Difference between revisions of "Conflict, Stability and Security Fund"

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{{short description|UK government fund for addressing conflict and instability overseas, with intelligence oversight}}
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{{short description|'''UK cross-government fund (2015–2024) for addressing conflict, instability and threats to national security overseas; replaced by the Integrated Security Fund'''}}
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{{Infobox organization
 
{{Infobox organization
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| name         = Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
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| name = Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
 
| abbreviation = CSSF
 
| abbreviation = CSSF
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| type         = Government fund
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| type = Government fund
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| formation   = 1 April 2015
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| formation = 1 April 2015
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| dissolved   = 1 April 2024
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| dissolved = 1 April 2024
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| successor   = [[Integrated Security Fund]]
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| successor = [[Integrated Security Fund]]
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| purpose     = Tackling conflict, instability and threats to UK national security
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| purpose = Tackling conflict, instability and threats to UK national security overseas
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| headquarters = London, United Kingdom
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| headquarters = London
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| budget       = Over £1 billion annually
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| budget = Over £1 billion annually
 
| leader_title = Senior Responsible Officer
 
| leader_title = Senior Responsible Officer
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| leader_name = [[National Security Adviser (United Kingdom)|National Security Adviser]]
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| leader_name = [[National Security Adviser (United Kingdom)|National Security Adviser]]
 
| parent_organization = [[National Security Council (United Kingdom)|National Security Council]]
 
| parent_organization = [[National Security Council (United Kingdom)|National Security Council]]
 
}}
 
}}
  
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The '''Conflict, Stability and Security Fund''' ('''CSSF''') was a cross-government fund established by the British Government on 1 April 2015 to address conflict, instability and threats to UK national security overseas.<ref name="parliament-20150312">UK Parliament, [http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2015-03-12/HCWS392/ Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement, Financial Year 2015-16 : Written statement - HCWS392], 12 March 2015.</ref> It integrated resources from defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence to support the UK's [[National Security Strategy (United Kingdom)|National Security Strategy]] and [[Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015|Strategic Defence and Security Review]].<ref name="cr-20140901">Conciliation Resources, [http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Joint%20SW_CR_IA%20briefing%20on%20CP%20CSSF%20BSOS%20-%20FINAL0914.pdf Investing in long-term peace? The new Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], 1 September 2014.</ref> The CSSF was overseen by the [[National Security Council (United Kingdom)|National Security Council]] and had strong links to British intelligence agencies, including [[Secret Intelligence Service|MI6]], facilitating the direction of funding towards intelligence-related activities.<ref name="isc-2023">Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, [https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ISC-Annual-Report-2022-2023.pdf Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2022–2023], 5 December 2023.</ref> Approximately half of its budget was classified as [[official development assistance]] (ODA).<ref name="hansard-20161102">UK Parliament, [https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2016-11-02/debates/333BB123-CF19-41CC-A67F-0D55E3D477A6/ConflictStabilityAndSecurityFund Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], House of Lords Hansard, Column 708, 2 November 2016.</ref>
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The '''[[Conflict, Stability and Security Fund]]''' ('''CSSF''') was a cross-government fund established on 1 April 2015 to address conflict, instability and threats to UK national security overseas. It integrated resources from defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence in support of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. The fund was overseen by the [[National Security Council (United Kingdom)|National Security Council]], with the National Security Adviser as Senior Responsible Officer. Approximately half its budget was classified as official development assistance (ODA). On 1 April 2024 it was renamed the [[Integrated Security Fund]], incorporating additional cyber and economic-deterrence elements.<ref name="parliament-20150312">UK Parliament, [http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2015-03-12/HCWS392/ Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement, Financial Year 2015-16 : Written statement - HCWS392], 12 March 2015.</ref><ref name="govuk-isf">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-integrated-security-fund/about About us - UK Integrated Security Fund], accessed 10 October 2026.</ref>
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The fund replaced the earlier [[Conflict (Prevention) Pool]] and represented a significant increase in resources for cross-departmental efforts, with an annual budget exceeding £1 billion.<ref name="parliament-20160721">Ben Gummer, [https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2016-07-21/HCWS123/ Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015 /16 and settlement for 2016 /17 : Written statement - HCWS123] ''UK Parliament'', 21 July 2016.</ref> It funded activities such as human rights training, strengthening local police and judiciaries, and facilitating political reconciliation, often through third parties.<ref name="cssf-ar2017">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b50a71ce5274a73013a8754/CSSF_Annual_Report_2017_to_2018.pdf Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2017 to 2018], July 2018.</ref> Critics argued that the CSSF was utilised for regime change operations, particularly in Syria, and for extending intelligence influence across government departments in alignment with the Fusion Doctrine.<ref name="declassified-2021">Declassified UK, [https://www.declassifieduk.org/revealed-the-uk-has-spent-350-million-promoting-regime-change-in-syria Revealed: The UK has spent £350-million promoting regime change in Syria], 20 July 2021.</ref><ref name="guardian-20160503">Ian Cobain, Alice Ross, Rob Evans and Mona Mahmood, [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/03/how-britain-funds-the-propaganda-war-against-isis-in-syria How Britain funds the 'propaganda war' against Isis in Syria] ''The Guardian'', 3 May 2016.</ref> On 1 April 2024, the CSSF was renamed the [[Integrated Security Fund]] (ISF), incorporating additional elements such as the National Cyber Programme and the Economic Deterrence Initiative.<ref name="govuk-isf">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-integrated-security-fund/about About us - UK Integrated Security Fund], accessed 14 February 2026.</ref>
 
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The CSSF's integration of intelligence capabilities allowed for the funding of disinformation countermeasures and internal government units, raising concerns about transparency and accountability.<ref name="icai-cssf">Independent Commission for Aid Impact, [https://icai.independent.gov.uk/html-version/cssf The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund's (CSSF) aid spending], accessed 14 February 2026.</ref> Its role in spreading intelligence influence was enhanced by the Fusion Doctrine, introduced in 2018, which promoted a whole-of-government approach to national security.<ref name="nscr-2018">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf National Security Capability Review – March 2018], March 2018.</ref>
 
  
 
== Governance and purpose ==
 
== Governance and purpose ==
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The CSSF was governed by the [[National Security Council (United Kingdom)|National Security Council]] (NSC), a shift from the joint control of the previous Conflict Pool by the [[Department for International Development]], [[Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Defence]], and [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office]].<ref name="cr-20140901" /> The [[National Security Adviser (United Kingdom)|National Security Adviser]] served as the Senior Responsible Officer, with the Deputy National Security Adviser playing a key role in intelligence, defence and security matters.<ref name="isc-2023" /><ref name="committees-2025">UK Parliament Committees, [https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/16349/html I am Deputy National Security Adviser.], 14 July 2025.</ref> This structure embedded intelligence oversight deeply within the fund's operations, allowing agencies like [[Secret Intelligence Service|MI6]] to influence funding allocations.<ref name="isc-2023" />
 
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The fund supported the UK's Building Stability Overseas Strategy, focusing on preventing conflict in vulnerable regions and tackling threats to British interests.<ref name="cr-20140901" /> Priorities were set by the NSC to leverage synergies across defence, diplomacy, development, security and intelligence.<ref name="stabilisationunit-20140325">UK Government, [http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/attachments/article/298/20140325-SU_Business_Plan_2014-15-Final-O.pdf Stabilisation Unit Business Plan] ''gov.uk'', 25 March 2014.</ref> It funded a range of activities, including direct interventions and third-party support for post-conflict reconciliation.
 
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== History ==
 
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Upon creation, £823 million of the CSSF's £1,033 million budget was transferred from the [[Department for International Development]], with administration split between the [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office]] (£739 million) and [[Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Defence]] (£42 million).<ref name="hocl-20151123">Lorna Booth, [https://secondreading.uk/world/what-do-we-know-about-future-aid-spending-uk-overseas-aid-and-the-spending-review/ Spending Review 2015: the future of overseas aid] ''UK Parliament House of Commons Library'', 23 November 2015.</ref><ref name="dfid-2015">Department for International Development, [http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/international-development/MainEstimateIDCMemoranda.pdf Main Estimate 2015/16] ''UK Parliament'', 2015.</ref> The 2015 UK Aid policy planned an increase to £1.3 billion by 2019/20.<ref name="UKaid-2015">HM Treasury, [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_final_web_0905.pdf UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest], Cm 9163, November 2015.</ref> This marked a substantial expansion from the Conflict Pool's £180 million in 2014/15.<ref name="icai-20120713">Independent Commission for Aid Impact, [http://icai.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/Evaluation-of-the-Inter-Departmental-Conflict-Pool-ICAI-Report.pdf Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool], 13 July 2012.</ref><ref name="abbott-20160229">Diane Abbott, [http://news.trust.org/item/20160229173810-dj9vp/ The stealth aid raid: militarising Britain's development budget] ''Thomson Reuters Foundation News'', 29 February 2016.</ref>
 
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In 2016, [[Mark Lyall Grant|Sir Mark Lyall Grant]], then National Security Adviser, identified major expenditures in Afghanistan (£90 million), Syria (£60 million) and Somalia (£32 million), with projects in over 40 countries.<ref name="parliament-20161128">UK Parliament, [http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/national-security-strategy-committee/conflict-stability-and-security-fund/oral/43877.html Oral evidence: Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], HC 208, 28 November 2016.</ref> Significant funding supported operations in Syria, including strategic communications for the moderate armed opposition.<ref name="parliament-20160721" /><ref name="govuk-assistance">Foreign & Commonwealth Office, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/factsheet-the-uks-non-humanitarian-aid-response-to-the-syria-crisis--2/providing-non-humanitarian-assistance-in-syria Providing non-humanitarian assistance in Syria], 1 December 2015.</ref><ref name="guardian-20160503" /> The [[Stabilisation Unit]] was funded by the CSSF.<ref name="su-aboutus">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about Stabilisation Unit - About us], accessed 5 December 2016.</ref>
 
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The 2017 annual report under [[Mark Sedwill|Sir Mark Sedwill]] highlighted top programmes: Afghanistan (£90 million), Syria (£64 million), Somalia (£33.5 million), Jordan (£25.3 million) and Lebanon (£24 million), much related to Syrian refugees.<ref name="cssf-ar2017" /> By 2020/21, the budget reached £1.37 billion, with major allocations to peacekeeping (£388 million), Middle East and North Africa (£183 million), South Asia (£103 million) and MOD Afghan Security (£100 million).<ref name="hoc-20210128">Penny Mordaunt, [https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2021-01-28/debates/21012813000009/ConflictStabilityAndSecurityFundAllocations2020-21 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund Allocations 2020-21] ''UK Parliament House of Commons'', 28 January 2021.</ref>
 
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In April 2024, the CSSF transitioned to the [[Integrated Security Fund]], expanding its remit to include domestic and cyber elements.<ref name="govuk-isf" />
 
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== Intelligence links and the Fusion Doctrine ==
 
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The CSSF's governance by the NSC and the National Security Adviser embedded it within the UK's intelligence framework. The Deputy National Security Adviser oversaw intelligence-related aspects, including threats from state actors.<ref name="committees-2025" /><ref name="youtube-2025">Sky News, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4nQYTy62Uaw Deputy national security adviser's statements brought China spying case to a 'crashing halt'], accessed 14 February 2026.</ref> Funding supported [[Secret Intelligence Service|MI6]] operations, with expenditures including CSSF allocations for intelligence activities.<ref name="isc-2023" />
 
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The 2018 introduction of the Fusion Doctrine enhanced the CSSF's role in spreading intelligence influence across government. This doctrine promoted integration of economic, security and influence levers, aligning with CSSF's cross-departmental model.<ref name="nscr-2018" /><ref name="rusi-2018">RUSI, [https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/uk-national-security-capability-review-and-fusion-doctrine The UK National Security Capability Review and the Fusion Doctrine], 4 April 2018.</ref> It facilitated intelligence-led funding for whole-of-government responses to threats, including disinformation and cyber activities.<ref name="govuk-defence">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-guidance-for-integrated-working/defence-guidance-for-integrated-working Defence guidance for integrated working], 13 June 2023.</ref>
 
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== Funding of internal government units on disinformation ==
 
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The '''CSSF''' funded internal units and programmes combating disinformation, such as the [[National Security Communications Team]] and the [[Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme]].<ref name="declassified-2022">Declassified UK, [https://www.declassifieduk.org/uk-spends-over-80m-on-media-in-20-countries-around-russia UK spends over £80m on media in 20 countries around Russia], 8 February 2022.</ref> Over £82.7 million was invested in media projects around Russia to counter disinformation, often presented as building media resilience but involving UK information operations.<ref name="declassified-2022" /> In Ukraine, CSSF supported cyber defences and counter-disinformation efforts against Russian narratives.<ref name="ads-2024">ADS Advance, [https://www.adsadvance.co.uk/uk-government-cssf-investment-boosts-global-security.html UK Government CSSF investment boosts global security], 19 January 2024.</ref> Programmes adapted during the COVID-19 pandemic to track and counter state-sponsored disinformation on vaccines.<ref name="cssf-ar2020">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/61b9c6358fa8f5037778c3f2/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2020-2021.pdf Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2020 to 2021], 2021.</ref> This funding extended intelligence influence into domestic and foreign policy arenas.
 
  
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=== Research, Information and Communications Unit ===
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The CSSF shifted control of conflict-related spending from the previous joint Conflict Pool (DFID, MoD and FCO) to the National Security Council. This embedded intelligence oversight more deeply: the Intelligence and Security Committee has noted the fund’s strong links to British intelligence agencies, including the Secret Intelligence Service, and its facilitation of funding towards intelligence-related activities. Priorities were set by the NSC to leverage synergies across defence, diplomacy, development, security and intelligence. Activities included human-rights training, strengthening local police and judiciaries, political reconciliation, strategic communications, and support to third parties. The 2018 Fusion Doctrine further promoted a whole-of-government approach, increasing the scope for intelligence influence across departments.<ref name="isc-2023">Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, [https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/ISC-Annual-Report-2022-2023.pdf Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2022–2023], 5 December 2023.</ref><ref name="nscr-2018">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf National Security Capability Review – March 2018], March 2018.</ref>
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The [[Research, Information and Communications Unit]] ([[RICU]]), created in 2007 under the Prevent strategy, counters terrorist and extremist ideologies to reduce risks to the UK.<ref name="guardian-20160502">Ian Cobain, [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/02/inside-ricu-the-shadowy-propaganda-unit-inspired-by-the-cold-war Inside Ricu, the shadowy propaganda unit inspired by the cold war] ''The Guardian'', 2 May 2016.</ref> Modelled on the Cold War-era Information Research Department, it produces strategic communications and supports counter-narratives.<ref name="guardian-20160502" /> [[RICU]]'s budget increased significantly from 2012/13, reaching £20 million in 2020/21, funded by the [[Home Office]] and [[Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office]].<ref name="parl-ricu2023">UK Parliament, [https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-02-22/HL5790 Research, Information and Communications Unit], 22 February 2023.</ref> While not directly funded by the CSSF, its activities complemented CSSF's counter-terrorism and disinformation efforts.<ref name="gov-prevent2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-prevents-report-and-government-response/the-response-to-the-independent-review-of-prevent-accessible The response to the Independent Review of Prevent (accessible)], 8 February 2023.</ref>
 
  
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=== 77th Brigade ===
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== History and scale ==
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The [[77th Brigade (United Kingdom)|77th Brigade]], formed in January 2015, conducts information operations and psychological warfare, using non-lethal methods to influence behaviours.<ref name="ukdj-2020">UK Defence Journal, [https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/77-brigade-is-countering-covid-misinformation 77 Brigade is countering Covid misinformation], 23 April 2020.</ref> It counters disinformation via social media, including during COVID-19 with the [[Cabinet Office]] Rapid Response Unit.<ref name="ukdj-2020" /> Funded by the [[Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom)|Ministry of Defence]], the brigade's operations aligned with CSSF's state threats portfolio, though direct CSSF funding was not specified.<ref name="declassified-2022" /> Costs nearly doubled by 2024, reflecting expanded roles, but specific figures under CSSF are not detailed.<ref name="ukdj-2024">UK Defence Journal, [https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/costs-of-british-army-77th-brigade-nearly-double Costs of British Army 77th Brigade nearly double], 16 August 2024.</ref>
 
  
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=== Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell ===
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The fund replaced the Conflict Pool and represented a significant increase in resources. In 2015/16 the allocation was £1.033 billion (roughly 50% ODA), with major early transfers from the DFID budget administered largely by the FCO. Annual budgets thereafter typically exceeded £1 billion until later reductions. Top programme areas consistently included Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, and refugee-related work in Jordan and Lebanon. The fund operated in more than 40 countries. Critics, including the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, described elements of it as opaque and potentially functioning as a “slush fund.” Independent Commission for Aid Impact reviews examined effectiveness and accountability. Detailed contractor-level breakdowns have never been fully published for security reasons; known recipients and programme summaries appear in annual reports, parliamentary answers and investigative reporting.<ref name="parliament-20160721">Ben Gummer, [https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2016-07-21/HCWS123/ Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015 /16 and settlement for 2016 /17 : Written statement - HCWS123] ''UK Parliament'', 21 July 2016.</ref><ref name="guardian-20170207">Karen McVeigh, [https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/07/secrecy-around-1bn-aid-and-security-fund-raises-significant-concern-say-mps Secrecy around £1bn aid and security fund raises ‘significant concern’, say MPs] ''The Guardian'', 7 February 2017.</ref>
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The [[Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell]] ([[CDCC]]), established in September 2015 and led by the UK, countered Daesh propaganda as part of the Global Coalition against Daesh.<ref name="globalcoalition-uk">The Global Coalition Against Daesh, [https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/partner/united-kingdom United Kingdom], accessed 14 February 2026.</ref> It used CSSF funding to undermine Daesh's narrative, reaching millions in the Middle East and reducing recruitment.<ref name="cssf-ar2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024], 5 December 2024.</ref> The [[CDCC]] continued operations through 2024.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> Funding through CSSF was ongoing, but specific annual amounts are not broken out; it formed part of broader counter-terrorism expenditures, with CSSF's Counter Terrorism Programme fund at £32.47 million in 2021/22.<ref name="cssf-ar202122">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2021-to-2022/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2021-to-2022 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Annual Report 2021 to 2022], 22 May 2023.</ref>
 
  
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=== Russian Language Programme ===
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=== Selected annual figures ===
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The [[Russian Language Programme]] ([[RLP]]), launched in April 2016, enhanced independent Russian-language media to counter disinformation.<ref name="parl-russian2018">UK Parliament, [https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2018-12-17/202768 Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Russian Language], 17 December 2018.</ref> It evolved into the [[Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme]] ([[CDMD]]) in 2016, expanding to non-Russian media.<ref name="parl-russian2018" /><ref name="declassified-2022" /> Funded by the CSSF at £60.4 million from 2017–2021, it aimed to reduce harm from Russian information operations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.<ref name="declassified-2022" />
 
  
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=== Rapid Response Unit ===
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{| class="wikitable"
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The [[Rapid Response Unit]] ([[RRU]]), created in early 2018 within the [[Government Communications Service]], monitored media and social media trends to counter misinformation and disinformation.<ref name="gov-factsheet">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/news/fact-sheet-on-the-cdu-and-rru Fact Sheet on the CDU and RRU], 9 June 2023.</ref> It functioned as a digital cuttings service, identifying false narratives and working with platforms to remove harmful content.<ref name="gov-factsheet" /> The [[RRU]] was disbanded in August 2022.<ref name="gov-factsheet" /> It collaborated with the [[Counter Disinformation Unit]] but was not explicitly funded by the CSSF; however, its role in refuting disinformation overlapped with CSSF-supported initiatives.<ref name="parl-2020">UK Parliament Committees, [https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/1955/documents/19090/default/ Misinformation in the COVID-19 Infodemic], 21 July 2020.</ref> Funding specifics for the [[RRU]] are integrated into [[Cabinet Office]] communications budgets, without separate CSSF allocations disclosed.
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! Year !! Approximate allocation !! Notes
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|-
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| 2015/16 || £1.033 billion || ~50% ODA; Syria ~£60m, Afghanistan ~£90m
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|-
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| 2016/17 || £1.127 billion || 48% ODA; Syria £64m, Somalia £33.5m
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|-
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| 2017/18 || £1.194 billion || 51% ODA
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|-
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| 2018/19 || £1.25 billion || 52% ODA
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|-
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| 2019/20 || £1.28 billion || 50% ODA
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|-
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| 2020/21 || £1.37 billion || 49% ODA
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|-
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| 2021/22 || £858.6 million || 40.4% ODA
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|-
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| 2022/23 || £830 million || Ukraine response intensified
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|-
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| 2023/24 || £850 million || Final year before transition to ISF
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|}
  
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=== Counter Disinformation Unit ===
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Figures drawn from parliamentary statements and CSSF annual reports; exact totals and ODA percentages vary slightly by source.<ref name="cssf-ar2017">UK Government, CSSF Annual Report 2017 to 2018.</ref><ref name="cssf-ar2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024], 5 December 2024.</ref>
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The [[Counter Disinformation Unit]] ([[CDU]]), which evolved from the [[Counter-Disinformation Cell]] ([[CDC]]) established during the COVID-19 pandemic, was formed in 2019 within the [[Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport]] to lead responses to misinformation and disinformation.<ref name="gov-factsheet" /><ref name="telegraph-20230901">The Telegraph, [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/09/01/secretive-covid-disinformation-unit-security-services/ Secretive Covid disinformation unit worked with security services], 1 September 2023.</ref> In 2023, it was renamed the [[National Security and Online Information Team]] ([[NSOIT]]) and transferred to the [[Department for Science, Innovation and Technology]].<ref name="globalgovforum-20240226">Global Government Forum, [https://www.globalgovernmentforum.com/uk-minister-defends-governments-rebranded-counter-disinformation-unit/ UK minister defends government's rebranded Counter Disinformation Unit], 26 February 2024.</ref> The unit commissioned reports from AI firms like Logically and focused on foreign state disinformation, including during COVID-19.<ref name="gov-factsheet" /> While not directly funded by the CSSF, its activities aligned with CSSF's counter-state threats portfolio, which received CSSF funding for disinformation efforts.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> Specific funding details for the [[CDU]]/[[NSOIT]] are not publicly itemised under CSSF, but it operated within broader national security budgets.
 
  
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=== National Security Communications Team ===
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== Syria and regime-change related activity ==
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The [[National Security Communications Team]] ([[NSCT]]), established in 2019/20 to deliver targeted communications campaigns on national security priorities, continued operations through 2024 without dissolution or name change.<ref name="govuk-nsct2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-national-security-communications-team-programme-summary-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: National Security Communications Team Programme Summary 2023 to 2024], 30 January 2025.</ref> It received CSSF funding, with £2.87 million allocated in 2021/22 as part of broader communications efforts.<ref name="cssf-ar202122" /> The [[NSCT]] focused on countering threats through strategic messaging, including responses to Middle East conflicts impacting UK communities.<ref name="govuk-nsct2023" />
 
  
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=== Government Information Cell ===
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The CSSF was a principal funding vehicle for UK support to Syrian opposition entities, stabilisation and strategic communications. Declassified UK has reported that the UK spent approximately £350 million promoting regime-change-related activity in Syria. Funding supported media and communications work for the moderate armed opposition (including Free Syrian Army press-office functions), civil-defence capacity (via [[Mayday Rescue]] / [[White Helmets]]), and contractors such as [[Incostrat]], [[ARK Group]] / Ark FZC, [[Adam Smith International]] and [[Albany Associates]]. Government framing emphasised civilian protection and counter-Daesh work; critics characterised substantial elements as information operations and opposition-support programming aligned with National Security Council priorities. The Guardian reported in 2016 on the use of the fund for the “propaganda war” against Isis and related communications activity.<ref name="declassified-2021">Declassified UK, [https://www.declassifieduk.org/revealed-the-uk-has-spent-350-million-promoting-regime-change-in-syria Revealed: The UK has spent £350-million promoting regime change in Syria], 20 July 2021.</ref><ref name="guardian-20160503">Ian Cobain, Alice Ross, Rob Evans and Mona Mahmood, [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/03/how-britain-funds-the-propaganda-war-against-isis-in-syria How Britain funds the ‘propaganda war’ against Isis in Syria] ''The Guardian'', 3 May 2016.</ref>
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The [[Government Information Cell]] ([[GIC]]), established in March 2022 during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, monitored and countered misinformation and disinformation relating to the virus and government policy.<ref name="parl-gic2023">UK Parliament, [https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-02-21/149641 Government Information Cell], House of Commons, 21 February 2023.</ref> It operated within the [[Cabinet Office]] and coordinated rapid responses to false narratives across government departments.<ref name="parl-gic2023" /> The [[GIC]] was amalgamated into the [[Information Threats and Influence Directorate]] ([[ITID]]) along with the [[Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme]] ([[CDMD]]) as part of the consolidation of counter-disinformation capabilities.
 
  
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=== Information Threats and Influence Directorate ===
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== Related units and complementary activity ==
−
The [[Information Threats and Influence Directorate]] ([[ITID]]), established around 2023 following the amalgamation of the [[Government Information Cell]] and the [[Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme]], focused on countering foreign information manipulation and interference.<ref name="cssf-ar2023">UK Government, [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-annual-report-2023-to-2024 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024], 5 December 2024.</ref> It detected, disrupted and deterred disinformation, cyber-attacks and electoral interference as part of the CSSF's state threats portfolio.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> The [[ITID]] received £17.33 million in 2023/24 from the CSSF, representing a dedicated funding stream for whole-of-government responses to state-sponsored threats.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> In 2024, following the transition to the [[Integrated Security Fund]], the directorate was renamed the [[Cyber, Information and Tech Threats Directorate]] under the new fund framework.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /> This portfolio embodied the Fusion Doctrine's integration of influence levers.<ref name="nscr-2018">UK Government, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf National Security Capability Review – March 2018], March 2018.</ref>
 
  
−
== Regime change activities ==
+
The CSSF funded or complemented a range of information, communications and counter-disinformation capabilities, including:
−
The CSSF has been criticised for supporting regime change, particularly in Syria, where it allocated over £350 million to opposition forces and projects in rebel-held areas.<ref name="declassified-2021" /> Funding included support for the [[Free Syrian Army]] press office, described as a propaganda effort, and organisations like the [[White Helmets]] and [[Incostrat]].<ref name="guardian-20160503" /> These activities aimed at undermining the Assad regime, facilitating political reconciliation and media operations for moderate opposition.<ref name="avalon-2016">Avalon Library, [https://avalonlibrary.net/Operation_Trojan_Horse/Part%201_Taming_Syria_I/MAO_BORDER_FORCE_CAPABILITY_PROJECT_(B-FOR)_Support_for_Moderate-Armed_Opposition/20160610.CSSF.Support.to.moderate.armed.opposition.ADAMSMITHINTERNATIONAL.pdf CSSF: SUPPORT TO MODERATE ARMED OPPOSITION], 10 June 2016.</ref> While the government framed this as stabilisation and civilian protection, critics viewed it as covert regime change operations aligned with NSC priorities.<ref name="congress-2024">US Congress, [https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IN12469 Syria: Regime Change, Transition, and U.S. Policy], 13 December 2024.</ref> Evaluations suggest these efforts contributed to the eventual fall of Assad in 2024, though outcomes remain contested amid ongoing instability.<ref name="whitehouse-2025">The White House, [https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/06/providing-for-the-revocation-of-syria-sanctions Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions], 30 June 2025.</ref>
 
  
−
== 2017 Committee on the National Security Strategy inquiry ==
+
* [[National Security Communications Team]] (NSCT) – targeted national-security messaging; CSSF funding (e.g. £2.87 million in 2021/22).
−
The [[Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy]] launched an inquiry in May 2016.<ref name="parliament-20160526">UK Parliament, [https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/national-security-strategy/news-parliament-2015/cssf-launch-16-17/ Conflict, Stability and Security Fund inquiry launched], 26 May 2016.</ref> [[Jack McConnell|Lord McConnell]] criticised the lack of an updated strategy since 2011.<ref name="hansard-20161102" /> The committee sought spending details from [[Mark Lyall Grant|Sir Mark Lyall Grant]], amid concerns over aid diversion to defence objectives.<ref name="guardian-20161201">Ben Quinn and Karen McVeigh, [https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/dec/01/uk-aid-reviews-trade-policy-sideline-poor-countries Plan to align UK aid with trade policy could sideline poor countries] ''The Guardian'', 1 December 2016.</ref><ref name="ft-20151120">John Mcdermott and Jim Pickard, [https://www.ft.com/content/24f11670-8f74-11e5-8be4-3506bf20cc2b Cash-strapped UK departments circle aid budget ahead of cuts] ''Financial Times'', 20 November 2015.</ref><ref name="guardian-20160924">Ben Quinn, [https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/sep/24/more-than-a-quarter-of-uk-aid-budget-to-fall-prey-to-rival-ministries-by-2020 More than a quarter of UK aid budget to fall prey to rival ministries by 2020] ''The Guardian'', 24 September 2016.</ref><ref name="guardian-20161125">Alex Scrivener, [https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/nov/25/do-we-really-want-the-military-spending-our-aid-budget Do we really want the military spending our aid budget?] ''The Guardian'', 25 November 2016.</ref>
+
* [[Counter-Daesh Coalition Communications Cell]] (CDCC) – UK-led effort against Daesh narratives.
 +
* [[Russian Language Programme]] / [[Counter Disinformation and Media Development Programme]] (CDMD) – CSSF funding of £60.4 million (2017–2021) reported by Declassified UK.
 +
* [[Information Threats and Influence Directorate]] (ITID) – later consolidation; £17.33 million CSSF in 2023/24.
 +
* Alignment with [[Research, Information and Communications Unit]] (RICU), [[77th Brigade]], Rapid Response Unit and Counter Disinformation Unit activities (direct CSSF funding of the latter units was limited or not itemised).
  
−
The February 2017 report highlighted opacity in objectives and achievements, with limited disclosure of projects due to security reasons. It criticised the fund as a potential 'slush fund' and the [[Foreign and Commonwealth Office]]'s procurement and conflict understanding. The committee recommended a single [[Cabinet Office]] minister oversee spending.<ref name="guardian-20170207">Karen McVeigh, [https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/07/secrecy-around-1bn-aid-and-security-fund-raises-significant-concern-say-mps Secrecy around £1bn aid and security fund raises 'significant concern', say MPs] ''The Guardian'', 7 February 2017.</ref><ref name="ft-20170207">Henry Mance, [https://www.ft.com/content/37828900-ec6f-11e6-ba01-119a44939bb6 UK antiwar project labelled a £1bn 'slush fund' by MPs] ''Financial Times'', 7 February 2017.</ref><ref name="guardian-20170306">Alan Travis, [https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/06/amber-rudd-secret-billion-pound-conflict-stability-security-fund Amber Rudd asked to reveal where secret £1bn conflict fund is spent] ''The Guardian'', 6 March 2017.</ref>
+
These sat within the broader Fusion Doctrine approach.<ref name="cssf-ar2023" /><ref name="declassified-2022">Declassified UK reporting on CDMD and related programmes.</ref>
  
−
The [[Independent Commission for Aid Impact]] initiated a review in 2017, with a final report in Spring 2018.<ref name="icai-2017">Independent Commission for Aid Impact, [https://icai.independent.gov.uk/upcoming-reviews/conflict-stability-security-fund/ Upcoming reviews - The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], 2017.</ref>
+
== Known recipients and contractors ==
  
−
== Recipients ==
+
The following have been identified in official summaries, parliamentary answers or investigative reporting as receiving CSSF (or closely related) funding. The list is incomplete because of security classifications and aggregated reporting:
−
The following organisations and companies have received funding from the CSSF, based on official reports, parliamentary disclosures and investigative sources up to 2026. The list is not exhaustive due to limited transparency.
 
  
 
* [[Adam Smith International]]
 
* [[Adam Smith International]]
 
* [[Albany Associates]]
 
* [[Albany Associates]]
−
* [[Ark FZC]]
+
* [[ARK Group]] / [[Ark FZC]]
 +
* [[Incostrat]]
 
* [[Mayday Rescue]] / [[White Helmets]]
 
* [[Mayday Rescue]] / [[White Helmets]]
 
* [[Mercy Corps]]
 
* [[Mercy Corps]]
−
* [[Incostrat]]
 
−
* [[National Security Communications Team]]
 
−
* [[Reprieve (organisation)]]
 
 
* [[Search for Common Ground]]
 
* [[Search for Common Ground]]
 
* [[Torchlight]]
 
* [[Torchlight]]
 
* [[Westminster Foundation for Democracy]]
 
* [[Westminster Foundation for Democracy]]
−
* [[Norwegian Refugee Council]] – received over £9 million (2022–2025) for legal aid and protection programmes in the Occupied Palestinian Territories<ref name="hansard-cssfrecipients" />
+
* [[Norwegian Refugee Council]]
−
* [[Tech 2 Peace]] – funded for dialogue and engagement projects between Palestinians and Israelis<ref name="hansard-2024feb">UK Parliament, [https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2024-01-31/hl2104/ Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: Israel], House of Lords, 31 January 2024.</ref>
+
* [[HALO Trust]]
−
* [[I’lam – Arab Centre for Media Freedom]] – supported media freedom initiatives in the Occupied Palestinian Territories
+
* Various UN, OSCE, NATO and IAEA channels
−
* [[Physicians for Human Rights Israel]] – backed for health-related dialogue and human rights work
 
−
* [[Project Rozana]] – funded for healthcare access and cross-community engagement in the Zionist entity and Occupied Palestinian Territories
 
−
* [[COMET-ME]] – received support for Palestinian communities in Area C of the West Bank to remain on their land
 
−
* [[Action Against Hunger]] – implemented confidence-building projects in the Caucasus
 
−
* [[Free Fields Foundation (3F)]] – funded for demining and community rehabilitation in Libya
 
−
* [[HALO Trust]] – supported for mine clearance operations
 
−
* [[Women for Women International]] – delivered gender-focused programmes in conflict zones
 
−
* [[Christian Aid]] – granted funding for humanitarian efforts tied to CSSF streams<ref name="ngomonitor-2025" />
 
  
−
== Multilateral partners ==
+
Syria-focused contractors (Incostrat, ARK, Mayday, Albany, Adam Smith International) are the most extensively documented in leaked tender documents and subsequent reporting.<ref name="guardian-20160503" /><ref name="declassified-2021" />
−
The CSSF also channelled resources through larger multilateral bodies that frequently subcontract to local NGOs:
 
  
−
* [[United Nations]] – major recipient for peacekeeping and humanitarian coordination
+
== Scrutiny and criticism ==
−
* [[Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]] – supported for regional stability efforts
 
−
* [[North Atlantic Treaty Organisation]] – funded for security capacity building
 
−
* [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] – backed for non-proliferation initiatives
 
  
−
== Transparency and criticism ==
+
The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s 2017 report highlighted opacity in objectives and achievements, limited project disclosure, and concerns that the fund could function as a slush fund. It recommended stronger Cabinet Office ministerial oversight. ICAI reviews examined aid effectiveness and the integration of development and security objectives. Transparency advocates and investigative outlets have repeatedly noted the difficulty of tracing specific contractor payments and the dual-use character of some strategic-communications work. Government responses have emphasised the necessity of classification for national-security reasons and the value of flexible, cross-government instruments.<ref name="guardian-20170207" /><ref name="jcnss-2017">Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, [https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtnatsec/208/208.pdf Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], HC 208, 6 February 2017.</ref>
−
Significant portions of CSSF expenditure remain undisclosed for national security reasons.<ref name="guardian-20170207">Karen McVeigh, [https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/07/secrecy-around-1bn-aid-and-security-fund-raises-significant-concern-say-mps Secrecy around £1bn aid and security fund raises 'significant concern', say MPs] ''The Guardian'', 7 February 2017.</ref> The [[Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy]] described the fund as lacking sufficient accountability and potentially functioning as a 'slush fund' for projects not fully aligned with stated priorities.<ref name="jcnss-2017">Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, [https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtnatsec/208/208.pdf Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], HC 208, 6 February 2017.</ref> In regions such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories, funding decisions have drawn scrutiny for engaging with structures that reinforce the Zionist settler colony without adequately addressing systemic discrimination and land appropriation.<ref name="ngomonitor-2025" />
 
  
 
== See also ==
 
== See also ==
−
[[Integrated Security Fund]]
 
−
[[National Security Council (United Kingdom)]]
 
−
[[Fusion Doctrine]]
 
−
[[Secret Intelligence Service]]
 
−
===Spending===
 
  
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2010]]
+
* [[Integrated Security Fund]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2011]]
+
* [[National Security Council (United Kingdom)]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2012]]
+
* [[Fusion Doctrine]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2013]]
+
* [[Secret Intelligence Service]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2014]]
+
* [[Incostrat]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2015]]
+
* [[ARK Group]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2016]]
+
* [[Mayday Rescue]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2017]]
+
* [[White Helmets]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2018]]
+
* [[FCO Programme spending 2015]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2019]]
+
* [[FCO Programme spending 2016]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2020]]
+
* [[FCDO Programme spending 2021]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2021]]
+
* [[FCDO Programme spending 2022]]
−
*[[FCO Programme spending 2022]]
+
 
 +
== External links ==
  
−
==External links==
+
* [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-cssf/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-an-overview CSSF overview (gov.uk)]
−
*[https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-cssf/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-an-overview Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: an overview]
+
* [https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-programme-summaries CSSF programme summaries]
−
*[https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/conflict-stability-and-security-fund-programme-summaries Conflict, Stability and Security Fund: programme summaries]
+
* [https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/uk-integrated-security-fund/about Integrated Security Fund]
−
*[https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/conflict_security_and_stability_fund_diverting_aid_and_undermining_human_rights_web.pdf The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund], [[Global Justice Now]], December 2017
+
* [https://www.declassifieduk.org/revealed-the-uk-has-spent-350-million-promoting-regime-change-in-syria Declassified UK, July 2021]
 +
* [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/03/how-britain-funds-the-propaganda-war-against-isis-in-syria Guardian, May 2016]
 +
* Global Justice Now, ''The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund'', December 2017
  
 
==Notes==
 
==Notes==
 
<references/>
 
<references/>
  
−
[[Category:United Kingdom national security]]
+
[[Category:United Kingdom national security|Conflict, Stability and Security Fund]]
−
[[Category:British intelligence agencies]]
+
[[Category:Propaganda|Conflict, Stability and Security Fund]]
−
[[Category:United Kingdom aid agencies]]
+
[[Category:UK|Conflict, Stability and Security Fund]]
−
[[Category:2015 establishments in the United Kingdom]]
 

Latest revision as of 20:15, 10 October 2026

UK cross-government fund (2015–2024) for addressing conflict, instability and threats to national security overseas; replaced by the Integrated Security Fund


Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
Type Government fund
Logo
Founded
Founder(s)
Dissolved 1 April 2024
Registration ID
Status
Headquarters London
Location
Area served
Services
Registration
Key people
Website
Remarks


The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) was a cross-government fund established on 1 April 2015 to address conflict, instability and threats to UK national security overseas. It integrated resources from defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence in support of the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. The fund was overseen by the National Security Council, with the National Security Adviser as Senior Responsible Officer. Approximately half its budget was classified as official development assistance (ODA). On 1 April 2024 it was renamed the Integrated Security Fund, incorporating additional cyber and economic-deterrence elements.[1][2]

Governance and purpose

The CSSF shifted control of conflict-related spending from the previous joint Conflict Pool (DFID, MoD and FCO) to the National Security Council. This embedded intelligence oversight more deeply: the Intelligence and Security Committee has noted the fund’s strong links to British intelligence agencies, including the Secret Intelligence Service, and its facilitation of funding towards intelligence-related activities. Priorities were set by the NSC to leverage synergies across defence, diplomacy, development, security and intelligence. Activities included human-rights training, strengthening local police and judiciaries, political reconciliation, strategic communications, and support to third parties. The 2018 Fusion Doctrine further promoted a whole-of-government approach, increasing the scope for intelligence influence across departments.[3][4]

History and scale

The fund replaced the Conflict Pool and represented a significant increase in resources. In 2015/16 the allocation was £1.033 billion (roughly 50% ODA), with major early transfers from the DFID budget administered largely by the FCO. Annual budgets thereafter typically exceeded £1 billion until later reductions. Top programme areas consistently included Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, and refugee-related work in Jordan and Lebanon. The fund operated in more than 40 countries. Critics, including the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, described elements of it as opaque and potentially functioning as a “slush fund.” Independent Commission for Aid Impact reviews examined effectiveness and accountability. Detailed contractor-level breakdowns have never been fully published for security reasons; known recipients and programme summaries appear in annual reports, parliamentary answers and investigative reporting.[5][6]

Selected annual figures

Year Approximate allocation Notes
2015/16 £1.033 billion ~50% ODA; Syria ~£60m, Afghanistan ~£90m
2016/17 £1.127 billion 48% ODA; Syria £64m, Somalia £33.5m
2017/18 £1.194 billion 51% ODA
2018/19 £1.25 billion 52% ODA
2019/20 £1.28 billion 50% ODA
2020/21 £1.37 billion 49% ODA
2021/22 £858.6 million 40.4% ODA
2022/23 £830 million Ukraine response intensified
2023/24 £850 million Final year before transition to ISF

Figures drawn from parliamentary statements and CSSF annual reports; exact totals and ODA percentages vary slightly by source.[7][8]

Syria and regime-change related activity

The CSSF was a principal funding vehicle for UK support to Syrian opposition entities, stabilisation and strategic communications. Declassified UK has reported that the UK spent approximately £350 million promoting regime-change-related activity in Syria. Funding supported media and communications work for the moderate armed opposition (including Free Syrian Army press-office functions), civil-defence capacity (via Mayday Rescue / White Helmets), and contractors such as Incostrat, ARK Group / Ark FZC, Adam Smith International and Albany Associates. Government framing emphasised civilian protection and counter-Daesh work; critics characterised substantial elements as information operations and opposition-support programming aligned with National Security Council priorities. The Guardian reported in 2016 on the use of the fund for the “propaganda war” against Isis and related communications activity.[9][10]

Related units and complementary activity

The CSSF funded or complemented a range of information, communications and counter-disinformation capabilities, including:

These sat within the broader Fusion Doctrine approach.[8][11]

Known recipients and contractors

The following have been identified in official summaries, parliamentary answers or investigative reporting as receiving CSSF (or closely related) funding. The list is incomplete because of security classifications and aggregated reporting:

Syria-focused contractors (Incostrat, ARK, Mayday, Albany, Adam Smith International) are the most extensively documented in leaked tender documents and subsequent reporting.[10][9]

Scrutiny and criticism

The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy’s 2017 report highlighted opacity in objectives and achievements, limited project disclosure, and concerns that the fund could function as a slush fund. It recommended stronger Cabinet Office ministerial oversight. ICAI reviews examined aid effectiveness and the integration of development and security objectives. Transparency advocates and investigative outlets have repeatedly noted the difficulty of tracing specific contractor payments and the dual-use character of some strategic-communications work. Government responses have emphasised the necessity of classification for national-security reasons and the value of flexible, cross-government instruments.[6][12]

See also

External links

Notes

  1. ↑ UK Parliament, Conflict Stability and Security Fund Settlement, Financial Year 2015-16 : Written statement - HCWS392, 12 March 2015.
  2. ↑ UK Government, About us - UK Integrated Security Fund, accessed 10 October 2026.
  3. ↑ Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2022–2023, 5 December 2023.
  4. ↑ UK Government, National Security Capability Review – March 2018, March 2018.
  5. ↑ Ben Gummer, Conflict Stability and Security Fund 2015 /16 and settlement for 2016 /17 : Written statement - HCWS123 UK Parliament, 21 July 2016.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Karen McVeigh, Secrecy around £1bn aid and security fund raises ‘significant concern’, say MPs The Guardian, 7 February 2017.
  7. ↑ UK Government, CSSF Annual Report 2017 to 2018.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 UK Government, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2023 to 2024, 5 December 2024.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Declassified UK, Revealed: The UK has spent £350-million promoting regime change in Syria, 20 July 2021.
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Ian Cobain, Alice Ross, Rob Evans and Mona Mahmood, How Britain funds the ‘propaganda war’ against Isis in Syria The Guardian, 3 May 2016.
  11. ↑ Declassified UK reporting on CDMD and related programmes.
  12. ↑ Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, HC 208, 6 February 2017.
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