BlackCore

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Online influence-for-hire operation that French authorities, Citizen Lab and Meta link to Israel

Not to be confused with Black Cube, the Israeli private intelligence firm.
BlackCore

Type No registered company identified
Founder(s) Not identified
Headquarters Israel (reported); no address identified
Industry Online influence operations ("influence-for-hire")
Services Covert online campaigns using fake websites and social media personas. Operations reported in France, Scotland, the United States (New York), Angola and Togo
Homepage blackcore.online (offline since May 2026)

BlackCore presented itself online as "an elite influence, cyber, and technology company built for the modern era of information warfare".[1] Its name first appeared publicly in a Reuters report of 13 May 2026, which said French authorities suspected it of a smear campaign against three La France Insoumise (LFI) candidates.[2][3][1] A joint investigation by Haaretz and Libération then traced its web infrastructure to servers shared with tools linked to two Tel Aviv companies, Galacticos and SNI, although it found "no direct connection" between Galacticos and the French operation.[4][3] In June 2026 the French government's foreign digital interference service, Viginum, published a technical report naming BlackCore as the probable source of the campaign, while stating that it could not identify the operators' exact roles or anyone who commissioned the work.[5] Its owners and executives have not been publicly identified. No company registration for BlackCore has been found. Reuters said it could not "find any reference to the company in Israeli corporate records",[2] Haaretz found no legal entity of that name registered in any country,[4] and Viginum describes it as a "pseudo-company" ("pseudo-société") with no legal status.[5] In August 2026 Meta removed a network it described as "an influence-for-hire operation" originating in Israel, which Citizen Lab assessed was "likely" BlackCore.[6][1]

BlackCore is a separate outfit from Black Cube, the Israeli private intelligence firm, and no published report links the two. Haaretz places BlackCore in a line of Israeli influence-for-hire firms that includes Team Jorge, exposed in 2023 by Haaretz, TheMarker and the Forbidden Stories consortium.[4]

What has been reported

France: the "Rokh Solis" campaign (2026 municipal elections)

Le Monde first exposed the operation on 9 March 2026, a week before the first round.[4][3] A fake "Blog de Sophie" accused LFI's Marseille candidate Sébastien Delogu of rape, and a separate website attacked the Toulouse candidate François Piquemal. A fourth site, "l'Alternative 2026", claimed to guide "Muslim citizens" towards candidates supporting "the application of sharia" and listed only LFI candidates.[3] Haaretz reports that another site published fake AI-generated photos presented as nude pictures of Delogu, as part of a purported Gaza fundraising campaign, and that the sites were amplified by fake social media accounts. After the Le Monde report the operators deleted avatars and websites, but digital traces remained. A team drawn from the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN), the Interior Ministry, the election commission and Viginum then identified BlackCore as the main suspect.[4] On 12 March Viginum classified the affair as "foreign digital interference", and a week later LFI's Roubaix candidate David Guiraud was identified as another target.[3]

Viginum's report, which calls the operating method "Rokh Solis", describes four websites (blogdesophie.com, delogupourpalestine.com, piquemalzero.com and lalternative2026.com). The report says the sites shared technical characteristics and were relayed by inauthentic accounts on TikTok, Instagram, X and Facebook. It also identifies "markers of foreign origin": Hebrew characters in one site's metadata, a TikTok account located in Israel, and the sharing of hashtags and posts associated with the pro-Israel organisation ELNET.[5] The report found the sites had only "low visibility" online despite repeated attempts at artificial amplification, but concluded that it met the criteria of foreign digital interference.[5]

France 3 reported that the targeted candidates had filed complaints, and that after the 22 March second round Piquemal had asked the administrative court to overturn the Toulouse result.[3] According to Middle East Eye, Paris prosecutors opened a probe in late May 2026.[7]

BlackCore's own materials

Haaretz reports that BlackCore's website described it as a cyber outfit with 15 years of experience, specialising in influence operations and information warfare for government and political clients, and claimed a "100 percent" success rate; the paper found that "no real entity seems to stand behind that name". A marketing mini-site in Hebrew and English presented "political campaign management", built around 1,600 avatars and fake accounts used for "infiltrating Facebook groups, manipulating trends, and skewing polls on TikTok and Instagram".[4] France 3 likewise reports that the website described a political campaign model of 1,600 social media avatars, up to a million posts a month, infiltration of Facebook groups and manipulation of TikTok trends, along with "positive narratives" for a client and "counter-narratives" against opponents.[3] Citizen Lab, which examined the site while it was still online, reported that a demo subdomain described three lines of business: "Discourse Dominance", "Organic Engagement" and "Counter Operations".[1] Viginum reported that the domain blackcore.online was registered on 22 August 2025 and that the website and LinkedIn page were deleted after the May 2026 press reports.[5] Haaretz reports the same timing: the domain was bought "only last August", through an Icelandic registrar that allows owners to remain anonymous, by a company that presents itself as long-established. The site gave no owners, executives or physical address, and the investigation found no legal entity called BlackCore registered in any country.[4] According to The Guardian, Reuters reported that BlackCore scrubbed its website after Reuters contacted it and did not respond to requests for comment.[8]

Other countries

At a press conference with Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu on 11 June 2026, Viginum's Marc-Antoine Brillant said the same modus operandi "also appears to have been used to carry out foreign digital interference operations in other countries or regions, such as Angola, Togo, the elections in Scotland, and the 2025 municipal election in New York".[9] He added: "Our investigations did not make it possible to identify the sponsor or sponsors, if indeed they exist".[8]

  • Scotland: Viginum reported that the accounts of First Minister John Swinney, the Scottish National Party and the Scottish government appear to have been targeted four times between 6 January and 8 May 2026. At least 256 accounts posted about 1,400 coordinated comments.[5][8]
  • New York: Viginum reported that some of the inauthentic accounts used in France had joined New York community groups in October 2025 and relayed posts by mayoral candidate Andrew Cuomo.[5]
  • Angola: a BlackCore subdomain referred to training given to the Angolan government in February 2026.[5] Haaretz and Libération found the subdomain, angola-plan.blackcore.online, hosting a Portuguese-language page titled "Campanha do Governo de Angola – Programa de Formação – Fevereiro 2026" ("Government of Angola Campaign – Training Program – February 2026"). It outlined a four-week course on content creation and paid social media campaigns, listing an active Meta Ads campaign, an active TikTok campaign and a three-month editorial calendar.[4] Citizen Lab obtained what it describes as BlackCore's final report on a "Digital Training Program 2026" for the Angolan government's communications team. According to that report, the programme began on 19 January 2026, ran for "more than 14 uninterrupted weeks" (against the four weeks outlined on the subdomain), and included live covert campaigns built around a fake outlet, "Agita News", and fake personas. Citizen Lab assessed it as "highly likely" that the programme took place as described, but could not confirm it independently or identify the participants or trainers.[1][10]
  • Togo and Gabon: a phone number on the "Sadaqah Palestine" website (below) led Viginum to a TikTok account located in Israel that promoted the opening of an Israeli hospital in Togo. Viginum also found Fiverr reviews, left by a profile linked to the same network, ordering AI-generated videos for Togolese or Gabonese audiences.[5]
  • "Sadaqah Palestine": Viginum found that sadaqahpalestine.com shared a mail server with electric-marinade.com, a domain hosted alongside BlackCore's infrastructure. The now-inactive site promoted a purported Palestinian charity. Posts from the related X account were amplified by accounts behaving identically to those that commented on the Facebook pages targeting the LFI candidates.[5]
  • Meta: on 27 August 2026 Meta reported disrupting "a Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior network originating in Israel" that targeted audiences in France, the UK, Australia, Iran, Togo, Gabon, Angola and the US. Citizen Lab assesses that this network is likely BlackCore.[1]

Meta takedown (August 2026)

On 27 August 2026 Meta published its Adversarial Threat Report for the second half of 2026. It described "a Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior network originating in Israel and targeting audiences in France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Iran, Togo, Gabon, Angola, and the United States", and assessed it as "an influence-for-hire operation, likely run on behalf of a number of distinct clients". Meta said it removed 215 Facebook accounts, 4 Pages and 1,044 Instagram accounts. About 32,500 accounts followed one or more of the Pages and about 248,000 followed one or more of the Instagram accounts, and the operators spent around $100 on adverts. Its investigation "revealed links to individuals based in Israel".[11][6]

According to Meta, the network ran Pages and Instagram accounts "posing as local, civically-engaged brands, news sources, religious organizations, and political activists", and boosted them with clusters of automated fake accounts that used AI to write comments, a tactic "the network's own operators referred to as 'Mother-Child'". Ahead of France's municipal elections it "created brands to criticize political candidates and spread narratives about the 'Islamization' of France". Meta said its messaging included "partisan content in Togo and Gabon, anti-government messaging in Iran and Angola, and anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim campaigns in France, the United Kingdom, and Australia", and that "a small cluster of these bots" was aimed at the New York mayoral campaign.[6] Meta does not name BlackCore. Its published indicators include three of the four websites Viginum described in the Rokh Solis campaign (lalternative2026.com, blogdesophie.com and delogupourpalestine.com) and the "Sadaqah Palestine" site that Viginum also tied to the network. They also list forsane-alizza.eu, which Viginum describes as a sixth site, supporting lalternative2026.com, and rcn-france.com. Viginum gives that fifth site, which warned about lalternative2026.com, as rcn-france.org; the sources do not explain the difference.[6][5]

Citizen Lab assessed that "the firm Meta is describing is likely BlackCore", citing BlackCore's reported targeting of the New York mayoral campaign and of audiences in Scotland, Togo and Angola. It noted an inconsistency: BlackCore's own Angola material described pro-government work, while Meta cites "anti-government messaging" in Angola. "It is not clear whether Meta was mistaken in their analysis, or BlackCore was servicing both sides of the political spectrum," Citizen Lab wrote.[1] The Record reported Citizen Lab's view in stronger terms, saying the network "was highly likely to have been operated by BlackCore".[10]

Related firms and investigations

Viginum describes BlackCore as a "pseudo-company" ("pseudo-société") with no legal status. It says BlackCore appears to sit within an ecosystem of numerous Israeli cyber-sector companies, which prevents it, for now, from determining "with a sufficient level of confidence" the identity and scope of the private company behind the campaign.[5]

  • Shared infrastructure: Haaretz and Libération traced a toolkit of influence-operation systems routed through servers in Britain, Germany, Finland and Lithuania. They identified eight subdomains tied to BlackCore. One was active on a London-based server, run by a Finnish cloud provider, that hosted only a small handful of other websites with shared characteristics. Haaretz reports that since August 2025 the London server hosted only four main network domains: two carried BlackCore's activity, a third was named Omri Systems and a fourth Electric Marinade. Internal system names on the server included "avatar-generator", "agent-maker" and "fb-search", and one locked system bore the SNI name.[4] France 3's summary of the same investigation gives a different start date: it says the London server hosted a BlackCore subdomain between March 2025 and May 2026, alongside about twenty subdomains of omrisystems.com and electric-marinade.com with names such as "avatar-data-generator", "agentforge", "fb-search" and "socialtrigger".[3] The sources do not explain the difference between August 2025 and March 2025. Viginum reports the same servers and says the electric-marinade.com, omrisystems.com and BlackCore entities appear to have no legal existence.[5]
  • Galacticos Ltd: the source code of the "avatar data generator" referred to "Galacticos AI".[3] Haaretz reports that Galacticos AI is the brand name of Galacticos Ltd, which according to Israel's companies registry was incorporated in Tel Aviv in April 2022 as Pagecorn Ltd, renamed Mycelium Intelligence Networks a year later, and renamed Galacticos in 2024. The commercial lawyer Doron Afik holds 51 per cent of its shares and Guy Geyor 28 per cent.[4] Israeli registry data list Galacticos Ltd (גלקטיקוס בע"מ) as an active private company, no. 516599818, registered at 103 HaHashmonaim Street (c/o Afik & Co.), Tel Aviv-Yafo 6713319, the address of Doron Afik's law firm.[12] Viginum's public report says Guy Geyor and Doron Afik "ont fondé et/ou dirigé" (founded and/or ran) the company.[13] Its domain, galacticos.ai, was registered on 17 April 2024; the current registrant is listed as "Tech GLC" at 103 Hahachmonaim, Tel Aviv, with the telephone number +972-3-6093609,[14] the number Afik & Co. lists for its lawyers.[15] Viginum says the domain was registered by Geyor through SNI.[5] Haaretz likewise reports that Geyor registered galacticos.ai and listed the site as belonging to SNI, and that Galacticos' chief technology officer, Daniel David Levy, is listed as the contact person on the domain registration.[4] A source familiar with Galacticos told Haaretz that the company "had developed a product that generates avatars that can be deployed both for influence operations and the monitoring of social media – as both require active accounts". Haaretz adds, however, that "no direct connection was found between Galacticos and the operation being investigated by the French".[4] The Canary gives the same company history, citing Haaretz.[16]
  • SNI Digital Ltd (SNI): a second Tel Aviv company at the same address. Haaretz gives its name as "SNI – Strategic Network Intelligence Ltd." and reports that its main shareholders are Afik and Geyor.[4] The Israeli registry entry found for this page records the company only as SNI Digital Ltd (below); it has not been confirmed whether "Strategic Network Intelligence" is a former registered name or an expansion of the initials. France 3 reports that Galacticos' director, the lawyer Doron Afik, also heads SNI Digital, and that the two companies share shareholders, including Guy Geyor, described by France 3 as an influencer turned tech entrepreneur and co-founder of SNI Cyber, and by Haaretz as a tech entrepreneur and former contestant on the Israeli versions of Survivor and The Bachelor.[3][4] Haaretz says Geyor is best known as a reality-show contestant and as founder of the wedding-payments start-up Easy2Give (also known as Going Dutch), and had not previously been linked to business involving avatars or campaigns. In April 2026 Easy2Give announced a merger with the shell company Axillion; Afik's firm did the legal work.[4] Agence France-Presse, via Le Parisien, also reports that Afik is director of both companies.[17] Registry data list SNI Digital Ltd (אס אן איי דיגיטל בע"מ) as an active private company, no. 516320363, at 103 HaHashmonaim Street, Tel Aviv-Yafo 6713319.[18] On the server that hosted a BlackCore subdomain, Viginum found an API configuration that pointed to a database named "sni-staging" at pg.electric-marinade.com. Viginum says this links electric-marinade.com and omrisystems.com, and "éventuellement" (possibly) sni.ai.[5] sni.ai was registered on 30 December 2021 behind a privacy service.[19] Internet Archive captures show that the front-end code of sni.ai (2024) and galacticos.ai (2025) carried the same marketing text for a brand and social-media monitoring service.[20][21]
  • Electric Marinade and Omri Systems: neither appears to be a registered company. Viginum found no legal existence for them,[5] and UK Companies House searches return no company of either name.[22] The domain electric-marinade.com was registered with GoDaddy on 19 February 2025,[23] and omrisystems.com was registered with GoDaddy on 12 February 2026.[24] Certificate Transparency logs list omrisystems.com subdomains including "agentforge", "avatar-data-generator", "fb-search", "socialtrigger", "flowise", "vnc" and "vpn".[25] An "fb.aoa" subdomain appears on all three of omrisystems.com, electric-marinade.com and modules.galacticos.ai.[25][26] Archived captures show password login pages there titled "AOA System" (galacticos.ai, February 2025) and "AOA Generator" (electric-marinade.com, April 2025).[27][28] What "AOA" stands for has not been reported.
  • Iron Mind AB: Viginum also traced the avatar tool to a development subdomain of iron-mind.ai. That domain belongs to Iron Mind AB, apparently a software developer, registered in Sweden on 30 October 2025 (company no. 559551-9181, Kopparvägen 44, 187 45 Täby).[5]
  • Denials: Afik told Haaretz that Galacticos "has no affiliation, partnership or prior knowledge regarding BlackCore, and no connection to the party France Unbowed", and that it had never worked with any French entity. He confirmed that the company "has a product in development", but said it never owned, operated or used a domain called Electric Marinade. Geyor told Haaretz: "I and the company don't know who BlackCore is, and we never had any connection with them. We have no activity in France – certainly no political activity." He confirmed that the company is linked to Omri Systems, but said this network domain is an internal system, unusable and still in development, and that it has never been sold or operated.[4] Haaretz reports that the remaining digital infrastructure of both BlackCore and Galacticos was taken offline less than two hours after Afik and Geyor were asked for comment.[4][16] Middle East Eye likewise reports that executives of both companies deny any connection to BlackCore.[7]
  • Official investigations: Viginum's investigation, with its report published on 11 June 2026,[5] and a Paris prosecutors' probe opened in late May 2026.[7] Haaretz reported in June that France's domestic intelligence agency was separately investigating who may have commissioned the campaign.[29] A source quoted by AFP described BlackCore as only "la porte d'entrée d'une entreprise beaucoup plus complexe" (the entry point to a much more complex enterprise), and said the campaign came from Israel but that it had not been established whether the state was involved.[17] According to The Guardian, the Israeli government said it was waiting for the French report before deciding whether to investigate, and denied any interest in interfering in other countries' elections.[8]

Alleged links

Unit 8200

Haaretz reports that Afik and Geyor have been joined in Galacticos and SNI by people with a background in intelligence or experience in technology, who together hold less than 10 per cent of the two companies. It names two of them. Nir Benita, according to his LinkedIn profile, served in Unit 8200. Daniel David Levy is Galacticos' chief technology officer. Neither responded to questions from Haaretz and Libération.[4] France 3's summary of the same investigation refers to one unnamed shareholder of Galacticos and SNI Digital who says he spent ten years in Unit 8200 and did not respond to requests for comment.[3] Haaretz does not say how long Benita served. The Canary writes that the investigation "found links to Israeli intelligence unit 8200".[16] No source identifies a Unit 8200 veteran as a founder or executive of BlackCore itself.

Yigal Unna

Yigal Unna, first director-general of the Israel National Cyber Directorate (2018–2022 per France 3), is described by Viginum as a "central figure" in the ecosystem around BlackCore. Viginum cites his former roles at the INCD and his past experience in Unit 8200 and the Shin Bet.[5][3] Viginum reports that:

  • photos from a September 2025 event at the Tel Aviv law firm that shares an address with Galacticos show Unna, apparently as a representative of Galacticos AI;
  • Unna's start-up incubator, Cygun Ltd, lists Galacticos AI among the start-ups it supports.[5]

France 3 reports that Unna's name is associated with Galacticos on the website of the law firm that hosts it.[3] The law firm's account of the 8 September 2025 event lists "Mr. Yigal Unna of Galacticos.AI" among the guests.[15] Cygun Ltd (סיגאון בע"מ) is a registered Israeli private company, no. 516559317, based in Givatayim.[30] Cygun's website describes Unna's career as beginning "in Unit 8200, Israel’s elite signal-intelligence corps", followed by "23 years in the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), where he rose to head the Cyber & Signal Intelligence Division", before he became Director General of the National Cyber Directorate.[31] The startups page on Cygun's current site (viewed October 2026) names no portfolio companies.

Denial: Unna told Haaretz and Libération that he never played any role at Galacticos, which he had been told was in the business of social media monitoring. He said Afik approached him "two years ago" (that is, about two years before May 2026) about an "OSINT [open-source intelligence] and social network startup focused on protecting commercial brands", and used him to help find clients. "I didn't see any real company. There's no CEO and no full-time VP of marketing. I never met any employees – it was a kind of improvisation," Unna said. He said he received no payment and had no contact with the firm in 2026.[4] The Canary reports that he "denied any link to the operation".[16] No source accuses Unna of involvement in BlackCore's campaigns.

What remains unknown

  • Legal identity: no legal entity named BlackCore has been found in Israel or elsewhere. Reuters could not "verify where it was based, or find any reference to the company in Israeli corporate records".[5][3][4][2]
  • The Meta network: Meta did not name the operator of the network it removed in August 2026. Citizen Lab's assessment that it was BlackCore is given as "likely" in its report and as "highly likely" in The Record; Meta's description of "anti-government messaging" in Angola conflicts with BlackCore's pro-government work there.[6][1][10]
  • Ownership and management: BlackCore's owners, executives and staff have not been publicly identified. Citizen Lab could not identify the individuals behind it and was "unable to find a recent contact point" to seek comment.[1]
  • Who commissioned the work: Viginum says nothing allows it to establish the identity or origin of any clients, and its chief said the sponsors, "if indeed they exist", could not be identified.[5][8]
  • Relationship to Galacticos and SNI: Viginum calls the relationship between BlackCore and these companies part of a wider ecosystem whose exact roles it cannot yet establish. Haaretz found shared web infrastructure but "no direct connection" between Galacticos and the French operation, and the companies' owners deny any link.[5][4]
  • Server dates: Haaretz dates the London server's hosting of the four network domains from August 2025; France 3 dates the BlackCore subdomain there from March 2025.[4][3]
  • Payment for the Angola programme: Citizen Lab told The Record it found no evidence of how BlackCore was hired, whether the Angolan government paid it directly, or how much the programme cost.[10]
  • State involvement: no official source has attributed the campaign to the Israeli state, which denies any interest in interfering in other countries' elections.[8]

Notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 Alberto Fittarelli, John Scott-Railton and Maia Scott, BlackCore’s Influence Operations for Hire, The Citizen Lab, 17 September 2026.
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 Gabriel Stargardter and Raphael Satter, France probes whether Israeli firm BlackCore interfered in local elections, sources say, Reuters, 13 May 2026 (archived copy).
  3. ↑ 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04 3.05 3.06 3.07 3.08 3.09 3.10 3.11 3.12 3.13 3.14 Dominique Durand, Ingérence lors des municipales contre des candidats LFI : de BlackCore à Tel-Aviv, ce que les enquêtes de Libération et Haaretz révèlent, France 3 Occitanie, 15 May 2026.
  4. ↑ 4.00 4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05 4.06 4.07 4.08 4.09 4.10 4.11 4.12 4.13 4.14 4.15 4.16 4.17 4.18 4.19 4.20 4.21 Omer Benjakob, Revealed: An Anti-left Influence Operation in France Leads to Tel Aviv, Haaretz, 18 May 2026.
  5. ↑ 5.00 5.01 5.02 5.03 5.04 5.05 5.06 5.07 5.08 5.09 5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 5.17 5.18 5.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 VIGINUM (SGDSN), Rapport technique – Rokh Solis (Rokh Solis: technical report), Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, 11 June 2026 (archived copy).
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Meta, Israel-Based Influence Operation Targeting France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Iran, Togo, Gabon, and Angola, facebook/threat-research (GitHub), accessed 3 November 2026.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Pauline Ertel, 'Attack on our democracy': Inside an Israeli influence campaign in France's local elections, Middle East Eye, 3 June 2026.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 Severin Carrell and Angelique Chrisafis, France accuses Israeli firm of interfering in Scottish elections and targeting SNP, The Guardian, 12 June 2026.
  9. ↑ Gabriel Stargardter and Dominique Vidalon, Israeli firm BlackCore also suspected of meddling in NYC, Scotland votes, French official says, Reuters, 11 June 2026 (archived copy).
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.3 Daryna Antoniuk, Israeli contractor BlackCore trained Angolan officials in online influence operations, The Record, 17 September 2026.
  11. ↑ Meta, Adversarial Threat Report, H2 2026, Meta Transparency Center, 27 August 2026, accessed 3 November 2026.
  12. ↑ OpenCorporates, גלקטיקוס בע"מ (GALACTICOS), company no. 516599818 (Israeli Registrar of Companies data).
  13. ↑ VIGINUM (SGDSN), Rapport public – Élections municipales 2026, 11 June 2026 (archived copy).
  14. ↑ RDAP record for galacticos.ai, retrieved 17 October 2026.
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Afik & Co., Article about a diplomacy and business event of the Ibero-American Department at Afik & Co. 08.09.2025, afiklaw.com, 21 September 2025.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 Joe Glenton, BlackCore: Inside an Israeli foreign influence operation, The Canary, 19 May 2026.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 Le Parisien with AFP, Municipales 2026 : une mystérieuse entité israélienne derrière la campagne de dénigrement de candidats LFI, Le Parisien, 15 May 2026.
  18. ↑ OpenCorporates, אס אן איי דיגיטל בע"מ (SNI DIGITAL), company no. 516320363 (Israeli Registrar of Companies data).
  19. ↑ RDAP record for sni.ai, retrieved 17 October 2026.
  20. ↑ Internet Archive capture of sni.ai, 17 February 2024.
  21. ↑ Internet Archive capture of galacticos.ai, 3 March 2025.
  22. ↑ UK Companies House, searches for "electric marinade", "omri systems", "galacticos ai" and "sni digital", retrieved 17 October 2026.
  23. ↑ RDAP record for electric-marinade.com, retrieved 17 October 2026.
  24. ↑ RDAP record for omrisystems.com, retrieved 17 October 2026.
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 Certificate Transparency log search for omrisystems.com subdomains, crt.sh, retrieved 17 October 2026.
  26. ↑ Certificate Transparency log search for galacticos.ai subdomains, crt.sh, retrieved 17 October 2026.
  27. ↑ Internet Archive capture of fb.aoa.modules.galacticos.ai/login ("Login - AOA System"), 21 February 2025.
  28. ↑ Internet Archive capture of fb.aoa.electric-marinade.com/login ("Login - AOA Generator"), 4 April 2025.
  29. ↑ Israeli Firm BlackCore Suspected of Meddling in NYC, Scotland Elections, French Official Says, Haaretz, 11 June 2026.
  30. ↑ OpenCorporates, סיגאון בע"מ (CYGUN), company no. 516559317 (Israeli Registrar of Companies data).
  31. ↑ Cygun, About Yigal Unna, Cygun Ltd (company website).