Targeting and Information Operations

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Targeting and Information Operations (formerly the Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations (DTIO)) is a group within the British Ministry of Defence which is involved in the Information Operations of the UK. It was established in 2001 in order "to ensure that [the MOD's] approach to information operations is fully incorporated into planning and operations".[1]

Structure

The TIO is a sub-division of the Security Policy and Operations (Sec Pol and Ops part of the MoD.) It is commanded by an Air Commodore and has a total of 24 military and 10 civil servant staff. It is made up of three branches; the Targeting Branch, the Info Ops Branch and the Policy and Capability branch.

Targeting Branch

The Targeting branch is responsible for policy advice on conventional and strategic targeting, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE). The Branch produces Targeting Directives, staffs ROE profiles in support of operations and is also responsible for co-ordinating the MOD Targeting Board. The standard job description for the staff in this branch is:

Provide targeting advice and staff support to senior MOD staff and Ministers and to be responsible for the policy, planning and implementation of the MOD’s joint kinetic targeting and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) process.

Information Operations Branch

The Information Operations (IO) branch is the MOD lead for the development of pan-governmental Information Strategies and provides policy advice and IO input to the Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directives to the Permanent Joint Headquarters. It also conducts strategic information operations and provides IO consultancy support to operational theatres. The staff have specific operational or regional responsibilities and the standard job description for the staff in this branch is:

Provide strategic direction for Information Operations (defined as all influence activity, including PsyOps) for Operations and other military activity in or associated with specific theatre of operations.

Policy and Capability Branch

The Policy and Capability branch coordinates all aspects of concepts and policy for the Division. As lead user, it is responsible for coordinating capability development and training for Targeting and Information Operations. The standard job descriptions for staff in this branch are defined by the role of the member of staff (ie policy, capability development or training):

Policy - Directorate lead for staffing and implementing Info Ops and Influence Activity concepts, policy and doctrine.
Capability Development - Staff Info Ops “concepts to capabilities”, leading on applied concepts & doctrine, capability development as ‘Lead User’.
Training - Development and delivery of Info Ops training.

Activities

Wartime Role

Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine Publication 3-00 (JDP3-00): Campaign Execution[2]details the role of Targeting and Information Operations during UK Military campaigns. The DTIO "formulates the Ministry of Defence contribution to the information strategy" of the campaign, which "provides a single coherent strategy to which all aspects of government must work...it encompasses both the management of information, in the form of themes and messages, and the specific actions to be conducted with the intention of promoting a desired message".
JDP3-00 is detailed about the role of the DTIO in operations, stating that:

Targeting and Information Operations (TIO) is the Ministry of Defence (MOD) department responsible for integrating strategic fires and influence activities’ policies towards achieving Joint Action. The role of TIO is to:
a. Provide specialist military advice to Ministers.
b. Provide target systems analysis in accordance with the Security Cooperation and Operations Group directive for contingency planning or conflict avoidance.
c. Develop and review the Chief of Defence Staff’s (CDS’) targeting directive in consultation with the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) for specific operations.
d. Coordinate strategic input to operational influence activities and monitor implementation of strategic guidance for influence activities.
e. Develop and review MOD rules of engagement profiles for specific operations, in conjunction with MOD Central Legal Services and PJHQ.
f. Manage the process of Ministerial clearance for discrete operational matters regarding targeting of fires and influence activities.
g. Coordinate Defence Intelligence Staff support to the process of campaign effectiveness assessment. [3]

As well as responsibility for generating the "Master Target List" of military targets, Targeting and Informations Operations is responsible for "Influence Activities", which are described in JDP3-00:

Influence activities are an integral part of the strategic plan. The Cabinet Office endorses an Information Strategy for a given theatre or operation which directs Government departments to compile their own supporting implementation plans and report back to the appropriate Information Strategy Group. It seeks to encourage cross-Government engagement but does not contain the detail that the MOD would require to direct influence activities. MOD, through TIO, formulates the MOD contribution to the Information Strategy, which is then reflected in the Information Strategy at a Glance document, containing influence themes, objectives and identifying the target audiences.[4]

For a full description of the role of Information Operations in Campaign Execution, see JDP3-00

The TIO provides the MoD's link to:

a.the Defence Intelligence Service
b.national agencies
c.allies and other nations
d.the target systems analysis process [5]

Information Operations

Information Operations (info ops) has been described as:

Critical in undermining an adversary's determination to persist with his unacceptable course of action, as well as supporting the legitimacy for UK involvement. It is an integrating strategy not a discrete capability. It permeates every level and, to be fully effective, must be conducted at the strategic level over the long term as part of integrated UK foreign policy and diplomacy; it is not just switched on and off in response to individual crisis or over the life of a specific campaign. Comprising a range of techniques and tools, it is directed at a wide audience of groupings (hostile, friendly, neutral) involved in the crisis-inside the JOA, as well as a much wider global grouping of bystanders and spectators. [6]

Air Vice Marshall Mike Heath who was head of the DTIO during Operation Telic (The British Military's name for the 2003 invasion of Iraq) describes Information Operations thus:

The concept of Information Operations for the military is to garner cross government activity, not just military activity, to contribute towards influence and persuasion. I like to think of it as a continuum, that if you get it right it starts during pre war fighting where you are looking towards dissuasion and coercion; it continues into military operations; and, of course, it then wraps up and it is just as essential that you carry it through into post conflict restoration and reconstitution [7]

Information Operations should be understood as a crossgovernmental practice, for example the information campaign in Operation Telic was lead from the Cabinet Office, with the involvement of the Foreign Office, Home Office and Department for International Development.[8] The DTIO "provides strategic guidance on targeting and the cross-government information campaign, as well as advice to Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff" [9] and works on Information Operations with the Director General, Operational Policy - to form a mutually supporting role in the influence campaign with other groups involved in Media Operations.

Information Campaign during Operation Telic

Operation Telic is the name given to British military operations undertaken in the invasion of Iraq. [10] During Operation Telic, the military, through the information campaign, aimed to influence the will of the Iraqi regime at the same time as influencing the attitudes of the ordinary Iraqi and to articulate the governments strategy to allies. [11] During his evidence to the Select Committee Air Vice Marshall Heath set out the objectives of the information campaign during Operation Telic as follows:

Initially, the key objective was to deter the deployment and use of weapons of mass destruction. It was to deter wilful damage to the Iraqi infrastructure either by the people or by the regime; it was to promote the coalition's aims and objectives in terms of deterrents, potential hostile action and the reconstitution that came afterwards. All three were equally important. It was to prevent or limit civilian casualties, predominantly through creating an understanding with the population that they were not the target group if we moved into conflict, and how they could remain relatively safe, and also to convey to military personnel how they could surrender and remain safe throughout the process once again if we went into conflict. Those, widely, are the grander, strategic concepts. [12]

There had been an information campaign of sorts directed at Iraq since the 1990s. But a full information campaign and info operations began in October 2002 with the American military dropping 120,00 leaflets warning Iraqi forces to not fire on US and UK aircraft and by January 13 2003 fourteen leaflet drops had been undertaken. The coalition's effort was to concentrate it's information campaigns on a range of targets including; the regular Iraqi Army, ordinary citizens, religious leaders and scientists connected with the Weapon of Mass Destruction programmes, ahead of pillars of the Baath regime including the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard. The US also made use of the internet through an email campaign which target military and political leaders in Iraq. [13] Some of these messages included:

If you provide information on weapons of mass destruction or if you takes steps to hamper their use, we will do whatever is necessary to protect you and protect your families. Failing to do that will lead to grave personal consequences. Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons violate Iraq's commitment to agreements and United Nations resolutions. Iraq has been isolated because of this behaviour. The United States and its allies want the Iraqi people to be liberated from Saddam's injustice and for Iraq to become a respected member of the international community. Iraq's future depends on you. [14]

Psychological Operations

Psychological Operations (Psyops) are "the tactical end of the strategic information operations whole"[15] and is seen as specifically military in nature as "it is specifically targeted by military means into target audiences" [16]. Psyops aim to influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of selected individuals or groups in accordance with info ops theme this can be done through print, radio, television, loudspeakers transmitting messages, face to face through lectures or word of mouth though rumour or gossip, and through the use of the internet. [17]In the UK Psyops capability is provided by 15 (UK) Psychological Operations Group who, in Iraq, were involved in actions such as setting up a coalition sponsored radio station in Basra - Radio Nahrain.[18]

Staff

In 2004 the the DTIO had a staff of 98, including "a psychiatrist, an anthropologist, and other specialist staff"; it also also "has contacts with a variety of experts in the United Kingdom in universities and other institutions"[19]. There is a dearth of information in the public domain about the DTIO, the following is a partial list of staff or affiliates with the year (or years) in which they are known to be involved with the DTIO

Directors

  • 2009: Air Commodore Robert Judson [20] Now Chief of Defence Staff's Liaison Officer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. [21]
  • April 2006-2008: Air Commodore Graham Wright CBE [22] Subsequently Deputy Director, Office of Cyber Security, Cabinet Office [23] During his appointment with the TIO Wright took responsibility for strategic level planning and advice for all aspects of Information operations and Targeting- including the operational lead in the field of computer network operations. [24] Now Director of Strategy and Business Development for Intelligence Systems and Cyber Security Northrop Gruman Information Systems(UK. [25]
  • 2004-2006: Air Commodore Ian Dugmore[26]
  • 2003: Air Vice Marshal Mike Heath[27]

Other Staff

2011: Squadron Leader Mark Pattinson, Targeting and Information Operations Officer [28]

Lieutenant Colonel John Stroud Turp, Policy [29]

2008: Dr George Brander, Capability Adviser Human Factors [30] Dr Brander was a principle psychologist at DERA[31] and is (or was) involved with the Strategic Analysis Group of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory [32]

2006-2007: Group Captain Willie Cruickshank, Chief of UK Special Technical Operations and the National lead for the development of Space Control activities. [33]

2001-2003: Wing Commander Phil Davies, Responsible for Air and Joint Electronic Warfare including operations, concepts, doctrine and policy and their implementation. UK representative on the NATO Electronic Warfare Advisory Committee. Now Business development manager for electronic warfare operational support at Seliex Galileo. [34]

Affiliations

  • DTIO used the American Information Operations firm the Rendon Group "to provide advice on information campaigns" - at least between 1999 and 2004 [35] Nick Davies reports in his book Flat Earth that in June 2006 John Rendon, members of the MoD and the American military, including members of the DTIO attended a secret two day conference on strategic communications. The Rendon group at the time was working for the British MoD and the Pentagon advising them on their ‘product’ and have been responsible for funding ‘pro-democracy’ groups in countries including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. [36]
  • The Campbell Group has been attributed to proving skill to the DTIO through their use of a ‘at-a-glance’ guide to controlling media messages written by Alastair Campbell himself. [37]

Location

The Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations
Old War Office Building
Whitehall
London
SW1A 2EU [39]

Notes

  1. ↑ Select Committee on Defence, Second Report: Annex, Intelligence, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2000-2001, accessed 09/02/10
  2. ↑ Campaign Execution, JDP3-30, JDP3-30 (3rd Edition),October 2009, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, accessed 10/02/10
  3. ↑ Campaign Execution, JDP3-30, JDP3-30 (3rd Edition),October 2009, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, accessed 10/02/10
  4. ↑ Campaign Execution, JDP3-30, JDP3-30 (3rd Edition),October 2009, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, accessed 10/02/10
  5. ↑ {http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2270/jwp3_80.pdf Joint Warfare Publication, JWP 3-80] (June 2002, Information Operations accessed 02/03/2011)
  6. ↑ Joint Operations Execution, JWP 3-00 JWP3-00 (Second Edition, March 2004, Joint Operations Execution accessed 01/05/11)
  7. ↑ Select Committee On Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 09/02/10)
  8. ↑ Select Committee On Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 09/02/10)
  9. ↑ Select Committee On Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 09/02/10)
  10. ↑ The National Archives, The National Archives, Operation Telic Official Information, accessed 24/04/2011)
  11. ↑ Committee on Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 20/04/2011)
  12. ↑ Committee on Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 20/04/2011
  13. ↑ Committee on Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 20/04/2011
  14. ↑ Committee on Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 20/04/2011
  15. ↑ Select Committee On Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 09/02/10)
  16. ↑ Select Committee On Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 09/02/10)
  17. ↑ Joint Warfare Publication, JWP 3-80, June 2002, Information Operations, accessed 20/04/2011
  18. ↑ Select Committee On Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 09/02/10)
  19. ↑ Select Committee On Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 09/02/10)
  20. ↑ 8th Annual Information Operations Europe, Programme, International Quality and Productivity Centre, accessed 09/02/10
  21. ↑ [1]
  22. ↑ Information Operations and Influence Activity Symposium, 2008, IOIA 2008, Programme, accessed 09/02/10
  23. ↑ Countering Terrorism in a Changed World, Security News (24/11/09), accessed 09/02/10
  24. ↑ [2], accessed 10/03/2011
  25. ↑ [3], accessed 02/04/2011
  26. ↑ A Guide to Appointments and Invitations (August 04), MOD Foreign Liaison Staff, accessed 09/02/10)
  27. ↑ Select Committee On Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 09/02/10)
  28. ↑ [4] accessed 10/04/2011)
  29. ↑ [5] accessed 1/04/2011)
  30. ↑ Information Operations and Influence Activity Syposium, 2008, IOIA 2008, Programme, accessed 09/02/10
  31. ↑ Lieutenant Colonel J P Storr (2003), Human Aspects of Command, Directorate General of Development and Doctrine, accessed 09/02/10
  32. ↑ DSTL IET Briefing Paper, Briefing Paper on RAO Human Capability Priority Research Area 2: Technology Insertion, QuinetiQ Website, accessed 09/02/10
  33. ↑ [6], accessed 06/03/2011
  34. ↑ [7] accessed 23/03/2011
  35. ↑ Select Committee On Defence, Third Report: Information Operations, Defence Committee Publications, Session 2003-2004, accessed 09/02/10)
  36. ↑ Davies, N (2008)Flat Earth News Chatto & Windus: London
  37. ↑ Davies, N (2008) Flat Earth News Chatto & Windus: London
  38. ↑ IOIA Symposium 2010 Information Operations and Influence Activity Symposium, Symposium 2010, accessed 09/02/10
  39. ↑ A Guide to Appointments and Invitations (July 2007), MOD Foreign Liaison Staff, accessed 09/02/10

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