Christopher Sebastian Joyce

Christopher Joyce 2015.

Maxim Katz and Christopher Joyce in Moscow in 2018.

Christopher Sebastian Joyce (born Oct-Dec 1970, Dover) is a career British diplomat who appears to have strong links to more than one intelligence agency and was expelled from Russia in 2018 as an MI6 operative.

Russian sources claimed that Christopher Joyce was the Deputy Head of the UK's HMG Russia Unit (part of the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office - FCDO) and involved in operations against Russia in late 2024. He was identified by Russian media as part of the leadership for the UK's Russia policy within the FCDO. His role was described as Deputy Head of Russia Policy.

According to a report on Russian website Underside:

The staffing table lists the already familiar figure of Christopher Joyce. He is listed as Deputy Head of the Department for Russia Policy. Underside's editorial team has already reported on how Joyce played the role of a good wizard for the Russian opposition. He was once the regional station chief for British intelligence in the South Caucasus, operating under the cover of political adviser at the British Embassy in Tbilisi. In late 2017, Joyce arrived to work at MI6's Moscow station under the cover of First Secretary of the Political Department, but was expelled from Russia for espionage in March 2018. However, he retained ties to the Russian opposition (for example, Chevening Scholars).

And already in January 2024, Chris Joyce allocated £668,000 (over 75 million rubles at the current exchange rate) to the European Leadership Network (ELN) for a project to study possible scenarios for Russia's future. More information about the project, aimed at "buying" and reformatting the minds of young Russian leaders and older but high-ranking officials, can be found here.

Dr Chris Joyce, UK Foreign Office Regional Advisor for the Caucasus on Conflicts (on the right) meets MP Rovshan Rzayev, Deputy Head of the 'Azerbaijan Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh' Public Union during his visit to Baku in October, 2014. Source Facebook.

Family and background

Father Alan George Joyce married his mother Evelyn M Joyce (maiden name Page) in Newton, Lancashire in 1963. He was born in Dover in 1970. In 2002 he was registered on the electoral Roll at an address in Hythe, Kent CT21, just down the coast, at which his parents were also registered. In the same year he was registered at 10 Third Avenue, Selly Park, Birmingham, West Midlands, B29 7EX along with two other people Duncan E Fielden, who went on to become Director of Undergraduate Studies at the Royal Birmingham Conservatoire and Jan A Smaczny who went on to become Harty Professor of Music at the Queen's University of Belfast.

In 2003 a biographical note said Joyce was 'a research fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham, England. He has recently completed his Ph.D. thesis “The Gulag: 1930–1960” and is working on a regional analysis of the Great Terror. He is also a professional singer and teaches Russian song repertoire at the Birmingham Conservatoire Given that the book chapter to which this note pertains was published by the California based and intelligence connected Hoover Institution, it may be surmised that Joyce's recruitment to MI6 would have been a natural development of his trajectory thus far.

Certainly it appears that he moved to London in 2003, since he was registered on the electoral Roll in a flat in Lewisham, SE13 in that year, along with Mairéad Sheerin who had read Music and English at the University of Birmingham followed by postgraduate vocal studies at Birmingham Conservatoire, thus making it likely that she knew Joyce from their time in Birmingham.

Activities

2015 speech

Speech of Dr. Christopher Joyce, the UK Regional Advisor for the Caucasus on Conflicts and post-Conflict Issues, at the conference “Policy of the conflict resolution: what has been achieved for the last three years” later today.

“Conflict resolution in Georgia and the South Caucasus: a series of missed opportunities!” - Will this be the view of historians in the future?

The title of this conference is looking at the achievements and challenges of conflict resolution policy in Georgia over the last three years. We have already heard today about the range of activities and policies by the Georgian government and society, as well as the international community. I have been working in the region for over two years covering conflict issues across the wider Caucasus region, including managing the UK Conflict, Stability & Security Fund (CSSF) (formerly known as the Conflict Pool). And so, I will certainly take credit for some of the achievements by the international community – but also, reluctantly, those activities or policy approaches which have not been as successful.

What I have learnt over the past two years is that the history of conflict resolution across the region is dominated by a long list of missed opportunities. Some only become apparent with the benefit of hindsight – others are apparent at the time, but a lack of political courage prevents individuals and governments from seizing the opportunity. It is impossible to know if the time is ever right for a new initiative or discussion – but if we don’t try – then events will move on and others will set the agenda.

The UK has been committed to resolving the conflicts of the South Caucasus for many years. Working closely with EU colleagues and other international organisations we devote considerable policy time and financial resources to help communities and governments across the region to address the issues that prevent them from peaceful co-existence.

Recently the UK has reaffirmed its commitment to finding peaceful solutions to the unresolved conflicts that prevent this region from reaching its full potential.

UK APPROACH

For those of you who are keen followers of events in the UK – you will be aware that, this week, the UK government announced two new policy documents of direct relevance to this region: National Security Strategy with its accompanying Strategic Defence & Security Review – together with a new UK Aid Strategy. This has been followed by a Spending Review which has allocated funds for all government programmes until 2020.

Although this National Security Strategy is primarily concerned with UK security it recognises that we live in a global village and that the security of the UK and its citizens can be affected by events far away from the British Isles. So, one of the three priorities listed in this document is to:

“Help strengthen the rules-based international order and its institutions, encouraging reform to enable further participation of growing powers. We will work with our partners to reduce conflict, and to promote stability, good governance and human rights.”

This UK priority is of direct relevance to Georgia and the South Caucasus region. Let me focus on different aspects of that priority:

Strengthening the rules-based international order and its institutions.

The UK is a proud member of many international organisations, including the UNSC, NATO, EU, G7, OSCE, CoE, IMF etc. The UK continually strives to ensure these organisations are effective and deliver against the spirit of their original mandates, and are modernised to guarantee their continued relevance in an ever-changing world. Unfortunately, in recent times, the very values and principles underpinning these organisations have been challenged. The new Strategy specifically mentions that Russia has shown a “willingness to undermine wider international standards of co-operation in order to secure its perceived interests”. This is a challenge to the entire global community. So the UK intends to work closely with its partners to restore the stability provided by these rules-based organisations. Now, the UK uses its membership of these many organisations to directly support Georgian foreign policy. In many of these institutions the UK uses its wide global diplomatic network to support the call for Georgia’s territorial integrity, to remind other nations of the unresolved conflicts and the ongoing issue of IDPs and their right to return.

The second part of this priority from the recent National Security Strategy’s stated that ….

We will work with our partners to reduce conflict, and to promote stability, good governance and human rights.

Across the South Caucasus the UK works closely with a number of international and local organisations and NGOs to tackle unresolved conflicts and assist in the development of key government and social mechanisms that underpin democratic and stable nations.

You will be pleased to know that in the South Caucasus region, Georgia receives the vast majority of UK financial and technical support, through the Conflict, Stability & Security Fund and the Good Governance Fund.

The Good Governance Fund, which was launched this year by our Prime Minister, aims to increase the level of good governance by helping to reform parts of the Georgian government and improve government oversight mechanisms and practices. This Fund will last for a number of years and will continue to develop. In this first year the UK has committed £3m to improve governance issues.

The main UK fund devoted to conflict resolution and bolstering the resilience of governments in the event of a crisis is the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund. This year, across the region the UK intends to spend over £4m on projects devoted to resolving conflicts and building resilience and stability. Following the UK Spending Review earlier this week, I can announce that this level of funding will be continued for at least the next four years. It may even increase.

This fund, not only supports today’s event, but a wide range of activities across Georgia, including work in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Activities include:

• Various dialogue processes between Georgians, Abkhaz, Ossetians, Russians, Armenians and Azeris. Many of these provide unique opportunities for communities, that have been divided by past and present conflicts, to meet face to face, and learn about each other’s societies. Often they come away realising that they have much in common and that it is only high level politics that prevents them from establishing permanent good relations. In many cases these dialogue processes provide opportunities for governments and civil society to pass important messages to each other and discuss issues in greater depth than is possible in any official international process.

• Within Abkhazia we provide support to local NGOs who try to improve the lives of all people living in Abkhazia. We have projects that aim to improve English language teaching so that people can engage with the wider world and can access alternative sources of information; we provide support to human rights defenders; through the HALO trust we aim to reduce the amount of unexploded ordnance and weaponry from past conflicts – some of which are highly unstable after 20 years.

• We also focus on stability issues across the rest of Georgia – supporting vocational training in the Pankisi Gorge; improving information flows by helping to develop local, community radio stations and developing unique on-line content on issues directly relevant to communities across the country.

• National stability is also dependent on effective government institutions and appropriate oversight mechanisms. So we support the State Security and Crisis Management Council in developing its Crisis Management response mechanism, which we hope will go live next year. Various other projects, supported by the Good Governance Fund, also aim to improve the resilience of Georgia by fostering its democratic credentials, improving transparency and the system of checks and balances.

• And finally, the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund allows the UK to second staff to the EUMM, the EUSR’s office and the Georgian MoD.

All of this work seeks to improve engagement with communities across the region. The UK is keen to deepen its engagement, particularly with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We aim to provide the populations of those territories with opportunities to strengthen and develop their own communities and to have direct experience of societies beyond their immediate neighbourhood. This is why we welcome people from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the UK and provide them with opportunities to explore how other societies operate. But always remember that our desire to increase engagement is not a slippery path towards recognition. As I have already mentioned, the UK is not only a firm supporter of Georgia’s territorial integrity, but we also use our diplomatic network to encourage others to uphold the internationally recognised borders of Georgia.

The UK approach towards conflict resolution in the Georgian context is focused on delivering projects and policies which aim to deliver in the short and medium term.

In this timeframe we hope to reduce tension between the conflict-affected communities, improve mutual understanding of past and present developments, and maintain and build links between the rich mix of communities that make up modern Georgia.

Through diplomacy and our Conflict, Stability & Security Fund project work the UK aims to create an environment in which the Georgians, Abkhaz and South Ossetians understand and respect each other’s views and feel confident in being able to discuss issues as equals.

It is not for the UK or any other member of the international community to decide the fate of the relationship between Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. Any external attempt to force an agreement upon the parties is unlikely to produce a satisfactory, sustainable solution.

Ultimately, it is up to the peoples of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia to engage in direct discussions and come to their own decisions. The international community is here to help all sides get to that stage and facilitate any dialogue, but we are not going to force any solution.

So – the answers lie in your hands.

There has been a noticeable shift in Georgian government public attitudes and rhetoric towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia over the last two years. (Including the new, positive atmospherics at the Geneva discussions which are the direct result of excellent Georgian diplomacy). And this has been noticed by the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, these populations remain highly sceptical of Georgian intentions and believe that the rhetoric could easily change overnight. What they want is something tangible that really demonstrates the genuine, good intentions of the Georgian nation.

This is not easy. The Georgian government faces a major challenge before it can even begin to deliver tangible changes to its policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In the current political climate there are heated political debates on a range of Georgian domestic issues. The issue of how a Georgian Government should approach Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not an attractive topic for any politician. The topic cannot be solved by any one individual, the options available appear extremely limited. Why would any sensible politician or government official want to touch such a difficult problem, one which is unlikely to generate any significant popular support in the short-term? And with elections next year – for any rational politician – this is the last topic you would want to raise publicly.

But the time is never right – there are always good reasons for not taking the initiative. But as the title of my presentation highlights – will historians of the future look back at this period and think – if only they had acted then – that was the last chance they had, before they lost all opportunity to genuinely engage with their breakaway territories.

And the challenge you face begins at home. The regional and global context surrounding Abkhazia and South Ossetia has moved on and so should the debate in society. We, that is all of us in this room (Georgian officials, civil society, the international community – both diplomatic and NGOs) need to open up the debate to wider Georgian society.

The issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an existential challenge for Georgia. A frank debate needs to be had. The issue is so important it should cross political divides. I am not so naïve to think that there would ever be total cross-party agreement on this issue. But for the sake of Georgia’s future there needs to be a discussion amongst the political parties. An honest exchange of opinions, initially behind closed doors; an opportunity to share assessments of developments in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia; discussion on how Georgia should respond to these developments; and more importantly, how Georgia can seize the initiative and set the agenda for the relationship with these territories – rather than catching up with developments.

An improved understanding across the political spectrum will then give Georgia the opportunity to begin public engagement on how to approach Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. Engaging with the population is key to prepare them for any new initiatives and tangible deliverables. The absence of any real public dialogue on this issue not only hinders policy development but also reinforces the impression in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that Georgia has nothing new to offer.

Reverting to hostile political point scoring on this issue is completely counter-productive for all Georgian society, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The only ones that benefit from this are Russia. The Kremlin can simply sit back and enjoy watching the political battles, occasionally delivering another provocative act to ensure the battle continues and at the same time reminding the Abkhaz and Ossetians that Tbilisi has not fundamentally changed.

And we, in the international community, should be prepared to support you in this public dialogue.

It is not going to be easy. The lack of any genuine public debate on this issue means that the Georgian public have never really had the opportunity to update their knowledge and challenge their own understanding of past and present conflicts. The UK is prepared to begin this public dialogue. We are unlikely to win many friends in this process but it needs to be done.

We would encourage other members of the international community to also engage in this debate and use all your public diplomacy opportunities to stimulate conversations on this issue.

Together, across all political parties, and using the support of the international community we should seize this opportunity to openly debate Georgia’s approach towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This should deliver an environment in which new approaches can be proposed and genuine re-engagement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia can begin.

British Embassy Tbilisi, Caucasian House

Timeline

• 2001 Ethos, the British Library compilation of data on 98% of all UK PhD's records the following thesis: The Gulag, 1930-1960 : Karelia and the Soviet system of forced labour Joyce, Christopher Sebastian https://isni.org/isni/0000000135933247 University of Birmingham https://isni.org/isni/0000000419367486 2001 Thesis (Ph.D.) History & Archaeology https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.396067
• 2003 - Author of Chapter 9: The Gulag in Karelia, 1929 to 1941 by Christopher Joyce (pp. 163-187) in The Economics of Forced Labor: The Soviet Gulag edited by Paul R. Gregory and V. V. Lazarev This is an edited volume published by the Hoover Institution Press at Stanford in 2003. Other authors in this volume included cold warrior Robert Conquest.
• 2003 - biographical note: CHRISTOPHER JOYCE is a research fellow at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham, England. He has recently completed his Ph.D. thesis “The Gulag: 1930–1960” and is working on a regional analysis of the Great Terror. He is also a professional singer and teaches Russian song repertoire at the Birmingham Conservatoire.
• 2014-2015 - Mr. Christopher Joyce First Secretary, Regional Conflict Adviser (residence in Tbilisi), Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan.
• November 2015 - 'I have been working in the region for over two years covering conflict issues across the wider Caucasus region, including managing the UK Conflict, Stability & Security Fund (CSSF) (formerly known as the Conflict Pool).
• 2018 - Defence Attache, British Embassy, Moscow - reportedly one of 23 British diplomats expelled for spying in the aftermath of the Skripal affair when British intelligence concocted an alleged chemical weapons incident in Salisbury.
• 2022-23 - Reportedly deputy head of the Russia Policy Department of the FCDO and part of HMG Russia Unit. Some Russian sources suggest that he is also connected to the Cabinet Office via being a member of the Joint Intelligence Organisation.