Difference between revisions of "Psyops"
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| − | [[Psyops]] or '''Psychological Operations''' are initiatives which convey information to audiences in order to alter their thinking and behaviour. Also known as '''Military Information Support Operations''' or '''MISO''' in the U.S., Psyops work by manipulating the emotions, motivations, and objective reasoning of the audience it is directed at. The purpose of Psyops is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviours in its targets that are beneficial to the sponsor organisation<ref>Military.com, [http://www.military.com/ContentFiles/techtv_update_PSYOPS.htm PSYOPS], Military.com website, accessed 16 March 2015</ref>. | + | [[Psyops]] or '''Psychological Operations''' are initiatives which convey information to audiences in order to alter their thinking and behaviour. Also known as '''Military Information Support Operations''' or '''MISO''' in the U.S., Psyops work by manipulating the emotions, motivations, and objective reasoning of the audience it is directed at. The purpose of Psyops is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviours in its targets that are beneficial to the sponsor organisation<ref>[[Military.com]], [http://www.military.com/ContentFiles/techtv_update_PSYOPS.htm PSYOPS], [[Military.com]] website, accessed 16 March 2015</ref>. |
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| − | As a technique of [[Propaganda]], Psyops can also be subject to similar classification systems depending on the degree of transparency of the source. If the correct sponsor of the Psychological Operations is disclosed to its audience, it can be considered [[White Propaganda]]. If a Psyops campaign is carried out without identifying or by actively obscuring the source of the campaign, it can be considered [[Grey Propaganda]]. When Psychological Operations are sponsored by one source, but are deceptively claiming to be from another, they can be considered [[Black Propaganda]]. In all of these instances, the information conveyed as part of the Psychological Operations can be true or false<ref>Debra Kelly (2014), [http://knowledgenuts.com/2014/02/12/the-difference-between-gray-white-and-black-propaganda/ The Difference Between Gray, White And Black Propaganda], KnowledgeNuts website, 12 February 2014, accessed 17 March 2015</ref>. | + | As a technique of [[Propaganda]], Psyops can also be subject to similar classification systems depending on the degree of transparency of the source. If the correct sponsor of the Psychological Operations is disclosed to its audience, it can be considered [[White Propaganda]]. If a Psyops campaign is carried out without identifying or by actively obscuring the source of the campaign, it can be considered [[Grey Propaganda]]. When Psychological Operations are sponsored by one source, but are deceptively claiming to be from another, they can be considered [[Black Propaganda]]. In all of these instances, the information conveyed as part of the Psychological Operations can be true or false<ref>[[Debra Kelly]] (2014), [http://knowledgenuts.com/2014/02/12/the-difference-between-gray-white-and-black-propaganda/ The Difference Between Gray, White And Black Propaganda], KnowledgeNuts website, 12 February 2014, accessed 17 March 2015</ref>. |
| − | Psychological Operations are often a key aspect of many nations’ military strategies during both peace and wartime. From a military perspective Psyops can work to crush the morale of enemy troops, reduce their combat efficiency, and sow dissidence within their ranks. Effective Psyops initiatives can also promote resistance in a civilian population against a hostile Government or enhance the image of a foreign power <ref name="Psyops">Frank Goldstein and Benjamin Findley, ed., (1996), [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/goldstein/goldstein_b18.pdf Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies], Alabama: Air University Press</ref>. | + | Psychological Operations are often a key aspect of many nations’ military strategies during both peace and wartime. From a military perspective Psyops can work to crush the morale of enemy troops, reduce their combat efficiency, and sow dissidence within their ranks. Effective Psyops initiatives can also promote resistance in a civilian population against a hostile Government or enhance the image of a foreign power <ref name="Psyops">[[Frank Goldstein]] and [[Benjamin Findley]], ed., (1996), [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/goldstein/goldstein_b18.pdf Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies], Alabama: [[Air University Press]]</ref>. |
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| − | '''Consolidation Psychological Operations''' aim to aid friendly civil and military forces strengthen their influence over an environment. This can include maintaining law and order, re-establishing governance, and aiding with disaster relief in both occupied and liberated areas<ref name="psywarrior">Ed Rouse, [http://www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html Psychological Operations/Warfare], Psywarrior website, accessed 17 March 2015</ref>. | + | '''Consolidation Psychological Operations''' aim to aid friendly civil and military forces strengthen their influence over an environment. This can include maintaining law and order, re-establishing governance, and aiding with disaster relief in both occupied and liberated areas<ref name="psywarrior">[[Ed Rouse]], [http://www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html Psychological Operations/Warfare], Psywarrior website, accessed 17 March 2015</ref>. |
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9) Posttesting; evaluating the response of the target audience | 9) Posttesting; evaluating the response of the target audience | ||
| − | 10) Feedback to inform future Psyop ventures<ref name="DOTA">Department of the Army (2005), [http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-30.pdf Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations], Federation of American Scientists website, 15 April 2005, accessed 26 March 2015. Washington, DC: Department of the Army</ref>. | + | 10) Feedback to inform future Psyop ventures<ref name="DOTA">[[United States Department of the Army|Department of the Army]] (2005), [http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-30.pdf Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations], [[Federation of American Scientists]] website, 15 April 2005, accessed 26 March 2015. Washington, DC: [[United States Department of the Army|Department of the Army]]</ref>. |
| − | == | + | ==Examples recorded in 2010–15== |
===United Kingdom=== | ===United Kingdom=== | ||
---- | ---- | ||
| + | |||
| + | ====Northern Ireland: terminology and disputed evidence==== | ||
| + | [[Image:Chap181.jpg|400px|thumb|right|Information organisations in Northern Ireland in January 1972, from the [[Bloody Sunday Inquiry]] report.]] | ||
| + | The [[Bloody Sunday Inquiry]] reported that the [[Information Liaison Department]] was replaced in or about September 1971 by the [[Information Policy Unit]], headed by Colonel [[Maurice Tugwell]], with [[INQ 1873 (Bloody Sunday Inquiry)|INQ 1873]] as his deputy.<ref>[[Bloody Sunday Inquiry]], [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7b7b6140f0b645ba3c49e4/0029_ix.pdf Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Volume IX], 15 June 2010, chapter 178, paras 178.6–178.7.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Colin Wallace]] told the inquiry that the unit combined liaison between the Army press room and operations network, counter-propaganda using white information, and a deniable role involving black operations. [[Maurice Tugwell|Tugwell]], [[INQ 1873 (Bloody Sunday Inquiry)|INQ 1873]] and [[Hugh Mooney]] denied that the unit disseminated dishonest or misleading information. The report noted that the disagreement depended substantially on competing definitions of psyops.<ref>[[Bloody Sunday Inquiry]], [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7b7b6140f0b645ba3c49e4/0029_ix.pdf Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Volume IX], 15 June 2010, chapter 178, paras 178.25–178.26. citing Wallace’s evidence, Day 235/139 and 235/147; Day 235/154–155; Day 236/142; and Tugwell, Day 240/72.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]] draws attention to July 1971 terms of reference instructing staff to use the designation [[G (Liaison) Staff]] rather than psyops. He treats such naming practices as part of a wider attempt to distance military communications from the associations of propaganda.<ref name="Miller2015">[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/Miller-Sociology%20and%20propaganda-in%20Dawson%20et%20al-2015-AFC.pdf Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations], in [[Matt Dawson]], [[Bridget Fowler]], [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]] and [[Andrew Smith]] (eds), ''Stretching the Sociological Imagination: Essays in Honour of [[John Eldridge]]'', Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp.163–188, doi:10.1057/9781137493644_9 (author’s final copy).</ref> The inquiry itself recorded that Tugwell’s note of 24 January 1972 recommended avoiding the word psyops because of its sinister connotations. It also reproduced a passage stating that isolated black-propaganda exercises were not excluded, but required authorisation by the [[Military Information Policy Committee]].<ref>[[Bloody Sunday Inquiry]], [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7b7b6140f0b645ba3c49e4/0029_ix.pdf Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Volume IX], 15 June 2010, chapter 178, paras 178.27–178.29. underlying note G70C.441.9; oral evidence Day 241/111–112.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | These general policy provisions should be distinguished from the inquiry’s findings about [[Bloody Sunday]]. It found no evidence that the committee authorised black activity in relation to that day. With the exception of a possible false rumour about an Army incursion into the Creggan, it found no evidence of advance plans to spread false information. Although describing later inaccurate information about casualties as highly regrettable, it found no evidence that military-information personnel knowingly disseminated false information about Bloody Sunday.<ref>[[Bloody Sunday Inquiry]], [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7b7b6140f0b645ba3c49e4/0029_ix.pdf Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Volume IX], 15 June 2010, chapter 178, paras 178.30 and 178.74.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ====The 1973 Chiefs of Staff note==== | ||
| + | In his account of [[B. G. T. Stanbridge]]’s note COS 17/73, dated 6 April 1973, [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]] reports a definition of psyops encompassing planned activity directed at enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in peace and war. His account describes strategic psyops as a continuing activity with a high political content, involving the [[Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee (Ancillary Measures)]], the [[Ministry of Defence]] and [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office]] departments including the [[Information Research Department]].<ref>[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/Miller-Sociology%20and%20propaganda-in%20Dawson%20et%20al-2015-AFC.pdf Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations], 2015, section “A situation of great political delicacy”, citing [[B. G. T. Stanbridge]], “Psychological Operations – Note by the Secretary”, [[Chiefs of Staff Committee]], COS 17/73, 6 April 1973, Annex A, pp.A-1–A-2, as cited by Miller. The original note is cited here through Miller’s chapter.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | Miller reports that the note described psyops work in Malaya, Borneo and Oman. He also reports that its Northern Ireland establishment comprised a colonel and a lieutenant-colonel at [[Headquarters Northern Ireland]] and a major at [[8 Infantry Brigade]], employed on information-policy matters. Miller argues that the note’s broad definition and staffing account challenge witnesses’ narrower use of the term psyops.<ref>[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/Miller-Sociology%20and%20propaganda-in%20Dawson%20et%20al-2015-AFC.pdf Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations], 2015, section “A situation of great political delicacy”, citing [[B. G. T. Stanbridge]], “Psychological Operations – Note by the Secretary”, [[Chiefs of Staff Committee]], COS 17/73, 6 April 1973, Annex A, as discussed by Miller. The original note is cited here through Miller’s chapter.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ====Army Information Teams==== | ||
| + | According to [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]]’s account of COS 17/73, psyops teams in Hong Kong and Oman were publicly described as '''[[Army Information Teams]]''' for reasons of local expediency. The note, as reported by Miller, dated the Oman team’s presence from September 1971. It also required selected posts to be held by personnel who had taken a five-day psyops course at the [[Joint Warfare Establishment]], while other posts required a psyops briefing.<ref>[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/Miller-Sociology%20and%20propaganda-in%20Dawson%20et%20al-2015-AFC.pdf Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations], 2015, section “A situation of great political delicacy”, citing [[B. G. T. Stanbridge]], “Psychological Operations – Note by the Secretary”, [[Chiefs of Staff Committee]], COS 17/73, 6 April 1973, Annex A, p.A-4, as cited by Miller. The original note is cited here through Miller’s chapter.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
====15 Psychological Operations Group==== | ====15 Psychological Operations Group==== | ||
| − | The British were one of the first nation-state powers to effectively utilise Psychological Operations during both the First and Second World Wars. In the | + | The British were one of the first nation-state powers to effectively utilise Psychological Operations during both the First and Second World Wars. In the 2010 account of the [[British Army]] cited here, Psyops initiatives are handled by the [[15 Psychological Operations Group]], a joint service organisation, with personnel from the [[Royal Navy]], [[British Army|Army]] and [[Royal Air Force]]. The Group was formed directly after the Gulf War in 1991, and comprises over 150 personnel, approximately 75 from the regular Armed Services and 75 from the Reserves. The Psychological Operations Group supports deployed commanders in the provision of Psychological Operations in operational and tactical environments<ref>[[Royal Navy]], [http://web.archive.org/web/20100702002020/http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/psychological-ops-group Psychological Ops Group], [[Ministry of Defence]] website, archived via the Internet Archive on 02 July 2010, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. |
====77th Brigade==== | ====77th Brigade==== | ||
| − | + | A January 2015 report described the [[15 Psychological Operations Group]] as becoming one of the sub-units of the [[77th Brigade]], formerly the [[Security Assistance Group]], which has been created to deal with the evolving nature of modern conflicts, recognising that modern battlefields are affected by by a variety of non-violent measures<ref>[[Ewen MacAskill]], [http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/31/british-army-facebook-warriors-77th-brigade British army creates team of Facebook warriors], ''The Guardian'' website, 31 January 2015, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. | |
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===United States=== | ===United States=== | ||
---- | ---- | ||
| − | Since 2010, U.S. Psychological Operations have been known as Military Information Support Operations (MISO)<ref>Craig Whitlock (2013), [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/somali-american-caught-up-in-a-shadowy-pentagon-counterpropaganda-campaign/2013/07/07/b3aca190-d2c5-11e2-bc43-c404c3269c73_story_2.html Somali American caught up in a shadowy Pentagon counterpropaganda campaign], ''Washington Post'' website, 07 July 2013, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. U.S. Psyop forces are forbidden to target U.S. citizens at any time, in any global location, under any circumstances (except to provide public information to aid natural disaster relief)<ref name="DOTA"/>. | + | Since 2010, U.S. Psychological Operations have been known as Military Information Support Operations (MISO)<ref>[[Craig Whitlock]] (2013), [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/somali-american-caught-up-in-a-shadowy-pentagon-counterpropaganda-campaign/2013/07/07/b3aca190-d2c5-11e2-bc43-c404c3269c73_story_2.html Somali American caught up in a shadowy Pentagon counterpropaganda campaign], ''[[Washington Post]]'' website, 07 July 2013, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. U.S. Psyop forces are forbidden to target U.S. citizens at any time, in any global location, under any circumstances (except to provide public information to aid natural disaster relief)<ref name="DOTA"/>. |
====2nd Psychological Operations Group==== | ====2nd Psychological Operations Group==== | ||
| − | Formed on the 29 October 1965, the [[2nd Psychological Operations Group]] is a Psyops Unit of the United States Army Reserve. When called to active duty, it supports the 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne) in deploying anywhere in the world on short notice; planning, developing, and conducting Psyops to help benefit U.S. troops, coalition forces, or other government agencies as directed by the [[Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command]]<ref>Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/2psyopgp.htm 2nd Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)], Global Security website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. | + | Formed on the 29 October 1965, the [[2nd Psychological Operations Group]] is a Psyops Unit of the [[United States Army Reserve]]. When called to active duty, it supports the [[4th Military Information Support Group]] (Airborne) in deploying anywhere in the world on short notice; planning, developing, and conducting Psyops to help benefit U.S. troops, coalition forces, or other government agencies as directed by the [[Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command]]<ref>[[GlobalSecurity.org|Global Security]], [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/2psyopgp.htm 2nd Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)], [[GlobalSecurity.org|Global Security]] website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. |
====7th Psychological Operations Group==== | ====7th Psychological Operations Group==== | ||
| − | Formed on 19 August 1965, the [[7th Psychological Operations Group]] is a Psyops unit of the United States Army Reserve. When called to active duty, it supports the 4th Information Support Group (Airborne) in deploying anywhere in the world on short notice; planning, developing, and conducting Psyops to help benefit U.S. troops, coalition forces, or other government agencies as directed by the [[Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command]]<ref>Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/7psyopgp.htm 7th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)], Global Security website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. | + | Formed on 19 August 1965, the [[7th Psychological Operations Group]] is a Psyops unit of the [[United States Army Reserve]]. When called to active duty, it supports the 4th Information Support Group (Airborne) in deploying anywhere in the world on short notice; planning, developing, and conducting Psyops to help benefit U.S. troops, coalition forces, or other government agencies as directed by the [[Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command]]<ref>[[GlobalSecurity.org|Global Security]], [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/7psyopgp.htm 7th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)], [[GlobalSecurity.org|Global Security]] website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. |
====4th Military Information Support Group==== | ====4th Military Information Support Group==== | ||
| − | Formed on 07 November 1967, the [[4th Military Information Support Group]] (Airborne) is an active Psychological Operations unit of the United States Army, alongside the 8th Military Information Support Group (Airborne). The Group currently has around 1000 active service personnel. The unit is part of the [[United States Army Special Operations Command]] (USASOC), the organisation charged with overseeing the various special operations forces of the United States Army based, which is currently based at Fort Bragg, NC. | + | Formed on 07 November 1967, the [[4th Military Information Support Group]] (Airborne) is an active Psychological Operations unit of the [[United States Army]], alongside the [[8th Military Information Support Group]] (Airborne). The Group currently has around 1000 active service personnel. The unit is part of the [[United States Army Special Operations Command]] (USASOC), the organisation charged with overseeing the various special operations forces of the [[United States Army]] based, which is currently based at Fort Bragg, NC. |
| − | The 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne) personnel include regional experts and linguists who understand the political, cultural ethnic, and religious subtleties of the target audience. They also include functional experts in technical fields such as broadcast journalism radio operations, print, illustration, interrogation layout operations, and long-range tactical communications. | + | The [[4th Military Information Support Group]] (Airborne) personnel include regional experts and linguists who understand the political, cultural ethnic, and religious subtleties of the target audience. They also include functional experts in technical fields such as broadcast journalism radio operations, print, illustration, interrogation layout operations, and long-range tactical communications. |
| − | The Group had a distinguished record during the Vietnam conflict, where the unit provided tactical support for allied operations and took part in 11 strategic campaigns against North Vietnam, including the Tet Counteroffensive. The Group provided Psyops support in both Grenada for [[Operation Urgent Fury]] and Panama for [[Operation Just Cause]]. During [[Operation Desert Shield]] and [[Operation Desert Storm]], the 4th Military Information Support Group provided Psyops support to coalition troops fighting Iraqi forces in southern Iraq and Kuwait. The Group subsequently provided Psychological Operations support to missions ranging from humanitarian assistance, like [[Operation Provide Promise]] in Bosnia-Herzegovina and peace keeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Group was heavily engaged in the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and other areas throughout the globe<ref>Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/4psyopgp.htm 4th Military Information Support Operations Group (Airborne)] Global Security website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. | + | The Group had a distinguished record during the Vietnam conflict, where the unit provided tactical support for allied operations and took part in 11 strategic campaigns against North Vietnam, including the Tet Counteroffensive. The Group provided Psyops support in both Grenada for [[Operation Urgent Fury]] and Panama for [[Operation Just Cause]]. During [[Operation Desert Shield]] and [[Operation Desert Storm]], the [[4th Military Information Support Group]] provided Psyops support to coalition troops fighting Iraqi forces in southern Iraq and Kuwait. The Group subsequently provided Psychological Operations support to missions ranging from humanitarian assistance, like [[Operation Provide Promise]] in Bosnia-Herzegovina and peace keeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Group was heavily engaged in the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and other areas throughout the globe<ref>[[GlobalSecurity.org|Global Security]], [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/4psyopgp.htm 4th Military Information Support Operations Group (Airborne)] [[GlobalSecurity.org|Global Security]] website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. |
====8th Military Information Support Group==== | ====8th Military Information Support Group==== | ||
| − | Formed on 26 August 2011, the [[8th Military Information Support Group]] (Airborne) is an active Psychological Operations unit of the United States Army, alongside the 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne). The Group currently has around 1070 active service personnel. The unit was created as part of the restructuring of Military Information Support Operations within the United States Army Special Operations Command. | + | Formed on 26 August 2011, the [[8th Military Information Support Group]] (Airborne) is an active Psychological Operations unit of the [[United States Army]], alongside the [[4th Military Information Support Group]] (Airborne). The Group currently has around 1070 active service personnel. The unit was created as part of the restructuring of Military Information Support Operations within the [[United States Army Special Operations Command]]. |
| − | The Group has been commissioned with helping to provide Psychological Operations support to geographic combatant commanders, special operations task forces, and U.S. ambassadors. The Group has yet to see active service in any major military campaigns yet<ref>Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/8psyopgp.htm 8th Military Information Support Operations Group (Airborne) (Provisional)], Global Security website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. | + | The Group has been commissioned with helping to provide Psychological Operations support to geographic combatant commanders, special operations task forces, and U.S. ambassadors. The Group has yet to see active service in any major military campaigns yet<ref>[[GlobalSecurity.org|Global Security]], [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/8psyopgp.htm 8th Military Information Support Operations Group (Airborne) (Provisional)], [[GlobalSecurity.org|Global Security]] website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. |
====Commando Solo==== | ====Commando Solo==== | ||
| − | The [[Air National Guard]] provides support for Psychological Operations using a modified C-130 Hercules aircraft named EC-130 [[Commando Solo|COMMANDO SOLO]], operated by the [[193d Special Operations Wing]]. The purpose of COMMANDO SOLO is to provide an aerial platform for broadcast media on both television and radio. The media broadcast is created by various agencies and organisations. As part of the broader function of information operations, COMMANDO SOLO can also jam the enemy's Psychological Warfare broadcasts<ref>Christopher Lamb, Paris Genalis (2005), [http://fas.org/irp/eprint/lamb.pdf Review of Psychological Operations: Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience], September 2005, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Federation of American Scientists website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. | + | The [[Air National Guard]] provides support for Psychological Operations using a modified C-130 Hercules aircraft named EC-130 [[Commando Solo|COMMANDO SOLO]], operated by the [[193d Special Operations Wing]]. The purpose of COMMANDO SOLO is to provide an aerial platform for broadcast media on both television and radio. The media broadcast is created by various agencies and organisations. As part of the broader function of information operations, COMMANDO SOLO can also jam the enemy's Psychological Warfare broadcasts<ref>[[Christopher Lamb]], [[Paris Genalis]] (2005), [http://fas.org/irp/eprint/lamb.pdf Review of Psychological Operations: Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience], September 2005, Washington, DC: [[National Defense University|National Defense University Press]]. [[Federation of American Scientists]] website, accessed 26 March 2015</ref>. |
==Resources== | ==Resources== | ||
| − | *Military.com, [http://www.military.com/ContentFiles/techtv_update_PSYOPS.htm PSYOPS]: Defining US Psyops | + | *[[Military.com]], [http://www.military.com/ContentFiles/techtv_update_PSYOPS.htm PSYOPS]: Defining US Psyops |
| − | * Frank Goldstein and Benjamin Findley, ed., (1996), [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/goldstein/goldstein_b18.pdf Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies]: Broad review of US Military view on Psyops | + | * [[Frank Goldstein]] and [[Benjamin Findley]], ed., (1996), [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/goldstein/goldstein_b18.pdf Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies]: Broad review of US Military view on Psyops |
| − | * | + | *[[Ed Rouse]], [http://www.psywarrior.com/psyhist.html Psychological Operations/Warfare]: Brief look at the history of Psyops |
| − | |||
*Online Psychology Degree, [http://www.online-psychology-degree.com/psyops/ PSYOPS – Wars Are Fought On and Off the Battlefield]: Infographic on Psyops | *Online Psychology Degree, [http://www.online-psychology-degree.com/psyops/ PSYOPS – Wars Are Fought On and Off the Battlefield]: Infographic on Psyops | ||
| − | *Jon Kelly, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7464430.stm The secret world of 'psy-ops']: Article exploring modern British Psyops | + | *[[Jon Kelly]], [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7464430.stm The secret world of 'psy-ops']: Article exploring modern British Psyops |
| − | *Harold Kennedy, [http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/national-defense/psyops-units.htm]: Article discussing the modernisation of U.S. Psyops technology | + | *[[Harold Kennedy]], [http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/national-defense/psyops-units.htm]: Article discussing the modernisation of U.S. Psyops technology |
| + | |||
| + | ==Archival document images== | ||
| + | [[File:Psychological_Operations_in_Northern_Ireland_31_December_1970.jpg|thumb|left|300px|“Psychological Operations in Northern Ireland”, 31 December 1970, NISC 13/9. Bradshaw and Deane reproduce this as Figure 2 (TNA: CJ 4/4248), but their caption describes a Home Office minute of 22 September 1969 enclosing a memo.<ref name="BD2025Figure2">Tancred Bradshaw and Shelley Deane, [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/969438 A Propaganda Failure in the Perimeter: The British in Northern Ireland, c. 1969–82], ''Irish Studies in International Affairs'', vol. 36, no. 2 (ARINS, 2025), Figure 2; TNA: CJ 4/4248, as cited for Figure 2 by Bradshaw and Deane. Accessed 7 November 2026.</ref>]] | ||
| + | [[File:Perimeter_Davies_17_November_1969_DEFE_31_28.jpg|thumb|left|300px|H. E. Davies memorandum on codeword “[[Perimeter (codeword)|PERIMETER]]” and restrictions on sharing information with the Northern Ireland government, 17 November 1969, ref. 19/601/1/2 (TNA: DEFE 31/28).<ref name="BD2025Figure1">Tancred Bradshaw and Shelley Deane, [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/969438 A Propaganda Failure in the Perimeter: The British in Northern Ireland, c. 1969–82], ''Irish Studies in International Affairs'', vol. 36, no. 2 (ARINS, 2025), Figure 1; TNA: DEFE 31/28. Accessed 7 November 2026.</ref>]] | ||
| + | <div style="clear:both"></div> | ||
| + | ==See also== | ||
| + | *[[Perimeter (codeword)|Perimeter]], the handling codeword under which some British papers on Northern Ireland, including the 1970 psychological operations paper shown above, were kept from the Northern Ireland government | ||
| + | *[[Information Policy Unit]] | ||
| + | *[[Information Research Department]] | ||
| + | *[[Northern Ireland Information Service]] | ||
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[[Category:Propaganda]] | [[Category:Propaganda]] | ||
[[Category:Psychological operations]] | [[Category:Psychological operations]] | ||
| − | |||
[[Category:US Propaganda]] | [[Category:US Propaganda]] | ||
[[Category:British Propaganda]] | [[Category:British Propaganda]] | ||
Latest revision as of 12:23, 7 November 2026
| This article is part of the Propaganda Portal project of Spinwatch. |
Psyops or Psychological Operations are initiatives which convey information to audiences in order to alter their thinking and behaviour. Also known as Military Information Support Operations or MISO in the U.S., Psyops work by manipulating the emotions, motivations, and objective reasoning of the audience it is directed at. The purpose of Psyops is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behaviours in its targets that are beneficial to the sponsor organisation[1].
Whilst the two concepts are often used interchangeably, Psychological Warfare (Psywar) refers to an overarching campaign incorporating many different facets, including Psyops, Misinformation, Disinformation and Propaganda; whereas Psychological Operations (Psyops) is used more to describe specific military operations and the tactical units which practice them.
As a technique of Propaganda, Psyops can also be subject to similar classification systems depending on the degree of transparency of the source. If the correct sponsor of the Psychological Operations is disclosed to its audience, it can be considered White Propaganda. If a Psyops campaign is carried out without identifying or by actively obscuring the source of the campaign, it can be considered Grey Propaganda. When Psychological Operations are sponsored by one source, but are deceptively claiming to be from another, they can be considered Black Propaganda. In all of these instances, the information conveyed as part of the Psychological Operations can be true or false[2].
Psychological Operations are often a key aspect of many nations’ military strategies during both peace and wartime. From a military perspective Psyops can work to crush the morale of enemy troops, reduce their combat efficiency, and sow dissidence within their ranks. Effective Psyops initiatives can also promote resistance in a civilian population against a hostile Government or enhance the image of a foreign power [3].
Types of Psyops
Tactical Psychological Operations are addressed toward a specific opposition fighting force in a particular battlefield, aiming to influence their morale, combat effectiveness and behaviour in a short-scale combat situation.
Strategic Psychological Operations are large-scale initiatives that comprise part of a carefully planned long-term campaign. They are directed at much larger target audiences than Tactical Psyops, aiming to influence public opinion.
Consolidation Psychological Operations aim to aid friendly civil and military forces strengthen their influence over an environment. This can include maintaining law and order, re-establishing governance, and aiding with disaster relief in both occupied and liberated areas[4].
Carrying out Psyops
Before modern day Psychological Operations can be authorised, intelligence analysts carefully profile potential targets in order to determine which sections of the population would be the most susceptible and should therefore be targeted. In order to figure this out, intelligence operatives need to determine the vulnerabilities of the target population and what would most affect them, as well as exploring a multitude of other factors like attitudes, motivations, cultural tensions, prejudices and languages. Once the targets have been effectively profiled, the Psyop process can begin.
The Psyop Process
1) Clearly define the mission in terms of national objectives
2) Carry out a Psyop estimation of the current situation
3) Prepare a plan of implementation
4) Select the medium of distribution
5) Product development
6) Pretesting; determining the probable impact upon the target audience
7) Production and dissemination of the Psyop material
8) Implement the plan
9) Posttesting; evaluating the response of the target audience
10) Feedback to inform future Psyop ventures[5].
Examples recorded in 2010–15
United Kingdom
Northern Ireland: terminology and disputed evidence
The Bloody Sunday Inquiry reported that the Information Liaison Department was replaced in or about September 1971 by the Information Policy Unit, headed by Colonel Maurice Tugwell, with INQ 1873 as his deputy.[6]
Colin Wallace told the inquiry that the unit combined liaison between the Army press room and operations network, counter-propaganda using white information, and a deniable role involving black operations. Tugwell, INQ 1873 and Hugh Mooney denied that the unit disseminated dishonest or misleading information. The report noted that the disagreement depended substantially on competing definitions of psyops.[7]
David Miller draws attention to July 1971 terms of reference instructing staff to use the designation G (Liaison) Staff rather than psyops. He treats such naming practices as part of a wider attempt to distance military communications from the associations of propaganda.[8] The inquiry itself recorded that Tugwell’s note of 24 January 1972 recommended avoiding the word psyops because of its sinister connotations. It also reproduced a passage stating that isolated black-propaganda exercises were not excluded, but required authorisation by the Military Information Policy Committee.[9]
These general policy provisions should be distinguished from the inquiry’s findings about Bloody Sunday. It found no evidence that the committee authorised black activity in relation to that day. With the exception of a possible false rumour about an Army incursion into the Creggan, it found no evidence of advance plans to spread false information. Although describing later inaccurate information about casualties as highly regrettable, it found no evidence that military-information personnel knowingly disseminated false information about Bloody Sunday.[10]
The 1973 Chiefs of Staff note
In his account of B. G. T. Stanbridge’s note COS 17/73, dated 6 April 1973, David Miller reports a definition of psyops encompassing planned activity directed at enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in peace and war. His account describes strategic psyops as a continuing activity with a high political content, involving the Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee (Ancillary Measures), the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office departments including the Information Research Department.[11]
Miller reports that the note described psyops work in Malaya, Borneo and Oman. He also reports that its Northern Ireland establishment comprised a colonel and a lieutenant-colonel at Headquarters Northern Ireland and a major at 8 Infantry Brigade, employed on information-policy matters. Miller argues that the note’s broad definition and staffing account challenge witnesses’ narrower use of the term psyops.[12]
Army Information Teams
According to David Miller’s account of COS 17/73, psyops teams in Hong Kong and Oman were publicly described as Army Information Teams for reasons of local expediency. The note, as reported by Miller, dated the Oman team’s presence from September 1971. It also required selected posts to be held by personnel who had taken a five-day psyops course at the Joint Warfare Establishment, while other posts required a psyops briefing.[13]
15 Psychological Operations Group
The British were one of the first nation-state powers to effectively utilise Psychological Operations during both the First and Second World Wars. In the 2010 account of the British Army cited here, Psyops initiatives are handled by the 15 Psychological Operations Group, a joint service organisation, with personnel from the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force. The Group was formed directly after the Gulf War in 1991, and comprises over 150 personnel, approximately 75 from the regular Armed Services and 75 from the Reserves. The Psychological Operations Group supports deployed commanders in the provision of Psychological Operations in operational and tactical environments[14].
77th Brigade
A January 2015 report described the 15 Psychological Operations Group as becoming one of the sub-units of the 77th Brigade, formerly the Security Assistance Group, which has been created to deal with the evolving nature of modern conflicts, recognising that modern battlefields are affected by by a variety of non-violent measures[15].
United States
Since 2010, U.S. Psychological Operations have been known as Military Information Support Operations (MISO)[16]. U.S. Psyop forces are forbidden to target U.S. citizens at any time, in any global location, under any circumstances (except to provide public information to aid natural disaster relief)[5].
2nd Psychological Operations Group
Formed on the 29 October 1965, the 2nd Psychological Operations Group is a Psyops Unit of the United States Army Reserve. When called to active duty, it supports the 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne) in deploying anywhere in the world on short notice; planning, developing, and conducting Psyops to help benefit U.S. troops, coalition forces, or other government agencies as directed by the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command[17].
7th Psychological Operations Group
Formed on 19 August 1965, the 7th Psychological Operations Group is a Psyops unit of the United States Army Reserve. When called to active duty, it supports the 4th Information Support Group (Airborne) in deploying anywhere in the world on short notice; planning, developing, and conducting Psyops to help benefit U.S. troops, coalition forces, or other government agencies as directed by the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command[18].
4th Military Information Support Group
Formed on 07 November 1967, the 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne) is an active Psychological Operations unit of the United States Army, alongside the 8th Military Information Support Group (Airborne). The Group currently has around 1000 active service personnel. The unit is part of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the organisation charged with overseeing the various special operations forces of the United States Army based, which is currently based at Fort Bragg, NC.
The 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne) personnel include regional experts and linguists who understand the political, cultural ethnic, and religious subtleties of the target audience. They also include functional experts in technical fields such as broadcast journalism radio operations, print, illustration, interrogation layout operations, and long-range tactical communications.
The Group had a distinguished record during the Vietnam conflict, where the unit provided tactical support for allied operations and took part in 11 strategic campaigns against North Vietnam, including the Tet Counteroffensive. The Group provided Psyops support in both Grenada for Operation Urgent Fury and Panama for Operation Just Cause. During Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, the 4th Military Information Support Group provided Psyops support to coalition troops fighting Iraqi forces in southern Iraq and Kuwait. The Group subsequently provided Psychological Operations support to missions ranging from humanitarian assistance, like Operation Provide Promise in Bosnia-Herzegovina and peace keeping in Bosnia and Kosovo. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the Group was heavily engaged in the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and other areas throughout the globe[19].
8th Military Information Support Group
Formed on 26 August 2011, the 8th Military Information Support Group (Airborne) is an active Psychological Operations unit of the United States Army, alongside the 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne). The Group currently has around 1070 active service personnel. The unit was created as part of the restructuring of Military Information Support Operations within the United States Army Special Operations Command.
The Group has been commissioned with helping to provide Psychological Operations support to geographic combatant commanders, special operations task forces, and U.S. ambassadors. The Group has yet to see active service in any major military campaigns yet[20].
Commando Solo
The Air National Guard provides support for Psychological Operations using a modified C-130 Hercules aircraft named EC-130 COMMANDO SOLO, operated by the 193d Special Operations Wing. The purpose of COMMANDO SOLO is to provide an aerial platform for broadcast media on both television and radio. The media broadcast is created by various agencies and organisations. As part of the broader function of information operations, COMMANDO SOLO can also jam the enemy's Psychological Warfare broadcasts[21].
Resources
- Military.com, PSYOPS: Defining US Psyops
- Frank Goldstein and Benjamin Findley, ed., (1996), Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies: Broad review of US Military view on Psyops
- Ed Rouse, Psychological Operations/Warfare: Brief look at the history of Psyops
- Online Psychology Degree, PSYOPS – Wars Are Fought On and Off the Battlefield: Infographic on Psyops
- Jon Kelly, The secret world of 'psy-ops': Article exploring modern British Psyops
- Harold Kennedy, [1]: Article discussing the modernisation of U.S. Psyops technology
Archival document images
See also
- Perimeter, the handling codeword under which some British papers on Northern Ireland, including the 1970 psychological operations paper shown above, were kept from the Northern Ireland government
- Information Policy Unit
- Information Research Department
- Northern Ireland Information Service
Notes
- ↑ Military.com, PSYOPS, Military.com website, accessed 16 March 2015
- ↑ Debra Kelly (2014), The Difference Between Gray, White And Black Propaganda, KnowledgeNuts website, 12 February 2014, accessed 17 March 2015
- ↑ Frank Goldstein and Benjamin Findley, ed., (1996), Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies, Alabama: Air University Press
- ↑ Ed Rouse, Psychological Operations/Warfare, Psywarrior website, accessed 17 March 2015
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Department of the Army (2005), Field Manual 3-05.30: Psychological Operations, Federation of American Scientists website, 15 April 2005, accessed 26 March 2015. Washington, DC: Department of the Army
- ↑ Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Volume IX, 15 June 2010, chapter 178, paras 178.6–178.7.
- ↑ Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Volume IX, 15 June 2010, chapter 178, paras 178.25–178.26. citing Wallace’s evidence, Day 235/139 and 235/147; Day 235/154–155; Day 236/142; and Tugwell, Day 240/72.
- ↑ David Miller, Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations, in Matt Dawson, Bridget Fowler, David Miller and Andrew Smith (eds), Stretching the Sociological Imagination: Essays in Honour of John Eldridge, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp.163–188, doi:10.1057/9781137493644_9 (author’s final copy).
- ↑ Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Volume IX, 15 June 2010, chapter 178, paras 178.27–178.29. underlying note G70C.441.9; oral evidence Day 241/111–112.
- ↑ Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, Volume IX, 15 June 2010, chapter 178, paras 178.30 and 178.74.
- ↑ David Miller, Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations, 2015, section “A situation of great political delicacy”, citing B. G. T. Stanbridge, “Psychological Operations – Note by the Secretary”, Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS 17/73, 6 April 1973, Annex A, pp.A-1–A-2, as cited by Miller. The original note is cited here through Miller’s chapter.
- ↑ David Miller, Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations, 2015, section “A situation of great political delicacy”, citing B. G. T. Stanbridge, “Psychological Operations – Note by the Secretary”, Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS 17/73, 6 April 1973, Annex A, as discussed by Miller. The original note is cited here through Miller’s chapter.
- ↑ David Miller, Sociology, Propaganda and Psychological Operations, 2015, section “A situation of great political delicacy”, citing B. G. T. Stanbridge, “Psychological Operations – Note by the Secretary”, Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS 17/73, 6 April 1973, Annex A, p.A-4, as cited by Miller. The original note is cited here through Miller’s chapter.
- ↑ Royal Navy, Psychological Ops Group, Ministry of Defence website, archived via the Internet Archive on 02 July 2010, accessed 26 March 2015
- ↑ Ewen MacAskill, British army creates team of Facebook warriors, The Guardian website, 31 January 2015, accessed 26 March 2015
- ↑ Craig Whitlock (2013), Somali American caught up in a shadowy Pentagon counterpropaganda campaign, Washington Post website, 07 July 2013, accessed 26 March 2015
- ↑ Global Security, 2nd Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), Global Security website, accessed 26 March 2015
- ↑ Global Security, 7th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), Global Security website, accessed 26 March 2015
- ↑ Global Security, 4th Military Information Support Operations Group (Airborne) Global Security website, accessed 26 March 2015
- ↑ Global Security, 8th Military Information Support Operations Group (Airborne) (Provisional), Global Security website, accessed 26 March 2015
- ↑ Christopher Lamb, Paris Genalis (2005), Review of Psychological Operations: Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience, September 2005, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. Federation of American Scientists website, accessed 26 March 2015
- ↑ Tancred Bradshaw and Shelley Deane, A Propaganda Failure in the Perimeter: The British in Northern Ireland, c. 1969–82, Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 36, no. 2 (ARINS, 2025), Figure 2; TNA: CJ 4/4248, as cited for Figure 2 by Bradshaw and Deane. Accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Tancred Bradshaw and Shelley Deane, A Propaganda Failure in the Perimeter: The British in Northern Ireland, c. 1969–82, Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 36, no. 2 (ARINS, 2025), Figure 1; TNA: DEFE 31/28. Accessed 7 November 2026.