Difference between revisions of "Northern Ireland Information Service"
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| − | + | The Northern Ireland Information Service is the Press and PR department of the [[Northern Ireland Office]]. | |
| − | + | According to one account of the history of the NIIS written in 1997: | |
| − | + | :Eventually the Northern Ireland Office took closer control of information. This did not stop misinformation, particularly over state killings, in which the NIO occasionally participated. But it did ensure that misinformation was used more judiciously and efficiently. | |
| − | + | :With the change in strategy the sophistication of official public relations increased. Although the Red Menace scare remained a useful tactic throughout the 1980s, more energy was put into portraying 'the province' as 'getting back to normal' and leaving the 'terrorists' behind. | |
| − | + | :More and more money was spent on glossy brochures and promoting and marketing Northern Ireland. One key example is the twice yearly NIO magazine [[Omnibus magazine|Omnibus]], first published in 1993, which is distributed free to thousands of readers around the world. | |
| − | + | :It includes positive stories about Northern Ireland, many written by well-known journalists and celebrities. Nowhere does it mention that it is published by the British government. Instead the more anonymous '[[Northern Ireland Information Service]]' is listed. | |
| − | + | :Production values are extraordinarily high and have increased in the last two years using heavier and glossier paper and expanding its pagination from about 45 to 62 pages. | |
| − | + | :The 1980s also saw a range of quasi-autonomous bodies set up which engaged in public relations work on behalf of the government. One of the more recent is the Community Relations Council which pushes the line that the problem in Northern Ireland is nothing to do with the British government. | |
| − | + | :Such indirect Public Relations is complimented in mainstream politics by a change towards more sophisticated 'spindoctoring' at the NIO. This has been especially marked since the advent of the 'peace process'. | |
| − | + | :Now misinformation consists less of issuing outright falsehoods, than in putting spin on material which would otherwise be unflattering or hard to sell. | |
| − | + | :Perhaps the key example is the way the government handled the revelation in late 1993 of talks with Sinn Fein. | |
| − | + | :[[John Major]] said in Parliament that such talks "would turn my stomach". The head of information at the NIO, [[Andy Wood]], in a statement that must now make him blush, scoffed that such reports belonged "more properly in the fantasy of spy thrillers than in real life". Sir [[Patrick Mayhew]], choosing his words carefully, said: 'Nobody has been authorised to talk or negotiate on behalf of the British government with Sinn Fein." This was interpreted by the media and everyone else as a denial of the talks which are now a matter of record. | |
| − | + | :Yet in the peculiar world that is Whitehall openness such a statement is not regarded by the head of the British Civil Service as misleading. | |
| − | Information strategy is now an integral part of the policy-making progress. If there is to be real progress towards peace, the duplicity of the Whitehall spindoctors will need to be acknowledged more candidly than it has been so far. | + | :Sir [[Robin Butler]] told the Scott Inquiry that: 'It was a half-answer, if you like, but it was an accurate answer...It did not deny that there had been contacts. It simply did not cover the point." It was "not designed to mislead". |
| + | |||
| + | :This kind of spin on official statements has become a familiar part of political debate and is one factor which decreases trust in a shaky peace process. Misinformation remains a key part of government approaches to the media, albeit in a more sophisticated and less easily found out form. | ||
| + | |||
| + | :Information strategy is now an integral part of the policy-making progress. If there is to be real progress towards peace, the duplicity of the Whitehall spindoctors will need to be acknowledged more candidly than it has been so far.<ref>David Miller [http://www.spinwatch.org/content/view/107/8/ Manipulating the message:Policy change that gagged army's dirty tricks brigade] The Irish News 7 January 1997.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Staffing and publicity in the early 1990s== | ||
| + | In his 1993 study, [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]] described the NIIS as a major source of political news, delivering press releases to Belfast news desks three times a day and employing 58 staff in its Belfast and London offices in 1991–92.<ref name="Miller1993p74">[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, ch. 4, p.74.</ref> A parliamentary answer by [[Brian Mawhinney]] on 7 May 1991 recorded 58 staff in post on 1 April for 1991–92, against a complement of 60.<ref>[[Brian Mawhinney]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1991/may/07/press-and-public-relations-staff Press and Public Relations Staff], ''Hansard'', HC Deb, 7 May 1991, vol. 190, col. 431W.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | Miller reported that the service produced favourable stories for international distribution, working partly through the [[Central Office of Information]] and its [[London Press Service]]. He also described a related publicity initiative by the [[Industrial Development Board for Northern Ireland|Industrial Development Board]]: in 1990 it replaced [[Burson-Marsteller]] with [[Shandwick]], paying the latter £3.5 million for the first year of a contract which included supplying international media with favourable stories from a Belfast news bureau.<ref name="Miller1993pp77-78">[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.77–78. The contract payment is reported by Miller; the original contract was not independently retrieved.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Strategy and publicity booklets== | ||
| + | Miller argued that the information strategy of the [[Northern Ireland Office]] combined an emphasis on violence and counterinsurgency with a message of reform, economic development and a return to normality. In his analysis, these were complementary elements of a strategy of containment, rather than evidence that official publicity was concerned only with violence.<ref>[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.76–83, 98.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | His main example was ''The Day of the Men and Women of Peace Must Surely Come'', issued in July 1989 for the twentieth anniversary of the deployment of [[British Army|British troops]]. Miller reported that 10,000 copies were produced; according to the NIO account he cited, they were distributed to MPs, the media, opinion formers and others interested in Northern Ireland.<ref>''[[Fortnight]]'', September 1989, cited indirectly in [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, p.78. The magazine item was not independently retrieved.</ref> Miller read the booklet as presenting civil rights grievances as having been met, the army and [[Royal Ulster Constabulary]] as protectors of the community, and industrial development as evidence of recovery. He argued that this presentation cast the British government as a neutral facilitator rather than a party to the conflict.<ref>[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.78–83.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Access to journalists and the use of intermediaries== | ||
| + | Miller characterised the service's relations with journalists as a “hierarchy of access”, distinguishing Dublin journalists, local Northern Ireland journalists, journalists working for London-based outlets, and international correspondents. He argued that access depended on the audiences the NIO wished to reach, as well as media type and professional and personal relationships.<ref>[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.88–94, 98.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | As an earlier example of restrictions on Dublin journalists, Miller reproduced a memorandum from [[Eric Montgomery]], dated 18 March 1960, concerning [[Garret FitzGerald]], then Dublin correspondent of the ''[[Financial Times]]''. Montgomery advocated keeping assistance to FitzGerald to a minimum in order to restrict his coverage to the south. The [[Cabinet Publicity Committee]], chaired by [[Basil Brooke]], agreed on 23 March that only the basic minimum co-operation should be provided to Dublin writers.<ref>[[Eric Montgomery]], memorandum, 18 March 1960; minutes of the 97th meeting of the [[Cabinet Publicity Committee]], 23 March 1960, [[Public Record Office of Northern Ireland]] (PRONI), CAB9F/123/72. Cited indirectly, as quoted in [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.88–89. The original archive documents were not independently retrieved.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | For the period after direct rule was announced, Miller cited [[Henry Kelly]]'s account of confidential lobby briefings by [[William Whitelaw]]'s PR officer, [[Keith McDowall]], which excluded Belfast newspapers and Dublin-based daily and evening papers in favour of correspondents for London papers.<ref>[[Henry Kelly]], ''[[Irish Times]]'', 6 April 1972 (article title not supplied by Miller). Cited indirectly, as quoted in [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.90–91. The newspaper original was not independently retrieved.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | Miller also examined the use of apparently independent speakers and publications to carry official arguments. He described publicity aimed at American journalists and newspaper editorial boards, alongside the overseas work of [[British Information Services]]. The service's long-time director, [[David Gilliland]], claimed in a 1983 speech that patient explanations of government policy had secured a more sympathetic response in American editorial comment.<ref>[[David Gilliland]], speech to the [[Belfast Chamber of Commerce and Industry]], [[Forum Hotel]], Belfast, 31 January 1983, p.7. Cited indirectly, as quoted in [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.94–95, 102. The speech was not independently retrieved.</ref> As an example involving published material, Miller reported that passages from an [[Information Research Department]] briefing, ''The IRA: Aims, Policy, Tactics'', had been reproduced almost verbatim in [[David Barzilay]]'s ''The British Army in Ulster'' (1973). He argued that such reuse could give official accounts the appearance of independent corroboration.<ref>[[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.86–87, 100, note 10. Miller identifies pp.119–124 of [[David Barzilay]], ''The British Army in Ulster'', vol. 1, Belfast: Century Services, 1973; neither the briefing nor those pages was independently retrieved.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==The tension between anti-IRA publicity and investment promotion== | ||
| + | Miller used ''The Terror and the Tears'', published in March 1972, to illustrate the tension between publicity about [[Irish Republican Army|IRA]] violence and attempts to present Northern Ireland as a stable place for investment. Citing contemporary newspaper reports, he recorded that around 100,000 copies had been printed and a further 150,000 ordered shortly before direct rule.<ref>''[[Irish Times]]'', 22 March 1972, and ''[[The Times]]'', 27 August 1974 (article titles not supplied by Miller), cited indirectly in [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.95–97. The newspaper originals were not independently retrieved.</ref> In a parliamentary answer on 19 June 1972, [[David Howell]] said approximately 120,000 copies had been distributed in Britain and abroad by the previous administration. General distribution had not continued since 24 March, although copies were available on request.<ref>[[David Howell]], [https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1972/jun/19/the-terror-and-the-tears “The Terror and the Tears”], ''Hansard'', HC Deb, 19 June 1972, vol. 839, cols 37–38W.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | Gilliland acknowledged this problem in his 1983 speech: publicising the use of funds or equipment to support violence risked discouraging businesses from committing resources to Northern Ireland. Miller stressed that these conflicting objectives, and the differing priorities of news organisations, limited the service's ability to obtain the coverage it wanted.<ref>[[David Gilliland]], speech to the [[Belfast Chamber of Commerce and Industry]], 31 January 1983, p.7, cited indirectly, as quoted in [[David Miller (Powerbase)|David Miller]], [https://drdavidmiller.org/images/docs/miller-northern%20ireland%20information%20service-eldridge-getting%20the%20message%20-%201993_ed.pdf The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics], in [[John Eldridge]] (ed.), ''Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power'', London: Routledge, 1993, pp.97–98. The speech was not independently retrieved.</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==People== | ||
| + | *[[Liz Drummond]] | [[David Gilliland]] | [[Clifford Hill]], based in the NIO from the [[FCO]] in the early 1970s | [[Tom Roberts]] | [[Maggie Stanfield]] | [[Andy Wood]] | [[Frank Woods]] | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Case Studies== | ||
| + | |||
| + | * [[Cabinet Publicity Committee]] | ||
| + | * [[Northern Ireland Information Service: Background Briefing Documents]] | ||
| + | * [[Northern Ireland Information Service: Misinformation]] | ||
| + | * [[Northern Ireland Information Service: Planting Stories]] | ||
| + | * [[Northern Ireland Information Service: Targeting Audiences]] | ||
| + | * [[Northern Ireland Information Service: Using other people]] | ||
| + | * [[Northern Ireland Information Service: Visits]] | ||
| + | * [[Omnibus magazine]] | ||
| + | * [[Real Lives]] | ||
| + | * [[The British Media and Gibraltar]] | ||
| + | * [[The Committee]] | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Publications== | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Information Service, nd, Northern Ireland Observed, Belfast: NIIS. | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Information Service/Arts Council of Northern Ireland (1985) Images: Arts and People in Northern Ireland, March, Belfast:NIIS/Arts Council | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Office (1980a) H-blocks: The Facts, October, Belfast:NIO | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Office (1980b) H-blocks: The Reality, November, Belfast:NIO | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Office (1981a) Day to Day Life in Northern Ireland Prisons, March, Belfast:NIO | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Office (1981b) Scope for Further Improvements in Prison Life, July, Belfast:NIO | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Office (1981c) H-blocks: What the Papers Say, July, Belfast:NIO | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Office (1981d) The Tragedy of Terrorism, October, Belfast:NIO | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Office (1985a) Life Sentence Prisoners in Northern Ireland: An Explanatory Memorandum, January, Belfast:NIO | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Office (1985b) Armagh Prison Strip Searching: The Facts, Belfast:NIO | ||
| + | *Northern Ireland Office (1989) 'The Day of the Men and Women of Peace Must Surely Come...'', July, Belfast:NIO | ||
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | ==Archival document images== | ||
| + | [[File:Presentation_in_Northern_Ireland_Cooper_October_1974_CJ_4_2419.jpg|thumb|left|300px|“Presentation in Northern Ireland”, attributed by Bradshaw and Deane to Cooper, 10 October 1974 (TNA: CJ 4/2419/1).<ref name="BD2025Figure5">Tancred Bradshaw and Shelley Deane, [https://muse.jhu.edu/article/969438 A Propaganda Failure in the Perimeter: The British in Northern Ireland, c. 1969–82], ''Irish Studies in International Affairs'', vol. 36, no. 2 (ARINS, 2025), Figure 5; TNA: CJ 4/2419/1 (article footnote 66; figure caption gives CJ 4/2419/). Accessed 7 November 2026.</ref>]] | ||
| + | {{clear}} | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
| − | + | <references/> | |
| + | |||
| + | |||
| + | [[Category:British Propaganda]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Propaganda]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Northern Ireland]] | ||
Latest revision as of 23:33, 7 November 2026
| This article is part of the Propaganda Portal project of Spinwatch. |
The Northern Ireland Information Service is the Press and PR department of the Northern Ireland Office.
According to one account of the history of the NIIS written in 1997:
- Eventually the Northern Ireland Office took closer control of information. This did not stop misinformation, particularly over state killings, in which the NIO occasionally participated. But it did ensure that misinformation was used more judiciously and efficiently.
- With the change in strategy the sophistication of official public relations increased. Although the Red Menace scare remained a useful tactic throughout the 1980s, more energy was put into portraying 'the province' as 'getting back to normal' and leaving the 'terrorists' behind.
- More and more money was spent on glossy brochures and promoting and marketing Northern Ireland. One key example is the twice yearly NIO magazine Omnibus, first published in 1993, which is distributed free to thousands of readers around the world.
- It includes positive stories about Northern Ireland, many written by well-known journalists and celebrities. Nowhere does it mention that it is published by the British government. Instead the more anonymous 'Northern Ireland Information Service' is listed.
- Production values are extraordinarily high and have increased in the last two years using heavier and glossier paper and expanding its pagination from about 45 to 62 pages.
- The 1980s also saw a range of quasi-autonomous bodies set up which engaged in public relations work on behalf of the government. One of the more recent is the Community Relations Council which pushes the line that the problem in Northern Ireland is nothing to do with the British government.
- Such indirect Public Relations is complimented in mainstream politics by a change towards more sophisticated 'spindoctoring' at the NIO. This has been especially marked since the advent of the 'peace process'.
- Now misinformation consists less of issuing outright falsehoods, than in putting spin on material which would otherwise be unflattering or hard to sell.
- Perhaps the key example is the way the government handled the revelation in late 1993 of talks with Sinn Fein.
- John Major said in Parliament that such talks "would turn my stomach". The head of information at the NIO, Andy Wood, in a statement that must now make him blush, scoffed that such reports belonged "more properly in the fantasy of spy thrillers than in real life". Sir Patrick Mayhew, choosing his words carefully, said: 'Nobody has been authorised to talk or negotiate on behalf of the British government with Sinn Fein." This was interpreted by the media and everyone else as a denial of the talks which are now a matter of record.
- Yet in the peculiar world that is Whitehall openness such a statement is not regarded by the head of the British Civil Service as misleading.
- Sir Robin Butler told the Scott Inquiry that: 'It was a half-answer, if you like, but it was an accurate answer...It did not deny that there had been contacts. It simply did not cover the point." It was "not designed to mislead".
- This kind of spin on official statements has become a familiar part of political debate and is one factor which decreases trust in a shaky peace process. Misinformation remains a key part of government approaches to the media, albeit in a more sophisticated and less easily found out form.
- Information strategy is now an integral part of the policy-making progress. If there is to be real progress towards peace, the duplicity of the Whitehall spindoctors will need to be acknowledged more candidly than it has been so far.[1]
Staffing and publicity in the early 1990s
In his 1993 study, David Miller described the NIIS as a major source of political news, delivering press releases to Belfast news desks three times a day and employing 58 staff in its Belfast and London offices in 1991–92.[2] A parliamentary answer by Brian Mawhinney on 7 May 1991 recorded 58 staff in post on 1 April for 1991–92, against a complement of 60.[3]
Miller reported that the service produced favourable stories for international distribution, working partly through the Central Office of Information and its London Press Service. He also described a related publicity initiative by the Industrial Development Board: in 1990 it replaced Burson-Marsteller with Shandwick, paying the latter £3.5 million for the first year of a contract which included supplying international media with favourable stories from a Belfast news bureau.[4]
Strategy and publicity booklets
Miller argued that the information strategy of the Northern Ireland Office combined an emphasis on violence and counterinsurgency with a message of reform, economic development and a return to normality. In his analysis, these were complementary elements of a strategy of containment, rather than evidence that official publicity was concerned only with violence.[5]
His main example was The Day of the Men and Women of Peace Must Surely Come, issued in July 1989 for the twentieth anniversary of the deployment of British troops. Miller reported that 10,000 copies were produced; according to the NIO account he cited, they were distributed to MPs, the media, opinion formers and others interested in Northern Ireland.[6] Miller read the booklet as presenting civil rights grievances as having been met, the army and Royal Ulster Constabulary as protectors of the community, and industrial development as evidence of recovery. He argued that this presentation cast the British government as a neutral facilitator rather than a party to the conflict.[7]
Access to journalists and the use of intermediaries
Miller characterised the service's relations with journalists as a “hierarchy of access”, distinguishing Dublin journalists, local Northern Ireland journalists, journalists working for London-based outlets, and international correspondents. He argued that access depended on the audiences the NIO wished to reach, as well as media type and professional and personal relationships.[8]
As an earlier example of restrictions on Dublin journalists, Miller reproduced a memorandum from Eric Montgomery, dated 18 March 1960, concerning Garret FitzGerald, then Dublin correspondent of the Financial Times. Montgomery advocated keeping assistance to FitzGerald to a minimum in order to restrict his coverage to the south. The Cabinet Publicity Committee, chaired by Basil Brooke, agreed on 23 March that only the basic minimum co-operation should be provided to Dublin writers.[9]
For the period after direct rule was announced, Miller cited Henry Kelly's account of confidential lobby briefings by William Whitelaw's PR officer, Keith McDowall, which excluded Belfast newspapers and Dublin-based daily and evening papers in favour of correspondents for London papers.[10]
Miller also examined the use of apparently independent speakers and publications to carry official arguments. He described publicity aimed at American journalists and newspaper editorial boards, alongside the overseas work of British Information Services. The service's long-time director, David Gilliland, claimed in a 1983 speech that patient explanations of government policy had secured a more sympathetic response in American editorial comment.[11] As an example involving published material, Miller reported that passages from an Information Research Department briefing, The IRA: Aims, Policy, Tactics, had been reproduced almost verbatim in David Barzilay's The British Army in Ulster (1973). He argued that such reuse could give official accounts the appearance of independent corroboration.[12]
The tension between anti-IRA publicity and investment promotion
Miller used The Terror and the Tears, published in March 1972, to illustrate the tension between publicity about IRA violence and attempts to present Northern Ireland as a stable place for investment. Citing contemporary newspaper reports, he recorded that around 100,000 copies had been printed and a further 150,000 ordered shortly before direct rule.[13] In a parliamentary answer on 19 June 1972, David Howell said approximately 120,000 copies had been distributed in Britain and abroad by the previous administration. General distribution had not continued since 24 March, although copies were available on request.[14]
Gilliland acknowledged this problem in his 1983 speech: publicising the use of funds or equipment to support violence risked discouraging businesses from committing resources to Northern Ireland. Miller stressed that these conflicting objectives, and the differing priorities of news organisations, limited the service's ability to obtain the coverage it wanted.[15]
People
- Liz Drummond | David Gilliland | Clifford Hill, based in the NIO from the FCO in the early 1970s | Tom Roberts | Maggie Stanfield | Andy Wood | Frank Woods
Case Studies
- Cabinet Publicity Committee
- Northern Ireland Information Service: Background Briefing Documents
- Northern Ireland Information Service: Misinformation
- Northern Ireland Information Service: Planting Stories
- Northern Ireland Information Service: Targeting Audiences
- Northern Ireland Information Service: Using other people
- Northern Ireland Information Service: Visits
- Omnibus magazine
- Real Lives
- The British Media and Gibraltar
- The Committee
Publications
- Northern Ireland Information Service, nd, Northern Ireland Observed, Belfast: NIIS.
- Northern Ireland Information Service/Arts Council of Northern Ireland (1985) Images: Arts and People in Northern Ireland, March, Belfast:NIIS/Arts Council
- Northern Ireland Office (1980a) H-blocks: The Facts, October, Belfast:NIO
- Northern Ireland Office (1980b) H-blocks: The Reality, November, Belfast:NIO
- Northern Ireland Office (1981a) Day to Day Life in Northern Ireland Prisons, March, Belfast:NIO
- Northern Ireland Office (1981b) Scope for Further Improvements in Prison Life, July, Belfast:NIO
- Northern Ireland Office (1981c) H-blocks: What the Papers Say, July, Belfast:NIO
- Northern Ireland Office (1981d) The Tragedy of Terrorism, October, Belfast:NIO
- Northern Ireland Office (1985a) Life Sentence Prisoners in Northern Ireland: An Explanatory Memorandum, January, Belfast:NIO
- Northern Ireland Office (1985b) Armagh Prison Strip Searching: The Facts, Belfast:NIO
- Northern Ireland Office (1989) 'The Day of the Men and Women of Peace Must Surely Come..., July, Belfast:NIO
Archival document images
References
- ↑ David Miller Manipulating the message:Policy change that gagged army's dirty tricks brigade The Irish News 7 January 1997.
- ↑ David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, ch. 4, p.74.
- ↑ Brian Mawhinney, Press and Public Relations Staff, Hansard, HC Deb, 7 May 1991, vol. 190, col. 431W.
- ↑ David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.77–78. The contract payment is reported by Miller; the original contract was not independently retrieved.
- ↑ David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.76–83, 98.
- ↑ Fortnight, September 1989, cited indirectly in David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, p.78. The magazine item was not independently retrieved.
- ↑ David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.78–83.
- ↑ David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.88–94, 98.
- ↑ Eric Montgomery, memorandum, 18 March 1960; minutes of the 97th meeting of the Cabinet Publicity Committee, 23 March 1960, Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI), CAB9F/123/72. Cited indirectly, as quoted in David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.88–89. The original archive documents were not independently retrieved.
- ↑ Henry Kelly, Irish Times, 6 April 1972 (article title not supplied by Miller). Cited indirectly, as quoted in David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.90–91. The newspaper original was not independently retrieved.
- ↑ David Gilliland, speech to the Belfast Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Forum Hotel, Belfast, 31 January 1983, p.7. Cited indirectly, as quoted in David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.94–95, 102. The speech was not independently retrieved.
- ↑ David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.86–87, 100, note 10. Miller identifies pp.119–124 of David Barzilay, The British Army in Ulster, vol. 1, Belfast: Century Services, 1973; neither the briefing nor those pages was independently retrieved.
- ↑ Irish Times, 22 March 1972, and The Times, 27 August 1974 (article titles not supplied by Miller), cited indirectly in David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.95–97. The newspaper originals were not independently retrieved.
- ↑ David Howell, “The Terror and the Tears”, Hansard, HC Deb, 19 June 1972, vol. 839, cols 37–38W.
- ↑ David Gilliland, speech to the Belfast Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 31 January 1983, p.7, cited indirectly, as quoted in David Miller, The Northern Ireland Information Service and the media: aims, strategy, tactics, in John Eldridge (ed.), Getting the Message: News, Truth and Power, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.97–98. The speech was not independently retrieved.
- ↑ Tancred Bradshaw and Shelley Deane, A Propaganda Failure in the Perimeter: The British in Northern Ireland, c. 1969–82, Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 36, no. 2 (ARINS, 2025), Figure 5; TNA: CJ 4/2419/1 (article footnote 66; figure caption gives CJ 4/2419/). Accessed 7 November 2026.