EN1001

This article is part of the Undercover Research Portal at Powerbase - investigating corporate and police spying on activists

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Part of a series on National Public Order Intelligence Unit
'EN1001'
Alias:	unknown
Deployment:	late 2000s
Role:	other

EN1001 is the cipher given to a police officer who played a role in an undercover operation run by the National Public Order Intelligence Unit. They are a serving police officer as of 2017. Sir John Mitting, chair of the Undercover Policing Inquiry, has ruled that the Inquiry will restrict the officers real name in the Inquiry.

• For the EN cipher system see EN officers page.

As a police officer

EN1001 was a Test Purchasing Officer doing several low level undercover operations in various towns and scities, for which they gave evidence at court on many occasions - always shielded from the public.

In the late 2000s they took on a different role in connection with undercover policing, which role they continue to hold (as of 2017). According to the gist of the officer's witness statement:

EN1001 emphasises that the whole of the current unit in which EN1001 operates depends on his/her covert identity and real identity remaining confidential. EN1001 states that if his/her identity were to be compromised, the entire unit would be placed at risk. Not only would this be at a very significant cost to the taxpayer, more importantly it would place all the undercover officers currently working in the unit at a significant risk of harm and jeopardise their future careers as undercover officers.

The officer also noted:

I cannot recall being given any specific written or oral assurance that my identity would be protected. I would not, however, have undertaken this work if I considered that there was any prospect of my identity being revealed. Given the protection of undercover officers and cover officers I have never considered that disclosure was a possibility.

Elsewhere, EN1001's relationship to NPOIU is described as:

EN1001 has never been seconded to the National Public Order Intelligence Unit and has never applied for a role within that organisation. EN1001 performed a peripheral supporting role in one operation in the late 2000s. EN1001 does not know if any risk arises to EN1001 or anyone else involved in this operation if EN1001’s real or covert identities are revealed.

In the Undercover Policing Inquiry

• 2 May 2018: Mitting minded to restrict real and cover names, writing:

EN1001 was not seconded to the [NPOIU], but performed a peripheral supporting role in one operation for a short time in the late 2000s. It is unlikely that the Inquiry will need to receive or take into account evidence from EN1001 so as to permit it to fulfil its terms of reference. EN1001 was and is a serving police officer with a provincial force. In that capacity EN 1001 has undertaken routine criminal undercover deployments, some of which were dangerous. The work done by EN1001 and that done by other police officers would be substantially impaired if either the cover or real name of EN1001 were to be published. It is not in the public interest that either should occur. Further, publication of either would interfere with the right to respect for the private and family life of EN1001 and would not be justified

• 9 July 2018: Inquiry releases open / gisted versions of the restriction order application and witness statement for the officer and Mitting directed that any submissions in response to these applications were to be made by 20 July 2018.

• 30 October 2018: Mitting rules to restrict both real and cover names, writing:

The first sentence of the 'Minded to' note accurately describes the role played by EN1001. The words used in paragraph 4 of the gist of the application "as he/she used when seconded to the [National Public Order Intelligence Unit]" would have been better expressed as "when performing that supporting role". The words used in paragraph 5 of the gist of the application accurately state the original text. The words "whether any" could have been better expressed as "which, if any". These semantic quibbles do not "underscore", let alone demonstrate or establish, "the inappropriateness of relying exclusively on the self-report of the officer". I had, and have, no reason to doubt the truthfulness and substantial accuracy of the statement made by EN1001 in support of the application for a restriction order.

I am satisfied that it is not in the public interest that the valuable duties performed by the unit of which EN 1001 is part should be jeopardised by publication of the cover name of EN 1001, as they would be. I also reject the suggestion that EN 1001 should be removed from current duties until the public hearings have occurred which concern the National Public Order Intelligence Unit.