Operation Volute
Codename for a series of UK covert propaganda / strategic communications programmes in Syria that began around 2012; run by the Ministry of Defence (including Military Strategic Effects) and the Foreign Office (including the Counter-Daesh Communications Cell), with CSSF involvement; involved contractors producing media material, training opposition spokespeople, and managing press offices for “moderate armed opposition” groups; subject of a critical internal review in 2016
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| Type | Covert strategic communications / propaganda programmes |
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| Location | Syria (contractor offices in Istanbul, Amman and elsewhere) |
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Operation Volute was the codename for a series of UK covert propaganda and strategic communications programmes in Syria that began around 2012. The programmes aimed to undermine both President Bashar al-Assad and the Islamic State group, and to bolster the “moderate” Syrian opposition by promoting the “popular rejection of the Assad regime and extremist alternatives.” They were guided by the National Security Council and involved the Ministry of Defence (including the unit Military Strategic Effects), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (including the Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell), and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. Contractors produced videos, photos, military reports, radio broadcasts, print products, social media posts, children’s comics and other material, and effectively ran elements of opposition press offices.[1][2]
Structure and management
Documents obtained by investigative journalist Ian Cobain and reported by Middle East Eye and Declassified UK show that five main programmes formed part of the Volute effort. Two were managed by a unit within the MoD called Military Strategic Effects, two by a group in the Foreign Office called the Counter-Daesh Communications Cell, and a fifth by the cross-government Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. Contracts were often awarded by the Foreign Office but overseen by the MoD, sometimes by military intelligence officers. Contractor offices were established in Istanbul, Amman and, for a period, Reyhanli in southeast Turkey. Syrians were employed who in turn recruited citizen journalists inside Syria, frequently without those journalists knowing they were being directed from London.[1][2]
The overall budget reached £9.6 million in 2015–16 alone, with further funds earmarked. Although the primary audience was Syrians inside and outside the country, documents make clear that UK audiences could sometimes be “a specified target” of media material and that some material “may reach the UK information space.”[1]
Contractors and activities
Contractors hired by the government selected and trained opposition spokespeople, managed their press offices, and developed their social media accounts. Material was branded with the logos of fighting groups. One British source with knowledge of the contracts described the government as essentially running a “Free Syrian Army press office.” The contract for strategic communications and media operations support to the Syrian moderate armed opposition was briefly held by Regester Larkin before being taken over by InCoStrat from November 2014. Other contractors involved in the broader Syria strategic communications effort included ARK Group, Albany Associates and The Global Strategy Network.[3][4]
A 2014 FCO report described a joint operation with the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development to support “strategic communications, research, monitoring and evaluation and operational support to Syrian opposition entities,” including “creating network linkages between political movements and media outlets” and “mentoring, training and coaching for enhanced delivery of media services.”[4]
Internal review
An internal review conducted in the summer of 2016 concluded that the programmes had “fundamental shortcomings,” including “no conflict analysis [and] no target audience analysis.” The review also revealed concerns within government about the need for the programmes, which were pushed most enthusiastically by the MoD from 2013 onwards because of “policy restraints” imposed by the parliamentary vote against military action. The review was scathing about planning and legality.[1]
See also
- Military Strategic Effects
- Kevin Stratford-Wright
- InCoStrat
- Regester Larkin
- ARK Group
- Albany Associates
- The Global Strategy Network
- Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell
- Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
- Paul Tilley
External links
- Middle East Eye – “EXCLUSIVE: British propaganda efforts in Syria may have broken UK law” (11 May 2020)
- Declassified UK – “Revelations about UK covert operations in Syria” (18 May 2020)
- The Guardian, 3 May 2016
- The Grayzone, 23 September 2020
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Ian Cobain and Alice Ross, “EXCLUSIVE: British propaganda efforts in Syria may have broken UK law”, Middle East Eye, 11 May 2020.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Mark Curtis, “Revelations about UK covert operations in Syria challenge media narratives on the war”, Declassified UK, 18 May 2020.
- ↑ Ian Cobain et al., “How Britain funds the ‘propaganda war’ against Isis in Syria”, The Guardian, 3 May 2016.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 “Leaked docs expose massive Syria propaganda operation waged by Western govt contractors and media”, The Grayzone, 23 September 2020.