Aman

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Israeli military-intelligence directorate

Aman / Military Intelligence Directorate

Logo Shlomi Binder photographed in 2017
Shlomi Binder, photographed in 2017; director from 21 August 2024. [1]
Type Military intelligence directorate
Founded Military intelligence organisation developed in 1948. [2]
Status Part of the Israel Defense Forces General Staff; reporting to the chief of staff and minister of defence. [3]
Headquarters Glilot, identified as directorate headquarters in reporting on the August 2024 handover. [1]
Location Israel
Services Collection, including human and signals intelligence; analysis and production; military security. [3]
Key people Shlomi Binder — director from 21 August 2024. [1]
Website Israel Defense Forces
Remarks Also called Agaf ha-Modi'in and Israeli Defence Intelligence (IDI). Includes Unit 8200. Sister services: Mossad and Shin Bet.


Aman (Agaf ha-Modi'in) is Israel's military intelligence agency.[4] It is known by a number of terms in English, including Israeli Defence Intelligence (IDI).[5]

Although often overshadowed by Mossad and Shin Bet, Aman has historically been the largest Israeli intelligence agency. It is a part of the military general staff, reporting to the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence.[3]

History

Formation and related organisations

The military intelligence service developed out of the intelligence arrangements of the Haganah and the new Israel Defense Forces in 1948. It is organisationally distinct from Mossad and Shin Bet, although the agencies share an intelligence-community history and operational relationships. [2]

In 1954, military intelligence’s Unit 131 carried out Operation Susannah, the failed bombing operation in Egypt known as the Lavon Affair. The Israel Ministry of Defence archive describes civilian targets and intended false attribution to other groups, the resulting Egyptian trial, and the dispute over responsibility between Pinhas Lavon, Benjamin Gibli and other senior officials. Gibli and unit commander Motke Ben-Zur were dismissed. [6]

Six Day War and War of Attrition

Aman's correct prediction that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the Six Day War, strengthened the agency's established view of the late 1960s, that the Soviet Union would not risk a confrontation with the United States in the Middle East.[7] As a result, Aman was taken by surprise when Soviet military advisors were attached to Egyptian military units in 1970.[8]

Yom Kippur War

Nevertheless, Aman's leadership remained strongly attached to the 'konseptzia', the belief that Egypt was too weak and disorganised to risk attacking Israel.[9] Following the Agranat Commission into the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Aman chief Eliahu Zeira and a number of his subordinates lost their jobs.[10]

Analysis and the 1973 warning failure

Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman distinguish Aman's collection capabilities from its interpretation of what was collected before the October 1973 war. They report that Binyamin Siman-Tov, an officer attached to Southern Command, warned on 1 October that Egypt was preparing to attack within days, but that Eliahu Zeira rejected the warning. Their account describes evidence of preparations being interpreted as an exercise or an attempt to provoke a costly mobilisation. The authors also describe a separate political calculation by Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan against a pre-emptive strike, concerned that it would jeopardise US support; this should not be conflated with the intelligence assessment of whether an attack was likely.[11]

Following the Agranat Commission, Shlomo Gazit replaced Eli Zeira as director. Raviv and Melman describe measures intended to reduce dependence on a single institutional interpretation: the revival of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' research and political-planning centre and the expansion of Mossad's research capacity. These bodies were to provide additional assessments of intelligence already collected, rather than simply duplicate collection organisations. The authors also report that Yitzhak Rabin, as prime minister from 1974, wanted access to raw material rather than relying exclusively on digested summaries.[12]

Raviv and Melman describe a different failure of anticipation in 1977: Aman's estimate still expected Anwar Sadat to resort to war as he moved towards a peace initiative. Their account records Gazit's explanation that intelligence could not readily predict a personal decision made outside the normal Egyptian governmental process. They also report that concern about a possible deception led to an alert before Sadat's flight to Jerusalem. The contrast illustrates the authors' distinction between warning of hostile capabilities and understanding a political leader's intentions.[13]

1980s - Lebanon and the Intifada

According to a 1985 report in The Times, Aman was wary of Israel's involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s:

It was Mossad, the body responsible for covert operations, that built up Israel's secret links with the Christian Phalange, a policy regarded with scepticism by Aman. But in a rare moment of agreement the heads of both organizations, Major Generals Saguy (Aman) and Hofi (Mossad) advised in 1982 against the invasion.
The current chief of military intelligence, Major General Ehud Barak, is reportedly prominent among officers who are trying to reestablish the conventional Israeli strategic doctrines that were flouted in the era of Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan.[14]

Although this doctrine held that states rather than non-state actors were the primary threat, Barak and his successor as Aman commander were nevertheless reportedly directing operations from on board a Boeing jet off the coast of Tunisia when Israel assassinated Abu Jihad of the PLO in 1988.[15]

2006 Lebanon war

According to a study by the Rand Corporation, Aman issued a 130-page document on 'Hezbollah's War Conception' in January 2006, which accurately reported the location of many of Hezbollah's short-range rockets, but because of classification restrictions, this information did not always reach front-line commanders during the conflict later that year.[16]

Gaza War

Following the 2006 Lebanon War, according to a Rand Corporation study, Aman began a systematic 'intelligence soak' of the Gaza Strip, which identified a list of 603 allegedly Hamas-related targets for the Israeli Air Force in the subsequent Gaza War of 2008-2009.[17]

7 October 2023 and the 2024 handover

At the 21 August 2024 handover, outgoing director Aharon Haliva accepted responsibility for military intelligence’s failure to warn of the Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023 and called for a national investigation. He had announced his resignation in April 2024. Incoming director Shlomi Binder, previously head of the IDF Operations Division, undertook to investigate failures and correct mistakes. [1]

Some victims’ families criticised Binder’s appointment, arguing that his own part in the military’s failures had not been sufficiently investigated. Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi defended the choice and emphasised investigation and institutional learning. These competing assessments are reported as such; the handover reporting is not itself a completed inquiry into individual responsibility. [1]

Military Intelligence Directorate change of command ceremony in August 2024
The Military Intelligence Directorate change-of-command ceremony, August 2024.

The Turgeman review and changes after 2023

On 10 November 2025 the IDF announced the findings of a review, led by Maj.-Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman for Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, of the 25 earlier IDF inquiries into 7 October 2023. According to the Jerusalem Post, five of them, including inquiries into the Operations Directorate and into decision-making on 6–7 October, were found to have failed and were to be redone, and the review gave private recommendations on individual commanders that were not published. The newspaper reported that Turgeman had found greater failings in Shlomi Binder's conduct on 7 October, when he headed the Operations Directorate, than the original inquiries had; that Herzi Halevi had earlier found Binder's failings to stem from the flawed intelligence he was given; and that all signs were that Binder would stay in post. It also reported that the review criticised the army's handling of the “Walls of Jericho” documents on Hamas's invasion plan, seized in 2021–22, including a May 2022 meeting attended by the then head of military intelligence, Aharon Haliva, after which officers who moved on did not pass the issue to successors.[18]

On 7 October 2026 the IDF published a review of changes since the attack. The Hebrew news site Nekuda, reporting that statement, said it described changes in military intelligence under Binder: updated warning concepts and new warning models based on “indicative signs”, with less weight on assessments of the enemy's intentions or “reassuring signs”; strengthened warning cells; a multi-theatre warning room; a re-established, expanded control department to challenge the directorate's assumptions; a new school for training intelligence commanders; and a new technology unit combining computing, data and artificial intelligence. The report noted that the army's account did not address the wider cultural change that had preceded the failure.[19]

Intelligence support for targeted killings

Ronen Bergman describes a change in Aman's operational role during the second intifada. Rather than supplying intelligence only through finished reports, military intelligence personnel worked alongside Shin Bet and the Israeli Air Force in a Joint War Room. In his account, Unit 8200 committed substantial interception capacity to locating targets, while observation aircraft and satellites supplied visual intelligence. Bergman argues that combining these streams made a more rapid and larger-scale targeted-killing programme possible.[20]

Bergman distinguishes the institutional stages: Shin Bet proposed targets, the prime minister authorised attacks and the military selected the executing force and weapons. The Joint War Room was required to obtain separate sources identifying the target. He also describes objections by Aharon Ze'evi-Farkash, then head of Aman, to examining wider policy almost entirely through the lens of targeted killings. This was a disagreement about the programme's strategic dominance, not a claim that Ze'evi-Farkash opposed every such operation.[20]

Structure and Personnel

Journalists Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman reported that Aman consisted of six departments in 1991, of which the largest were the collection and production departments. The detailed desks and appointments below are historical descriptions associated with their cited dates, not an assertion that every unit or officeholder remained in place in 2026.[3]

Leadership

Directors of Military Intelligence

Directors of Military Intelligence
Person Recorded tenure or role
Isser Be'eri 1948-49
Col. Chaim Herzog 1949-50
Col. Binyamin Gibli 1950-55
Maj. Gen. Yehoshafat Harkabi 1955-59
Maj. Gen. Chaim Herzog 1959-62
Maj. Gen. Meir Amit 1962-63
Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv 1964-72
Maj. Gen. Eliahu Zeira 1972-74
Maj. Gen. Shlomo Gazit 1974-78
Maj. Gen. Yehoshua Saguy 1979-83
Maj. Gen. Ehud Barak 1983-85
Maj. Gen. Amnon Shahak 1986-91
Maj. Gen. Uri Saguy 1991-95
Maj. Gen. Moshe Ya'alon 1995[21]-1998
Maj. Gen. Amos Malka 1998[22] -2001
Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi Farkash
Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin 2006-2010.
Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi 2010–September 2014. [23]
Maj. Gen. Herzi Halevi — September 2014–28 March 2018. [24] [25]
Maj. Gen. Tamir Hayman — 28 March 2018–5 October 2021. [25] [26]
Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva — 5 October 2021–21 August 2024. [26] [1]
Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder — from 21 August 2024; identified as military intelligence chief in reporting dated 5 October 2026. [1][27] [28]

Deputy Directors of Military Intelligence

Deputy Directors of Military Intelligence
Person Recorded tenure or role
Yehoshafat Harkabi 1950-1955[29]
Yuval Ne'eman 1955-1957[30]
Uzi Narkis c.1958[31]
David Carmon c.1967.[32]
Zvi Lidor [33]
Reuven Yerdor c.1982.[34]
Meir Elran 1987-1989[35]
Danny Rothschild c.1991[36]

Collection Department

The Collection Department is responsible for both agent and informer human intelligence, and for signals intelligence.[3]

Heads of the Collection Department

Heads of the Collection Department
Person Recorded tenure or role
Eliahu Zeira c.1960s[37]
Menahem Digli c.1973.[38]
Yossi Langotsky
Ephraim Lapid

SIGINT - Unit 8200

Aman's signals intelligence capability is provided by Unit 8200.[39] Prior to 1976, the unit was known as Unit 848.[40]

The 2003 refusal

Ronen Bergman recounts a dispute within Unit 8200 following the January 2003 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. A network intelligence officer whom he identifies by the pseudonym Amir refused to supply the confirmation needed for a proposed air strike on a Fatah office building in occupied Khan Yunis. According to Bergman's account, Amir believed that the building was used for civilian political activity and that there was no basis for treating the people inside as military targets. The disagreement concerned a particular proposed strike, not refusal to carry out every intelligence duty.[41]

Bergman reports that other officers initially sought to continue the operation, but that doubts within Unit 8200 ultimately reached the defence minister and the strike was cancelled. The military did not accept Amir's judgement, and he left the service without a public trial. Bergman's account also records Asa Kasher's criticism that the officer lacked the full context. The episode therefore documents an internal argument over legality and responsibility, rather than a court judgement that the proposed strike was unlawful.[41]

Surveillance of Palestinians and the 2014 reservists' letter

Antony Loewenstein describes Unit 8200 as central to the interception of Palestinian communications and the collection of personal information in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. His account places the Urim installation within a wider signals-intelligence infrastructure and links the unit's technical expertise to Israel's commercial cyber-security sector. His argument that the occupation functions as a testing ground is an interpretation of the relationship between military practice and export markets, not a statement that every technology company is an operational arm of Aman.[42]

Loewenstein reproduces the objections of forty-three Unit 8200 reservists who signed a letter in 2014 refusing service connected with the occupation. The signatories alleged that information on sexuality, financial difficulties and access to medical treatment was used to pressure Palestinians into cooperation, including people not involved in violence. Loewenstein also interviews one signatory, identified as Daniel, who describes his objection as opposition to military rule over a population without political rights. These are the reservists' allegations and testimony as presented by Loewenstein, not findings from a judicial inquiry.[43]

The technology-export pipeline

Antony Loewenstein argues that Unit 8200 supplies private industry not only with technical skills but also with professional networks and experience of surveillance at scale. He discusses alumni employed by NSO Group, recruited by DarkMatter in the United Arab Emirates and involved in companies such as Mitiga. The examples include defensive cyber-security as well as offensive surveillance. A veteran's employment by a company does not, by itself, establish that the company operates under Aman's direction.[44]

Loewenstein uses Mer Security as a specific example of the relationship between domestic deployment and overseas sales. He identifies Nir Lempert and Chaim Mer as Unit 8200 veterans, and describes the company's involvement in the Mabat 2000 camera system in Jerusalem's Old City, in occupied East Jerusalem. He reports Chaim Mer's acknowledgement that potential customers could see the Israeli police installation in operation. Loewenstein presents that demonstration effect as part of his explanation of export success, rather than evidence that military intelligence itself awarded or controlled every foreign contract.[45]

HUMINT

The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for human sources.[46]

OSINT

The Collection Department controls a unit responsible for open source intelligence.[46]

Production Department

The production department is responsible for intelligence analysis.[3] The Department is known in Hebrew as Aman Mehkar.[47] English sources use various names for the department including research department, production department, research and analysis department, analysis and production department and research division.

The Department is organised in a desk system along functional and geographical lines.[3]

Heads of the Production Department

Heads of the Production Department
Person Recorded tenure or role
David Carmon c.1959-1962.[48][49]
Shlomo Gazit c.1967.[50]
Aryeh Shalev 1967-1974.
Aviezer Yaari c.1981.[51]
Amos Gilboa 1981-1984.[47]
Danny Rothschild c.1991.[36]
Ya'acov Ami-Dror c.1992-c.1994.[47]
Amos Gilad - 1996-2001[52]
Yosef Kuperwasser c.2001-2006.[53]
Yossi Beyditz c.2006-2011.[54]
Itai Brun 2011-[55]

Assistant Directors of the Research Division for Evaluation

Assistant Directors of the Research Division for Evaluation
Person Recorded tenure or role
Col. Gideon Gera c.1973[46]
Meir Elran [35]
Ephraim Kam c.1993[56]

Assistant Director for Operations

Assistant Director for Operations
Person Recorded tenure or role
Col. Aharon Levran c.1973[46]

Basic Research Team

Basic Research Team
Person Recorded tenure or role
Col. Shlomo Marom Head c.1973.[46]
Major Amos Gilboa member of the Basic Research Team, c.1973.[57]

Southern Area desk

  • Jordan and the Arabian peninsula.[3] Known as Branch 2 at the time of the Yom Kippur War.[58]
  • Lt. Col. Zusia Kaniazher head c.1973.[59]

International Desk

Known as Branch 3.[58] Responsible for the superpowers at the time of the Yom Kippur war.[60]

International Desk
Person Recorded tenure or role
Avraham Lif , c.1972.[61]
Chaim Yavetz , head c.1973.[62]
Arie Adan , head of the American desk, c.late 1960s.[63]
Moshe Noiman , first head of the Soviet military desk.[63]
Meir Elran , head of the Soviet military section, c.1973.[62]
Ilan Tehila , head of the Soviet political section, c.1973.[64]

Eastern Area desk

Western Area desk

Branch 7

  • Technical/technological desk.[38]

"Terror and Palestinians" desk

Report and Circulation Center

  • Established after the 1967 Six Day War to circulate material from the various collection agencies within military intelligence.[73]

"Foreign left-wing groups" desk

  • Haaretz reported in March 2011 that a department had been created in the research division that "will monitor Western groups involved in boycotting Israel, divesting from it or imposing sanctions on it. The unit will also collect information about groups that attempt to bring war crime or other charges against high-ranking Israeli officials, and examine possible links between such organizations and terror groups."[74]
  • In August 2015 Haaretz named the unit the Delegitimization Department and reported that it had been established as part of the lessons learned after the May 2010 Mavi Marmara raid.[75] Among the overseas organisations monitored were dozens affiliated with the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement.[75] Monitoring of each BDS-linked group was approved in advance by a senior Research Division officer, after a decision not to follow groups that had only indirect contacts with Israeli activists; groups inside Israel with the same goals were not monitored by the department.[75] The department also gathered material presented as evidence of Hamas violations of international law during the 2014 Gaza war (Operation Protective Edge).[75] The IDF said it does not collect information on Israeli citizens and that that role belongs to the Shin Bet, which monitors Israeli citizens involved in what are regarded as "delegitimisation" activities.[75]

Other desks

  • Inter-Arab relations.[3]
  • Middle East Economics.[3]
  • Territory and targets.[73]
  • A desk responsible for aerial photography existed within the Research Department in 1973.[73]

Field Security Department

Responsible for security across the IDF.[46]

Organization Department

Handles administration matters such as logistics, finance and personnel.[46]

Contact

External Resources

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 Jerusalem Post staff and Reuters, Intel. chief in retirement speech: I will have Oct. 7 on my conscience for rest of my life, The Jerusalem Post, 21 August 2024, accessed 7 November 2026.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services, Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, pp.54–55, accessed 7 November 2026.
  3. ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.207-208.
  4. ↑ Aman, GlobalSecurity.org, accessed 29 July 2009.
  5. ↑ Private Israeli Company Collects Counter-terrorism Intelligence, Wikileaks, 1 September 2011.
  6. ↑ Israel Ministry of Defence, IDF and Defense Establishment Archives, The “Unfortunate” or the Lavon affair, Ministry of Defence, accessed 7 November 2026.
  7. ↑ Dima P. Adamsky, American and Israeli Intelligence Failure, in Nigel John Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, pp.115-116.
  8. ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.208.
  9. ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.209.
  10. ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, pp.212.
  11. ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, chapter 10, pp.209–211.
  12. ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, chapter 10, pp.212–213.
  13. ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, chapter 10, p.222.
  14. ↑ Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Lebanon - army and hawks divide / Israeli foreign policy, 11 June 1985.
  15. ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.396.
  16. ↑ Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza, Rand Corporation, 2011, p.150.
  17. ↑ Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Operations in Israel's War Against Hezbollah: Learning from Lebanon and Getting It Right in Gaza, Rand Corporation, 2011, p.238.
  18. ↑ Yonah Jeremy Bob, New IDF probe reveals failures in five Oct. 7 investigations, which need to be redone, The Jerusalem Post, 10 November 2025, accessed 11 November 2026.
  19. ↑ Nekuda staff, צה"ל מציג: כך שוקם אגף המודיעין שלוש שנים אחרי 7 באוקטובר (The IDF presents: how the intelligence directorate was rebuilt three years after 7 October), Nekuda, 7 October 2026, accessed 11 November 2026.
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapters 28–29, “All-Out War” and “More Suicide Bombers Than Explosive Vests”.
  21. ↑ ISRAEL - Heads of A'man, Mossad, & Shin Bet, The Literature of Intelligence, Muskingum University,via the Internet Archive, accessed 29 July 2009.
  22. ↑ Ira Chernus, Helping Israel on a False and Dangerous Course, CommonDreams.org, 28 June 2004.
  23. ↑ Anshel Pfeffer and Amos Harel, Rising star Kochavi to replace Yadlin as IDF intelligence chief, Haaretz, 17 September 2011.
  24. ↑ N12, Incoming head of Military Intelligence warns: difficult to be optimistic about calm in the region [Hebrew], N12, 22 September 2014, accessed 7 November 2026.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 i24NEWS, Amid growing Iran threat, Israel gets new military intelligence chief, i24NEWS, 28 March 2018, accessed 7 November 2026.
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Israel Defense Forces, Major General Aharon Haliva Enters His Position as Head of the Intelligence Directorate, IDF Spokesperson, 5 October 2021, accessed 7 November 2026.
  27. ↑ Amichai Stein, IDF killed two-thirds of terrorists who invaded Israel on October 7, intel chief tells cabinet, The Jerusalem Post, 5 October 2026, accessed 7 November 2026.
  28. ↑ Itamar Eichner, Mossad changes chiefs: Barnea’s legacy and Gofman’s challenges, Ynetnews, undated, accessed 7 November 2026.
  29. ↑ Avi Shlaim, Obituary: Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi, The independent, 14 September 1994.
  30. ↑ Yuval Ne'eman, The Telegraph, 15 May 2006.
  31. ↑ Avi Shlaim, [Israel, the Great Powers, and the Middle East Crisis of 1958], Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 12:2, May 1999, archived at users.ox.ac.uk, accessed 9 July 2012.
  32. ↑ Ami Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Government, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963-1967, Taylor & Francis, 2007, p.105.
  33. ↑ Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, v p.192.
  34. ↑ Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option, Faber and Faber, 1993, p.293.
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 Meir Elran, Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 9 July 2012.
  36. ↑ 36.0 36.1 Danny Rothschild, World Economic Forum, accessed 10 July 2012.
  37. ↑ Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.65.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.236.
  39. ↑ Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, Routledge, 2004, p.168.
  40. ↑ Ephraim Kahana, Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence, Scarecrow Press, 2006, p.43.
  41. ↑ 41.0 41.1 Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapter 31, “The Rebellion in Unit 8200”.
  42. ↑ Antony Loewenstein, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation around the World, London: Verso, 2023, chapter 3, “Preventing an Outbreak of Peace”, discussion accompanying notes 41–48.
  43. ↑ Antony Loewenstein, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation around the World, London: Verso, 2023, chapter 3, “Preventing an Outbreak of Peace”, discussion accompanying notes 52–58 and interview with Daniel.
  44. ↑ Antony Loewenstein, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation around the World, London: Verso, 2023, chapter 3, “Preventing an Outbreak of Peace”, discussion accompanying notes 45–48.
  45. ↑ Antony Loewenstein, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation around the World, London: Verso, 2023, chapter 3, “Preventing an Outbreak of Peace”, discussion accompanying notes 49–50.
  46. ↑ 46.0 46.1 46.2 46.3 46.4 46.5 46.6 Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.5.
  47. ↑ 47.0 47.1 47.2 Steve Rodan, Dynamic Duo, Jerusalem Post, 14 October 1994.
  48. ↑ Amir Oren, From Erdelhun to Erdogan, Haaretz, 12 September 2011.
  49. ↑ Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, v p.105.
  50. ↑ Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, v p.255.
  51. ↑ Uri Dromi, Quiet Man, Unquiet Times, Haaretz, 18 June 2004.
  52. ↑ Akiva Eldar, Popular Misconceptions, Haaretz, 11 June 2004.
  53. ↑ About Us, American Center for Democracy, accessed 31 July 2009, archived at the Internet Archive.
  54. ↑ Ronny Sofer, IDF: Syrian army in battle positions, ynetnews.com, 15 october 2006.
  55. ↑ Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.382.
  56. ↑ Ephraim Kam, Institute for National Security Studies, accessed 10 July 2012.
  57. ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.115.
  58. ↑ 58.0 58.1 58.2 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.300.
  59. ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.290.
  60. ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.138.
  61. ↑ Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.xxii.
  62. ↑ 62.0 62.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.179.
  63. ↑ 63.0 63.1 63.2 Dima P. Adamsky, American and Israeli Intelligence Failure, in Nigel John Ashton, ed., The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and the Superpowers, 1967-73, Routledge, 2007, p.131.
  64. ↑ 64.0 64.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.291.
  65. ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.47.
  66. ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.183.
  67. ↑ 67.0 67.1 Michael I. Handel, Thomas G. Mahnken, eds, Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, Routledge, 2004, p.166. Digitised book excerpt.
  68. ↑ 68.0 68.1 Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.251.
  69. ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, Suny Press, 2005, p.110.
  70. ↑ Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.87.
  71. ↑ Amos Gilboa, Yochai Erlich, eds., Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence, Gefen, 2011, p.384.
  72. ↑ Consultants, MM~Law, accessed 15 July 2013.
  73. ↑ 73.0 73.1 73.2 Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction, Sussex Academic Press, 2010, p.6.
  74. ↑ Barak Ravid, Military Intelligence Monitoring Foreign Left-wing Organizations Haaretz, 21 March 2011, accessed 9 November 2026.
  75. ↑ 75.0 75.1 75.2 75.3 75.4 Gili Cohen, Israel's Military Intelligence Monitoring Dozens of BDS Groups Around the World Haaretz, 18 August 2015, archived at archive.ph/pIjXP, accessed 9 November 2026.