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This article is part of the Undercover Research Portal at Powerbase - investigating corporate and police spying on activists

Part of a series on
National Public Order Intelligence Unit
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Alias: unknown
Deployment: 2000s
Cover officer, minor role as an undercover.

EN29 is the cipher given to a former cover officer with the National Public Order Intelligence Unit, who briefly served undercover. They subsequently was an undercover in serious and organised crime groups. The Undercover Policing Inquiry has indicated that it is minded to restrict the officer's real name (and the cover name briefly used with the NPOIU).[1][2]

For the N cipher system see N officers page.

In the Undercover Policing Inquiry

  • 15 November 2018: Mitting wrote:[1]
EN29 was deployed, intermittently and part time, as a cover officer for operations conducted by the National Public Order Intelligence Unit throughout its existence and played a minor role as an undercover officer once. It is inconceivable that any member of any of the groups targeted by the National Public Order Intelligence Unit would remember the cover or real name of EN29. On the basis of what I know so far, no good purpose would be served by publication of either. In particular, fulfilment of the terms of reference of the Inquiry would not be facilitated.
Throughout much of a lengthy police career, EN29 was deployed as an undercover or cover officer into serious and organised criminal groups. Some members of them and some other individuals have demonstrated a w illingness or propensity to use serious, even lethal, violence. The risk of serious violence to EN29 and others encountered during the deployments from such people has been assessed by the risk assessor in an assessment submitted on 25 September 2018, as high, if the real identity of EN29 is discovered by them. It is not necessary for me to accept that the risk is high. I accept, without hesitation, that there is a real risk of such violence. The risk is contingent, not immediate, so that it engages Article 8 of the European Convention, rather than Articles 2 or 3. Given that the publication of the name, real or cover, of EN29 is not necessary to facilitate fulfilment of the terms of reference of the Inquiry, it would not be justified to run that risk.
The deployments which give rise to that risk are those identified in paragraphs 25 to 28 inclusive of the closed risk assessment. Those paragraphs are founded on information provided by EN29. I have no reason to disbelieve or doubt that information and have not required it to be further substantiated.