]] 1987-1989<ref name="LegacySource1">[http://www.inss.org.il/experts.php?cat=0&incat=&staff_id=12 Meir Elran], Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 9 July 2012.</ref> |
| − | *[[Danny Rothschild]] c.1991<ref>[http://www.weforum.org/contributors/danny-rothschild Danny Rothschild], World Economic Forum, accessed 10 July 2012.</ref> | + | *[[Danny Rothschild]] c.1991<ref name="LegacySource2">[http://www.weforum.org/contributors/danny-rothschild Danny Rothschild], World Economic Forum, accessed 10 July 2012.</ref> |
===Collection Department=== | ===Collection Department=== | ||
| Line 66: | Line 98: | ||
====SIGINT - Unit 8200==== | ====SIGINT - Unit 8200==== | ||
*'''Main Page''' [[Unit 8200]]. | *'''Main Page''' [[Unit 8200]]. | ||
| − | Aman's signals intelligence capability is provided by [[Unit 8200]].<ref>Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, ''Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel'', Routledge, 2004, p.168.</ref> Prior to 1976, the unit was known as '''Unit 848'''.<ref>Ephraim Kahana, ''Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence'', Scarecrow Press, 2006, p.43.</ref> | + | [[Aman]]'s signals intelligence capability is provided by [[Unit 8200]].<ref>Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, ''Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel'', Routledge, 2004, p.168.</ref> Prior to 1976, the unit was known as '''Unit 848'''.<ref>Ephraim Kahana, ''Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence'', Scarecrow Press, 2006, p.43.</ref> |
====HUMINT==== | ====HUMINT==== | ||
| − | The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for human sources.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.</ref> | + | The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for human sources.<ref name="LegacySource3">Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.</ref> |
====OSINT==== | ====OSINT==== | ||
| − | The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for open source intelligence.<ref | + | The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for open source intelligence.<ref name="LegacySource3"/> |
===Production Department=== | ===Production Department=== | ||
| − | The production department is responsible for intelligence analysis.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> The Department is known in Hebrew as Aman Mehkar.<ref name="RodanDuo">Steve Rodan, Dynamic Duo, ''Jerusalem Post'', 14 October 1994.</ref> English sources use various names for the department including research department, production department, research and analysis department, analysis and production department and research division. | + | The production department is responsible for intelligence analysis.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> The Department is known in Hebrew as [[Aman]] Mehkar.<ref name="RodanDuo">Steve Rodan, Dynamic Duo, ''Jerusalem Post'', 14 October 1994.</ref> English sources use various names for the department including research department, production department, research and analysis department, analysis and production department and research division. |
The Department is organised in a desk system along functional and geographical lines.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> | The Department is organised in a desk system along functional and geographical lines.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> | ||
| Line 84: | Line 116: | ||
*[[Aryeh Shalev]] 1967-1974. | *[[Aryeh Shalev]] 1967-1974. | ||
*[[Aviezer Yaari]] c.1981.<ref>Uri Dromi, [http://www.haaretz.com/culture/books/quiet-man-unquiet-times-1.125614 Quiet Man, Unquiet Times], ''Haaretz'', 18 June 2004.</ref> | *[[Aviezer Yaari]] c.1981.<ref>Uri Dromi, [http://www.haaretz.com/culture/books/quiet-man-unquiet-times-1.125614 Quiet Man, Unquiet Times], ''Haaretz'', 18 June 2004.</ref> | ||
| − | *[[Amos Gilboa]] 1981-1984.<ref name="RodanDuo" | + | *[[Amos Gilboa]] 1981-1984.<ref name="RodanDuo"/> |
| − | *[[Danny Rothschild]] c.1991.<ref | + | *[[Danny Rothschild]] c.1991.<ref name="LegacySource2"/> |
| − | *[[Ya'acov Ami-Dror]] c.1992-c.1994.<ref name="RodanDuo" | + | *[[Ya'acov Ami-Dror]] c.1992-c.1994.<ref name="RodanDuo"/> |
*[[Amos Gilad]] - 1996-2001<ref>Akiva Eldar, [http://www.haaretz.com/popular-misconceptions-1.124896 Popular Misconceptions], ''Haaretz'', 11 June 2004.</ref> | *[[Amos Gilad]] - 1996-2001<ref>Akiva Eldar, [http://www.haaretz.com/popular-misconceptions-1.124896 Popular Misconceptions], ''Haaretz'', 11 June 2004.</ref> | ||
*[[Yosef Kuperwasser]] c.2001-2006.<ref>[http://web.archive.org/web/20080719175209/http://public-integrity.org/advisory-board.php About Us], American Center for Democracy, accessed 31 July 2009, archived at the Internet Archive.</ref> | *[[Yosef Kuperwasser]] c.2001-2006.<ref>[http://web.archive.org/web/20080719175209/http://public-integrity.org/advisory-board.php About Us], American Center for Democracy, accessed 31 July 2009, archived at the Internet Archive.</ref> | ||
| Line 93: | Line 125: | ||
====Assistant Directors of the Research Division for Evaluation==== | ====Assistant Directors of the Research Division for Evaluation==== | ||
| − | *Col. [[Gideon Gera]] c.1973<ref | + | *Col. [[Gideon Gera]] c.1973<ref name="LegacySource3"/> |
| − | *[[Meir Elran]]<ref | + | *[[Meir Elran]]<ref name="LegacySource1"/> |
*[[Ephraim Kam]] c.1993<ref>[http://www.inss.org.il/experts.php?cat=0&incat=&staff_id=3 Ephraim Kam], Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 10 July 2012.</ref> | *[[Ephraim Kam]] c.1993<ref>[http://www.inss.org.il/experts.php?cat=0&incat=&staff_id=3 Ephraim Kam], Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 10 July 2012.</ref> | ||
====Assistant Director for Operations==== | ====Assistant Director for Operations==== | ||
| − | *Col. [[Aharon Levran]] c.1973<ref | + | *Col. [[Aharon Levran]] c.1973<ref name="LegacySource3"/> |
====Basic Research Team==== | ====Basic Research Team==== | ||
| − | *Col. [[Shlomo Marom]] Head c.1973.<ref | + | *Col. [[Shlomo Marom]] Head c.1973.<ref name="LegacySource3"/> |
*Major [[Amos Gilboa]] member of the Basic Research Team, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman115">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.115.</ref> | *Major [[Amos Gilboa]] member of the Basic Research Team, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman115">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.115.</ref> | ||
| Line 107: | Line 139: | ||
====International Desk==== | ====International Desk==== | ||
| − | Known as Branch 3.<ref name="Watchman300" | + | Known as Branch 3.<ref name="Watchman300"/> Responsible for the superpowers at the time of the Yom Kippur war.<ref name="Watchman138">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.138.</ref> |
*[[Avraham Lif]], c.1972.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.xxii.</ref> | *[[Avraham Lif]], c.1972.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.xxii.</ref> | ||
*[[Chaim Yavetz]], head c.1973.<ref name="Watchman179">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.179.</ref> | *[[Chaim Yavetz]], head c.1973.<ref name="Watchman179">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.179.</ref> | ||
| − | *[[Arie Adan]], head of the American desk, c.late 1960s.<ref>Dima P. Adamsky, ''American and Israeli Intelligence Failure'', in Nigel John Ashton, ed., ''The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73'', Routledge, 2007, p.131.</ref> | + | *[[Arie Adan]], head of the American desk, c.late 1960s.<ref name="LegacySource4">Dima P. Adamsky, ''American and Israeli Intelligence Failure'', in Nigel John Ashton, ed., ''The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73'', Routledge, 2007, p.131.</ref> |
| − | *[[Moshe Noiman]], first head of the Soviet military desk.<ref | + | *[[Moshe Noiman]], first head of the Soviet military desk.<ref name="LegacySource4"/> |
| − | *[[Meir Elran]], head of the Soviet military section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman179" | + | *[[Meir Elran]], head of the Soviet military section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman179"/> |
*[[Ilan Tehila]], head of the Soviet political section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman291">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.291.</ref> | *[[Ilan Tehila]], head of the Soviet political section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman291">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.291.</ref> | ||
====Eastern Area desk==== | ====Eastern Area desk==== | ||
| − | *Responsible for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> Also known as Branch 5.<ref name="Watchman300" | + | *Responsible for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> Also known as Branch 5.<ref name="Watchman300"/> |
*Lt. Col. [[Aviezer Yaari]], head 1971-c.1973.<ref name="Watchman47">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.47.</ref> | *Lt. Col. [[Aviezer Yaari]], head 1971-c.1973.<ref name="Watchman47">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.47.</ref> | ||
*Maj. [[Yekutiel Mor]], head of the military section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman183">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.183.</ref> | *Maj. [[Yekutiel Mor]], head of the military section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman183">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.183.</ref> | ||
====Western Area desk==== | ====Western Area desk==== | ||
| − | *Responsible for Egypt, Sudan and Libya.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> Known as Branch 6 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.<ref>Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, ''Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel'', Routledge, 2004, p.166.</ref> | + | *Responsible for Egypt, Sudan and Libya.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> Known as Branch 6 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.<ref name="LegacySource5">Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, ''Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel'', Routledge, 2004, p.166. [http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sj94Q-874hEC&pg=PA185&lpg=PA185&dq=%22Amos+gilboa%22+Aman&source=bl&ots=GT6Zp7hve2&sig=7nNPJ2DU2Ns1vnoM1fyOXUXEnZ8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=RkL7T5PQOujb0QWLs-GrBw&ved=0CE4Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=%22Amos%20gilboa%22%20Aman&f=false Digitised book excerpt].</ref> |
*[[Meir Meir]]<ref name="Watchman251">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.251.</ref> | *[[Meir Meir]]<ref name="Watchman251">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.251.</ref> | ||
| − | *Lt. Col. [[Yonah Bandman]] head c.1973.<ref | + | *Lt. Col. [[Yonah Bandman]] head c.1973.<ref name="LegacySource5"/> |
*Lt. Col. [[Zusia Kaniazher]]<ref name="Watchman251"/> | *Lt. Col. [[Zusia Kaniazher]]<ref name="Watchman251"/> | ||
*Mr [[Albert Sudai]], head of political section c.1973.<ref name="Watchman110">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.110.</ref> | *Mr [[Albert Sudai]], head of political section c.1973.<ref name="Watchman110">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.110.</ref> | ||
| − | *[[Yaacov Rosenfeld]], head of military section c.1973.<ref name="Watchman291" | + | *[[Yaacov Rosenfeld]], head of military section c.1973.<ref name="Watchman291"/> |
| − | *[[Moshe Noiman]] - officer on the political desk. c.late 1960s.<ref | + | *[[Moshe Noiman]] - officer on the political desk. c.late 1960s.<ref name="LegacySource4"/> |
====Branch 7==== | ====Branch 7==== | ||
| − | *Technical/technological desk.<ref name="Watchman236" | + | *Technical/technological desk.<ref name="Watchman236"/> |
===="Terror and Palestinians" desk==== | ===="Terror and Palestinians" desk==== | ||
| Line 139: | Line 171: | ||
====Report and Circulation Center==== | ====Report and Circulation Center==== | ||
| − | *Established after the 1967 Six Day War to circulate material from the various collection agencies within military intelligence.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.</ref> | + | *Established after the 1967 Six Day War to circulate material from the various collection agencies within military intelligence.<ref name="LegacySource6">Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.</ref> |
===="Foreign left-wing groups" desk==== | ===="Foreign left-wing groups" desk==== | ||
| − | *Haaretz reported in March 2011 that a department had been created in the research division that "will monitor Western groups involved in boycotting Israel, divesting from it or imposing sanctions on it. The unit will also collect information about groups that attempt to bring war crime or other charges against high-ranking Israeli officials, and examine possible links between such organizations and terror groups."<ref>Barak Ravid, [http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/military-intelligence-monitoring-foreign-left-wing-organizations-1.350713 Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations] ''Haaretz'', 21 March 2011.</ref> | + | *[[Haaretz]] reported in March 2011 that a department had been created in the research division that "will monitor Western groups involved in boycotting Israel, divesting from it or imposing sanctions on it. The unit will also collect information about groups that attempt to bring war crime or other charges against high-ranking Israeli officials, and examine possible links between such organizations and terror groups."<ref>Barak Ravid, [http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/military-intelligence-monitoring-foreign-left-wing-organizations-1.350713 Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations] ''Haaretz'', 21 March 2011.</ref> |
====Other desks==== | ====Other desks==== | ||
*Inter-Arab relations.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> | *Inter-Arab relations.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> | ||
*Middle East Economics.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> | *Middle East Economics.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> | ||
| − | *Territory and targets.<ref | + | *Territory and targets.<ref name="LegacySource6"/> |
| − | *A desk responsible for aerial photography existed within the Research Department in 1973.<ref | + | *A desk responsible for aerial photography existed within the Research Department in 1973.<ref name="LegacySource6"/> |
===Field Security Department=== | ===Field Security Department=== | ||
| − | Responsible for security across the IDF.<ref | + | Responsible for security across the [[Israel Defense Forces|IDF]].<ref name="LegacySource3"/> |
===Organization Department=== | ===Organization Department=== | ||
| − | Handles administration matters such as logistics, finance and personnel.<ref | + | Handles administration matters such as logistics, finance and personnel.<ref name="LegacySource3"/> |
==Contact== | ==Contact== | ||
| − | * | + | *Historical website: [http://www1.idf.il/aman/site/default.asp http://www1.idf.il/aman/site/default.asp] |
| + | *[[Israel Defense Forces]]: [https://www.idf.il/en/ official website]. | ||
==External Resources== | ==External Resources== | ||
| − | *Barak Ravid, [http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/military-intelligence-monitoring-foreign-left-wing-organizations-1.350713 'Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations'], Haaretz, 21 March 2011. | + | *[[Barak Ravid]], [http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/military-intelligence-monitoring-foreign-left-wing-organizations-1.350713 'Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations'], [[Haaretz]], 21 March 2011. |
| − | *Gili Cohen, [http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.671785?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter Israel's Military Intelligence Monitoring Dozens of BDS Groups Around the World], ''Haaretz'', 18 August 2015. | + | *[[Gili Cohen]], [http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.671785?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter Israel's Military Intelligence Monitoring Dozens of BDS Groups Around the World], ''[[Haaretz]]'', 18 August 2015. |
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
Revision as of 08:03, 7 November 2026
| Aman / Military Intelligence Directorate
| |
|---|---|
| Logo |  Shlomi Binder, photographed in 2017; director from 21 August 2024. [1] |
| Type | Military intelligence directorate |
| Founded | Military intelligence organisation developed in 1948. [2] |
| Status | Part of the Israel Defense Forces General Staff; reporting to the chief of staff and minister of defence. [3] |
| Headquarters | Glilot, identified as directorate headquarters in reporting on the August 2024 handover. [1] |
| Location | Israel |
| Services | Collection, including human and signals intelligence; analysis and production; military security. [3] |
| Key people | Shlomi Binder — director from 21 August 2024. [1] |
| Website | Israel Defense Forces |
| Remarks | Also called Agaf ha-Modi'in and Israeli Defence Intelligence (IDI). Includes Unit 8200. Sister services: Mossad and Shin Bet. |
Aman (Agaf ha-Modi'in) is Israel's military intelligence agency.[4] It is known by a number of terms in English, including Israeli Defence Intelligence (IDI).[5]
Although often overshadowed by Mossad and Shin Bet, Aman has historically been the largest Israeli intelligence agency. It is a part of the military general staff, reporting to the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence.[3]
History
The military intelligence service developed out of the intelligence arrangements of the Haganah and the new Israel Defense Forces in 1948. It is organisationally distinct from Mossad and Shin Bet, although the agencies share an intelligence-community history and operational relationships. [2]
In 1954, military intelligence’s Unit 131 carried out Operation Susannah, the failed bombing operation in Egypt known as the Lavon Affair. The Israel Ministry of Defence archive describes civilian targets and intended false attribution to other groups, the resulting Egyptian trial, and the dispute over responsibility between Pinhas Lavon, Benjamin Gibli and other senior officials. Gibli and unit commander Motke Ben-Zur were dismissed. [6]
Six Day War and War of Attrition
Aman's correct prediction that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Six Day War, strengthened the agency's established view of the late 1960s, that the Soviet Union would not risk a confrontation with the United States in the Middle East.[7] As a result, Aman was taken by surprise when Soviet military advisors were attached to Egyptian military units in 1970.[8]
Yom Kippur War
Nevertheless, Aman's leadership remained strongly attached to the 'konseptzia', the belief that Egypt was too weak and disorganised to risk attacking Israel.[9] Following the Agranat Commission into the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Aman chief Eliahu Zeira and a number of his subordinates lost their jobs.[10]
1980s - Lebanon and the Intifada
According to a 1985 report in The Times, Aman was wary of Israel's involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s:
- It was Mossad, the body responsible for covert operations, that built up Israel's secret links with the Christian Phalange, a policy regarded with scepticism by Aman. But in a rare moment of agreement the heads of both organizations, Major Generals Saguy (Aman) and Hofi (Mossad) advised in 1982 against the invasion.
- The current chief of military intelligence, Major General Ehud Barak, is reportedly prominent among officers who are trying to reestablish the conventional Israeli strategic doctrines that were flouted in the era of Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan.[11]
Although this doctrine held that states rather than non-state actors were the primary threat, Barak and his successor as Aman commander were nevertheless reportedly directing operations from on board a Boeing jet off the coast of Tunisia when Israel assassinated Abu Jihad of the PLO in 1988.[12]
2006 Lebanon war
According to a study by the Rand Corporation, Aman issued a 130-page document on 'Hezbollah's War Conception' in January 2006, which accurately reported the location of many of Hezbollah's short-range rockets, but because of classification restrictions, this information did not always reach front-line commanders during the conflict later that year.[13]
Gaza War
Following the 2006 Lebanon War, according to a Rand Corporation study, Aman began a systematic 'intelligence soak' of the Gaza Strip, which identified a list of 603 allegedly Hamas-related targets for the Israeli Air Force in the subsequent Gaza War of 2008-2009.[14]
7 October 2023 and the 2024 handover
At the 21 August 2024 handover, outgoing director Aharon Haliva accepted responsibility for military intelligence’s failure to warn of the Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023 and called for a national investigation. He had announced his resignation in April 2024. Incoming director Shlomi Binder, previously head of the IDF Operations Division, undertook to investigate failures and correct mistakes. [1]
Some victims’ families criticised Binder’s appointment, arguing that his own part in the military’s failures had not been sufficiently investigated. Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi defended the choice and emphasised investigation and institutional learning. These competing assessments are reported as such; the handover reporting is not itself a completed inquiry into individual responsibility. [1]
The Military Intelligence Directorate change-of-command ceremony, August 2024.
Structure and Personnel
Journalists Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman reported that Aman consisted of six departments in 1991, of which the largest were the collection and production departments. The detailed desks and appointments below are historical descriptions associated with their cited dates, not an assertion that every unit or officeholder remained in place in 2026.[3]
Leadership
Directors of Military Intelligence
- Isser Be'eri 1948-49
- Col. Chaim Herzog 1949-50
- Col. Binyamin Gibli 1950-55
- Maj. Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi 1955-59
- Maj. Gen. Chaim Herzog 1959-62
- Maj. Gen. Meir Amit 1962-63
- Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv 1964-72
- Maj. Gen. Eliahu Zeira 1972-74
- Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit 1974-78
- Maj. Gen. Yehoshua Saguy 1979-83
- Maj. Gen. Ehud Barak 1983-85
- Maj. Gen. Amnon Shahak 1986-91
- Maj. Gen. Uri Saguy 1991-95
- Maj. Gen. Moshe Ya'alon 1995[15]-1998
- Maj. Gen. Amos Malka 1998[16] -2001
- Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi Farkash
- Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin 2006-2010.
- Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi 2010–September 2014. [17]
- Maj. Gen. Herzi Halevi — September 2014–28 March 2018. [18] [19]
- Maj. Gen. Tamir Hayman — 28 March 2018–5 October 2021. [19] [20]
- Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva — 5 October 2021–21 August 2024. [20] [1]
- Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder — from 21 August 2024; identified as military intelligence chief in reporting dated 5 October 2026. [1][21] [22]
Deputy Directors of Military Intelligence
- Yehoshafat Harkabi 1950-1955[23]
- Yuval Ne'eman 1955-1957[24]
- Uzi Narkis c.1958[25]
- David Carmon c.1967.[26]
- Zvi Lidor[27]
- Reuven Yerdor c.1982.[28]
- Meir Elran 1987-1989[29]
- Danny Rothschild c.1991[30]
Collection Department
The Collection Department is responsible for both agent and informer human intelligence, and for signals intelligence.[3]
Heads of the Collection Department
- Eliahu Zeira c.1960s[31]
- Menahem Digli c.1973.[32]
- Yossi Langotsky
- Ephraim Lapid
SIGINT - Unit 8200
- Main Page Unit 8200.
Aman's signals intelligence capability is provided by Unit 8200.[33] Prior to 1976, the unit was known as Unit 848.[34]
HUMINT
The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for human sources.[35]
OSINT
The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for open source intelligence.[35]
Production Department
The production department is responsible for intelligence analysis.[3] The Department is known in Hebrew as Aman Mehkar.[36] English sources use various names for the department including research department, production department, research and analysis department, analysis and production department and research division.
The Department is organised in a desk system along functional and geographical lines.[3]
Heads of the Production Department
- David Carmon c.1959-1962.[37][38]
- Shlomo Gazit c.1967.[39]
- Aryeh Shalev 1967-1974.
- Aviezer Yaari c.1981.[40]
- Amos Gilboa 1981-1984.[36]
- Danny Rothschild c.1991.[30]
- Ya'acov Ami-Dror c.1992-c.1994.[36]
- Amos Gilad - 1996-2001[41]
- Yosef Kuperwasser c.2001-2006.[42]
- Yossi Beyditz c.2006-2011.[43]
- Itai Brun 2011-[44]
Assistant Directors of the Research Division for Evaluation
- Col. Gideon Gera c.1973[35]
- Meir Elran[29]
- Ephraim Kam c.1993[45]
Assistant Director for Operations
- Col. Aharon Levran c.1973[35]
Basic Research Team
- Col. Shlomo Marom Head c.1973.[35]
- Major Amos Gilboa member of the Basic Research Team, c.1973.[46]
Southern Area desk
- Jordan and the Arabian peninsula.[3] Known as Branch 2 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.[47]
- Lt. Col. Zusia Kaniazher head c.1973.[48]
International Desk
Known as Branch 3.[47] Responsible for the superpowers at the time of the Yom Kippur war.[49]
- Avraham Lif, c.1972.[50]
- Chaim Yavetz, head c.1973.[51]
- Arie Adan, head of the American desk, c.late 1960s.[52]
- Moshe Noiman, first head of the Soviet military desk.[52]
- Meir Elran, head of the Soviet military section, c.1973.[51]
- Ilan Tehila, head of the Soviet political section, c.1973.[53]
Eastern Area desk
- Responsible for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.[3] Also known as Branch 5.[47]
- Lt. Col. Aviezer Yaari, head 1971-c.1973.[54]
- Maj. Yekutiel Mor, head of the military section, c.1973.[55]
Western Area desk
- Responsible for Egypt, Sudan and Libya.[3] Known as Branch 6 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.[56]
- Meir Meir[57]
- Lt. Col. Yonah Bandman head c.1973.[56]
- Lt. Col. Zusia Kaniazher[57]
- Mr Albert Sudai, head of political section c.1973.[58]
- Yaacov Rosenfeld, head of military section c.1973.[53]
- Moshe Noiman - officer on the political desk. c.late 1960s.[52]
Branch 7
- Technical/technological desk.[32]
"Terror and Palestinians" desk
- Palestinian desk.[3]
- Gadi Zohar - Head c.1976.[59]
- Ephraim Lavie - Head 1998-2002.[60]
- Zmira Lavi - ' Head of the Palestinian research and analysis section' - date not known.[61]
Report and Circulation Center
- Established after the 1967 Six Day War to circulate material from the various collection agencies within military intelligence.[62]
"Foreign left-wing groups" desk
- Haaretz reported in March 2011 that a department had been created in the research division that "will monitor Western groups involved in boycotting Israel, divesting from it or imposing sanctions on it. The unit will also collect information about groups that attempt to bring war crime or other charges against high-ranking Israeli officials, and examine possible links between such organizations and terror groups."[63]
Other desks
- Inter-Arab relations.[3]
- Middle East Economics.[3]
- Territory and targets.[62]
- A desk responsible for aerial photography existed within the Research Department in 1973.[62]
Field Security Department
Responsible for security across the IDF.[35]
Organization Department
Handles administration matters such as logistics, finance and personnel.[35]
Contact
- Historical website: http://www1.idf.il/aman/site/default.asp
- Israel Defense Forces: official website.
External Resources
- Barak Ravid, 'Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations', Haaretz, 21 March 2011.
- Gili Cohen, Israel's Military Intelligence Monitoring Dozens of BDS Groups Around the World, Haaretz, 18 August 2015.
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 Jerusalem Post staff and Reuters, Intel. chief in retirement speech: I will have Oct. 7 on my conscience for rest of my life, The Jerusalem Post, 21 August 2024, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services, Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, pp.54–55, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.207-208.
- ↑ Aman, GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 29 July 2009.
- ↑ Private Israeli Company Collects Counter-terrorism Intelligence, Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.
- ↑ Israel Ministry of Defence, IDF and Defense Establishment Archives, The “Unfortunate” or the Lavon affair, Ministry of Defence, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Dima P. Adamsky, American and Israeli Intelligence Failure, in Nigel John Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, pp.115-116.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.208.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.209.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.212.
- ↑ Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Lebanon - army and hawks divide / Israeli foreign policy, 11 June 1985.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.396.
- ↑ Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza, Rand Corporation, 2011, p.150.
- ↑ Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza, Rand Corporation, 2011, p.238.
- ↑ ISRAEL - Heads of A'man, Mossad, & Shin Bet, The Literature of Intelligence, Muskingum University,via the Internet Archive, accessed 29 July 2009.
- ↑ Ira Chernus, Helping Israel on a False and Dangerous Course, CommonDreams.org, 28 June 2004.
- ↑ Anshel Pfeffer and Amos Harel, Rising star Kochavi to replace Yadlin as IDF intelligence chief, Haaretz, 17 September 2011.
- ↑ N12, Incoming head of Military Intelligence warns: difficult to be optimistic about calm in the region [Hebrew], N12, 22 September 2014, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ 19.0 19.1 i24NEWS, Amid growing Iran threat, Israel gets new military intelligence chief, i24NEWS, 28 March 2018, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Israel Defense Forces, Major General Aharon Haliva Enters His Position as Head of the Intelligence Directorate, IDF Spokesperson, 5 October 2021, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Amichai Stein, IDF killed two-thirds of terrorists who invaded Israel on October 7, intel chief tells cabinet, The Jerusalem Post, 5 October 2026, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Itamar Eichner, Mossad changes chiefs: Barnea’s legacy and Gofman’s challenges, Ynetnews, undated, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Avi Shlaim, Obituary: Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi, The independent, 14 September 1994.
- ↑ Yuval Ne'eman, The Telegraph, 15 May 2006.
- ↑ Avi Shlaim, [Israel, the Great Powers, and the Middle East Crisis of 1958], Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12:2, May 1999, archived at users.ox.ac.uk, accessed 9 July 2012.
- ↑ Ami Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963-1967, Taylor & Francis, 2007, p.105.
- ↑ Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, v p.192.
- ↑ Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option, Faber and Faber, 1993, p.293.
- ↑ 29.0 29.1 Meir Elran, Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 9 July 2012.
- ↑ 30.0 30.1 Danny Rothschild, World Economic Forum, accessed 10 July 2012.
- ↑ Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.65.
- ↑ 32.0 32.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.236.
- ↑ Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, Routledge, 2004, p.168.
- ↑ Ephraim Kahana, Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence, Scarecrow Press, 2006, p.43.
- ↑ 35.0 35.1 35.2 35.3 35.4 35.5 35.6 Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.
- ↑ 36.0 36.1 36.2 Steve Rodan, Dynamic Duo, Jerusalem Post, 14 October 1994.
- ↑ Amir Oren, From Erdelhun to Erdogan, Haaretz, 12 September 2011.
- ↑ Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, v p.105.
- ↑ Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, v p.255.
- ↑ Uri Dromi, Quiet Man, Unquiet Times, Haaretz, 18 June 2004.
- ↑ Akiva Eldar, Popular Misconceptions, Haaretz, 11 June 2004.
- ↑ About Us, American Center for Democracy, accessed 31 July 2009, archived at the Internet Archive.
- ↑ Ronny Sofer, IDF: Syrian army in battle positions, ynetnews.com, 15 october 2006.
- ↑ Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.382.
- ↑ Ephraim Kam, Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 10 July 2012.
- ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.115.
- ↑ 47.0 47.1 47.2 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.300.
- ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.290.
- ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.138.
- ↑ Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.xxii.
- ↑ 51.0 51.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.179.
- ↑ 52.0 52.1 52.2 Dima P. Adamsky, American and Israeli Intelligence Failure, in Nigel John Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, p.131.
- ↑ 53.0 53.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.291.
- ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.47.
- ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.183.
- ↑ 56.0 56.1 Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, Routledge, 2004, p.166. Digitised book excerpt.
- ↑ 57.0 57.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.251.
- ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.110.
- ↑ Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.87.
- ↑ Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.384.
- ↑ Consultants, MM~Law, accessed 15 July 2013.
- ↑ 62.0 62.1 62.2 Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.
- ↑ Barak Ravid, Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations Haaretz, 21 March 2011.