Mossad
Israeli foreign-intelligence service
| Mossad
| |
|---|---|
| Logo |  Roman Gofman, photographed in 2017; director from 2 June 2026. [1] |
| Type | Foreign intelligence service |
| Founded | 13 December 1949 coordinating directive; reorganised 2 March 1951; operational 1 April 1951. [2] |
| Founder(s) | David Ben-Gurion; first director Reuven Shiloah. [2] |
| Status | Reports to the prime minister. [1] |
| Headquarters | Tel Aviv, according to the historical Federation of American Scientists profile. [3] |
| Location | Israel |
| Area served | Foreign intelligence and overseas operations. [3] |
| Services | Human intelligence; liaison; covert operations. [3] |
| Key people | Roman Gofman — director from 2 June 2026. [1] |
| Website | mossad.gov.il |
| Remarks | Predecessor functions: Foreign Ministry Political Division. [2] Sister services: Shin Bet and Aman. Historical staffing estimates are discussed below. |
Mossad (Hebrew for Institute) is an abbreviation for ha-Mossad le-Modiin ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim (Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks), an Israeli intelligence agency focused on foreign intelligence.[4] In English, Mossad officers are known to use the term ISIS (Israel Secret Intelligence Service).[5]
History
Marc E. Vargo dates Mossad’s establishment to 13 December 1949.[6] The agency’s origins span several organisational stages rather than one interchangeable foundation date. David Ben-Gurion directed the creation of a coordinating institute on 13 December 1949, with Reuven Shiloah reporting to him but initially administered through the Foreign Ministry. Ian Black and Benny Morris distinguish this directive from the formal establishment of the reorganised service on 2 March 1951 and its commencement of operations on 1 April 1951. Initially called the Institute for Coordination, it assumed functions previously exercised by the Foreign Ministry’s Political Division; the name Institute for Intelligence and Special Duties was adopted in 1963. [2]
The reorganisation was contested inside the intelligence community. Political Division officers, including Asher Ben-Natan, tendered collective resignations on 2 March 1951 in the episode known as the ‘spies’ revolt’. Haim Ya’ari headed the replacement Foreign Intelligence Authority, while Isi Dorot was loaned from the General Security Service as Shiloah’s deputy and Akiva Levinsky became treasurer. [2]
Reorganisation under Meir Amit
Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman describe the replacement of Isser Harel by Meir Amit in March 1963 as a change in both management and the distribution of power. Harel's combined ascendancy over Mossad and Shin Bet did not pass to his successor. Amit initially continued as head of military intelligence as well as Mossad, but relinquished the military post in December 1963. During the overlap he brought Unit 131 into Mossad and combined its personnel with the agency's existing operational units. This later transfer did not make the unit's 1954 Lavon Affair a Mossad operation.[7]
In Raviv and Melman's account, Amit sought to prioritise the collection of military and political intelligence on Arab states over the spectacular missions associated with Harel. He recruited officers from Aman, including Rehavia Vardi, and combined some military-attaché and station-chief appointments. The authors describe his adoption of more systematic management and his attempt to reduce inter-agency rivalry, while also recording opposition from Harel's supporters and the departure of senior European operatives.[8]
Role and accountability
Mossad’s foreign-intelligence role includes human-source collection, liaison with foreign services and covert operations. The older Federation of American Scientists account also describes counterterrorism and clandestine assistance to Jewish refugees leaving Syria, Iran and Ethiopia. Its account of departments and personnel is historical rather than a verified 2026 organisation chart. [3]
The director reports to the prime minister. At the June 2026 handover, outgoing director David Barnea described Iran as a central strategic priority; reporting also identified hostage negotiations and operations against Iran among the responsibilities associated with his term. Claims about particular covert operations should be distinguished from publicly acknowledged actions. [1]
Peripheral alliances and secret diplomacy
Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman trace the strategy of cultivating non-Arab states and minorities around the Arab states to Reuven Shiloah. Their account describes assistance to Iraqi Kurdish forces, relations with Iran under the Shah and cooperation with Turkey. At the end of 1958, Mossad, SAVAK and the Turkish National Security Service established the secret intelligence-cooperation network Trident. It included meetings of the three service chiefs, exchanges on Soviet activity and training. These were historical alliances, not an account of relations with the post-1979 Iranian government.[9]
The same authors describe Mossad as an instrument of diplomacy as well as espionage. Under Itzhak Hofi, it organised clandestine contacts between Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein, and exchanges with Jordanian intelligence. In 1977, Hofi and David Kimche also participated in the Moroccan channel to Hassan Tohami, which preceded the meeting between Tohami and Moshe Dayan and Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Raviv and Melman distinguish this operational contribution to negotiations from intelligence assessments: Aman failed to anticipate Sadat's peace initiative.[10]
Structure and Personnel
The departmental accounts and undated or circa-dated appointments below describe the periods covered by their cited sources; they are not presented as a current staff directory.
According to intelligence writers Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Mossad has historically had eight departments: Collection, Operational Planning and Co-ordination, Research, Political Action and Liaison, Training, Finance and Manpower, Technology, and Technical Operations.[11] Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch also state that Mossad has eight departments, but cite some which Melman and Raviv do not list such as psychological warfare.[12]
Directors
| Person | Recorded tenure or role |
|---|---|
| Reuven Shiloah | 1949-1952 |
| Isser Harel | 1953-1963 |
| Meir Amit | 1963-1968 |
| Zvi Zamir | 1968-1974 |
| Itzhak Hofi | 1974-1982 |
| Nahum Admoni | 1982-1989 |
| Shabtai Shavit | 1989-1996 |
| Dani Yatom | 1996-1998 |
| Efraim Halevi | 1998-2002 |
| Meir Dagan | 2002[13]-2010 |
| Tamir Pardo | — appointment announced in 2010; director until January 2016, when Yossi Cohen succeeded him. [14] |
| Yossi Cohen | — 6 January 2016–1 June 2021. [15] [16] |
| David Barnea | — 1 June 2021–2 June 2026. [16] [1] |
| Roman Gofman | — from 2 June 2026. [1][17] |
Deputy Director
| Person | Recorded tenure or role |
|---|---|
| Izi Dorot | 1953-1963[18] |
| David Kimche | c.1980[19] |
| Nahum Admoni | c.1982[20] |
| Menahem Navot | c.1982[21] |
| Shabtai Shavit | 1986-1989.[22] |
| Efraim Halevi | 1990-95[23] |
| Aliza Magen | c.1997.[24] |
| Amiram Levin | 1998-2000[25] |
| Ilan Mizrahi | c.2003[26] |
| Tamir Pardo | - 2002-2005[14] |
| Naftali Granot | - 2005[27]-2007[28] |
| Tamir Pardo | - 2007-2009.[29] |
| Mossad Officer R | -2011 |
| Yossi Cohen | 2011-[30]-2013[31] |
Tzomet - collection department
The collection department has lead responsibility for espionage, with field officers operating under official and non-official cover around the world.[12]
| Person | Recorded tenure or role |
|---|---|
| Rehavia Vardi | - Head c.1973.[32] |
| Avi Dagan | |
| Ilan Mizrahi | - c.1997[24] |
| Naftali Granot | -2005 |
| Yossi Cohen | 2005-[28] |
Caesarea or Metsada - operations department
The special operations division is responsible for covert actions such as sabotage, assassinations and paramilitary operations. According to Todd and Bloch it is known as 'Metsada'.[12] According to the New York Times, the Kidon assassination unit is reputed to have been established within it in the 1970s.[33]
| Person | Recorded tenure or role |
|---|---|
| Peter Zvi Malkin | c.1960s[34] |
| Rafi Eitan | c.1972.[35] |
| Mike Harari | c.1972.[36] |
| Shabtai Shavit | 1980-c.1986.[22] |
| Tamir Pardo | 1988-c.1992.[29] |
| Haggai Hadas | c.1997[37] |
Tevel - political action and liaison department
The political action and liaison department is responsible for liaison with friendly foreign intelligence agencies, and back-channel diplomacy with states with which Israel does not have official relations.[12]
| Person | Recorded tenure or role |
|---|---|
| Yaakov Karoz | c.1963.[38] |
| Yoram Hessel | [39] |
| Itzik Barzilai | c.1997[24] |
| Mossad Officer D | c.2005.[28] |
| David Meidan | c.2007.[40] |
Lohama Psichologit - psychological operations department
Responsible for briefing friendly journalists and media spin. Works with Metsada on psyops.[12]
Research department
Responsible for analysis and publications, including reports, open source and daily intelligence summaries.[12]
According to Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, it has fifteen geographical desks. They include: United States, Canada and Western Europe, Latin America, Former Soviet territories, China, Africa, the Maghreb, Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and Iran. (Since they name fourteen desks, the missing one may be Egypt; this suggestion is conjectural, not a documented identification of the fifteenth desk). There is also a dedicated section covering weapons of mass destruction.[12]
| Person | Recorded tenure or role |
|---|---|
| Uzi Arad | Head c.1996.[41] |
Technology Department
Responsible for Mossad's own technological base, such as computers.[12]
Operations
- Operation Magic Carpet Yemen and Aden
- Operation Ezra and Nehemia Iraq
- Operation Mural Morocco
- Operation Yakhin Morocco
- Operation Susannah (Lavon Affair) Egypt — a military-intelligence operation, not a Mossad operation. The Israel Ministry of Defence archive identifies recruitment by Israeli military intelligence and the dismissal of Benjamin Gibli and Motke Ben-Zur, commander of Unit 131, after its failure in 1954. [42]
- Operation Moses Ethiopia
Adolf Eichmann
Ronen Bergman describes the 1960 capture of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina as an operation intended to bring him to trial rather than kill him. His account credits the German prosecutor Fritz Bauer with passing information to Mossad, and describes Isser Harel's supervision of the abduction and Eichmann's removal to Israel on an El Al aircraft. Eichmann was tried, sentenced to death and executed. Bergman places the operation within Harel's pursuit of Nazi perpetrators, while distinguishing an abduction for trial from the assassination campaigns that are the main subject of his book.[43]
Munich and the expansion of overseas killings
According to Ronen Bergman, the murder of the Israeli Olympic team by Black September in Munich in September 1972 changed the geographic scope of the assassination policy. He reports that Golda Meir's government authorised her to approve attacks in friendly countries without informing their authorities. Mike Harari's Caesarea organisation and its Bayonet teams became central to the campaign. Bergman argues that the eventual targets extended beyond the individuals directly responsible for Munich to a wider range of people suspected of involvement with Black September and the Palestine Liberation Organisation.[44]
Bergman explicitly cautions that his reconstruction of covert operations is not an officially confirmed account. In his source statement he describes interviews with serving and former officials, including unnamed sources, and documents supplied without official permission; he also acknowledges the risk that participants sought to promote their own versions. His account of the campaign therefore includes disagreements about responsibility for particular attacks, rather than treating every intelligence allegation about a target as an established fact.[45]
Lillehammer
Ronen Bergman reconstructs the killing of Ahmed Bouchiki, a Moroccan waiter living in Norway, on 21 July 1973. A Mossad team wrongly identified him as Ali Hassan Salameh. Bergman records conflicting accounts of how the identification was made and reports that doubts expressed within the surveillance team were rejected. He finds no substantive evidence connecting Bouchiki to terrorism. Six operatives were arrested, five were convicted, and the investigation exposed safe houses and other elements of Mossad's European infrastructure.[46]
In Bergman's account, Zvi Zamir and Mike Harari retained their posts, but the affair prompted greater operational caution and the effective disbandment of Bayonet in its existing form. He contrasts the killing with a subsequent operation in Rome in which Zamir chose to alert the Italian authorities to a planned attack on an El Al aircraft rather than send his own team into the suspects' apartment.[46]
The Khaled Mashal attempt
Ronen Bergman attributes the September 1997 attempt to poison Hamas leader Khaled Mashal in Amman to Mossad, acting with Benjamin Netanyahu's approval. He describes the capture of two operatives and the resulting crisis with King Hussein. Israel supplied an antidote, and the subsequent agreement included the release of Ahmed Yassin and other Palestinian prisoners in return for the departure of the remaining team. Bergman records disputes among senior Israeli officials over who had been informed before the operation.[47]
Bergman reports that an internal investigation led by Tamir Pardo criticised the planning and execution, and that the heads of Caesarea and Bayonet left their posts. He also records Ami Ayalon's objection that Mashal was not part of the operational terrorist circle and was therefore an inappropriate target. This was an internal disagreement over the justification for the attempted killing, as well as a dispute over operational competence.[47]
Dubai and the limits of operational success
Ronen Bergman attributes the January 2010 killing of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai to Mossad under Meir Dagan. His account emphasises the consequences of the subsequent police reconstruction: extensive surveillance footage, travel records and the misuse of foreign passports exposed personnel and methods and damaged liaison relationships. Bergman reports that Dagan initially emphasised the death of the target and the safe return of the team, but later accepted personal responsibility for the passport decision in an interview for the book.[48]
The same chapter describes disagreement over escalation against Iran. Bergman reports Dagan's opposition to preparations he understood as an imminent Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010, while also recording Ehud Barak's different account that he and Benjamin Netanyahu were testing the feasibility of such an attack. Bergman's broader assessment distinguishes the ability to kill individual targets or delay programmes from the ability to secure a lasting political outcome.[48]
Resources and appointment controversy
The Federation of American Scientists gives historical, not contemporary, estimates of 1,500–2,000 personnel in the late 1980s and a later estimate of approximately 1,200. Those figures should not be read as a 2026 headcount or budget. [3]
Roman Gofman’s appointment was challenged in court. Israel Defense reported on 2 June 2026 that the High Court of Justice had rejected the petitions the preceding day. David Barnea had opposed the appointment, but urged cooperation with his successor. Ynet described criticism of appointing an outsider alongside supporters’ argument that Gofman brought military operational experience; these are competing assessments, not findings of misconduct. [1] [49]
Contact
- Website: Mossad.
External Resources
- Nir Mann, Period piece, Haaretz, 27 August 2010.
- Ulrike Putz, Sabotaging Iran's Nuclear Program: Mossad Behind Tehran Assassinations, Says Source, SpiegelOnline, 2 August 2011.
- Mark Perry, False Flag, Foreign Policy, 13 January 2012.
See also
Shin Bet | LEKEM | Nativ | Misgeret | Aman | Unit 8200
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 Dan Arkin, Roman Gofman Assumes Role as Mossad Director, Israel Defense, 2 June 2026, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services, Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, pp.82–85, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 Federation of American Scientists, Mossad: The Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks, Intelligence Resource Program, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Mossad, Federation of American Scientists, accessed 14 May 2009.
- ↑ Amir Oren, The cult of ISIS, Haaretz, 27 June 2002.
- ↑ Marc E. Vargo, The Mossad: Six Landmark Missions of the Israeli Intelligence Agency, 1960–1990, McFarland, 2015, introduction, p.1; supplied book text consulted 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, chapter 6, pp.126–130.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, chapter 6, pp.128–133.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, chapter 4, pp.81–83.
- ↑ Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990, chapter 10, pp.213–214, 221–222.
- ↑ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.135.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today, Zed Books, 2003, pp.152-153.
- ↑ About Us - Directors, Mossad, accessed 14 May 2009.
- ↑ 14.0 14.1 Yossi Melman, Who is new Mossad chief Tamir Pardo, Haaretz, 29 November 2010.
- ↑ Herb Keinon, New Mossad head: Iran remains Israel’s most significant challenge, The Jerusalem Post, 6 January 2016, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 Yonah Jeremy Bob, Barnea takes over Mossad; Cohen: Mossad struck deep into Iran’s heart, The Jerusalem Post, 1 June 2021, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Yonah Jeremy Bob, Reshaping the Mossad: Inside Roman Gofman’s world of spies, Iran, and high-stakes strategy, The Jerusalem Post, 11 September 2026, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Izi Dorot, Israel Security Agency, accessed 24 July 2012.
- ↑ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.258.
- ↑ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.269.
- ↑ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.272.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 Yossi Melman, Meir Javedanfar, The Nuclear Sphinx of Tehran, Basic Books, 2008, p.154.
- ↑ Efraim Halevy, Us Middle East Project Inc., accessed 24 July 2012.
- ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 Yossi Melman, Returning to the scene of the crime, Haaretz, 25 September 2007.
- ↑ Major General (Res.) Amiram Levin, Former Deputy Mossad Chief,, Bloomberg, 11 May 2009.
- ↑ Aluf Benn and Yossi Melman, Ilan Mizrahi, former deputy Mossad chief, to head NSC, Haaretz, 7 May 2006.
- ↑ Amir Oren, Mossad deputy chief N. quits after spat with boss Dagan, Haaretz, 25 June 2007.
- ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 Yossi Melman, Returning the Mossad to its basics, Haaretz, 15 November 2005.
- ↑ 29.0 29.1 Attila Somfalvi, Tamir Pardo named new Mossad chief, ynetnews.com, 29 November 2010.
- ↑ Ronen Bergman, Mossad chief names new deputy, ynetnews.com, 5 June 2011.
- ↑ Herb Keinon, PM names deputy Mossad head as new National Security council chief, Jerusalem Post, 21 August 2013.
- ↑ Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise Of Yom Kippur And Its Sources, SUNY Press, 2005, p.48.
- ↑ Bruce Weber, Michael Harari, Israeli Agent Likened to James Bond, Dies at 87, New York Times, 27 September 2014.
- ↑ Israel Line, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2005.
- ↑ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.253.
- ↑ Yossi Melman, Targeted killings - a retro fashion very much in vogue, Haaretz, 24 March 2004.
- ↑ Yoav Limor, Yori Yalon, Yael Branovsky and Israel Hayom Staff, Former Mossad official to head efforts against African infiltrators, Israel Hayom, 30 August 2012.
- ↑ Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, Every Spy a Prince: The Secret History of Israel's Intelligence Community, Houghton Mifflin, 1991, p.129.
- ↑ Amir Oren, We can sell, but you can't, Haaretz, 17 April 2007.
- ↑ Yossi Melman, Get ready for some Mossad resignations, Haaretz, 21 April 2011.
- ↑ Amir Oren, Insider info on Netanyahu's office shows Israel may be in untrustworthy hands, Haaretz, 4 March 2012.
- ↑ Israel Ministry of Defence, IDF and Defense Establishment Archives, The “Unfortunate” or the Lavon affair, Ministry of Defence, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapter 4, “The Entire Supreme Command, with One Blow”.
- ↑ Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapters 9–10, “The PLO Goes International” and “I Have No Problem with Anyone That I've Killed”.
- ↑ Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, “A Note on the Sources”; chapter 11, “Wrong Identification of a Target Is Not a Failure. It's a Mistake.”
- ↑ 46.0 46.1 Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapter 11, “Wrong Identification of a Target Is Not a Failure. It's a Mistake.”
- ↑ 47.0 47.1 Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapter 26, “Sly as a Snake, Naïve as a Little Child”.
- ↑ 48.0 48.1 Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, New York: Random House, 2018, chapter 35, “Impressive Tactical Success, Disastrous Strategic Failure”.
- ↑ Itamar Eichner, Mossad changes chiefs: Barnea’s legacy and Gofman’s challenges, Ynetnews, undated, accessed 7 November 2026.