Difference between revisions of "Aman"
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==History== | ==History== | ||
===Six Day War and War of Attrition=== | ===Six Day War and War of Attrition=== | ||
| − | Aman's correct prediction that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Six Day War, strengthened the agency's established view of the late 1960s, that the Soviet Union would not risk a confrontation with the United States in the Middle | + | Aman's correct prediction that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Six Day War, strengthened the agency's established view of the late 1960s, that the Soviet Union would not risk a confrontation with the United States in the Middle East.<ref>Dima P. Adamsky, ''American and Israeli Intelligence Failure'', in Nigel John Ashton, ed., ''The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73'', Routledge, 2007, pp.115-116.</ref> As a result, Aman was taken by surprise when Soviet military advisors were attached to Egyptian military units in 1970.<ref name="Prince208">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.208.</ref> |
===Yom Kippur War=== | ===Yom Kippur War=== | ||
| − | Neverthless, Aman's leadership remained strongly attached to the 'konseptzia', the belief that Egypt was too weak and disorganised to risk attacking Israel.<ref name="Prince209">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.209.</ref> Following the [[Agranat Commission]] into the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Aman chief [[Eliahu Zeira]] and a number of his subordinates lost their jobs | + | Neverthless, Aman's leadership remained strongly attached to the 'konseptzia', the belief that Egypt was too weak and disorganised to risk attacking Israel.<ref name="Prince209">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.209.</ref> Following the [[Agranat Commission]] into the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Aman chief [[Eliahu Zeira]] and a number of his subordinates lost their jobs.<ref name="Prince212">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.212.</ref> |
===1980s - Lebanon and the Intifada=== | ===1980s - Lebanon and the Intifada=== | ||
| Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
::The current chief of military intelligence, Major General [[Ehud Barak]], is reportedly prominent among officers who are trying to reestablish the conventional Israeli strategic doctrines that were flouted in the era of [[Ariel Sharon]] and Chief of Staff [[Rafael Eitan]].<ref>Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Lebanon - army and hawks divide / Israeli foreign policy, 11 June 1985.</ref> | ::The current chief of military intelligence, Major General [[Ehud Barak]], is reportedly prominent among officers who are trying to reestablish the conventional Israeli strategic doctrines that were flouted in the era of [[Ariel Sharon]] and Chief of Staff [[Rafael Eitan]].<ref>Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Lebanon - army and hawks divide / Israeli foreign policy, 11 June 1985.</ref> | ||
| − | Although this doctrine held that states rather than non-state actors were the primary threat, Barak and his successor as Aman commander were nevertheless reportedly directing operations from on board a Boeing jet off the coast of Tunisia when Israel assassinated [[Abu Jihad]] of the [[PLO]] in 1988.<ref name=" | + | Although this doctrine held that states rather than non-state actors were the primary threat, Barak and his successor as Aman commander were nevertheless reportedly directing operations from on board a Boeing jet off the coast of Tunisia when Israel assassinated [[Abu Jihad]] of the [[PLO]] in 1988.<ref name="Prince396">Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, ''Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community'', Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.396.</ref> |
===2006 Lebanon war=== | ===2006 Lebanon war=== | ||
| Line 24: | Line 24: | ||
==Structure and Personnel== | ==Structure and Personnel== | ||
| − | Journalists Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman reported that Aman consisted of six departments in 1991, of which the largest were the collection and production departments.<ref name="Prince207-8" | + | Journalists Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman reported that Aman consisted of six departments in 1991, of which the largest were the collection and production departments.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> |
===Leadership=== | ===Leadership=== | ||
| Line 57: | Line 57: | ||
===Collection Department=== | ===Collection Department=== | ||
| − | The Collection Department is responsible for both agent and informer | + | The Collection Department is responsible for both agent and informer human intelligence, and for signals intelligence.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> |
| − | |||
====Heads of the Collection Department==== | ====Heads of the Collection Department==== | ||
*[[Eliahu Zeira]] c.1960s<ref>Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., ''Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence'', Gefen, 2011, p.65.</ref> | *[[Eliahu Zeira]] c.1960s<ref>Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., ''Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence'', Gefen, 2011, p.65.</ref> | ||
| Line 76: | Line 75: | ||
===Production Department=== | ===Production Department=== | ||
| − | The production department is responsible for intelligence analysis.<ref name="Prince207-8" | + | The production department is responsible for intelligence analysis.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> The Department is known in Hebrew as Aman Mehkar.<ref name="RodanDuo">Steve Rodan, Dynamic Duo, ''Jerusalem Post'', 14 October 1994.</ref> English sources use various names for the department including research department, production department, research and analysis department, analysis and production department and research division. |
| − | The Department is organised in a desk system along functional and geographical lines.<ref name="Prince207-8" | + | The Department is organised in a desk system along functional and geographical lines.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> |
====Heads of the Production Department==== | ====Heads of the Production Department==== | ||
| Line 101: | Line 100: | ||
====Basic Research Team==== | ====Basic Research Team==== | ||
*Col. [[Shlomo Marom]] Head c.1973.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.</ref> | *Col. [[Shlomo Marom]] Head c.1973.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.</ref> | ||
| − | *Major [[Amos Gilboa]] member of the Basic Research Team, c.1973.<ref name=" | + | *Major [[Amos Gilboa]] member of the Basic Research Team, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman115">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.115.</ref> |
====Southern Area desk==== | ====Southern Area desk==== | ||
| − | *Jordan and the Arabian peninsula.<ref name="Prince207-8" | + | *Jordan and the Arabian peninsula.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> Known as Branch 2 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.<ref name="Watchman300">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.300.</ref> |
*Lt. Col. [[Zusia Kaniazher]] head c.1973.<ref name="Watchman290">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.290.</ref> | *Lt. Col. [[Zusia Kaniazher]] head c.1973.<ref name="Watchman290">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.290.</ref> | ||
| Line 114: | Line 113: | ||
*[[Moshe Noiman]], first head of the Soviet military desk.<ref>Dima P. Adamsky, ''American and Israeli Intelligence Failure'', in Nigel John Ashton, ed., ''The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73'', Routledge, 2007, p.131.</ref> | *[[Moshe Noiman]], first head of the Soviet military desk.<ref>Dima P. Adamsky, ''American and Israeli Intelligence Failure'', in Nigel John Ashton, ed., ''The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73'', Routledge, 2007, p.131.</ref> | ||
*[[Meir Elran]], head of the Soviet military section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman179">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.179.</ref> | *[[Meir Elran]], head of the Soviet military section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman179">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.179.</ref> | ||
| − | *[[Ilan Tehila]], head of the Soviet political section, c.1973.<ref name=" | + | *[[Ilan Tehila]], head of the Soviet political section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman291">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.291.</ref> |
====Eastern Area desk==== | ====Eastern Area desk==== | ||
| − | *Responsible for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.<ref name="Prince207-8" | + | *Responsible for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> Also known as Branch 5.<ref name="Watchman300">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.300.</ref> |
*Lt. Col. [[Aviezer Yaari]], head 1971-c.1973.<ref name="Watchman47">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.47.</ref> | *Lt. Col. [[Aviezer Yaari]], head 1971-c.1973.<ref name="Watchman47">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.47.</ref> | ||
*Maj. [[Yekutiel Mor]], head of the military section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman183">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.183.</ref> | *Maj. [[Yekutiel Mor]], head of the military section, c.1973.<ref name="Watchman183">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.183.</ref> | ||
====Western Area desk==== | ====Western Area desk==== | ||
| − | *Responsible for Egypt, Sudan and Libya.<ref name="Prince207-8" | + | *Responsible for Egypt, Sudan and Libya.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> Known as Branch 6 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.<ref>Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, ''Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel'', Routledge, 2004, p.166.</ref> |
*[[Meir Meir]]<ref name="Watchman251">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.251.</ref> | *[[Meir Meir]]<ref name="Watchman251">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.251.</ref> | ||
*Lt. Col. [[Yonah Bandman]] head c.1973.<ref>Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, ''[http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sj94Q-874hEC&pg=PA185&lpg=PA185&dq=%22Amos+gilboa%22+Aman&source=bl&ots=GT6Zp7hve2&sig=7nNPJ2DU2Ns1vnoM1fyOXUXEnZ8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=RkL7T5PQOujb0QWLs-GrBw&ved=0CE4Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=%22Amos%20gilboa%22%20Aman&f=false Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel]'', Routledge, 2004, p.166.</ref> | *Lt. Col. [[Yonah Bandman]] head c.1973.<ref>Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, ''[http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=sj94Q-874hEC&pg=PA185&lpg=PA185&dq=%22Amos+gilboa%22+Aman&source=bl&ots=GT6Zp7hve2&sig=7nNPJ2DU2Ns1vnoM1fyOXUXEnZ8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=RkL7T5PQOujb0QWLs-GrBw&ved=0CE4Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=%22Amos%20gilboa%22%20Aman&f=false Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel]'', Routledge, 2004, p.166.</ref> | ||
| − | *Lt. Col. [[Zusia Kaniazher]]<ref name="Watchman251" | + | *Lt. Col. [[Zusia Kaniazher]]<ref name="Watchman251"/> |
*Mr [[Albert Sudai]], head of political section c.1973.<ref name="Watchman110">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.110.</ref> | *Mr [[Albert Sudai]], head of political section c.1973.<ref name="Watchman110">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.110.</ref> | ||
*[[Yaacov Rosenfeld]], head of military section c.1973.<ref name="Watchman291">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.291.</ref> | *[[Yaacov Rosenfeld]], head of military section c.1973.<ref name="Watchman291">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.291.</ref> | ||
| Line 131: | Line 130: | ||
====Branch 7==== | ====Branch 7==== | ||
| − | *Technical/technological desk.<ref name=" | + | *Technical/technological desk.<ref name="Watchman236">Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.236.</ref> |
===="Terror and Palestinians" desk==== | ===="Terror and Palestinians" desk==== | ||
| − | *Palestinian desk.<ref name="Prince207-8" | + | *Palestinian desk.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> |
*[[Gadi Zohar]] - Head c.1976.<ref>Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., ''Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence'', Gefen, 2011, p.87.</ref> | *[[Gadi Zohar]] - Head c.1976.<ref>Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., ''Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence'', Gefen, 2011, p.87.</ref> | ||
*[[Ephraim Lavie]] - Head 1998-2002.<ref>Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., ''Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence'', Gefen, 2011, p.384.</ref> | *[[Ephraim Lavie]] - Head 1998-2002.<ref>Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., ''Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence'', Gefen, 2011, p.384.</ref> | ||
| + | *[[Zmira Lavi]] - ' Head of the Palestinian research and analysis section' - date not known.<ref name="consultants">[http://www.mm-law.com/consultants.htm Consultants], MM~Law, accessed 15 July 2013.</ref> | ||
====Report and Circulation Center==== | ====Report and Circulation Center==== | ||
| Line 145: | Line 145: | ||
====Other desks==== | ====Other desks==== | ||
| − | *Inter-Arab relations.<ref name="Prince207-8" | + | *Inter-Arab relations.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> |
| − | *Middle East Economics.<ref name="Prince207-8" | + | *Middle East Economics.<ref name="Prince207-8"/> |
*Territory and targets.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.</ref> | *Territory and targets.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.</ref> | ||
*A desk responsible for aerial photography existed within the Research Department in 1973.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.</ref> | *A desk responsible for aerial photography existed within the Research Department in 1973.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.</ref> | ||
| Line 154: | Line 154: | ||
===Organization Department=== | ===Organization Department=== | ||
| − | + | Handles administration matters such as logistics, finance and personnel.<ref>Aryeh Shalev, ''Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction'', Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.</ref> | |
==Contact== | ==Contact== | ||
*Website: [http://www1.idf.il/aman/site/default.asp http://www1.idf.il/aman/site/default.asp] | *Website: [http://www1.idf.il/aman/site/default.asp http://www1.idf.il/aman/site/default.asp] | ||
| − | == | + | ==External Resources== |
*Barak Ravid, [http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/military-intelligence-monitoring-foreign-left-wing-organizations-1.350713 'Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations'], Haaretz, 21 March 2011. | *Barak Ravid, [http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/military-intelligence-monitoring-foreign-left-wing-organizations-1.350713 'Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations'], Haaretz, 21 March 2011. | ||
| + | *Gili Cohen, [http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.671785?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter Israel's Military Intelligence Monitoring Dozens of BDS Groups Around the World], ''Haaretz'', 18 August 2015. | ||
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
<references/> | <references/> | ||
| − | [[Category:Israel]][[Category:IDF]][[Category:Spooks]] | + | [[Category:Israel]][[Category:IDF]][[Category:Spooks]] [[Category:Israeli intelligence]] |
Latest revision as of 11:29, 12 January 2022
Aman (Agaf ha-Modi'in) is Israel's military intelligence agency.[1] It is known by a number of terms in English, including Israeli Defence Intelligence (IDI).[2]
Although often overshadowed by Mossad and Shin Bet, Aman has historically been the largest Israeli intelligence agency. It is a part of the military general staff, reporting to the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence.[3]
Contents
- 1 History
- 2 Structure and Personnel
- 2.1 Leadership
- 2.2 Collection Department
- 2.3 Production Department
- 2.3.1 Heads of the Production Department
- 2.3.2 Assistant Directors of the Research Division for Evaluation
- 2.3.3 Assistant Director for Operations
- 2.3.4 Basic Research Team
- 2.3.5 Southern Area desk
- 2.3.6 International Desk
- 2.3.7 Eastern Area desk
- 2.3.8 Western Area desk
- 2.3.9 Branch 7
- 2.3.10 "Terror and Palestinians" desk
- 2.3.11 Report and Circulation Center
- 2.3.12 "Foreign left-wing groups" desk
- 2.3.13 Other desks
- 2.4 Field Security Department
- 2.5 Organization Department
- 3 Contact
- 4 External Resources
- 5 Notes
History
Six Day War and War of Attrition
Aman's correct prediction that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Six Day War, strengthened the agency's established view of the late 1960s, that the Soviet Union would not risk a confrontation with the United States in the Middle East.[4] As a result, Aman was taken by surprise when Soviet military advisors were attached to Egyptian military units in 1970.[5]
Yom Kippur War
Neverthless, Aman's leadership remained strongly attached to the 'konseptzia', the belief that Egypt was too weak and disorganised to risk attacking Israel.[6] Following the Agranat Commission into the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Aman chief Eliahu Zeira and a number of his subordinates lost their jobs.[7]
1980s - Lebanon and the Intifada
According a 1985 report in The Times, Aman was wary of Israel's involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s:
- It was Mossad, the body responsible for covert operations, that built up Israel's secret links with the Christian Phalange, a policy regarded with scepticism by Aman. But in a rare moment of agreement the heads of both organizations, Major Generals Saguy (Aman) and Hofi (Mossad) advised in 1982 against the invasion.
- The current chief of military intelligence, Major General Ehud Barak, is reportedly prominent among officers who are trying to reestablish the conventional Israeli strategic doctrines that were flouted in the era of Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan.[8]
Although this doctrine held that states rather than non-state actors were the primary threat, Barak and his successor as Aman commander were nevertheless reportedly directing operations from on board a Boeing jet off the coast of Tunisia when Israel assassinated Abu Jihad of the PLO in 1988.[9]
2006 Lebanon war
According to a study by the Rand Corporation, Aman issued an 130 page document on 'Hezbollah's War Conception' in January 2006, which accurately reported the location of many of Hezbollah's short-range rockets, but because of classification restrictions, this information did not always reach front-line commanders during the conflict later that year.[10]
Gaza War
Following the 2006 Lebanon War, according to a Rand Corporation study, Aman began a systematic 'intelligence soak' of the Gaza Strip, which identified a list of 603 allegedly Hamas-related targets for the Israeli Air Force in the subsequent Gaza War of 2008-2009.[11]
Structure and Personnel
Journalists Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman reported that Aman consisted of six departments in 1991, of which the largest were the collection and production departments.[3]
Leadership
Directors of Military Intelligence
- Isser Be'eri 1948-49
- Col. Chaim Herzog 1949-50
- Col. Binyamin Gibli 1950-55
- Maj. Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi 1955-59
- Maj. Gen. Chaim Herzog 1959-62
- Maj. Gen. Meir Amit 1962-63
- Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv 1964-72
- Maj. Gen. Eliahu Zeira 1972-74
- Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit 1974-78
- Maj. Gen. Yehoshua Saguy 1979-83
- Maj. Gen. Ehud Barak 1983-85
- Maj. Gen. Amnon Shahak 1986-91
- Maj. Gen. Uri Saguy 1991-95
- Maj. Gen. Moshe Ya'alon 1995[12]-1998
- Maj. Gen. Amos Malka 1998[13] -2001
- Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi Farkash
- Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin 2006-2010.
- Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi 2010-[14]
Deputy Directors of Military Intelligence
- Yehoshafat Harkabi 1950-1955[15]
- Yuval Ne'eman 1955-1957[16]
- Uzi Narkis c.1958[17]
- David Carmon c.1967.[18]
- Zvi Lidor[19]
- Reuven Yerdor c.1982.[20]
- Meir Elran 1987-1989[21]
- Danny Rothschild c.1991[22]
Collection Department
The Collection Department is responsible for both agent and informer human intelligence, and for signals intelligence.[3]
Heads of the Collection Department
- Eliahu Zeira c.1960s[23]
- Menahem Digli c.1973.[24]
- Yossi Langotsky
- Ephraim Lapid
SIGINT - Unit 8200
- Main Page Unit 8200.
Aman's signals intelligence capability is provided by Unit 8200.[25] Prior to 1976, the unit was known as Unit 848.[26]
HUMINT
The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for human sources.[27]
OSINT
The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for open source intelligence.[28]
Production Department
The production department is responsible for intelligence analysis.[3] The Department is known in Hebrew as Aman Mehkar.[29] English sources use various names for the department including research department, production department, research and analysis department, analysis and production department and research division.
The Department is organised in a desk system along functional and geographical lines.[3]
Heads of the Production Department
- David Carmon c.1959-1962.[30][31]
- Shlomo Gazit c.1967.[32]
- Aryeh Shalev 1967-1974.
- Aviezer Yaari c.1981.[33]
- Amos Gilboa 1981-1984.[29]
- Danny Rothschild c.1991.[34]
- Ya'acov Ami-Dror c.1992-c.1994.[29]
- Amos Gilad - 1996-2001[35]
- Yosef Kuperwasser c.2001-2006.[36]
- Yossi Beyditz c.2006-2011.[37]
- Itai Brun 2011-[38]
Assistant Directors of the Research Division for Evaluation
- Col. Gideon Gera c.1973[39]
- Meir Elran[40]
- Ephraim Kam c.1993[41]
Assistant Director for Operations
- Col. Aharon Levran c.1973[42]
Basic Research Team
- Col. Shlomo Marom Head c.1973.[43]
- Major Amos Gilboa member of the Basic Research Team, c.1973.[44]
Southern Area desk
- Jordan and the Arabian peninsula.[3] Known as Branch 2 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.[45]
- Lt. Col. Zusia Kaniazher head c.1973.[46]
International Desk
Known as Branch 3.[45] Responsible for the superpowers at the time of the Yom Kippur war.[47]
- Avraham Lif, c.1972.[48]
- Chaim Yavetz, head c.1973.[49]
- Arie Adan, head of the American desk, c.late 1960s.[50]
- Moshe Noiman, first head of the Soviet military desk.[51]
- Meir Elran, head of the Soviet military section, c.1973.[49]
- Ilan Tehila, head of the Soviet political section, c.1973.[52]
Eastern Area desk
- Responsible for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.[3] Also known as Branch 5.[45]
- Lt. Col. Aviezer Yaari, head 1971-c.1973.[53]
- Maj. Yekutiel Mor, head of the military section, c.1973.[54]
Western Area desk
- Responsible for Egypt, Sudan and Libya.[3] Known as Branch 6 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.[55]
- Meir Meir[56]
- Lt. Col. Yonah Bandman head c.1973.[57]
- Lt. Col. Zusia Kaniazher[56]
- Mr Albert Sudai, head of political section c.1973.[58]
- Yaacov Rosenfeld, head of military section c.1973.[52]
- Moshe Noiman - officer on the political desk. c.late 1960s.[59]
Branch 7
- Technical/technological desk.[24]
"Terror and Palestinians" desk
- Palestinian desk.[3]
- Gadi Zohar - Head c.1976.[60]
- Ephraim Lavie - Head 1998-2002.[61]
- Zmira Lavi - ' Head of the Palestinian research and analysis section' - date not known.[62]
Report and Circulation Center
- Established after the 1967 Six Day War to circulate material from the various collection agencies within military intelligence.[63]
"Foreign left-wing groups" desk
- Haaretz reported in March 2011 that a department had been created in the research division that "will monitor Western groups involved in boycotting Israel, divesting from it or imposing sanctions on it. The unit will also collect information about groups that attempt to bring war crime or other charges against high-ranking Israeli officials, and examine possible links between such organizations and terror groups."[64]
Other desks
- Inter-Arab relations.[3]
- Middle East Economics.[3]
- Territory and targets.[65]
- A desk responsible for aerial photography existed within the Research Department in 1973.[66]
Field Security Department
Responsible for security across the IDF.[67]
Organization Department
Handles administration matters such as logistics, finance and personnel.[68]
Contact
External Resources
- Barak Ravid, 'Military Intelligence monitoring foreign left-wing organizations', Haaretz, 21 March 2011.
- Gili Cohen, Israel's Military Intelligence Monitoring Dozens of BDS Groups Around the World, Haaretz, 18 August 2015.
Notes
- ↑ Aman, GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 29 July 2009.
- ↑ Private Israeli Company Collects Counter-terrorism Intelligence, Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.207-208.
- ↑ Dima P. Adamsky, American and Israeli Intelligence Failure, in Nigel John Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, pp.115-116.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.208.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.209.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.212.
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