James Straven (alias)

This article is part of the Undercover Research Portal at Powerbase - investigating corporate and police spying on activists

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Part of a series on undercover police officers
HN16 / N16
Alias:	James Straven/Kevin Crossland
Deployment:	1997-2002
Unit:	Special Demonstration Squad
Targets:	Animal Liberation Front, Brixton and Croydon Hunt Saboteurs

In September 2018, the Inquiry revealed that the undercover officer known as HN16 had been using two identies 'James Straven' and 'Kevin Crossland'. He was deployed into the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Brixton and Croydon Hunt Saboteurs between 1997 and 2002.

HN16 / N16 is the cipher given to a former undercover officer with the Special Demonstration Squad. He is a core participant in the Undercover Policing Inquiry and is represented by Slater & Gordon. On 8 December 2017, the Inquiry Chair, John Mitting, granted HN16 anonymity in his real name.

N.B. As with all profiles, this is a work in progress, we very much want to get in touch with people who knew this spycop and can tell us more.

Cover names

HN16 seems to have been using two different cover names. 'James Straven' was the name that the Special Demonstration Squad sanctioned HN16 to use as his undercover identity. According to the Inquiry, this name was not based on the identity of a deceased child. It is also the name some activists remember him by.

Kevin Crossland was the identity of a deceased child who died in a plane crash in 1966. Use of this name does not appear to have been sanctioned by the Special Demonstration Squad, and the Inquiry is investigating why and how the name 'Kevin Crossland' was used. In its press release, the Inquiry took the unusual step to include a statement from the relatives, as they had asked, in Kevin's memory:

Kevin was a very happy, five year old boy full of life. On 31 August 1966 Kevin, his sister and parents left to go on holiday, boarding a flight from Luton Airport to Ljubljana, in Old Yugoslavia.

Kevin and sister were very excited, they had packed their favourite toys to take with them. On the way to Luton Airport both were singing, 'we are going to the summer holiday'. Kevin and his sister sat on the left side of the plane near the end, next to their mother, whilst their father sat the other side of gangway with a good view of his family.

It was clear night but just before coming to land gone midnight, father heard his daughter calling 'the wing is hitting tree tops and there is fire coming out of them' and in no time Kevin, his sister and their mother died - with only their father who survived with multiple injuries, burns and enormous guilt that he was not able to save his family.

The relatives have been granted core participant status in the Inquiry.

Intimate relationships

'Straven' has not been straightforward with the Inquiry about his relationships while undercover. In a statement signed just before the start of the closed session in October last year about his application for anonimity 'he denied conducting a sexual relationship in his cover name during his deployment with named women. One of them was "Ellie", identified by her real name.' Mitting writes that he did not accept the denial and decided that the cover name was to be released.

Six months later, in April 2018, HN16 submitted a statement to the Inquiry now admitting that indeed he had had a sexual relationship with "Ellie", lasting some months, during his deployment. 'The Inquiry attempted to obtain from him contact details for "Ellie", but all that it was said he could provide was "a guess at an old email address".'

He was lying again. On 20 August 2018, Harriet Wistrich submitted a statement to the Inquiry on behalf of Ellie saying she had had a sexual relationship with HN16 in 1999/2000 for about a year, and that she had remained in touch with him since. She also said he contacted her recently 'to say that he had been an undercover officer in the Special Demonstration Squad and to warn her that she might be contacted by the Inquiry.'

'Ellie' has now been accepted as a core participant to the Inquiry.

Background

According to his Nov 2017 risk assessment, N16 was involved in protection duties before joining the SDS. Initially he performed 'back office' duties and developed his legend before being deployed. He 'did not receive any formal training for the role', and 'preparation consisted of research, reviewing of files and informal contact with more experienced UCOs'. 'N16 had a mentor at the initial stage of the deployment and subsequent support from another SDS officer'. He told the Risk Assessor that promises of anonymity were given. (s.3)

N16 was arrested during his deployment, but the case did not come to trial. He declined to state whether he had 'engaged in any behaviour that could heighten the risk,' and as mentioned above denied having had relationships.

The gisted version noted: 'The risk assessor expressed concern about another individual who would be impacted if a restriction order was not made.' (s.4)

N16 has also been subject of a misconduct investigation. (s.5-7)

Douglas Edwards, an undercover officer himself from 1968 to 1971, was involved in HN16's deployment in an administratative role with the SDS, and was questioned about that by an operation (redacted in his personal statement, presumably Operation Herne, the Met's self-investigation into the undercover policing scandal).

In the Inquiry

March 2016 application for anonimity

In March 2016, the legal representative for HN16 (Slater & Gordon) applied to restrict his cover and real name, submitting the following documents:

• personal statement (gisted), * open application,
• draft order and
• risk assessment (gisted)

Acoording to the August 2017 UCPI press release, Mitting was considering a closed hearing for HN16 'due to sensitivity of material being considered'. In his Minded-To note he added: "Detailed factors particular to this officer's circumstances require them to be considered at a closed hearing." For this closed hearing a further risk assessment had to be submitted by 1 September 2017.

Following the closed hearing, Mitting issued a Supplementary Minded-To on 23 October 2017 in which he stated:

Publication of the cover name of HN16 is necessary to afford an opportunity to any individual who may have had an intimate relationship with HN16 under the cover name to provide information and evidence about it to the Inquiry. [emphasis added] This involves a small risk of significant interference with the right to respect for private and family life of HN16, if it leads to the revelation of the real name of HN16. Nevertheless, it is necessary to permit the Inquiry to fulfil its terms of reference to take that risk and proportionate to do so. On the basis of the information presently known to the Inquiry, and if no plausible evidence of such a relationship is forthcoming, publication of the real name of HN16 would neither be necessary for that purpose, nor proportionate nor otherwise justified.

The accompanying press release noted also:

The undercover police deployments of all three of these individuals [HN16, HN26, HN81] are of real interest to the Inquiry and the Chairman is of the view that there is no means of getting to the truth without the cover names being made public.

Unreleased by the Inquiry was a closed note from Mitting 'which sets out in detail the reasons for refusing the application for a restriction order in respect of the cover name.' See also the NPSCP submissions of 5 October 2017.

Risk assessment

The further material was released on 15 November 2017, including the MPS risk assessment.

The risk assessment noted that N16 had declined to meet his first assigned risk assessor, Kevin Shanahan but did provide material via his solicitors. He did meet with a new risk assessor, David Reid, but did not answer all questions. N16 has highlighted his perceptions of the risk he faces if his details are released; Reid agrees with some but not all of these views. (s.10) N16 did not 'reveal any ongoing psychological issues and declined to provide [Reid] with any information in respect of counseling or psychological support. (s.16)

It stated, in gisted form that:

The risk assessor accepts that a number of the individuals N16 reported on during the course of N16s' deployment are violent, or linked to others known to be violent. (Section 17)

... the substance of N16's evidence will betray N16's identity. In the context of the risk assessment, the risk assessor considered the giving of evidence in private to be the best means of managing the risk to N16. (Section 18)

Section 19 noted that in terms of risk if N16's cover name was released, the risk of attack was assessed as 'low' (2) (i.e. unlikely), though close to 'medium', but it was one of those cases were relying entirely on a numerical score was problematic. The likely impact was harder to assess, as some of the targeted individuals were likely to have a sense of betrayal, and also a history of violence which 'could foreseeably manifest into a physical attack against N16'. Thus, the impact was classed as 'moderate' (3), giving overall risk as 6.

The likelihood of physical attack if real identity confirmed was increased to medium ('probability of the risk occurring could reasonably be foreseen and is considered distinctly possible to occur at some stage'), increasing overall risk score to 9.

In relation to impact on family life:

The risk assessor believes that on balance that the risk of interference with N16's family and private life is higher than the risk of physical assault, but does not dismiss the latter. The risk assessor assesses the likelihood of interference with N16's personal and family life if only N16's cover identity was known as medium (3). The risk assessor considers that the exposure of N16's deployment would have a significant impact on N16's career and future career prospects. The risk assessor assesses the likely impact as the upper levels of the 'moderate' category (3). This is defined as requiring "additional support, 'target hardening' at their address, or cause real anxiety within their family or close friends".

It is not explained how or why this increased risk would be higher given that this refers to only his cover name.

The risk assessor is much more concerned for interference in family / private life if the real name was to be released, simply because 'the likelihood of interference... must logically be greater if N16's real name was known other than in the circumstances above when only a pseudonym or cypher was known. The risk assessor considers this risk more likely than that of a physical attack'. He thus assesses the risk as 'high' (4), i.e. probable to occur at some stage, though it is not clear where the source of this risk is perceived. Thus the overall risk here is classed as 12.

November 2017 application for anonimity

Application material

• HN16 - further written statement to Inquiry (16 October 2017) - fully gisted, answering three questions from the Inquiry 'arising from the circumstances of HN16's deployment as an undercover officer.
• N16 - Risk Assessment (David Reid, 10 November 2017, mostly gisted) - this is the third version as Kevin Shanahan no longer employed for such assessments, with David Reid taking over from him.
• HN16 - further written statement to Inquiry (28 April 2016) - fully gisted, which 'outlines HN16's views on possible routes by which HN16's identity may be revealed.
• N16 Medico-legal psychiatric report (Dr Walter Busuttil, 6 March 2017) - fully gisted, concluding that 'should N16's undercover and true identity be revealed medical issues will become more severe'.
• N16 Second Additional Statement in Support of Anonymity (15 June 2017) - fully gisted, setting out 'N16's concerns as to the impact on current and future employment should his cover or real identity be revealed'.
• HN16 - further written submissions to Inquiry in support of restriction order application (11 October 2017) - partial release. The Chair has written to N16 seeking to 'clarify the basis of the application for the restriction order being sought. N16 replied saying it was on basis of:

(i) a real and immediate risk of physical harm

(ii) a real risk of harassment falling short of physical harm

(iii) a real risk of loss of N16s employment and reputation

(iv) a real risk of harassment or even physical harm to N16's immediate family.

The gisted version of this document also notes that it makes supporting submissions 'regarding the threats resulting from public campaigns' and references 'a bundle of press articles to demonstrate types of direct action which have blighted the lives and careers of those affected in recent years.' This is presumably the S&G Media Coverage Bundle also released in the November documents. The further written submissions also touch on the various other issues such as the public interest in his case, the risk of 'jigsaw' identification, possible harm under Article 8, possible harm to third parties and effectiveness or otherwise of possible mitigation measures.

Minded-to & Ruling of December 2017

Inquiry Chair, John Mitting, consistently indicated that he was minded to release HN16's cover name, but restrict his real name. This was set out in his initial Minded-To note on this application (Oct 2017) and followed on from a closed hearing.

Issues raised in the supplementary 'minded to' were addressed in follow-up submissions from the NPSCPs, and Peter Francis.

HN16's open application was heard at the hearing of 21 November 2017 and on 5 December 2017, Mitting granted a ruling that there would be a restriction order for HN16's real name, but not his cover name. This was on the grounds that HN16's cover name was all that was required to fulfil the Inquiry's purposes, though if relevant wrong-doing came to light during his deployment, a case to release the real name could be made.

On 8 December 2017, Mitting granted HN16 a restriction order for his real name.

The matter of HN16's economics situation and how much could be said about it was raised by the non-police/state core participants in their general submissions of 11 January 2018, and responded to in the Counsel to the Inquiry's note of 31 January 2018.