Tempora
Code name of a GCHQ programme for tapping and buffering traffic on fibre-optic cables, launched in 2011 and revealed in the Snowden documents in June 2013
| Tempora | |
GCHQ Bude, Cornwall, May 2010, where GCHQ ran a three-year trial of fibre-optic cable tapping before launching Tempora. Photo: Tony Atkin, via Geograph and Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0 | |
| Type | Bulk interception and buffering of internet and telephone traffic from fibre-optic cables[1] |
|---|---|
| Operator | Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), shared with the National Security Agency[1] |
| Launched | 2011 (autumn), as a mainstream programme after a three-year trial at Bude[1] |
| Components | Mastering the Internet; Global Telecoms Exploitation[1] |
| Scale (2012) | More than 200 fibre-optic cables tapped, data processed from at least 46 at a time; 600 million "telephone events" a day; content buffered for three days and metadata for 30 days[1] |
| Legal basis claimed | Certificates under section 8(4) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000[1][2] |
| Disclosed | 21 June 2013, by The Guardian, from documents supplied by Edward Snowden[1] |
Tempora is the code name of a programme of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) for tapping fibre-optic cables and storing the traffic they carry, so that it can be sifted and analysed. It buffers content for three days and metadata for 30 days.[1] It was revealed by The Guardian on 21 June 2013 from documents supplied by Edward Snowden. The paper reported that the programme had been running for some 18 months, that by 2012 GCHQ was handling 600 million "telephone events" a day, and that it had tapped more than 200 cables. It also reported that the material was shared with the National Security Agency (NSA).[1] The historian Richard J. Aldrich describes Tempora as the achievement of something "which many scientists had long regarded as impossible, the tapping of fibre-optic cables".[3]
Development
Aldrich writes that fibre-optic cables, developed by the British Telecom research station at Martlesham in the 1990s, were long thought immune from secret listening because any attempt to tap them disrupted their activity. GCHQ, "with the assistance of British Telecom researchers", found a way around this. Wherever it had land-based access to cables, "often exploiting the last remnants of the British Empire, or old imperial friendships", it tapped in.[3] According to the Guardian, GCHQ set up a three-year trial at its station in Bude, Cornwall. By the summer of 2011 it had probes attached to more than 200 internet links, each carrying data at 10 gigabits a second, and it brought NSA analysts into the trials. In the autumn of 2011 it launched Tempora as a mainstream programme, shared with the Americans. By 2010, two years after the project was first trialled, GCHQ boasted that it had the "biggest internet access" of any member of the Five Eyes.[1] Aldrich writes that Bude, which in the 1960s had intercepted satellite traffic under projects such as "Echelon", was one of the key GCHQ sites for Tempora.[4]
Operation
The programme's two principal components were named Mastering the Internet and Global Telecoms Exploitation. Data was obtained under secret agreements with commercial companies, described in one document as "intercept partners". Staff were urged to disguise the origin of "special source" material for fear that the companies' role would cause "high-level political fallout".[1] The traffic was filtered using "selectors", search terms such as subjects, telephone numbers and email addresses; some 40,000 were chosen by GCHQ and 31,000 by the NSA. By May 2012, 300 GCHQ analysts and 250 NSA analysts had been assigned to sift the data. The Guardian reported that 850,000 NSA employees and US private contractors with top-secret clearance had access to GCHQ databases.[1] Aldrich writes that in a single day in 2010–11 GCHQ claimed to preside over 39 billion intercept events, and that Tempora meant GCHQ was "producing more metadata than NSA".[5]
In August 2013 Süddeutsche Zeitung and the German broadcaster NDR named seven telecommunications companies said to provide GCHQ with access to cables, along with their GCHQ code names: Verizon ("Dacron"), BT ("Remedy"), Vodafone Cable ("Gerontic"), Global Crossing ("Pinnage"), Level 3 ("Little"), Viatel ("Vitreous") and Interoute ("Streetcar").[6]
Legal basis and oversight
The Guardian reported that GCHQ relied on a clause of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 allowing the Foreign Secretary to sign a certificate for the interception of broad categories of material, as long as one end of the communications is abroad. It reported that GCHQ's compliance with these certificates was audited by the agency itself and that the results were secret. GCHQ lawyers told the Americans in legal briefings: "We have a light oversight regime compared with the US".[1] Aldrich writes that the only British politicians likely to have been briefed extensively on the cable-tapping programmes were three Foreign Secretaries, Jack Straw, David Miliband and William Hague, who were asked to sign off blanket section 8(4) warrants.[2]
The section 8(4) bulk interception regime was challenged by Big Brother Watch and others, who complained about "the scope and magnitude of the electronic surveillance programmes operated by the Government of the United Kingdom". In a Chamber judgment of 13 September 2018 the European Court of Human Rights found that the section 8(4) bulk interception regime, and the regime for obtaining data from communications service providers, had violated Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. On 25 May 2021 its Grand Chamber held, by fifteen votes to two, that the section 8(4) regime violated Article 8, because it lacked sufficient "end-to-end" safeguards. It also held unanimously that Article 10 had been violated through insufficient protection of confidential journalistic material. By twelve votes to five, it found no violation in the regime for receiving intelligence from foreign services.[7] The court's summary does not refer to Tempora by name.[7]
See also
- Government Communications Headquarters
- ECHELON
- Menwith Hill
- Edward Snowden
- Investigatory Powers Tribunal
- Big Brother Watch
Notes
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, "GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's communications", The Guardian, 21 June 2013, accessed 17 November 2026.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency, London: William Collins, 2019 edition (first published 2010), "Who left GCHQ's backdoor open?", p. 536.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency, London: William Collins, 2019 edition (first published 2010), "Who left GCHQ's backdoor open?", p. 525.
- ↑ Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency, London: William Collins, 2019 edition (first published 2010), "Who left GCHQ's backdoor open?", p. 527.
- ↑ Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain's Most Secret Intelligence Agency, London: William Collins, 2019 edition (first published 2010), "Who left GCHQ's backdoor open?", p. 528.
- ↑ Cyrus Farivar, "Seven telcos named as providing fiber optic cable access to UK spies", Ars Technica, 2 August 2013, accessed 17 November 2026.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 European Court of Human Rights, "Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC] – 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15" (PDF), Information Note on the Court's case-law 251, Council of Europe, May 2021, judgment of 25 May 2021, accessed 17 November 2026.