Difference between revisions of "European Strategic Communications Network"
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| + | {{short description|'''EU strategic communications network (successor to the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team); notionally hosted by the Belgian Ministry of the Interior and funded by the European Commission; in practice heavily staffed and directed by UK Home Office RICU and Breakthrough/Zinc personnel; key node in the export of RICU-style counter-narrative campaigns to EU member states and the Civil Society Empowerment Programme'''}} | ||
| + | {{Infobox organization | ||
| + | | name = European Strategic Communications Network | ||
| + | | other_names = ESCN; successor to the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT) | ||
| + | | type = Members-only strategic communications platform / advisory team | ||
| + | | founded = Circa 2015 (evolved from SSCAT) | ||
| + | | headquarters = Notionally Belgium (emails on escn.ibz.eu domain; URL registered by Belgian Prime Minister’s office); operationally linked to UK RICU and Breakthrough/Zinc | ||
| + | | parent_organization = Funded by the European Commission; hosted by the Belgian Ministry of the Interior; supported by the UK Home Office (RICU) | ||
| + | | purpose = Capacity-building for EU member states on strategic communications to counter violent extremism; consultancy, training and campaign support; link to the Radicalisation Awareness Network and Civil Society Empowerment Programme | ||
| + | | remarks = Password-protected website; described as not operating in the public sphere; Miller report characterises it as a covert RICU-led operation with Belgian intelligence (CUTA) assistance | ||
| + | }} | ||
| − | + | The '''[[European Strategic Communications Network]]''' (ESCN) is a members-only strategic communications platform and advisory team focused on countering violent extremism across EU member states. It evolved from the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT) and is notionally hosted by the Belgian Ministry of the Interior and funded by the European Commission. In practice it has been heavily staffed and directed by personnel from the UK Home Office’s [[Research, Information and Communications Unit]] (RICU) and its principal contractor [[Breakthrough Media Network]] / [[Zinc Network]]. It has served as a key vehicle for exporting RICU-style deniable counter-narrative campaigns into European civil society and for shaping the EU’s Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP).<ref name="Miller">David Miller, ''The Radicalisation Awareness Network: Policy network in search of an evidence base or covert propaganda platform?'', Public Interest Investigations / Spinwatch, February 2022, Chapter 5.</ref><ref name="EP">European Parliament research report, November 2017 (as cited in Miller).</ref> | |
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| − | == | + | == Origins and remit == |
| + | |||
| + | In 2014 the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator noted that expertise in strategic communications to counter the appeal of travel to Syria was scarce at EU level and recommended building on the considerable expertise available within RICU through the creation of a Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team. SSCAT was offered to interested member states (and, with EEAS support, third countries) to develop practical campaign communications solutions. The ESCN continued and broadened this work. Its stated purpose is to support capacity-building of member states and network members in their strategic communications response to violent extremism, through sharing of best practice, tailor-made consultancy, training and practical support.<ref name="Miller" /> | ||
| + | |||
| + | Unlike many EU initiatives, both SSCAT and the ESCN have not operated in the public sphere. The ESCN website is a locked, password-protected landing page. The domain was registered by the Belgian Prime Minister’s office in June 2018; staff emails use the escn.ibz.eu domain associated with the Belgian Ministry of the Interior. A 2016 think-tank report described a team of around ten experts funded by the European Commission, hosted by the Belgian Ministry of the Interior and supported by the British Home Office (with half the team coming from the UK).<ref name="Miller" /> | ||
| + | |||
| + | == Relationship to RICU and Breakthrough/Zinc == | ||
| + | |||
| + | A November 2017 European Parliament research report identified RICU as one of the key partners of both SSCAT and the ESCN. A British government memo to the Commission noted that RICU provides consultancy services to the ESCN as well as a bespoke consultancy service to network members. The same report recorded that RICU and the European Commission both work with Breakthrough Media to design campaigns. Official briefings in January 2015 indicated that British intelligence was slated for a key role in the SSCAT under the Belgian government.<ref name="Miller" /><ref name="Guardian">Ian Cobain et al., “Inside Ricu, the shadowy propaganda unit inspired by the cold war,” ''The Guardian'', 2 May 2016.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | Miller’s analysis of open-source staffing data concludes that, despite the Belgian hosting, the project was predominantly staffed by individuals with recent or ongoing connections to RICU or Breakthrough/Zinc. Of thirteen identified staff, only four had no obvious RICU connection; all four were Belgian Ministry of the Interior officials, at least two of whom were employees of the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA), Belgium’s fusion centre for terrorist and extremist threat assessment. The five most senior roles (Creative Director, Head of Advisory Team, Head of Network, Director, Team Leader) each had significant history with RICU or Breakthrough, including the Network Hub model. Suggested speaking notes for an ESCN presentation in Rome (June 2019) listed members as “Mainly MoI”, “CUTA – BE fusion center” and “RICU – UK HO”.<ref name="Miller" /> | ||
| + | |||
| + | The Network Hub model pioneered by Zinc for RICU (an office producing campaigns for civil-society organisations while keeping RICU and Breakthrough involvement confidential) was adapted for European work. Staff revolved between RICU/Breakthrough and ESCN/Network Hub roles. Internal Zinc documents describe the model as bringing together organisations to campaign against extremism while attributing content to partner organisations rather than to the contractor or RICU.<ref name="Miller" /> | ||
| + | |||
| + | == People == | ||
| + | |||
| + | === RICU / Breakthrough / Zinc connected === | ||
| + | * [[Richard Chalk]] – Head of RICU 2012–c.2015/16; reported as Head of the ESCN in March 2017; sole director of REOC Communications Limited. | ||
| + | * [[Luke Havill]] – Head of Advisory Team, ESCN (Apr 2019–); previously Development Director, The Network Hub; Communications Adviser Europe with RICU-I; Head of Consultancy, Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team. | ||
| + | * [[Simon Theis Jensen]] – Creative Director, ESCN (Jan 2016–Sep 2017); previously Head of Art at Breakthrough Media; later Creative Director, The Network Hub. | ||
| + | * [[Hugo MacPherson]] – Head of Network, ESCN (Jan 2015–); previously Deployable Civilian Expert (standby), Stabilisation Unit; launched MPower Youth Project in Hounslow while [[Sabin Khan]] was principal community cohesion officer. | ||
| + | * [[Tony McMahon]] – Head of Networks, The Network Hub (while at Breakthrough); later consultant for REOC Communications (Chalk). | ||
| + | * [[Elliot Grainger]] – Head of Operations and Lead Consultant, ESCN (Jan 2017–Dec 2019); previously Strategic Advisor, RICU; team leader, UN Centre for Counter-Terrorism. | ||
| + | * [[Louis Brooke]] – Team Leader, Strategic Communications Advisory Team / SSCAT (while at Breakthrough); later Managing Director, Zinc Network. | ||
| + | * [[Alex Lawrence-Archer]] – Strategy consultant, SSCAT (Jan 2015–Mar 2016); later UN Centre for Counter-Terrorism; director of Raedan Associates with Brooke. | ||
| + | * [[Jamie Harbour]] – Consultant, ESCN (Jan 2015–Oct 2016); previously UK Foreign Office / UKRep to the EU. | ||
| + | |||
| + | === Belgian Ministry of the Interior / CUTA connected === | ||
| + | * [[Clement Coltellaro]] (CUTA) | ||
| + | * [[An Michiels]] (CUTA; External Advisory Board, Trivalent project) | ||
| + | * [[Giulia Giacomelli]] | ||
| + | * Djamila Khibazieva (Belgian Ministry of the Interior) | ||
| + | |||
| + | == Activities and export of campaigns == | ||
| + | |||
| + | ESCN staff reported working with multiple member states (including Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Austria and Germany) to map national CVE contexts, identify campaigning priorities, produce detailed reports and run workshops to develop campaign plans. Tony McMahon described building a network of European civil-society groups in France, Germany, the Benelux, Nordic region and southern Europe. Louis Brooke described establishing a network of senior officials from 24 member states and leading consultancy visits that resulted in dedicated units and campaigns. An internal SSCAT document (with the RICU logo) outlined a strategy for Swedish civil-society engagement that explicitly drew on RICU/Breakthrough campaigns such as Faith Associates / Imams Online and listed Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) as a partner for family-focused work. The document noted reluctance among some Muslim communities to discuss violent extremism and proposed amplifying “home-grown” religious voices.<ref name="Miller" /> | ||
| + | |||
| + | In 2017 the RAN Centre of Excellence created a Joint Activity Plan for its Civil Society Empowerment Programme with the ESCN. ESCN advisory-team members were to participate in support and coordination meetings, contribute to kick-off events, provide training inputs, support dissemination, and share information on potential CSEP participants. The arrangement institutionalised a structural conflict of interest in which the same experts could advise on communications solutions and then deliver them in a consultancy capacity. RICU/ESCN personnel (including Elliot Grainger) also participated in adjacent bodies such as the High-Level Expert Group on Radicalisation and the EU Internet Forum.<ref name="Miller" /> | ||
| + | |||
| + | == Assessment == | ||
| + | |||
| + | Miller’s report characterises the ESCN as a covert operation led by the British intelligence-linked unit RICU (with assistance from Belgian intelligence via CUTA). Its objective, the report argues, is not the empowerment of independent civil society but the penetration of civil-society groups so that they carry state-sponsored messages into hard-to-reach (especially Muslim) communities. The password-protected nature of the platform, the revolving door between RICU/Breakthrough and ESCN roles, and the explicit confidentiality requirements around RICU involvement are cited as evidence.<ref name="Miller" /> | ||
| + | |||
| + | == See also == | ||
| + | |||
| + | * [[Research, Information and Communications Unit]] | ||
| + | * [[Breakthrough Media Network]] / [[Zinc Network]] | ||
| + | * [[Radicalisation Awareness Network]] | ||
| + | * [[Civil Society Empowerment Programme]] | ||
| + | * [[Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team]] | ||
| + | * [[Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment]] | ||
| + | * [[Network Hub]] | ||
| + | * [[Hugo MacPherson]] | ||
| + | * [[Richard Chalk]] | ||
| + | * [[Luke Havill]] | ||
| + | |||
| + | == External links == | ||
| + | |||
| + | * [https://powerbase.info/images/4/47/RAN_FINAL.pdf David Miller, ''The Radicalisation Awareness Network: Policy network in search of an evidence base or covert propaganda platform?'' (Spinwatch / Public Interest Investigations, February 2022) – Chapter 5] | ||
| + | * [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603836/EPRS_STU(2017)603836_EN.pdf European Parliament research report on SSCAT/ESCN (November 2017)] | ||
| + | * [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/02/inside-ricu-the-shadowy-propaganda-unit-inspired-by-the-cold-war ''The Guardian'', 2 May 2016 (“Inside Ricu…”)] | ||
| + | * [http://www.politicheeuropee.gov.it/media/3221/programma-del-seminario.pdf Club of Venice seminar programme (16–17 March 2017)] | ||
| + | * [https://heakodanik.ee/uudised/mis-euroopa-vastus-terrorismile-tule-konverentsile-30-martsil/ Hea Kodanik (27 March 2017)] | ||
| + | * [https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/blogi-terrorismikonverentsilt-tallinnas-kuidas-vastab-euroopa-terrorismile?id=77729236 Delfi blog of Tallinn conference (30 March 2017)] | ||
| + | * [https://archive.is/cuEiY Luke Havill LinkedIn (archived)] | ||
| + | * [https://archive.vn/d9zoH Simon Theis Jensen LinkedIn (archived)] | ||
| + | * [https://archive.vn/viqPa Hugo MacPherson LinkedIn (archived)] | ||
| + | * [https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/officers/C-P4piD-x3S0pxXrnxnl0oqjpGk/appointments Companies House: Richard Edward Oliver Chalk] | ||
| + | ==Notes== | ||
<references/> | <references/> | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Category:British Propaganda|European Strategic Communications Network]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Propaganda|European Strategic Communications Network]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Counter-Terrorism|European Strategic Communications Network]] | ||
| + | [[Category:EU|European Strategic Communications Network]] | ||
| + | [[Category:RICU|European Strategic Communications Network]] | ||
Latest revision as of 21:23, 10 October 2026
EU strategic communications network (successor to the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team); notionally hosted by the Belgian Ministry of the Interior and funded by the European Commission; in practice heavily staffed and directed by UK Home Office RICU and Breakthrough/Zinc personnel; key node in the export of RICU-style counter-narrative campaigns to EU member states and the Civil Society Empowerment Programme
| European Strategic Communications Network
| |
|---|---|
| Type | Members-only strategic communications platform / advisory team |
| Founded | Circa 2015 (evolved from SSCAT) |
| Headquarters | Notionally Belgium (emails on escn.ibz.eu domain; URL registered by Belgian Prime Minister’s office); operationally linked to UK RICU and Breakthrough/Zinc |
| Remarks | Password-protected website; described as not operating in the public sphere; Miller report characterises it as a covert RICU-led operation with Belgian intelligence (CUTA) assistance |
The European Strategic Communications Network (ESCN) is a members-only strategic communications platform and advisory team focused on countering violent extremism across EU member states. It evolved from the Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team (SSCAT) and is notionally hosted by the Belgian Ministry of the Interior and funded by the European Commission. In practice it has been heavily staffed and directed by personnel from the UK Home Office’s Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) and its principal contractor Breakthrough Media Network / Zinc Network. It has served as a key vehicle for exporting RICU-style deniable counter-narrative campaigns into European civil society and for shaping the EU’s Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP).[1][2]
Origins and remit
In 2014 the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator noted that expertise in strategic communications to counter the appeal of travel to Syria was scarce at EU level and recommended building on the considerable expertise available within RICU through the creation of a Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team. SSCAT was offered to interested member states (and, with EEAS support, third countries) to develop practical campaign communications solutions. The ESCN continued and broadened this work. Its stated purpose is to support capacity-building of member states and network members in their strategic communications response to violent extremism, through sharing of best practice, tailor-made consultancy, training and practical support.[1]
Unlike many EU initiatives, both SSCAT and the ESCN have not operated in the public sphere. The ESCN website is a locked, password-protected landing page. The domain was registered by the Belgian Prime Minister’s office in June 2018; staff emails use the escn.ibz.eu domain associated with the Belgian Ministry of the Interior. A 2016 think-tank report described a team of around ten experts funded by the European Commission, hosted by the Belgian Ministry of the Interior and supported by the British Home Office (with half the team coming from the UK).[1]
Relationship to RICU and Breakthrough/Zinc
A November 2017 European Parliament research report identified RICU as one of the key partners of both SSCAT and the ESCN. A British government memo to the Commission noted that RICU provides consultancy services to the ESCN as well as a bespoke consultancy service to network members. The same report recorded that RICU and the European Commission both work with Breakthrough Media to design campaigns. Official briefings in January 2015 indicated that British intelligence was slated for a key role in the SSCAT under the Belgian government.[1][3]
Miller’s analysis of open-source staffing data concludes that, despite the Belgian hosting, the project was predominantly staffed by individuals with recent or ongoing connections to RICU or Breakthrough/Zinc. Of thirteen identified staff, only four had no obvious RICU connection; all four were Belgian Ministry of the Interior officials, at least two of whom were employees of the Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment (CUTA), Belgium’s fusion centre for terrorist and extremist threat assessment. The five most senior roles (Creative Director, Head of Advisory Team, Head of Network, Director, Team Leader) each had significant history with RICU or Breakthrough, including the Network Hub model. Suggested speaking notes for an ESCN presentation in Rome (June 2019) listed members as “Mainly MoI”, “CUTA – BE fusion center” and “RICU – UK HO”.[1]
The Network Hub model pioneered by Zinc for RICU (an office producing campaigns for civil-society organisations while keeping RICU and Breakthrough involvement confidential) was adapted for European work. Staff revolved between RICU/Breakthrough and ESCN/Network Hub roles. Internal Zinc documents describe the model as bringing together organisations to campaign against extremism while attributing content to partner organisations rather than to the contractor or RICU.[1]
People
RICU / Breakthrough / Zinc connected
- Richard Chalk – Head of RICU 2012–c.2015/16; reported as Head of the ESCN in March 2017; sole director of REOC Communications Limited.
- Luke Havill – Head of Advisory Team, ESCN (Apr 2019–); previously Development Director, The Network Hub; Communications Adviser Europe with RICU-I; Head of Consultancy, Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team.
- Simon Theis Jensen – Creative Director, ESCN (Jan 2016–Sep 2017); previously Head of Art at Breakthrough Media; later Creative Director, The Network Hub.
- Hugo MacPherson – Head of Network, ESCN (Jan 2015–); previously Deployable Civilian Expert (standby), Stabilisation Unit; launched MPower Youth Project in Hounslow while Sabin Khan was principal community cohesion officer.
- Tony McMahon – Head of Networks, The Network Hub (while at Breakthrough); later consultant for REOC Communications (Chalk).
- Elliot Grainger – Head of Operations and Lead Consultant, ESCN (Jan 2017–Dec 2019); previously Strategic Advisor, RICU; team leader, UN Centre for Counter-Terrorism.
- Louis Brooke – Team Leader, Strategic Communications Advisory Team / SSCAT (while at Breakthrough); later Managing Director, Zinc Network.
- Alex Lawrence-Archer – Strategy consultant, SSCAT (Jan 2015–Mar 2016); later UN Centre for Counter-Terrorism; director of Raedan Associates with Brooke.
- Jamie Harbour – Consultant, ESCN (Jan 2015–Oct 2016); previously UK Foreign Office / UKRep to the EU.
Belgian Ministry of the Interior / CUTA connected
- Clement Coltellaro (CUTA)
- An Michiels (CUTA; External Advisory Board, Trivalent project)
- Giulia Giacomelli
- Djamila Khibazieva (Belgian Ministry of the Interior)
Activities and export of campaigns
ESCN staff reported working with multiple member states (including Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Austria and Germany) to map national CVE contexts, identify campaigning priorities, produce detailed reports and run workshops to develop campaign plans. Tony McMahon described building a network of European civil-society groups in France, Germany, the Benelux, Nordic region and southern Europe. Louis Brooke described establishing a network of senior officials from 24 member states and leading consultancy visits that resulted in dedicated units and campaigns. An internal SSCAT document (with the RICU logo) outlined a strategy for Swedish civil-society engagement that explicitly drew on RICU/Breakthrough campaigns such as Faith Associates / Imams Online and listed Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) as a partner for family-focused work. The document noted reluctance among some Muslim communities to discuss violent extremism and proposed amplifying “home-grown” religious voices.[1]
In 2017 the RAN Centre of Excellence created a Joint Activity Plan for its Civil Society Empowerment Programme with the ESCN. ESCN advisory-team members were to participate in support and coordination meetings, contribute to kick-off events, provide training inputs, support dissemination, and share information on potential CSEP participants. The arrangement institutionalised a structural conflict of interest in which the same experts could advise on communications solutions and then deliver them in a consultancy capacity. RICU/ESCN personnel (including Elliot Grainger) also participated in adjacent bodies such as the High-Level Expert Group on Radicalisation and the EU Internet Forum.[1]
Assessment
Miller’s report characterises the ESCN as a covert operation led by the British intelligence-linked unit RICU (with assistance from Belgian intelligence via CUTA). Its objective, the report argues, is not the empowerment of independent civil society but the penetration of civil-society groups so that they carry state-sponsored messages into hard-to-reach (especially Muslim) communities. The password-protected nature of the platform, the revolving door between RICU/Breakthrough and ESCN roles, and the explicit confidentiality requirements around RICU involvement are cited as evidence.[1]
See also
- Research, Information and Communications Unit
- Breakthrough Media Network / Zinc Network
- Radicalisation Awareness Network
- Civil Society Empowerment Programme
- Syria Strategic Communications Advisory Team
- Coordination Unit for Threat Assessment
- Network Hub
- Hugo MacPherson
- Richard Chalk
- Luke Havill
External links
- David Miller, The Radicalisation Awareness Network: Policy network in search of an evidence base or covert propaganda platform? (Spinwatch / Public Interest Investigations, February 2022) – Chapter 5
- European Parliament research report on SSCAT/ESCN (November 2017)
- The Guardian, 2 May 2016 (“Inside Ricu…”)
- Club of Venice seminar programme (16–17 March 2017)
- Hea Kodanik (27 March 2017)
- Delfi blog of Tallinn conference (30 March 2017)
- Luke Havill LinkedIn (archived)
- Simon Theis Jensen LinkedIn (archived)
- Hugo MacPherson LinkedIn (archived)
- Companies House: Richard Edward Oliver Chalk
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 David Miller, The Radicalisation Awareness Network: Policy network in search of an evidence base or covert propaganda platform?, Public Interest Investigations / Spinwatch, February 2022, Chapter 5.
- ↑ European Parliament research report, November 2017 (as cited in Miller).
- ↑ Ian Cobain et al., “Inside Ricu, the shadowy propaganda unit inspired by the cold war,” The Guardian, 2 May 2016.