Difference between revisions of "Conflict, Stability and Security Fund"
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The CSSF shifted control of conflict-related spending from the previous joint Conflict Pool (DFID, MoD and FCO) to the National Security Council. This embedded intelligence oversight more deeply: the Intelligence and Security Committee has noted the fund’s strong links to British intelligence agencies, including the Secret Intelligence Service, and its facilitation of funding towards intelligence-related activities. Priorities were set by the NSC to leverage synergies across defence, diplomacy, development, security and intelligence. Activities included human-rights training, strengthening local police and judiciaries, political reconciliation, strategic communications, and support to third parties. The 2018 Fusion Doctrine further promoted a whole-of-government approach, increasing the scope for intelligence influence across departments.<ref name="isc-2023">Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, [https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ISC-Annual-Report-2022-2023.pdf Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2022–2023], 5 December 2023.</ref><ref name="nscr-2018">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf National Security Capability Review – March 2018], March 2018.</ref> | The CSSF shifted control of conflict-related spending from the previous joint Conflict Pool (DFID, MoD and FCO) to the National Security Council. This embedded intelligence oversight more deeply: the Intelligence and Security Committee has noted the fund’s strong links to British intelligence agencies, including the Secret Intelligence Service, and its facilitation of funding towards intelligence-related activities. Priorities were set by the NSC to leverage synergies across defence, diplomacy, development, security and intelligence. Activities included human-rights training, strengthening local police and judiciaries, political reconciliation, strategic communications, and support to third parties. The 2018 Fusion Doctrine further promoted a whole-of-government approach, increasing the scope for intelligence influence across departments.<ref name="isc-2023">Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, [https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ISC-Annual-Report-2022-2023.pdf Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2022–2023], 5 December 2023.</ref><ref name="nscr-2018">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf National Security Capability Review – March 2018], March 2018.</ref> | ||
| + | The 2022–2023 annual report lists the “Conflict, Security and Stability Fund” (the Committee’s wording) as an expenditure category for the [[Secret Intelligence Service]] in 2021/22, with the amount redacted, and for Homeland Security Group (£2.7 million). It does not itself use the wording “strong links” or describe a general facilitation of intelligence-related funding. The Fusion Doctrine point is supported by the National Security Capability Review already cited, and by the Committee’s later ''Annual Report 2023–2025'', which discusses the introduction of the Fusion Doctrine in 2018 and the dispersal of national-security responsibilities beyond the organisations listed in the memorandum of understanding; that discussion is not in the 2022–2023 annual report.<ref name="isc-2023" /><ref name="nscr-2018" /><ref name="isc-2025-fusion">Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, ''Annual Report 2023–2025'', HC 1544, 15 December 2025, paragraphs 101–102.</ref> | ||
== History and scale == | == History and scale == | ||
Revision as of 12:35, 10 November 2026
UK cross-government fund (2015–2024) for addressing conflict, instability and threats to national security overseas; replaced by the Integrated Security Fund
| Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
| |
|---|---|
| Type | Government fund |
| Dissolved | 1 April 2024 |
| Headquarters | London |
The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) was a cross-government fund established on 1 April 2015 to address conflict, instability and threats to UK national security overseas. It integrated resources from defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence in support of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. The fund was overseen by the National Security Council, with the National Security Adviser as Senior Responsible Officer. Approximately half its budget was classified as official development assistance (ODA). On 1 April 2024 it was renamed the Integrated Security Fund, incorporating additional cyber and economic-deterrence elements.[1][2]
Governance and purpose
The CSSF shifted control of conflict-related spending from the previous joint Conflict Pool (DFID, MoD and FCO) to the National Security Council. This embedded intelligence oversight more deeply: the Intelligence and Security Committee has noted the fund’s strong links to British intelligence agencies, including the Secret Intelligence Service, and its facilitation of funding towards intelligence-related activities. Priorities were set by the NSC to leverage synergies across defence, diplomacy, development, security and intelligence. Activities included human-rights training, strengthening local police and judiciaries, political reconciliation, strategic communications, and support to third parties. The 2018 Fusion Doctrine further promoted a whole-of-government approach, increasing the scope for intelligence influence across departments.[3][4] The 2022–2023 annual report lists the “Conflict, Security and Stability Fund” (the Committee’s wording) as an expenditure category for the Secret Intelligence Service in 2021/22, with the amount redacted, and for Homeland Security Group (£2.7 million). It does not itself use the wording “strong links” or describe a general facilitation of intelligence-related funding. The Fusion Doctrine point is supported by the National Security Capability Review already cited, and by the Committee’s later Annual Report 2023–2025, which discusses the introduction of the Fusion Doctrine in 2018 and the dispersal of national-security responsibilities beyond the organisations listed in the memorandum of understanding; that discussion is not in the 2022–2023 annual report.[3][4][5]
History and scale
The fund replaced the Conflict Pool and represented a significant increase in resources. In 2015/16 the allocation was £1.033 billion (roughly 50% ODA), with major early transfers from the DFID budget administered largely by the FCO. Annual budgets thereafter typically exceeded £1 billion until later reductions. Top programme areas consistently included Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, and refugee-related work in Jordan and Lebanon. The fund operated in more than 40 countries. Critics, including the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, described elements of it as opaque and potentially functioning as a “slush fund.” Independent Commission for Aid Impact reviews examined effectiveness and accountability. Detailed contractor-level breakdowns have never been fully published for security reasons; known recipients and programme summaries appear in annual reports, parliamentary answers and investigative reporting.[6][7]
Selected annual figures
| Year | Approximate allocation | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2015/16 | £1.033 billion | ~50% ODA; Syria ~£60m, Afghanistan ~£90m |
| 2016/17 | £1.127 billion | 48% ODA; Syria £64m, Somalia £33.5m |
| 2017/18 | £1.194 billion | 51% ODA |
| 2018/19 | £1.25 billion | 52% ODA |
| 2019/20 | £1.28 billion | 50% ODA |
| 2020/21 | £1.37 billion | 49% ODA |
| 2021/22 | £858.6 million | 40.4% ODA |
| 2022/23 | £830 million | Ukraine response intensified |
| 2023/24 | £850 million | Final year before transition to ISF |
Figures drawn from parliamentary statements and CSSF annual reports; exact totals and ODA percentages vary slightly by source.[8][9]
The CSSF was a principal funding vehicle for UK support to Syrian opposition entities, stabilisation and strategic communications. Declassified UK has reported that the UK spent approximately £350 million promoting regime-change-related activity in Syria. Funding supported media and communications work for the moderate armed opposition (including Free Syrian Army press-office functions), civil-defence capacity (via Mayday Rescue / White Helmets), and contractors such as Incostrat, ARK Group / Ark FZC, Adam Smith International and Albany Associates. Government framing emphasised civilian protection and counter-Daesh work; critics characterised substantial elements as information operations and opposition-support programming aligned with National Security Council priorities. The Guardian reported in 2016 on the use of the fund for the “propaganda war” against Isis and related communications activity.[10][11]
Related units and complementary activity
The CSSF funded or complemented a range of information, communications and counter-disinformation capabilities, including:
- National Security Communications Team (NSCT) – targeted national-security messaging; CSSF funding (e.g. £2.87 million in 2021/22).
- Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell (CDCC) – UK-led effort against Daesh narratives.
- Russian Language Programme / Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme (CDMD) – CSSF funding of £60.4 million (2017–2021) reported by Declassified UK.
- Information Threats and Influence Directorate (ITID) – later consolidation; £17.33 million CSSF in 2023/24.
- Alignment with Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU), 77th Brigade, Rapid Response Unit and Counter Disinformation Unit activities (direct CSSF funding of the latter units was limited or not itemised).
These sat within the broader Fusion Doctrine approach.[9][12]
Known recipients and contractors
The following have been identified in official summaries, parliamentary answers or investigative reporting as receiving CSSF (or closely related) funding. The list is incomplete because of security classifications and aggregated reporting:
- Adam Smith International
- Albany Associates
- ARK Group / Ark FZC
- Incostrat
- Mayday Rescue / White Helmets
- Mercy Corps
- Search for Common Ground
- Torchlight
- Westminster Foundation for Democracy
- Norwegian Refugee Council
- HALO Trust
- Various UN, OSCE, NATO and IAEA channels
Syria-focused contractors (Incostrat, ARK, Mayday, Albany, Adam Smith International) are the most extensively documented in leaked tender documents and subsequent reporting.[11][10]
Scrutiny and criticism
The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s 2017 report highlighted opacity in objectives and achievements, limited project disclosure, and concerns that the fund could function as a slush fund. It recommended stronger Cabinet Office ministerial oversight. ICAI reviews examined aid effectiveness and the integration of development and security objectives. Transparency advocates and investigative outlets have repeatedly noted the difficulty of tracing specific contractor payments and the dual-use character of some strategic-communications work. Government responses have emphasised the necessity of classification for national-security reasons and the value of flexible, cross-government instruments.[7][13]
Strategic communications: procurement and evidence
The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office's 2023–2027 framework separated media development and outreach (Lot 1) from counter-terrorism, countering violent extremism and strategic communications (Lot 2). The published Lot 2 value was £600 million within a £3 billion maximum framework: a framework envelope, not money paid to any company. Names of 37 Lot 2 suppliers were withheld on national-security grounds. Appointment to another lot does not establish membership of the redacted lot.[14]
| Programme | Period | Figure | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| Integrity Initiative | 2018–19 | £1,961,000 | Announced FCO funding, not a framework award.[15][16] |
| Lebanon social-stability communications, ITT 2959 | 2019–21 | Up to £2.1m | Ceiling in leaked requirements; not evidence of spending or the winning bidder.[17] |
| Lebanon counter-Daesh communications, ITT 2348 | July 2018–March 2021 | £1.2–1.5m | Planning range in a separate leaked tender.[18] |
| Global Coalition against Daesh analysis | June 2023–March 2025 | £489,600 | Published contract award associated with The Global Strategy Network company number 10433562.[19] |
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's stated objectives in the Lebanon tender were to reduce community tensions and violent-extremist influence. Its requirements imposed UK-law compliance, conflict sensitivity and duty of care as well as restrictions on publicity. Those provisions do not by themselves demonstrate compliance, breach or effectiveness.[17][18]
Syria review and official response
In May 2020 Middle East Eye reported a 2016 internal review of five Syria communications programmes, with combined UK budgets of £9.6 million in 2015–16. It described weaknesses in analysis, coordination and scrutiny and a “major risk” of activities contravening UK law. The report was not a judicial finding of illegality. It also acknowledged some effective delivery; the FCO declined detailed questions.[20] In September 2020 the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office declined to discuss the reported hack but reiterated its support for elements of the Syrian moderate opposition against both Bashar al-Assad and Daesh.[21]
See also
- Integrated Security Fund
- National Security Council (United Kingdom)
- Fusion Doctrine
- Secret Intelligence Service
- Incostrat
- ARK Group
- Mayday Rescue
- White Helmets
- FCO Programme spending 2015
- FCO Programme spending 2016
- FCDO Programme spending 2021
- FCDO Programme spending 2022
External links
- CSSF overview (gov.uk)
- CSSF programme summaries
- Integrated Security Fund
- Declassified UK, July 2021
- Guardian, May 2016
- Global Justice Now, The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, December 2017
Notes
- ↑ UK Parliament, Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement, Financial Year 2015-16 : Written statement - HCWS392, 12 March 2015.
- ↑ UK Government, About us - UK Integrated Security Fund, accessed 10 October 2026.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2022–2023, 5 December 2023.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 UK Government, National Security Capability Review – March 2018, March 2018.
- ↑ Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Annual Report 2023–2025, HC 1544, 15 December 2025, paragraphs 101–102.
- ↑ Ben Gummer, Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015 /16 and settlement for 2016 /17 : Written statement - HCWS123 UK Parliament, 21 July 2016.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Karen McVeigh, Secrecy around £1bn aid and security fund raises ‘significant concern’, say MPs The Guardian, 7 February 2017.
- ↑ UK Government, CSSF Annual Report 2017 to 2018.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 UK Government, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024, 5 December 2024.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Declassified UK, Revealed: The UK has spent £350-million promoting regime change in Syria, 20 July 2021.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 Ian Cobain, Alice Ross, Rob Evans and Mona Mahmood, How Britain funds the ‘propaganda war’ against Isis in Syria The Guardian, 3 May 2016.
- ↑ Declassified UK reporting on CDMD and related programmes.
- ↑ Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, HC 208, 6 February 2017.
- ↑ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund Framework Agreement (2023–2027), notice 2023/S 000-029743, 9 October 2023, accessed 8 November 2026.
- ↑ Billy Briggs, The Ferret, Scottish charity watchdog damns group that attacked integrity of politicians, 5 November 2019, accessed 8 November 2026.
- ↑ Alan Duncan, UK Parliament, Written answer 198811: Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Integrity Initiative, 10 December 2018, accessed 8 November 2026.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Fostering Social Stability through Strategic Communications, Statement of Requirements, ITT 2959, 2019, pp. 1–5; leaked document published by Anonymous in 2020–21. Bid values and targets are not proof of award, payment or implementation.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, C-Daesh Comms Campaign Lebanon – Statement of Requirements, Attachment 02, ITT 2348, 2018, paras 3, 16–24, 35 and 44–52; leaked document published by Anonymous in 2020–21. Bid values and targets are not proof of award, payment or implementation.
- ↑ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Contracts Finder, CSSF: Global Coalition against Daesh Analysis, 21 June 2023, accessed 8 November 2026.
- ↑ Ian Cobain and Alice Ross, Middle East Eye, EXCLUSIVE: British propaganda efforts in Syria may have broken UK law, 11 May 2020, accessed 8 November 2026.
- ↑ Ian Cobain, Middle East Eye, EXCLUSIVE: UK government probing cyber-attack over Syria propaganda leaks, 28 September 2020, accessed 8 November 2026.