N officers
This article is part of the Undercover Research Portal at Powerbase: investigating corporate and police spying on activists.
Police officers cited in the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) are generally designated by a cypher / nominal starting with N or HN followed by a number. The practice of assigning these cyphers was begun in by the Metropolitan Police inquiry Operation Herne which investigated the activities of the Special Demonstration Squad undercovers. It was subsequently adopted by Mark Ellison for his Review and the UCPI, both of which draw heavily on the material assembled by Operation Herne. The practice was also taken up by Operation Elter, investigating the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. The system appears to have changed in 2017, when the 3 August 2017 rulings and direction of the new Inquiry Chair, John Mitting, began using the 'HN' label, though the associated numbers appear to be unchanged.[1]
The N number system appears to be applied across the board for police officers regardless of force, position or involvement with undercover policing. A few have since been identified, but many remain anonymous and as such few details of them are know. Except where profiled elsewhere, this page collates what is known of them and links to relevant documents, including relevant procedural issues within the Undercover Policing Inquiry.
In an updated explanatory note of 14 November 2017, the Counsel to the Inquiry noted:[2]
- Some names in these documents have been replaced with numbers preceded by the initials "PN". These are 'provisional nominals', cyphers allocated by the Inquiry to individuals who are not part of the current anonymity tranches; who the Inquiry legal team takes the view are or may be relevant individuals in the Inquiry and therefore whose appearance within documents should be capable of being identified; who may make an application for anonymity or other restriction of their identity in due course; and who cannot therefore be named in advance of the determination of any application without undermining that anticipated application. The allocation of 'provisional nominals' will be re-visited during the course of the Inquiry. This approach allows the Inquiry to publish necessary evidence relevant to preliminary issues without needing to determine all anonymity applications and privacy issues first.
Due to the number of offices and associated details, the list has been split over several pages. This is page 1, and as well as background material covers N officers with cypher number between 1 and 199 or higher. For other officers, with number 200 or higher see N Officers (page 2).
Updated 20 November 2017
N series officers
| Cypher | Name | Status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| HN2 | unknown | UCPI needs more details before making decision on restricting the cover and real name; also awaiting NH2 to appoint a legal representative.[1][3] |
SDS UCO. Application from MPS over restriction on publishing real name only; officer not in position to confirm whether wider restriction is to be sought over the cover name, and open version of material relating to HN2 has yet to be agreed.[4] Mentioned in Herne 1 as a former SDS undercover and later a cover officer, now retired:[5]
|
| N5 | John Dines | Confirmed.[6] | SDS UCO |
| HN7 | unknown | Subject to restriction order on real and cover name.[1] | SDS UCO. Deployed in late 1980s and early 1990s to three groups. Unconnected with his undercover deployment he sustained a significant head injury while a police officer. This injury and an unrelated condition have caused significant mental and personal problems, subject to a report by Prof. George Fox - who concludes there is a 'significant' ('highly likely to occur') risk of suicide if HN7's real or cover name were published.[7]
|
| N9 | unknown | An SDS officer mentioned by N81 in his interview: "N9 later told me that it was quite usual for SDS management to arrange meetings between operatives and outside persons at the management’s homes. This was because such persons would not be able to attend SDS safe houses." (Ellison, p. 232).[8] | |
| N10 | Bob Lambert | Confirmed.[9] | SDS UCO & manager. Role in meeting between Richard Walton and N81 discussed in Herne II[10] and the Ellison Review.[11] In March 2016 a restriction order application and supporting documents were filed on his behalf seeking some restriction on personal details being released by the Inquiry: Open Application, Personal Statement (open version), Draft Order. In October 2016, Pitchford issued a 'Minded-To' indicating he was willing to grant most of the order sought. Objections were to be received by 3 November 2016, but no final order is readily found on the Inquiry website. |
| N14 | Jim Boyling | Confirmed.[9] | SDS UCO. In March 2016 a restriction order application and supporting documents were filed on his behalf seeking some restriction on personal details being released by the Inquiry: Open Application, Draft Order. In October 2017, Pitchford issued a 'Minded-To note indicating he would grant the order. Objections were to be received by 3 November 2016, but no final order is readily found on the Inquiry website. Mentioned in passing in Herne 1 (para. 2.1).[5] Represented by Slater & Gordon. |
| HN15 | unknown | UCPI needs more details before making decision on restricting details.[1][3] | SDS UCO. Mentioned by Lambert as an SDS UCO who 'would have involvement in Stephen Lawrence campaign issues' (Ellison page 214).[11] No application from MPS, but in March 2016 NH15's lawyer had submitted an application to restrict real and cover names. The lawyers have since notified the Inquiry that a supplement to the application may be made on receipt of a final risk assessment from the MPS. The Inquiry has also received additional evidence, but is awaiting the further application before publishing anything.[4] March 2016 application documents: personal statement (gisted), open application, draft order and risk assessment (gisted). |
| HN16 | unknown | Minded to: restrict real name, release cover name (Oct 2017).[12] | SDS UCO
According to their Nov 2017 risk assessment, N16 was involved in protection duties before joining the SDS. Initially they performed 'back office' duties and developed their legend before being deployed. They 'did not receive any formal training for the role', and 'preparation consisted of research, reviewing of files and informal contact with more experienced UCOs'. 'N16 had a mentor at the intial stage of the deployment and subsequent support from another SDS officer'. They told the Risk Assessor that promises of anonymity were given. (s.3)[13] N16 was arrested during their deployment, but the case did not come to trial. They declined to state whether or not they had entered into any relationships during their deployment or whether they had 'engaged in any behaviour that could heighten the risk.'. The gisted version noted: 'The risk assessor expressed concern about another individual who would be impacted if a restriction order was not made.' (s.4) N16 has also been subject of a misconduct investigation. (s.5-7)[13] In March 2016, the legal representative for HN16 (S&G) had applied to restrict cover and real name. March 2016 application material: personal statement (gisted), open application, draft order and risk assessment (gisted) In the August 2017 UCPI press release, it was stated that Mitting was considering a closed hearing for HN16 'due to sensitivity of material being considered'[1] His then Minded-To also stated: "Detailed factors particular to this officer's circumstances require them to be considered at a closed hearing."[3] This closed hearing was take place after a further risk assessment, to be submitted by 1 September 2017 - the Inquiry was awaiting the awaiting the final risk assessment from the MPS before the open versions of all documents were to be published, though some documents were previously published in March 2016.[4] Following a closed hearing,[12] Mitting issued a Supplementary Minded-To on 23 October 2017 in which he stated:[14]
The accompanying press release noted also:[12]
Unreleased by the Inquiry was a closed note from Mitting 'which sets out in detail the reasons for refusing the application for a restriction order in respect of the cover name.'[14] The further material was released on 15 November 2017, including the MPS risk assessment. The risk assessment noted that N16 had declined to meet his first assigned risk assessor, Kevin Shanahan but did provide material via his solicitors. He did meet with a new risk assessor, David Reid, but did not answer all questions. N16 has highlighted his perceptions of the risk they faces if his details are released; Reid agrees with some but not all of these views. (s.10) N16 did not 'reveal any ongoing psychological issues and declined to provide [Reid] with any information in respect of counselling or psychological support. (s.16)[13] It stated, in gisted form that:[13]
Section 19 noted that in terms of risk if N16's cover name was released, the risk of attack was assessed as 'low' (2) (i.e. unlikely), though close to 'medium', but it was one of those cases were relying entirely on a numerical score was problematic. The likely impact was harder to assess, as some of the targeted individuals were likely to have a sense of betrayal, and also a history of violence which 'could foreseeably manifest into a physical attack against N16'. Thus, the impact was classed as 'moderate' (3), giving over all risk risk as 6.[13] The likelihood of physical attack if real identity confirmed was increased to medium ('probablity of the risk occuring could reasonably forseen and is considered distinctly possible to occur at some stage'), increasing overall risk score to 9.[13] In relation to impact on family life:[13]
It is not explained how or why this increased risk woudl be higher given that this refers to only their cover name. The risk assessor is much more concerned for interference in family / private life if the real name was to be released, simply because 'the likelihood of interference... must logically be greater if N16's real name was known other than in the circumstanes above when only a pseudonym or cipher was known. The risk assessor consdieres this riks more likely than that of a physical attack'. He thus assesses the risk as 'high' (4), i.e. probable to occur at some stage, though it is not clear where the source of this risk is perceived. Thus the overall risk here is classed as 12.[13] November 2017 application material
N16 is a core participant and represented by Slater & Gordon. |
| N17 | unknown | SDS UCO. Mentioned by Lambert as a contemporary of Peter Francis (early/mid 1990s) who infiltrated far right groups (Ellison, p. 214).[11] | |
| N24 | unknown | SDS Management. N81 stated to Op. Herne: 'I was informed, at the height of the Macpherson Inquiry, that my reporting was going straight to Sir Paul Condon’s desk each morning via N24, and N127 (SDS Sgt) passed on to me from N24 congratulations from the Commissioner for your excellent reporting...' (Ellison, p. 232).[11] | |
| HN26 | unknown | Minded-To: restrict real name, release cover name (Oct 2017).[12] | SDS UCO (early/mid 1990s).
They were a Special Branch officer prior to being recruited to SDS and 'promised lifelong anonymity along with personal safety assurances'.[15] According to the 1994/1995 SDS annual review, cited by Herne I, N26 was the first officer to obtain a completely fictitious identity with the practice of using identities of deceased children being phased out starting November 1994 (5.4).[5] An application for full anonymity for HN26 had been made in March 2016:[4] In August 2017, the Metrpolitian Police applied to restrict HN26's reall name only [16] while HN26's solicitors (S&G) applied for both cover and real names to be subject of a restriction order.[17] HN26 has not cooperated with the risk assessment, refusing to meet the risk assessor and providing information only through his lawyer.[15] A closed session for on HN26's restriction order applications was to be held 'due to sensitivity of material being considered'[1] / 'detailed factors particular to this officer's circumstances'[3] and Mitting directed that NH26 should be present or at least contactable throughout the hearing.[18]. This closed hearing took place following which Mitting stated he was minded to release the cover name and restrict HN26's real name,[12] stating in his Minded To (Oct 2013):[14]
An unpublised closed note was stated to provide more detailed reasons.[14] The accompanying press release noted also:[12]
March 2016 material: open application, S&G application, personal statement (gisted), draft order, and risk assessment (gisted). August 2017 material: MPS have applied to MPS application to restrict real name (MPS), application to restrict both cover and real names (S&G), expert medical evidence (Dr Walter Busuttil, fully redacted), personal statement (fully redacted) & risk assessment (Graham Walker, mostly redacted). Represented by Slater & Gordon. |
| N27 | unknown | SDS Undercover. Ellison cites Lambert's interview with Operation Herne as saying: "N27 (also deployed into a different left-wing group) and would have come across Peter Francis, certainly both were at Welling…" (Ellison, p. 214).[11] | |
| N40 | unknown | Likely SDS officer. Mentioned in relation to how information from the SDS, particularly on the identities of protestors, was passed on to the rest of the police (Herne II, 13.4, 24.1.3).[10] | |
| N43 | Peter Francis | Confirmed. | Mentioned in Herne I (3.5, 3.6) though not by real name; his identity can be inferred as he was the only former undercover who provided a video interview to the Guardian.[5] |
| N52 | unknown | SDS sergeant, who in 1998 received the memo from Bob Lambert on the meeting between Richard Walton and N81 (Ellison Review, p. 229).[11] | |
| N53 | unknown | SDS Management. Authored a series of internal memos in 2002 in relation to a joint operation with the National Criminal Intelligence Service known as Op. Wisdom - in relation to the use of the 'Jackal run' process of using a deceased person's identity to obtain passports. "N53 explained that he believed that between 1968 and 2002 there had been one hundred and two (102) SDS officers who had been provided with covert identities. N53’s documentation stated that the majority of these UCO’s would have used a deceased child’s identity." (Herne I, 5.4 & 6.2).[5] Mentioned as an ex-SDS Detective Inspector in relation to material being passed onto other units: Another ex-Detective Inspector, N53, told Herne: “The SDS retained nothing that would betray its identity” (Ellison, p. 201).[11] Briefly mentioned in relation to computerisation of SDS / Special Branch records circa 1998 (Herne II, 13.1).[10] | |
| HN58 | unknown | Minded-To: cover name known but UCPI minded to restrict it and real name (Aug 2017).[1] Position changed to considering publishing both cover and real name by separating the two; further submissions invited (Oct 2017).[12] | SDS UCO & manager. 'HN58 is now aged over 60. From 1997 to 2001, HN58 had a managerial position in the Special Demonstration Squad, having earlier being deployed as as an undercover officer.'[3]
In August 2017 open applications from the MPS & HN58's lawyer to restrict cover and real names were published and accompanied by a personal statement, expert medical report & additional threat assessments.[4] Mitting in his 'Minded-To' indicated he would accept both applications, stating (Aug 2017, para. 4):[3]
In October 2017, Mitting noted submissions from other non-police core participants and wrote:
March 2016 application: open application, draft order, personal statement (gisted) & risk assessment (gisted). August 2017 application: open application for restriction order, open supplementary application for restriction order, open risk assessment (David Reid), medical statement (Prof. G. C. Fox; fully redacted) Core participant in the Inquiry, represented by Slater & Gordon. Though his names are not known, HN58 appears under his cypher in a number of related documents. MPS risk assessment:[19]
Ellison Review: Head of SDS in August 1998 as Detective Chief Inspector, when he received Lambert's report on the meeting between N81 and Richard Walton. In response he commented: "An excellent meeting and a good example of the strides N81 has made over the last 12 months" (Ellison, page 229). Author of an SDS Intelligence Update in September 1998, titled 'Extremist involvement in the Stephen Lawrence Campaign' where he wrote: "N81’s unique insight into the behind-the-scenes machinations of the Lawrence campaign has also proved invaluable to A/DI Walton who is currently attached to the Stephen Lawrence review team" (Ellison, page 229).[11] PCC Investigation: HN58 was one of those investigated for gross misconduct by the IPCC following formal referral by the MPS in the wake of the 2014 Ellison Review's criticism of the meeting between Richard Walton and N81. In this investigation HN58 was given the cipher N34 and it was noted he was "responsible for the management of officers deployed within Special Branch, including officers deployed within the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) who worked undercover" (para.148). The report state HN58 was promoted to Detective Chief Inspector rank in 1997 and transfered to SDS in mid-1998, with Det. Insp. Bob Lambert working under him (para. 152, 194). In this, he answered to Detective Superintendent 'N35', who oversaw 'S Squad' which included the SDS (para. 190). He retired in 2001 (para. 152). HN58 was aware of the meeting between Walton and N81, though did not consider it inappropriate at the time (para. 158, 194).[20] During the IPCC investigation HN58 was interviewed but declined to answer questions, though later provided a written statement (para. 151). The IPCC subsequently said there was not enough documentary or witness evidence (para. 217) to proceed with misconduct hearings against HN58 so on balance of probabilities there was no case to answer in respect of authorising the meeting between Lambert and N81, though there was retrospective knowledge of it. However, the author of the report did state: "With such a close working relationship between Robert Lambert and N34 , it is inconceivable that Robert Lambert would have been able to make the arrangements for this meeting to take place without some knowledge on the part of N34" (para. 214). The author also noted that the meeting was initiated within the SDS itself, which leaves HN35, and his two superiors N34 and Colin Black in the frame (para. 219, 220).[20] |
| N67 | unknown | SDS UCO (1981-1984). Used dead child identity; said at time of deployment there was no training manual but there was a 'best practice' reference folder (Herne I, 7.4 & 7.5).[5] | |
| HN68 | unknown | Minded-To: real name cannot be published.[3] | SDS UCO & managerial; deceased. Deployed against groups from 1968 to 1974. Managerial position in SDS 1982-84.[3]
Cover name to be published, however Mitting states: "As in the case of the living officers cited it is unlikely that the publication of his real name would prompt the giving or production of evidence necessary to permit the Inquiry to fulfil its terms of reference. Evidence about the discharge of his managerial duties can be given by reference to his cypher. The identity of HN68 is known to those who can give such evidence. Publication of his real name would be likely to interfere with the right of his widow to respect for her private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the European Convention’). It is unlikely that such interference would be justified under Article 8(2). The possibility that disclosure of his cover name might interfere with her right is nil or negligible. Closed reasons accompany this note."[3] The MPS have submitted an application to restrict N68's real name, a witness statement from his widow and an open risk assessment (Mark Veljovic). The above information on N68 comes from Mitting's 'Minded-To' note, and does not appear in the risk assessment. As he deceased, HN68 is not a core participant. |
| N69 | unknown | SDS Chief Inspector (1986-1987). In his statement to Op. Herne stated '…new recruits were instructed on how to go about obtaining false birth certificates. They would obtain details of a deceased person of a similar age from Somerset House and then use those details to go about creating their legend.' (Herne I, 3.1)[5] | |
| N72 | unknown | SDS. Provided evidence that N81's tasking to spy on the Lawrence family came from Commissioner Stevens (Ellison, p. 253; Herne II, 21.1.15 & 21.2).[10] Operation Herne told Ellison that N72 did not serve with SDS until after the Macpherson Inquiry so his account should be treated as hearsay; Stevens also denied this (Ellison, p. 253).[11] | |
| N78 | unknown | SDS UCO. Joined Special Branch in 1986 and SDS in 1991. Deployed as an undercover into left wing groups Summer 1991 to 1995, including some near the Lawrence campaign; had left the SDS by 1996 (Herne II, 12.2; Ellison, 6.4). Aware of Peter Francis' role; said he heard nothing indicating material to smear the Lawrences was being sought (Herne II, 21.1.14; Ellison, 6.3(p), 6.4). Considerable material from him covered in section 6.4 of the Ellison Review (Vol.1).[10] | |
| HN81 / N81 | unknown | Minded-To: Real name cannot be published, cover name can be.[12] | SDS UCO. Referred to extensively in the Ellison Review in relation to the targeting of the family of Stephen Lawrence.
On joining the SDS he received a home visit from two officers who affirmed he would have anonymity for the rest of their career. During his time undercover he would have twice weekly meetings with his handlers, and following the end of his deployment he returned to Special Branch.[21] In March 2016 N81's lawyers submitted applications for restriction orders of N81's real and cover names. Revised application and supporting material from the lawyers and MPS was released by the Inquiry in August 2017.[4] In August 2017 Mitting proposed to hold a closed session hearing over cover name to be held 'due to sensitivity of material being considered' - directions to be given separately.[1] As such he issued a direction that there should be a closed hearing to It was desired that N81 attends the hearing, but it was not ordered. Some additional bits of notification were to be provided to the Inquiry no later than 17 August 2017.[18] Mitting stated at the time:[3]
In his October 2017 Supplementary 'Minded-To', Mitting wrote:[14]
The accompanying press release noted also:[12]
Unpublished close reasons were also issued setting reasons out in greater detail for this proposed decision. Mitting also stated:[14]
March 2016 application documents: open application & S&G application, draft order, personal statement (gisted) & risk assessment (gisted) August 2017 documents: open application for restriction order (MPS), open supplementary application for restriction order (S&G), open risk assessment (David Reid), open medical assessment N81 is a core participant and is represented by Slater & Gordon. |
| N85 | Roger Pearce | Confirmed.[22] | SDS UCO & manager. Head of Special Branch and Director of Intelligence for Metropolitan Police Service. See under profile for mentions of him in Herne I and the Ellison Review. |
| N86 | unknown | SDS Head from 1993 to 1996, as Detective Chief Inspector; responsiblities included SDS recruitment & tasking. Author of a dcocument of 24 Sept 1993 referring to a 'new, violent anti-fascist group forming within Youth Against Racism'. Also authored the 1993/1994 SDS Annual Report which discussed left-wing campaigning around the death of Stephen Lawrence. Left SDS for another post on 11 April 1996. On 21 April 1997 he took temporary control for six months of S Squad (the division which contained the SDS) due to illness of its Suptintendent. Refused to provide a statement to Operation Herne. However, as he is central to the claims of Peter Francis regarding racism in the SDS and the tasking against the Lawrence family, N86 provided a statement for the Ellison Review in which he denied much of what Francis said. (Ellison 6.5 & 6.9(c)-(d); Herne II, 26.1.19)[11][5] | |
| N89 | unknown | SDS UCO; infiltrated far right in 1990s and 'involved in public order situations where left and right attended'; contemporary of Peter Francis who would confide in N89. | |
| HN101 | unknown | SDS. Contemporary of Peter Francis, who had 'a involvement in Stephen Lawrence campaign issues' according to Lambert (Ellison, p. 214).[11] | |
| HN104 | Carlo Neri (alias) | UCPI minded to restrict real name.[1][3] | SDS UCO. Deployed against two groups March 2000 to Summer 2006. Both he and partners concerned about violence being used by (ex)members of the groups he targeted and of media intrusion, and the efforts of those with IT skills to ascertain his real name and whereabouts. "These concerns are not irrational and have some basis in fact". According to Prof Fox, (report of 8 March 2017), HN104 suffers from significant mental health conditions. Mitting opposing publishing of real name as interference under Article 8(2), and not necessary for those who claim sexual relationships with him in order to give evidence in acts committed by his cover name. "On the basis of what is known, interference in Article 8(2) rights ais not justified." Can give evidence from behind a screen.[3] Applications from MPS & N104's lawyer to restrict publication of real name only; also received are personal statements from his family and expert medical report; final risk assessment from MPS awaited but no scope for restriction of cover name. Open versions published.[4]
In the responding submissions made by the Non-Police/State Core Participants, it was noted that Carlo's real name was known to those he had spied upon.[23] August 2017 documents: open application for restriction order (MPS), open application for restriction order (S&G), Open supplementary application for restriction order (S&G), open medical assessment, open personal statement (1), open personal statement (2), open statement by HN104's partner, open statement by HN104's relative |
| HN108 | unknown | real name to be published in due course.[1] No application made.[3] | SDS back office / manager |
| HN109 | unknown | SDS Detective Inspector in 1995. Interview by Operation Herne quoted in Ellison Review: "There was never any reference made to ‘smearing’ in relation to the Lawrence family. Deployments into the support campaigns surrounding Stephen Lawrence were specifically to build a picture of the public order background… Any meeting I was involved in was never about any family member. It was done to protect the family" (Ellison, p.211).[11] | |
| N118 | Simon Wellings (alias) | Confirmed.[24] | SDS UCO |
| HN120 | unknown | real name to be published in due course.[1] No application made.[3] | SDS back office / manager |
| HN123 | unknown | Minded-to: restrict both cover name and real name.[1][3] | SDS UCO. Deployed into number of left-wing groups 1993-1998. Retired from MPS on health grounds & later diagnosed from mental health condition in part derived from his deployment - in slow but incomplete recovery. "HN123 and HN123’s partner are concerned about the possibility that HN123’s identity will be revealed during the Inquiry, both for reasons of safety and because of the potential impact on HN123’s health. I have read personal statements by both of them, which are and will remain closed, in which these concerns are expressed. I accept that they are genuine and not irrational. Overriding them would interfere with their right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention and would require to be justified under Article 8(2). Fulfilment of the terms of reference of the Inquiry does not require that the real or cover name of HN123 be published. The evidence of HN123 can be given under a cypher. HN123 was involved indirectly in deployments affecting the Lawrence family and can give evidence about that under the cypher. To the extent that it is contentious, it can be challenged just as effectively, as if given in the real or cover name. In those circumstances, the interference would not be justified. It is desirable, and may be essential, that HN123 gives evidence in public. In that event, protective measures are likely to be required."[3] Application from MPS & HN123's lawyer to restrict both cover and real names, along with personal statements & medical material - open versions published, some material previously being released in March 2016.[4]
March 2016 application documents: open application, draft order, personal statement (gisted) & risk assessment (gisted). August 2017 documents: open application for restriction order (MPS), open application for restriction order (S&G) The Ellison review stated (p.211): N123... spoke on the telephone to Operation Herne in November 2013: "Francis was lying about the smearing of Lawrence…" N123 had taken over from Mr Francis when in the back office. Mr Francis had told him that it was their role to provide "gossip for the field…" N123 had spent nine months in the back office and amongst management and had gone to field meetings. Not once did N123 see or hear any instruction to 'smear' the Lawrences. He did not see any paperwork to reflect this either. According to Bob Lambert (Ellison, p.214), N123 started his undercover work after Lambert had become head of the SDS and stated: I am sure from day one the Stephen Lawrence case would have been on N123’s agenda, and… they must have attended, started to attend meetings with the Stephen Lawrence campaign, almost goes as read that they would have been there… they would want to be inside the meeting, to have a speaker on the platform and so N123 is following close behind ‘Pete Francis’… they became quite close friends and times would have been at the same events… May well have been events specifically in support of the Stephen Lawrence campaign… Mentioned in Herne II has being undercover with the potential to report on the Lawrence family (Herne II, 12.2).[10]
|
| N127 | unknown | Sergeant with SDS 1997-2001. Provides statement where he states he does not recognise Peter Francis's statements regarding spying on the Lawrence family; also received Lambert's memo on the N81 / Walton meeting (Ellison, p.229). N81 told Ellison: …I was informed, at the height of the Macpherson inquiry, that my reporting was going straight to Sir Paul Condon’s desk each morning via N24, and N127 (SDS Sgt) passed on to me from N24 congratulations from the Commissioner for your excellent reporting…' (Ellison 212, 229 & 232).[11] | |
| N129 | unknown | SDS Detective Sergeant. received Lamberts memo on the N81 / Walton meeting; commented on character and skill of Peter Francis, but also that they did not recognise the allegations regarding seeking information to smear the Lawrence family. His statement to Op. Herne is quoted in Ellison (p.212): "[Mr Francis] was targeted towards the campaign in the same way as today… to perform a dual role of protecting the family from malicious extremist influences and providing information about potential public order issues. The anti-police sentiment on the streets was palpable, and Territorial Policing was very interested in any potential or planned disorder…" N129 believes that he was directly tasked to get involved with the campaign, although not necessarily with the family. His role was not about ‘smearing’ at all.[11] | |
| HN146 | unknown | Real name to be published in due course.[1] No application made.[3] | SDS back office / manager |
| N183 | Richard Walton | Special Branch background. Later head of Counter Terrorism Command. | |
| N190 | unknown | SDS Detective Inspector; commented on retention / destruction of documents within the SDS during a 2004 document rationalisation process (Ellison, 201).[11] |
Not all officers have publicly assigned N numbers, for instance those of Mike Chitty, Colin Black and Robert Potter are as yet unknown.
Restriction order tranches
On 18th May 2017, the then Chair of the Undercover Policing Inquiry, Christopher Pitchford, ordered that restriction orders should be submitted for three separate tranches of officers. These were:[25]
- By 1st June 2017: HN7, HN16, HN108, HN120, HN294, HN321, HN323, HN326, HN327, HN329, HN330, HN333, HN325 & HN343.
- By 1 July 2017: HN2, HN15, HN26, HN58, HN68, HN81, HN104, HN123, HN146, HN204, HN297, HN328, HN335 & HN1251.
- By 1 August 2017: N1, N23, N40, N45, N78, N86, N127, N216, N241, N298, N318, N322, N331, N334, N336, N344, N347 & N348.
Matters relating to the following officers were addressed in the August 2013 material issued by the Inquiry:
- HN2, HN17, HN15, HN16, HN26, HN58, HN68, HN81, HN104, HN108, HN120, HN123, HN146, HN204, HN294, HN297, HN321, HN326, HN327, HN328, HN329, HN330, HN333, HN325, HN335, HN343, HN345, HN1251
On 23 October 2017, the new Chair, John Mitting, directed that applications for restrictin orders should be submitted for the following officers no later than 31 October:<ref>John Mitting, [https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/20171023-directions-anonymity-and-ROA-1974.pdf (1) The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and its impact on the Inquiry’s work (2) Applications for restriction orders in respect of the real and cover names of officers of the Special Operations Squad and the Special D
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.13 Press Release: 'Minded to' note, ruling and directions in respect of anonymity applications relating to former officers of the Special Demonstration Squad, Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI.org.uk), 3 August 2017 (accessed 3 August 2017).
- ↑ Counsel to the Inquiry's Explanatory Note to accompany the 'Minded-To' Note (2) in respect of applications for restriction orders over the real and cover names of officers of the Special Operations Squad and the Special Demonstration Squad, Undercover Policing Inquiry, 14 November 2017 (accessed 15 November 2017)
- ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 3.15 3.16 John Mitting, In the matter of section 19(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005 Applications for restriction orders in respect of the real and cover names of officers of the Special Operations Squad and the Special Demonstrations Squad ‘Minded to’ note, Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI.org.uk), 3 August 2017 (accessed 5 August 2017).
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 David Barr & Kate Wilkinson, Counsel to the Inquiry's explanatory note to accompany the 'Minded to' note in respect of applications for restrictions over the real and cover names of officers of the Special Operations Squad and the Special Demonstration Squad, Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI.org.uk), 3 August 2017 (accessed 5 August 2017).
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 Mick Creedon, Operation Herne Report 1: Covert Identities, Metropolitan Police Service, July 2013.
- ↑ No anonymity sought for N5, Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI.org.uk), 20 December 2017 (accessed 5 August 2017).
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 John Mitting, In the matter of section 19(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005 Application for restriction order in respect of HN7 Ruling (Ruling in respect of HN7), Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI.org.uk), 3 August 2017 (accessed 5 August 2017).
- ↑ Mark Ellison, The Stephen Lawrence Independent Review - Volume 1: Possible corruption and the role of undercover policing in the Stephen Lawrence case, Gov.UK, March 2014.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 The Chairman’s ‘Minded to’ note on applications for restriction orders in respect of two former undercover police officers, Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI.org.uk), 20 October 2016 (accessed 5 August 2017).
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 Mick Creedon, Operation Herne: Report 2 - Allegations of Peter Francis, Metropolitan Police Service, March 2014.
- ↑ 11.00 11.01 11.02 11.03 11.04 11.05 11.06 11.07 11.08 11.09 11.10 11.11 11.12 11.13 11.14 Mark Ellison, Possible corruption and the role of undercover policing in the Stephen Lawrence case, Stephen Lawrence Independent Review, Vol. 1, Gov.UK, March 2014
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 Supplementary ‘Minded to’ note on anonymity, updated and additional hearing dates, directions to the Metropolitan Police Service, Undercover Policing Inquiry, 23 October 2017 (accessed 23 October 2017 via UCPI.org.uk).
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 David Reid, N16 - Risk Assessment (mostly gisted), Metropolitan Police Service, 10 November 2017 (accessed via UCPI.org.uk).
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 Sir John Mitting, Supplementary 'Minded-To', Undercover Policing Inquiry, 23 October 2017 (accessed 23 October 2017 via UCPI.org.uk).
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 Graham Walker, HN26 - Open risk assessment, Metropolitan Police Service, 24 July 2017 (accessed via UCPI.org.uk).
- ↑ Open application for a restriction order (anonymity) re: N26, Metropolitan Police Service, 30 July 2017 (accessed via UCPI.org.uk).
- ↑ Open revised supplemental application on behalf of N26 for restriction orders, Slater & Gordon LLP (solicitors), 21 July 2017 (accessed via UCPI.org.uk).
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 John Mitting, In the matter of section 19(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005 Applications for restriction orders in respect of the real and cover names of officers of the Special Operations Squad and the Special Demonstrations Squad Directions (Directions arising out of the 'Minded-To'), Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI.org.uk), 3 August 2017 (accessed 5 August 2017).
- ↑ David Reid, N58 Risk Assessment (version 2 - gisted), Metropolitan Police Service, 25 May 2017 (accessed via UCPI.org.uk).
- ↑ 20.0 20.1 Steve Bimson, Ellison Review - Walton, Lambert and Black: An investigation into the circumstances surrounding a meeting between A/Detective Inspector Richard Walton and an undercover officer on 14 August 1998, Independent Police Compliants Commission, 14 January 2016.
- ↑ David Reid, HN81 - Open Risk Assessment (redacted), Metropolitan Police Service28 June 2017 (accessed via UCPI.org.uk).
- ↑ No anonymity sought for Roger Pearce, Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI.org.uk), 29 March 2017 (accessed 3 August 2017).
- ↑ Ruth Brander & Philippa Kaufmann QC, Submissions on behalf of the non-police, non-state core participants re the Chairman's 'Minded To' note dated 3 August 2017 concerning restriction order applications, 5 October 2017 (accessed via UCPI.org.uk).
- ↑ Update on anonymity applications – N118 ("Simon Wellings"), Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI.org.uk), 19 January 2017 (accessed 5 August 2017).
- ↑ Christopher Pitchford, Order pursuant to the ruling of 2 May 2017 granting an extention of time for service of anonymity applications by the Metropolitan Police Service in respect of the Special Demonstration Squad, Undercover Policing Inquiry, 18 May 2017.
