Difference between revisions of "Specialist Group Military Intelligence"
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| + | Documents of unknown provenance, which purport to be internal [[Specialist Group Military Intelligence]] (SGMI) files from March and April 2020, describe how SGMI received and handled tasks during the Covid-19 response, Operation RESCRIPT. The authenticity of these documents has not been established. | ||
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| + | A memorandum of 5 April 2020 states that "In normal running, SGMI Ops is the sole tasking and product release authority within SGMI". Group members were responsible for liaising with customers "to scope and deliver tasks".<ref name="SGMItaskmemo">SGMI Ops, ''20200405-Covid-19 task management-O'', memorandum, 5 April 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.</ref> An accompanying slide set describes the process as "administered via MODnet-based task tracker", and lists as sources of requirements the [[Standing Joint Command]] (SJC), "ISR Bde" ([[1st Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade|1 ISR Brigade]]), "StratComm", [[Army Headquarters]], [[Defence Intelligence]] (DI), other government departments (OGD) and [[Defence Medical Services]] (DMS).<ref name="SGMItaskslides">SGMI, ''Covid-19 task management'', slide set, 5 April 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.</ref> The memorandum says that "Operation RESCRIPT has caused SGMI to work at a tempo and focus unseen in its history". Among the factors it says were "impeding the work of SGMI Ops" were "OGD interest in SGMI support, well-intentioned SGMI members contacting potential customers or suggesting internal tasks, tasks generating multiple outputs, parallel publishing routes and onward forwarding of products".<ref name="SGMItaskmemo"/> | ||
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| + | ===Support to Defence Intelligence medical intelligence=== | ||
| + | A direction dated 19 March 2020, headed "SGMI Support to DI MEDINT - National COVID-19 Response" and signed by the Commander SGMI, ordered SGMI to support DI's medical intelligence staff (DI MEDINT) "as part of the" national response, and to support Army Headquarters (AHQ) "through the provision of MEDINT and SRO advice as required". It granted the team lead direct liaison authority ("DIRLAUTH") with DI MEDINT and AHQ.<ref name="SGMIdirection">Commander SGMI, ''SGMI Support to DI MEDINT - National COVID-19 Response'' (SGMI/COVID19/Direction), 19 March 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.</ref> | ||
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| + | Emails of 19 and 20 March 2020 from DI's SO1 Medical Intelligence to the SGMI team, with the subject "Potential SGMI tasker", asked about the seasonality of Covid-19 and about antibody testing. The second email asked of such a test: "Could it be effectively used as a health passport to confirm that people may return to work".<ref name="SGMItasker">SO1 Medical Intelligence, Defence Intelligence, ''Potential SGMI tasker-O'', emails, 19 and 20 March 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.</ref> The same material contains SGMI briefs addressed to DI MEDINT on both subjects, dated 21 and 22 March 2020.<ref name="SGMIbriefs">SGMI, ''Rapid serologic confirmation of prior COVID-19 infection'' and ''COVID-19 ecological studies: seasonality'', briefs to DI MEDINT, 21 and 22 March 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.</ref> | ||
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| + | An organisation chart headed "SGMI C-19 Support structure", dated 31 March 2020, shows three Covid-19 strands and where their output went. Support to MEDINT went "To DI/AHQ cc LIFC" and PMESII analysis "To SJC via LIFC". The regional and thematic threats strand is marked "Pri LIFC/4/1MI". The [[Land Intelligence Fusion Centre]] (LIFC) appears in all three routings.<ref name="SGMIc19chart">SGMI, ''SGMI C-19 Support structure'', organisation chart, 31 March 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.</ref> | ||
==People== | ==People== | ||
Revision as of 15:43, 5 November 2026
Tasking
Documents of unknown provenance, which purport to be internal Specialist Group Military Intelligence (SGMI) files from March and April 2020, describe how SGMI received and handled tasks during the Covid-19 response, Operation RESCRIPT. The authenticity of these documents has not been established.
A memorandum of 5 April 2020 states that "In normal running, SGMI Ops is the sole tasking and product release authority within SGMI". Group members were responsible for liaising with customers "to scope and deliver tasks".[1] An accompanying slide set describes the process as "administered via MODnet-based task tracker", and lists as sources of requirements the Standing Joint Command (SJC), "ISR Bde" (1 ISR Brigade), "StratComm", Army Headquarters, Defence Intelligence (DI), other government departments (OGD) and Defence Medical Services (DMS).[2] The memorandum says that "Operation RESCRIPT has caused SGMI to work at a tempo and focus unseen in its history". Among the factors it says were "impeding the work of SGMI Ops" were "OGD interest in SGMI support, well-intentioned SGMI members contacting potential customers or suggesting internal tasks, tasks generating multiple outputs, parallel publishing routes and onward forwarding of products".[1]
Support to Defence Intelligence medical intelligence
A direction dated 19 March 2020, headed "SGMI Support to DI MEDINT - National COVID-19 Response" and signed by the Commander SGMI, ordered SGMI to support DI's medical intelligence staff (DI MEDINT) "as part of the" national response, and to support Army Headquarters (AHQ) "through the provision of MEDINT and SRO advice as required". It granted the team lead direct liaison authority ("DIRLAUTH") with DI MEDINT and AHQ.[3]
Emails of 19 and 20 March 2020 from DI's SO1 Medical Intelligence to the SGMI team, with the subject "Potential SGMI tasker", asked about the seasonality of Covid-19 and about antibody testing. The second email asked of such a test: "Could it be effectively used as a health passport to confirm that people may return to work".[4] The same material contains SGMI briefs addressed to DI MEDINT on both subjects, dated 21 and 22 March 2020.[5]
An organisation chart headed "SGMI C-19 Support structure", dated 31 March 2020, shows three Covid-19 strands and where their output went. Support to MEDINT went "To DI/AHQ cc LIFC" and PMESII analysis "To SJC via LIFC". The regional and thematic threats strand is marked "Pri LIFC/4/1MI". The Land Intelligence Fusion Centre (LIFC) appears in all three routings.[6]
People
See also
- Integrity Initiative
- Chris Donnelly
- Alex Finnen
- A list of SGMI agents published by Anonymous
- Intelligence Corps
Resources
- https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2020-09-30-uk-information-operations-in-the-time-of-coronavirus/
- https://apply.army.mod.uk/what-we-offer/army-reserve-centres/south-east/thatcham-denison-barracks
- https://minorinput.wordpress.com/2019/04/19/does-the-ifs-have-a-trojan-horse-in-the-fco/
- http://web.archive.org/web/20140803074442/http://army.newsdeskmedia.com/Images/Upload/files/TheBritishArmy2014.pdf
- https://archive.ph/xSKh9
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 SGMI Ops, 20200405-Covid-19 task management-O, memorandum, 5 April 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.
- ↑ SGMI, Covid-19 task management, slide set, 5 April 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.
- ↑ Commander SGMI, SGMI Support to DI MEDINT - National COVID-19 Response (SGMI/COVID19/Direction), 19 March 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.
- ↑ SO1 Medical Intelligence, Defence Intelligence, Potential SGMI tasker-O, emails, 19 and 20 March 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.
- ↑ SGMI, Rapid serologic confirmation of prior COVID-19 infection and COVID-19 ecological studies: seasonality, briefs to DI MEDINT, 21 and 22 March 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.
- ↑ SGMI, SGMI C-19 Support structure, organisation chart, 31 March 2020, accessed 1 November 2026.