N officers 1

This article is part of the Undercover Research Portal at Powerbase: investigating corporate and police spying on activists.

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Part of a series on the Undercover Policing Inquiry
N Officers list
Description:	A list of N & HN cyphers used to designate individual officers in the Inquiry and by Operation Herne (Part 2)

Police officers cited in the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) are generally designated by a cypher / nominal starting with N or HN followed by a number. The practice of assigning these cyphers was begun in by the Metropolitan Police inquiry Operation Herne which investigated the activities of the Special Demonstration Squad undercovers. It was subsequently adopted by Mark Ellison for his Review and the UCPI, both of which draw heavily on the material assembled by Operation Herne. The practice was also taken up by Operation Elter, investigating the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. The system appears to have changed in 2017, when the 3 August 2017 rulings and direction of the new Inquiry Chair, John Mitting, began using the 'HN' label, though the associated numbers appear to be unchanged.

The N number system appears to be applied across the board for police officers regardless of force, position or involvement with undercover policing. A few have since been identified, but many remain anonymous and as such few details of them are known. Except where profiled elsewhere, this page collates what is known of them and links to relevant documents, including relevant procedural issues within the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

Due to the number of offices and associated details, the list has been split into several pages. This is page 1, covering N officers with cypher number up to 99.

For N officers with numbers 100 and higher, see N officers 2.

• Updated 19 November 2017

N Officers (1 - 99)

Cypher	Name	Status	Notes
HN1	Likely to be Matt Rayner (alias)	Minded-To: real name cannot be published.	Deployed against animal rights groups 1992-1997; cover name already in public domain and there 'are allegations about his conduct which require to be publicly ventilated to permit the Inquiry to fulfil its terms of reference. Publication of his real name is not necessary to permit this to be achieved. It would carry significant risks to his physical safety and well-being and the well-being of his family.' This would interfere with Article 8 Right and if the risk did materialise the result would be 'substantial'. Even if the risk didn't materialise, the 'interference would still be significant'. Mitting also said full reasons could not be set out openly and a closed note expanding on them would also be provided.
HN2	unknown	Full name and cover name to be published as no application for restriction order made. It had previously been noted that the UCPI needed further details before making a decision and had been awaiting NH2 to appoint a legal representative.	SDS UCO. Application from MPS over restriction on publishing real name only; officer not in position to confirm whether wider restriction is to be sought over the cover name, and open version of material relating to HN2 has yet to be agreed. Mentioned in Herne 1 as a former SDS undercover and later a cover officer, now retired: 3.4: "According to N2 efforts would be made to research the existence of close family members. Names that were too unusual or too common would be discounted, as too would cases where the deceased had died in unusual or memorable circumstances. In preference, children were chosen that would have died between four (4) and eight (8) years of age and would be of broadly the same age as the UCO." 4.4: "... he found himself in a situation where he had penetrated an organisation and was then asked by the group to help trace a mole among them."
N5	John Dines (a.k.a. John Barker)	Confirmed.	SDS UCO
HN7	unknown	Subject to final restriction order on real and cover name, made on 4 Sept 2017..	SDS UCO. Deployed in the late 1980s and early 1990s to three groups. Unconnected with his undercover deployment he sustained a significant head injury while a police officer. This injury and an unrelated condition have caused significant mental and personal problems, subject to a report by Prof. George Fox - who concludes there is a 'significant' ('highly likely to occur') risk of suicide if HN7's real or cover name were published. A separate ruling without hearing granted HN7 anonymity, based on medical evidence. "[Mitting] has therefore made a final determination based on medical evidence which cannot be properly disputed." Mitting in his ruling on anonymity states the risk to suicide is one he is not prepared to take, and even if that risk were not to materialise, notes "the mental distress which would be occasioned to him would amount to a significant interference in with his right to respect for his private life" under Article 8 human rights and "The need to arrive at that truth in relation to his deployment is unlikely to provide that justification. There is likely to be a good deal of other open evidence of similar and contemporaneous deployments from which conclusions can be drawn". See also Open application for restriction order for HN7.
N9	unknown		An SDS officer mentioned by N81 in his interview: "N9 later told me that it was quite usual for SDS management to arrange meetings between operatives and outside persons at the management’s homes. This was because such persons would not be able to attend SDS safe houses." (Ellison, p. 232).
N10	Bob Lambert	Confirmed.	SDS UCO & manager. Role in meeting between Richard Walton and N81 discussed in Herne II and the Ellison Review. In March 2016 a restriction order application and supporting documents were filed on his behalf seeking some restriction on personal details being released by the Inquiry: Open Application, Personal Statement (open version), Draft Order. In October 2016, Pitchford issued a 'Minded-To' indicating he was willing to grant most of the order sought. Objections were to be received by 3 November 2016, but no final order is readily found on the Inquiry website. Core participant; represented by Slater & Gordon.
N14	Jim Boyling	Confirmed.	SDS UCO. In March 2016 a restriction order application and supporting documents were filed on his behalf seeking some restriction on personal details being released by the Inquiry: Open Application, Draft Order. In October 2017, Pitchford issued a 'Minded-To note indicating he would grant the order. Objections were to be received by 3 November 2016, but no final order is readily found on the Inquiry website. Mentioned in passing in Herne 1 (para. 2.1). Core participant; represented by Slater & Gordon.
HN15	unknown	Mitting minded to refuse restriction orders over real & cover names. Closed hearing to be held to consider this. Previously, it was noted that the UCPI needed more details before making a decision.	SDS UCO. Mentioned by Lambert as an SDS UCO who 'would have involvement in Stephen Lawrence campaign issues' (Ellison page 214). No application from MPS, but in March 2016 NH15's lawyer submitted an application to restrict real and cover names. The lawyers have since notified the Inquiry that a supplement to the application may be made on receipt of a final risk assessment from the MPS. The Inquiry has also received additional evidence, but is awaiting the further application before publishing anything. March 2016 application documents: personal statement (gisted), open application, draft order and risk assessment (gisted). In November 2017, Mitting noted: I am minded to refuse to make a restriction order in respect of either real or cover name. A closed hearing is required to permit HN15 to make submissions in support of either or both applications. If I were to state the reasons for the decisions which I am minded to make openly and/or if HN15 were to make submissions openly it would so undermine the applications as to deprive them of purpose. Represented by Slater & Gordon.
HN16	unknown	Cover name to be released; real name to be restricted. This followed the position set out in Mitting's initial Minded-To note on this (Oct 2017) and follows a closed hearing.	SDS UCO According to their Nov 2017 risk assessment, N16 was involved in protection duties before joining the SDS. Initially they performed 'back office' duties and developed their legend before being deployed. They 'did not receive any formal training for the role', and 'preparation consisted of research, reviewing of files and informal contact with more experienced UCOs'. 'N16 had a mentor at the initial stage of the deployment and subsequent support from another SDS officer'. They told the Risk Assessor that promises of anonymity were given. (s.3) N16 was arrested during their deployment, but the case did not come to trial. They declined to state whether or not they had entered into any relationships during their deployment or whether they had 'engaged in any behaviour that could heighten the risk.'. The gisted version noted: 'The risk assessor expressed concern about another individual who would be impacted if a restriction order was not made.' (s.4) N16 has also been subject of a misconduct investigation. (s.5-7) In March 2016, the legal representative for HN16 (S&G) had applied to restrict cover and real name. March 2016 application material: personal statement (gisted), open application, draft order and risk assessment (gisted) In the August 2017 UCPI press release, it was stated that Mitting was considering a closed hearing for HN16 'due to sensitivity of material being considered' His then Minded-To also stated: "Detailed factors particular to this officer's circumstances require them to be considered at a closed hearing." This closed hearing was to take place after a further risk assessment, to be submitted by 1 September 2017 - the Inquiry was awaiting the awaiting the final risk assessment from the MPS before the open versions of all documents were to be published, though some documents were previously published in March 2016. Following a closed hearing, Mitting issued a Supplementary Minded-To on 23 October 2017 in which he stated: Publication of the cover name of HN16 is necessary to afford an opportunity to any individual who may have had an intimate relationship with HN16 under the cover name to provide information and evidence about it to the Inquiry. [emphasis added] This involves a small risk of significant interference with the right to respect for private and family life of HN16, if it leads to the revelation of the real name of HN16. Nevertheless, it is necessary to permit the Inquiry to fulfil its terms of reference to take that risk and proportionate to do so. On the basis of the information presently known to the Inquiry, and if no plausible evidence of such a relationship is forthcoming, publication of the real name of HN16 would neither be necessary for that purpose, nor proportionate nor otherwise justified. The accompanying press release noted also: The undercover police deployments of all three of these individuals [HN16, HN26, HN81] are of real interest to the Inquiry and the Chairman is of the view that there is no means of getting to the truth without the cover names being made public. Unreleased by the Inquiry was a closed note from Mitting 'which sets out in detail the reasons for refusing the application for a restriction order in respect of the cover name.' The further material was released on 15 November 2017, including the MPS risk assessment. The risk assessment noted that N16 had declined to meet his first assigned risk assessor, Kevin Shanahan but did provide material via his solicitors. He did meet with a new risk assessor, David Reid, but did not answer all questions. N16 has highlighted his perceptions of the risk they face if his details are released; Reid agrees with some but not all of these views. (s.10) N16 did not 'reveal any ongoing psychological issues and declined to provide [Reid] with any information in respect of counseling or psychological support. (s.16) It stated, in gisted form that: Section 17: ...The risk assessor accepts that a number of the individuals N16 reported on during the course of N16s' deployment are violent, or linked to others known to be violent. Section 18: ... the substance of N16's evidence will betray N16's identity. In the context of the risk assessment, the risk assessor considered the giving of evidence in private to be the best means of managing the risk to N16. Section 19 noted that in terms of risk if N16's cover name was released, the risk of attack was assessed as 'low' (2) (i.e. unlikely), though close to 'medium', but it was one of those cases were relying entirely on a numerical score was problematic. The likely impact was harder to assess, as some of the targeted individuals were likely to have a sense of betrayal, and also a history of violence which 'could foreseeably manifest into a physical attack against N16'. Thus, the impact was classed as 'moderate' (3), giving overall risk as 6. The likelihood of physical attack if real identity confirmed was increased to medium ('probability of the risk occurring could reasonably be foreseen and is considered distinctly possible to occur at some stage'), increasing overall risk score to 9. In relation to impact on family life: The risk assessor believes that on balance that the risk of interference with N16's family and private life is higher than the risk of physical assault, but does not dismiss the latter. The risk assessor assesses the likelihood of interference with N16's personal and family life if only N16's cover identity was known as medium (3). The risk assessor considers that the exposure of N16's deployment would have a significant impact on N16's career and future career prospects. The risk assessor assesses the likely impact as the upper levels of the 'moderate' category (3). This is defined as requiring "additional support, 'target hardening' at their address, or cause real anxiety within their family or close friends". It is not explained how or why this increased risk would be higher given that this refers to only their cover name. The risk assessor is much more concerned for interference in family / private life if the real name was to be released, simply because 'the likelihood of interference... must logically be greater if N16's real name was known other than in the circumstances above when only a pseudonym or cypher was known. The risk assessor considers this risk more likely than that of a physical attack'. He thus assesses the risk as 'high' (4), i.e. probable to occur at some stage, though it is not clear where the source of this risk is perceived. Thus the overall risk here is classed as 12. November 2017 application material HN16 - further written statement to Inquiry (16 October 2017) - fully gisted, answering three questions from the Inquiry 'arising from the circumstances of HN16's deployment as an undercover officer. N16 - Risk Assessment (David Reid, 10 November 2017, mostly gisted) - this is the third version as Kevin Shanahan no longer employed for such assessments, with David Reid taking over from him. HN16 - further written statement to Inquiry (28 April 2016) - fully gisted, which 'outlines HN16's views on possible routes by which HN16's identity may be revealed. N16 Medico-legal psychiatric report (Dr Walter Busuttil, 6 March 2017) - fully gisted, concluding that 'should N16's undercover and true identity be revealed medical issues will become more severe'. N16 Second Additional Statement in Support of Anonymity (15 June 2017) - fully gisted, setting out 'N16's concerns as to the impact on current and future employment should his cover or real identity be revealed'. HN16 - further written submissions to Inquiry in support of restriction order application (11 October 2017) - partial release. The Chair has written to N16 seeking to 'clarify the basis of the application for the restriction order being sought. N16 replied saying it was on basis of: (i) a real and immediate risk of physical harm (ii) a real risk of harassment falling short of physical harm (iii) a real risk of loss of N16s employment and reputation (iv) a real risk of harassment or even physical harm to N16's immediate family. The gisted version of this document also notes that it makes supporting submissions 'regarding the threats resulting from public campaigns' and references 'a bundle of press articles to demonstrate types of direct action which have blighted the lives and careers of those affected in recent years.' This is presumably the S&G Media Coverage Bundle also released in the November documents. The further written submissions also touch on the various other issues such as the public interest in their case, the risk of 'jigsaw' identification, possible harm under Article 8, possible harm to third parties and effectiveness or otherwise of possible mitigation measures. N16 is a core participant and represented by Slater & Gordon.
N17	unknown	Neither real or cover name can be published.	SDS UCO targeting right wing groups. Mentioned by Lambert as a contemporary of Peter Francis (early/mid 1990s) who infiltrated far right groups (Ellison, p. 214). Mitting stated in his Minded-To: HN17 is no longer a serving police officer. HN17 was deployed against a number of groups in the last 15 years of the existence of the SDS. If the true identity were to be discovered by members of them HN17 would be at real risk of serious violence by them or their associates. Nothing in the nature of the deployment or of what is known of HN17’s conduct of it could justify running that risk. For reasons which can only be, and are, explained in the closed note accompanying these reasons, publication of the cover name would be likely eventually to lead to the discovery of the real name [emphasis added]. That is not a risk which I am prepared to run. Even if Article 3 of the European Convention is not, on the facts, engaged, Article 8 is; and the interference with HN17’s right to respect for private and family life which would be occasioned by both the risk and occurrence of violence would not be justified under Article 8(2). Careful thought will, in the future, need to be given to the manner in which the evidence of HN17 will be received by the Inquiry. An application for restriction order over real and cover names had been made; supporting evidence supplied to Inquiry, but has not been published.
HN23	unknown	Minded-To: Neither real or cover names can be released (Nov 2017).	SDS UCO in 1990s. According to Mitting (Nov 2017): HN23 was deployed against one group and reported on other groups in the 1990’s. The nature of the deployment gave rise to risks to HN23's life and safety which, to an extent which cannot be precisely quantified, remain. They are more fully set out in the closed note which accompanies these reasons. Nothing short of anonymity in respect of real and cover name could obviate the risks. I would not be justified in running them. It is unavoidable that the evidence which HN23 can give will be given in a closed session. An application for restriction order over real and cover names had been made; supporting evidence supplied to Inquiry, but has not been published.
N24	unknown	Extension sought to be deal with in a future tranche.	SDS Management. N81 stated to Op. Herne: 'I was informed, at the height of the Macpherson Inquiry, that my reporting was going straight to Sir Paul Condon’s desk each morning via N24, and N127 (SDS Sgt) passed on to me from N24 congratulations from the Commissioner for your excellent reporting...' (Ellison, p. 232).
HN26	unknown	Minded-To: restrict real name, release cover name (Oct & Nov 2017).	SDS UCO (early/mid 1990s). They were a Special Branch officer prior to being recruited to SDS and 'promised lifelong anonymity along with personal safety assurances'. According to the 1994/1995 SDS annual review, cited by Herne I, N26 was the first officer to obtain a completely fictitious identity with the practice of using identities of deceased children being phased out starting November 1994 (5.4). An application for full anonymity for HN26 had been made in March 2016: In August 2017, the Metropolitan Police applied to restrict HN26's reall name only while HN26's solicitors (S&G) applied for both cover and real names to be subject to a restriction order. HN26 has not cooperated with the risk assessment, refusing to meet the risk assessor and providing information only through his lawyer. A closed session for on HN26's restriction order applications was to be held 'due to sensitivity of material being considered' / 'detailed factors particular to this officer's circumstances' and Mitting directed that NH26 should be present or at least contactable throughout the hearing. This hearing took place by 14 November, with legal representatives for HN26 (S&G), the MPS and the Inquiry in attendance. This closed hearing took place following which Mitting stated he was minded to release the cover name and restrict HN26's real name, stating in his Minded To (Oct 2013): It is necessary to permit the Inquiry’s terms of reference to be fulfilled that HN26’s cover name be published. The activities in which HN26 participated during deployment are matters of legitimate public concern. Others, not belonging to the Special Demonstration Squad, could, if alerted to the cover name of HN26 give evidence of potential value about them and about HN26’s participation in them. Unless the cover name is published, there is a real risk that the Inquiry would be deprived of such evidence. No practical means exists of obtaining such evidence from them unless the cover name of HN26 is published by the Inquiry. The Article 8(2) European Convention rights of HN26 are engaged, but the public interest identified above justifies the interference with them identified in the closed reasons which accompany this note. Publication of the real name of HN26 by the Inquiry is not necessary to permit the terms of reference of the Inquiry to be fulfilled. Given that it is not necessary, it would be disproportionate to do so. An unpublished closed note was stated to provide more detailed reasons. The accompanying press release noted also: The undercover police deployments of all three of these individuals [HN16, HN26, HN81] are of real interest to the Inquiry and the Chairman is of the view that there is no means of getting to the truth without the cover names being made public. March 2016 material: open application, S&G application, personal statement (gisted), draft order, and risk assessment (gisted). August 2017 material: MPS have applied to MPS application to restrict real name (MPS), application to restrict both cover and real names (S&G), expert medical evidence (Dr Walter Busuttil, fully redacted), personal statement (fully redacted) & risk assessment (Graham Walker, mostly redacted). Core participant; represented by Slater & Gordon.
N27	unknown		SDS Undercover. Ellison cites Lambert's interview with Operation Herne as saying: "N27 (also deployed into a different left-wing group) and would have come across Peter Francis, certainly both were at Welling…" (Ellison, p. 214).
HN33	unknown	Extent of restriction sought unclear; MPS to clarify.
HN34	unknown	Real name to be published.	SDS Management / back office staff. No restriction order application made.
N40	unknown	Minded-To: Neither real name or cover name to be published (Nov 2017).	SDS UCO. Mentioned in relation to how information from the SDS, particularly on the identities of protestors, was passed on to the rest of the police (Herne II, 13.4, 24.1.3). In November 2017, Mitting stated: HN40 was deployed against two groups in the last decade of the existence of the SDS [1998-2008]. If the true identity were to be discovered by members of them HN40 would be at real risk of serious violence by them or their associates. Nothing in the nature of the deployment or in what is known of HN40’s conduct of it could justify running that risk. For reasons which can only be, and are, explained in the closed note accompanying these reasons, publication of the cover name would be likely eventually to lead to the discovery of the real name. That is not a risk which I am prepared to run. Even if Article 3 of the European Convention is not, on the facts, engaged, Article 8 is; and the interference with HN40’s right to respect for private and family life which would be occasioned by both the risk and occurrence of violence would not be justified under Article 8(2). Careful thought will, in the future, need to be given to the manner in which the evidence of HN40 will be received by the Inquiry.
N43	Peter Francis	Confirmed.	Mentioned in Herne I (3.5, 3.6) though not by real name; his identity can be inferred as he was the only former undercover who provided a video interview to the Guardian.
N45	unknown	Minded-To: cover name can be published, but not real name (Nov 2017).	SDS UCO & Management. Currently in 70s they were deployed against groups in the 1970s, from which there is no known allegation of misconduct. Later had an administrative role in SDS in 1982-1983 which involved collation & internal distribution of intelligence reports, but 'not the tasking of undercover officers or target group selection.' Mitting noted (Nov 2017): Only immediate family members are aware of HN45’s deployment. They are concerned about the damage to HN45’s reputation which might result from association in the real name with other now notorious undercover officers and from lies which might be told by others about HN45. HN45 undertook the role of an undercover officer in the expectation that identity would not be revealed. In respect of real identity, this expectation should be fulfilled unless it is in the public interest that it should be set aside – for example, if it were necessary to do so to permit an accusation of misconduct to be determined. It is not. Further, reputation is an aspect of HN45’s private life to which respect must be shown. Interference with it is not necessary to fulfil the terms of reference of the Inquiry. The same considerations do not apply to the cover name. I accept, as claimed, that HN45 understood that the cover name would not be revealed publicly. I also accept, as contended, that it is unlikely that any member of any of the groups encountered by this officer, will be able to give evidence about the deployment because of the elapse of time and the death of the principal target. I cannot, however, exclude the possibility that disclosure of the cover name may prompt such evidence and that it may be necessary to receive it to fulfil the terms of reference of the Inquiry. I am satisfied on the basis of the risk assessment dated 10 July 2017 that the risk that disclosure of the cover name would lead to the identification of HN45 by real name is nil or negligible. In those circumstances, the balance of factors requires that the cover name is published. Closed reasons were also provided.
N52	unknown		SDS sergeant, who in 1998 received the memo from Bob Lambert on the meeting between Richard Walton and N81 (Ellison Review, p. 229).
N53	unknown		SDS Management. Authored a series of internal memos in 2002 in relation to a joint operation with the National Criminal Intelligence Service known as Op. Wisdom - in relation to the use of the 'Jackal run' process of using a deceased person's identity to obtain passports. "N53 explained that he believed that between 1968 and 2002 there had been one hundred and two (102) SDS officers who had been provided with covert identities. N53’s documentation stated that the majority of these UCO’s would have used a deceased child’s identity." (Herne I, 5.4 & 6.2). Mentioned as an ex-SDS Detective Inspector in relation to material being passed onto other units: Another ex-Detective Inspector, N53, told Herne: “The SDS retained nothing that would betray its identity” (Ellison, p. 201). Briefly mentioned in relation to computerisation of SDS / Special Branch records circa 1998 (Herne II, 13.1).
HN56	unknown	Extent of restriction sought unknown; MPS to clarify.
HN58	unknown	Initially Mitting minded to restrict both cover and real name (Aug 2017). This position changed to considering publishing both cover and real name by separating the two; further submissions invited (Oct 2017). This changed again in November 2017, with the then minded-to suggesting publishing real name but not cover name - with further submissions invited and possibly a short closed hearing to take place.	SDS UCO & manager. 'HN58 is now aged over 60. From 1997 to 2001, HN58 had a managerial position in the Special Demonstration Squad, having earlier being deployed as an undercover officer.' In August 2017 open applications from the MPS & HN58's lawyer to restrict cover and real names were published and accompanied by a personal statement, expert medical report & additional threat assessments. Mitting in his 'Minded-To' indicated he would accept both applications, stating (Aug 2017, para. 4): The publication of any details about the deployment would give rise to some risk to HN58's personal safety. Further, in a report dated 18 January 2017 Professor Fox states that the publication of the cover name creates a slight risk of causing a stress reaction recognised in the 10th revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems. It is is not necessary to fulfil the Inquiry's terms of reference to run these risks. What matters is the evidence which HN58 can give about the discharge of HN58's managerial duties and evidence which can be given by others about it. The identity of HN58 is known to those who can do so. The cogency of HN58's evidence and theirs will not be diminished by the use of a cypher. It is likely that HN58 will have to give evidence from behind a screen. Closed reasons supplement this paragraph." In October 2017, Mitting noted submissions from other non-police core participants and wrote: The principal reason supporting the decision which I was minded to make to restrict publication of both real and cover names was concern for the safety of HN58, arising out of the deployment of HN58 as an undercover officer. It is possible that this concern could be met if evidence about the discharge of managerial duties by HN58 was given in the real name and evidence about HN58’s activities as an undercover officer was given entirely in closed session. Not much of public value would be lost thereby. I invite submissions from all concerned with this issue, including HN58 on this alternative course. A short closed hearing may be required after open submissions have been made. March 2016 application: open application, draft order, personal statement (gisted) & risk assessment (gisted). August 2017 application: open application for restriction order, open supplementary application for restriction order, open risk assessment (David Reid), medical statement (Prof. G. C. Fox; fully redacted) Core participant in the Inquiry, represented by Slater & Gordon. Though his names are not known, HN58 appears under his cypher in a number of related documents. MPS risk assessment: On recruitment as UCO: "There was a lot of secrecy about the SDS and N58 states that people didn't talk unnecessarily. N58 had no idea of the existence of the SDS when N58 first went to Special Branch. N58 gradually became aware because people N58 knew 'disappeared' for a number of years before returning." On being recruited into the SDS he received a home visit where he was assured of lifetime anonymity. He used the identity of a dead child. He also attended twice-weekly meetings with his supervisors while undercover. Ellison Review: Head of SDS in August 1998 as Detective Chief Inspector, when he received Lambert's report on the meeting between N81 and Richard Walton. In response, he commented: "An excellent meeting and a good example of the strides N81 has made over the last 12 months" (Ellison, page 229). Author of an SDS Intelligence Update in September 1998, titled 'Extremist involvement in the Stephen Lawrence Campaign' where he wrote: "N81’s unique insight into the behind-the-scenes machinations of the Lawrence campaign has also proved invaluable to A/DI Walton who is currently attached to the Stephen Lawrence review team" (Ellison, page 229). PCC Investigation: HN58 was one of those investigated for gross misconduct by the IPCC following formal referral by the MPS in the wake of the 2014 Ellison Review's criticism of the meeting between Richard Walton and N81. In this investigation, HN58 was given the cypher N34 and it was noted he was "responsible for the management of officers deployed within Special Branch, including officers deployed within the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) who worked undercover" (para.148). The report state HN58 was promoted to Detective Chief Inspector rank in 1997 and transferred to SDS in mid-1998, with Det. Insp. Bob Lambert working under him (para. 152, 194). In this, he answered to Detective Superintendent 'N35', who oversaw 'S Squad' which included the SDS (para. 190). He retired in 2001 (para. 152). HN58 was aware of the meeting between Walton and N81, though did not consider it inappropriate at the time (para. 158, 194). During the IPCC investigation, HN58 was interviewed but declined to answer questions, though later provided a written statement (para. 151). The IPCC subsequently said there was not enough documentary or witness evidence (para. 217) to proceed with misconduct hearings against HN58 so on balance of probabilities there was no case to answer in respect of authorising the meeting between Lambert and N81, though there was retrospective knowledge of it. However, the author of the report did state: "With such a close working relationship between Robert Lambert and N34, it is inconceivable that Robert Lambert would have been able to make the arrangements for this meeting to take place without some knowledge on the part of N34" (para. 214). The author also noted that the meeting was initiated within the SDS itself, which leaves HN35, and his two superiors N34 and Colin Black in the frame (para. 219, 220).
HN64	unknown	Minded-To: restrict both cover & real names (Nov 2017)	SDS UCO in the 1990s where they were deployed against one group and reported on others. Mitting noted in Nov 2017: The deployment posed risks to HN64’s life and safety which, to an extent which cannot be precisely quantified, remain. The risks are explained in the closed note which accompanies these reasons. Nothing short of anonymity in respect of both real and cover names could obviate those risks. I would not be justified in running them. It is unavoidable that the evidence of HN64 will be given in closed session.
N67	unknown		SDS UCO (1981-1984). Used dead child identity; said at time of deployment there was no training manual but there was a 'best practice' reference folder (Herne I, 7.4 & 7.5).
HN68	unknown	Minded-To: real name cannot be published.	SDS UCO & managerial; deceased. Deployed against groups from 1968 to 1974. Managerial position in SDS 1982-84. Cover name to be published, however, Mitting states: "As in the case of the living officers cited it is unlikely that the publication of his real name would prompt the giving or production of evidence necessary to permit the Inquiry to fulfil its terms of reference. Evidence about the discharge of his managerial duties can be given by reference to his cypher. The identity of HN68 is known to those who can give such evidence. Publication of his real name would be likely to interfere with the right of his widow to respect for her private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the European Convention’). It is unlikely that such interference would be justified under Article 8(2). The possibility that disclosure of his cover name might interfere with her right is nil or negligible. Closed reasons accompany this note." The MPS have submitted an application to restrict N68's real name, a witness statement from his widow and an open risk assessment (Mark Veljovic). The above information on N68 comes from Mitting's 'Minded-To' note, and does not appear in the risk assessment. As he deceased, HN68 is not a core participant.
N69	unknown		SDS Chief Inspector (1986-1987). In his statement to Op. Herne stated '…new recruits were instructed on how to go about obtaining false birth certificates. They would obtain details of a deceased person of a similar age from Somerset House and then use those details to go about creating their legend.' (Herne I, 3.1)
HN72 / N72	unknown	Extension sought to deal with in a future tranche.	SDS. Provided evidence that N81's tasking to spy on the Lawrence family came from Commissioner Stevens (Ellison, p. 253; Herne II, 21.1.15 & 21.2). Operation Herne told Ellison that N72 did not serve with SDS until after the Macpherson Inquiry so his account should be treated as hearsay; Stevens also denied this (Ellison, p. 253).
N78	unknown	Extent of restriction sought unclear; extension sought for MPS to supply application.	SDS UCO. Joined Special Branch in 1986 and SDS in 1991. Deployed as an undercover into left-wing groups Summer 1991 to 1995, including some near the Lawrence campaign; had left the SDS by 1996 (Herne II, 12.2; Ellison, 6.4). Aware of Peter Francis' role; said he heard nothing indicating material to smear the Lawrences was being sought (Herne II, 21.1.14; Ellison, 6.3(p), 6.4). Considerable material from him covered in section 6.4 of the Ellison Review (Vol.1).
HN81 / N81	unknown	Minded-To: Real name cannot be published, cover name can be.	SDS UCO. Referred to extensively in the Ellison Review in relation to the targeting of the family of Stephen Lawrence. On joining the SDS he received a home visit from two officers who affirmed he would have anonymity for the rest of their career. During his time undercover he would have twice-weekly meetings with his handlers, and following the end of his deployment he returned to Special Branch. In March 2016 N81's lawyers submitted applications for restriction orders of N81's real and cover names. Revised application and supporting material from the lawyers and MPS was released by the Inquiry in August 2017. In August 2017 Mitting proposed to hold a closed session hearing over cover name to be held 'due to sensitivity of material being considered' - directions to be given separately. As such he issued a direction that there should be a closed hearing to (a) evaluate the risk to N81 and their partner, (b) how they can be protected from that risk if the cover name is disclosed and (c) if the risk cannot be taken how the issues can be fully investigated by the Inquiry. It was desired that N81 attends the hearing, but it was not ordered. Some additional bits of notification were to be provided to the Inquiry no later than 17 August 2017. Mitting stated at the time: One of the reasons for setting up the Inquiry was to investigate these issues. I can at present see no means of resolving disputed questions of fact about them without the cover name of HN81 being published. One of the issues which I may have to determine is whether or not the group against which HN81 was deployed was steered towards the Lawrence family campaign by HN81. For others to be able to give evidence about that issue, they would have to know the cover name. HN81 is understandably concerned that revelation of the cover name may lead to the identification of the real name. This has had, and continues to have, an impact on HN81’s mental health. According to Dr Walter Busuttil, a consultant psychiatrist, in a report dated 15 February 2017, the impact has been significant and will be severe if the cover name is disclosed. HN81’s situation has also had an impact on the health and well-being of HN81’s partner. Their right to respect for their private and family life, including health and personal integrity, under Article 8 of the European Convention will be infringed unless the interference is justified under Article 8(2). The issue is both important and difficult. I propose, therefore, to take the exceptional course of conducting a closed hearing at which I can receive representations by or on behalf of HN81 and discuss possible means of reconciling HN81’s legitimate interests with those of the Inquiry. If necessary, I will thereafter invite representations from non-state core participants, if necessary at an open hearing. Closed reasons supplement this paragraph. In his October 2017 Supplementary 'Minded-To', Mitting wrote: Following the closed hearing on 10 October 2017 I am minded to make a restriction order under section 19(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005 in respect of the real name of HN81 and to refuse the application in respect of the cover name. The Inquiry cannot fulfil its terms of reference on a critical issue – the alleged infiltration of the Lawrence family campaign and the intelligence gathered and reported upon it by undercover police officers, in particular HN81 – unless the cover name is published. It is essential that members of the group against which HN81 was deployed and others in the Lawrence family campaign should be able to give evidence about HN81’s actions. They cannot sensibly be expected to do so unless they know who HN81 was in the name by which HN81 was known to them. It is likely that this decision will have an adverse impact on HN81’s mental health and so interfere with the right to respect for the family and private life of HN81 and HN81’s partner. I am satisfied that the interference is justified under Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the European Convention’) because of the compelling public interest in getting to the truth about HN81’s deployment. Publication of the real name of HN81 by the Inquiry is not necessary to permit the terms of reference of the Inquiry to be fulfilled. Given that it is not necessary, it would be disproportionate to do so. The accompanying press release noted also: The undercover police deployments of all three of these individuals [HN16, HN26, HN81] are of real interest to the Inquiry and the Chairman is of the view that there is no means of getting to the truth without the cover names being made public. Unpublished close reasons were also issued setting reasons out in greater detail for this proposed decision. Mitting also stated: If the decision proposed is made, neither the cover name of HN81 nor the name of the group against which HN81 was deployed will be published immediately, to permit steps to be taken to mitigate the impact on HN81’s mental health. March 2016 application documents: open application & S&G application, draft order, personal statement (gisted) & risk assessment (gisted) August 2017 documents: open application for restriction order (MPS), open supplementary application for restriction order (S&G), open risk assessment (David Reid), open medical assessment N81 is a core participant and is represented by Slater & Gordon.
N85	Roger Pearce	Confirmed.	SDS UCO & manager. Head of Special Branch and Director of Intelligence for Metropolitan Police Service. See under profile for mentions of him in Herne I and the Ellison Review.
N86	unknown	Extent of restriction sought unclear; extension sought for MPS to supply application.	SDS Head from 1993 to 1996, as Detective Chief Inspector; responsibilities included SDS recruitment & tasking. Author of a dcocument of 24 Sept 1993 referring to a 'new, violent anti-fascist group forming within Youth Against Racism'. Also authored the 1993/1994 SDS Annual Report which discussed left-wing campaigning around the death of Stephen Lawrence. Left SDS for another post on 11 April 1996. On 21 April 1997 he took temporary control for six months of S Squad (the division which contained the SDS) due to illness of its Suptintendent. Refused to provide a statement to Operation Herne. However, as he is central to the claims of Peter Francis regarding racism in the SDS and the tasking against the Lawrence family, N86 provided a statement for the Ellison Review in which he denied much of what Francis said. (Ellison 6.5 & 6.9(c)-(d); Herne II, 26.1.19)
N88	unknown	Minded-To (Nov 2017): cover name to be published (application to restrict refused), real name to be restricted.	SDS UCO. Deployed against community-based support groups in 1980s. Application to restrict both cover and real names made with accompanying risk assessement and personal impact statement (all unpublished). Mitting noted (Nov 2017): One of the issues which the Inquiry must explore is whether or not the deployment was justified and what, if anything, of legitimate interest to the police occurred during the deployment. It is unlikely, due in part to the passage of time, that HN88 will be able to give detailed evidence about the deployment. In that event, and in any event, the Inquiry will wish to obtain, if possible, evidence from those against whom HN88 was deployed. This task will be at least impeded if the cover name is not published. Publication of HN88’s real name is not necessary to permit this to occur. It would give rise to an interference with private and family life, including HN88’s economic activity which would not be justified under Article 8(2) of the European Convention or fair to the officer. HN88 is concerned that if the cover name is published the real name might be identified. I am satisfied that the risk is so small as not to amount to a real risk and have therefore discounted it. A closed note was also issued setting out further details.
N89	unknown		SDS UCO; infiltrated far right in 1990s and 'involved in public order situations where left and right attended'; contemporary of Peter Francis who would confide in N89.
HN89	unknown	Minded-to (Nov 2017): real & cover name to be published.	SDS UCO. Deceased and no application made to restrict details. Note from URG: Not clear if this is the same person as N89, mentioned in Ellison.
HN99	unknown	Real name to be published	SDS Management / back office. No application for restriction made.

For further N officers, with numbers 100 and higher, see N officers 2.

Notes

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