Food Standards Agency

This article is part of the Foodspin project of Spinwatch.

The UK's Food Standards Agency (FSA) describes itself as 'an independent food safety watchdog set up by an Act of Parliament in 2000 to protect the public's health and consumer interests in relation to food.' In 2002 the FSA produced a two-year update on its activities. 'Our independence is vital if we are to succeed in putting consumers first', read the introduction. Government minister Margaret Beckett reinforces the message that 'the Food Standards Agency... is very much an independent agency and an independent voice in government'.

'Putting consumers first' and 'being independent' are, in fact, listed as 2 of the FSA's 3 'guiding principles'. The Agency also lists as a key aim earning 'people's trust by what we do and how we do it'. This emphasis is unsurprising. The main reason for the establishment of the FSA was the collapse in public trust which occurred during the BSE crisis, when civil servants within the then Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries (MAFF) were widely perceived as putting the interests of producers ahead of those of consumers. The FSA's independence from 'industry interests' is of 'paramount importance', according to the head of the FSA, Sir John Krebs. Krebs was replaced by Deirdre Hutton as Chair of the FSA in July 2005.

Independence undermined

Prof Philip James, who drew up the blueprint for the FSA, told the investigative journalist, Andy Rowell, that there were two key decisions that have tended to undermine the blueprint and the agency's independence. 'When you look at the way the FSA was organised, they managed not to make the staff independent of the civil service which we'd identified as critical for establishing its independence', says James. In addition, 'they appointed senior MAFF staff to the senior echelons of the agency, when I'd made it quite clear from our analysis of previous experience with Health and Safety that you needed to bring in outsiders'. According to Prof James, this then had the knock-on effect of alienating others involved in developing the FSA blueprint who 'suddenly saw the final decisions' being 'controlled by MAFF' and so 'immediately asked for a transfer' out of the agency.

At the same time, Prof James says, those who might have had the breadth of experience to challenge vested interests via the FSA's council and board were deliberately excluded. Anyone who had been prominent in the food debate and 'knew anything about the problems' was, according to James, 'automatically removed from the shortlist' to the council and the board.

Krebs

The FSA's first chief officer was Geoffrey Podger, a full time civil servant and previously career bureaucrat in MAFF and the Department of Health. The FSA's first head, Sir John Krebs, is a leading Fellow of the Royal Society. A member of the Zoology Department at Oxford, his specialty is bird behaviour rather than farming or food safety. However, Sir John had previously assisted MAFF by designing the 'Krebs experiments' to investigate whether badgers are responsible for the increasing incidence of TB in cattle. These controversial experiments lead to the slaughter of 20,000 badgers. As the experimental approach was one already stronghly favoured from within MAFF, some see the 'Krebs experiments' as symptomatic of Krebs' willingness to toe the MAFF line.

Pro-GM

If the experiments had made Krebs controversial prior to his appointment, things have got worse since. On the day it was announced that he was becoming the head of the FSA, he publicly endorsed GM food in interviews, saying all GM products approved for sale in the UK 'were as safe as their non-GM counterparts'. Even prior to his appointment, he was already on record as saying that criticisms of GM food were 'shrill, often ill-informed and dogma-driven'. Some have suggested that his historic support for GM food may have been a factor in his being offered the top job at the FSA.

The FSA takes its advice on GM foods from exactly the same committee, ACNFP, that previously advised government ministers. By accepting this arrangement without question and by holding a position from day one that all approved GM products 'were as safe as their non-GM counterparts', the FSA under Krebs has brought an unquestioning attitude to the status quo. This contrasts notably with Krebs' and the FSA's combative stance on organic food. Interstingly, it is in the context of organic food that Krebs' has asserted the 'paramount importance' of the FSA's independence from 'industry .

But just as worrying as the FSA's attack on organics, in the eyes of many, has been its role in backing the position of the US government and the biotechnology industry in opposing strict EU labelling and traceability rules on GM foods and animal feed. Its position has been condemned by the Consumers' Association who 'remain bitterly disappointed at the anti-consumer stance' taken by the FSA. 'An open and transparent system of labelling, coupled with effective traceability mechanisms, will provide the best basis for consumer choice', said Sue Davies, the Association's Principal Policy Adviser. In contrast to the FSA position, a survey undertaken for the Consumers' Association in the summer of 2002 showed that 94 per cent of consumers think that food containing GM ingredients should be labelled.

The FSA has also been accused of seeking to weaken guidelines on GM at an international level. A report from Dr Michael Hansen of America's Consumers Union, and a Consumers International representative, at the Codex Ad Hoc Working Group on Allergenicity (10-12 September, Vancouver), comments on the role of Nick Tomlinson of the UK Food Standards Agency at the meeting. 'The representative from the UK, Nick Tomlinson, played a key role in producing the weak guidelines, along with Canada and Australia supporting the US. Tomlinson helped to push the notion that the guidelines should be more general in scope (even though the explicit terms of reference called for developing "detailed procedures" (for assessing allergenicity) and never objected to abandoning the decision tree.'

2002 saw the publication of an FSA-commissioned study by researchers at the University of Newcastle to see if GM DNA survived human digestion or transfers to gut bacteria � - possibilities that have been dismissed by the biotech industry in spite of existing evidence to the contrary in rodents. The study found that GM DNA survived in the small intestine but did not survive passage through the colon; however, alarmingly, bacteria in the gut had taken up GM DNA. Research leader Prof Harry Gilbert played down dangers, saying, 'There is some evidence of gene transfer, but it is at an extremely low rate and therefore it probably does not represent a significant risk to human health'. The FSA spun the research into meaning that GM foods are safe, a conclusion disputed by other human geneticists, such as Dr Michael Antoniou of Guy's Hospital, London, who said the results indicated the need for extensive GM food testing.

Other GM-related FSA research has proven equally controversial. A proposed 18-month study aimed at monitoring the health effects of consuming GM foods was dismissed by a leading epidemiologist as 'worthless'. While a professor of food microbiology pointed out, 'It took decades to prove the link between smoking and ill health, and that was fairly obvious. I wouldn't expect them to find anything meaningful in 18 months.' (BBC: GM eating habits study 'worthless')

Public Debate on GM

In March 2003 the FSA again came under criticism over its alleged pro-GM bias during the UK's Public Debate on GM. In particular, debate materials developed by the FSA were widely condemned as biased. In a joint letter to the FSA a number of leading UK organisations, including the National Federation of Women's Institutes and the UK's largest trade union, UNISON, condemned not just the 'biased materials the FSA had created for the debate' but the FSA's complete failure to co-operate with the Government-sponsored GM Public Debate, which was being run by an independent Steering Group set up at arms length from Government in order to minimise bias. 'There is a strong consensus amongst consumer and environment organisations,' the letter said, 'that the published views and statements of the FSA and its Chair are indistinguishable from those of the pro-GM lobby and do not properly represent public health and consumer interests.' (Attack on food safety chief for GM crop ' bias ') Such concerns were dismissed by Sir John in the media and at a FSA Board Meeting on 13th March.

In May the same group of organisations again charged Sir John and the FSA with 'manipulating the GM Debate and misrepresenting the views of the public'. The accusations mirrored those made in a report by the FSA's own Consumers Committee, namely that the FSA produced 'incomplete and therefore biased' materials on GM that 'ignored existing concerns about GM food', and that the FSA failed to consult its own Committee about the GM Debate. Contributors to the Consumers Committee's report , released on the 6th May 2003, included representatives of the Consumers Association and the National Consumers Council.

The FSA also came under attack over the various consultation activities it organised separately from the main debate and without consulting stakeholders or its own Consumers Committee or the debate Steering Group. In particular, it stood accused of 'spinning' the results of these consultations in order to make their conclusions seem more supportive of GM.

For instance, in its press release reporting the various findings of a 'Citizen's Jury' it had organised on GM, it failed to mention, the Jury's key conclusion that: 'More time is needed to understand the long-term environmental implications of GM crops before farmers start to grow them in the UK - growing GM crops in the UK would be irreversible and might eventually reduce choice'. Given that the whole point of the Public Debate was to help the Government decide whether or not to allow commercial growing of GM crops in the UK, the FSA stood accused of concealing 'the most significant finding of its Citizen's Jury - namely that such a decision should be postponed.'

A public letter to Sir John from nine national UK organisations concluded, 'The FSA is clearly guilty of bias and manipulation of the facts on GM issues. As the FSA was established in part to restore consumer confidence in national food policies we wish to know how you intend to redress the situation, represent the real views of consumers and restore the trust of all the consumer and citizen groups that you have now lost on the GM food issue.'

After the conclusion of the Debate, The House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee also seemed less than impressed by the FSA's contribution to the Debate. In a published report on the results of the Committee's investigation into the Conduct of the GM Public Debate, the Committee noted, We would value an explanation from the Food Standards Agency of its decision to undertake a 'public debate' of its own about GM food, why it chose to do so at the time that it did, what was the cost to public funds of its initiative, and how its work relates to the other strands of the public debate. We would also be keen to learn of future plans for the Agency to study public opinion about GM food.' (Paragraph 38)

Spinning Farmed Salmon

According to Spinning Farmed Salmon:

The first major line of attack (on a paper in Scinence titled Global Assessment of Organic Contaminants in Farmed Salmon)was simply to ignore the data and attack the standards against which the data had been evaluated. But in a stunning series of errors the UK government and salmon industry responses fundamentally misinterpreted the science and criticised the paper on grounds which were simply scientifically irrelevant. Scottish Quality Salmon claimed that the authors ‘seem to have misapplied an already suspect risk model developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency’. The director of the UK government’s Food Standards Agency raised the EPA model explicitly. Sir John Krebs wrote a letter to the Guardian arguing that ‘The EPA ... bases its risk assessment on out-of-date science from 1991. The WHO takes into account the mechanism by which dioxins cause cancer. It concluded in 2001, using independent experts, that so long as dioxins were kept below thresholds, there would be no adverse effect upon health.’ In a statement at the time the FSA elaborated on this claiming the EPA approach ‘has been evolving since 1991, but has not been finalised’.

There is indeed an EPA process in progress since April 1991, but it is not the standard used by the authors of the paper. It is however, useful to examine the extent to which the process beginning in 1991 supports the case made by the FSA. . The report ‘Exposure and Human Health Reassessment of 2,3,7,8- Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-Dioxin (TCDD) and Related Compounds’ was revised in 1994 and on subsequent occasions, with the most recent draft being published in December 2003.

According to the FSA, Krebs view was based on a report produced by the UK government Committee on Toxicity. This 2001 report was published under the title COT statement on Dioxins and PCBs. This report does not, however, seem to support the view that the EPA process is based on dated or flawed science. The COT report did take a different view on the EPA approach, but not on the basis that it was outdated.

The COT report notes that ‘The EPA provided an excellent comprehensive review of the literature on developmental and reproductive toxicity, and although some new studies had emerged since it was written these did not have a major impact.’ So, on two counts (the fact that the process was regularly revised and that the most recent version was some two years more up to date than the FSA’s own science) Krebs statement that the process was based on ‘out of date science’ is simply wrong. In fact the EPA process was more up to date (December 2003) than the FSA’s own preferred report (2001).

But more incredibly the FSA approach was not the standard used in the paper in Science. Rather, the consumption advice was based on a different EPA process which assessed a different set of contaminants (PCBs as a whole, toxaphene and dieldrin). Given in note 25 of the paper this is: U.S. EPA, Guidance for Assessing Chemical Contaminant Data for Use in Fish Advisories. Volume 2: Risk Assessment and Fish Consumption Limits (U.S. EPA, Washington, DC, ed. 3, 2000). The Science article said nothing whatever about dioxins in relation to consumption. The researchers specifically excluded dioxins from their conclusions because of the varying regulatory standards. The FSA approach was, therefore, entirely mistaken.

Most critics of the study preferred to ignore the existence of the EPA altogether and claim that the findings were well within health and safety limits. John Webster sometimes described by SQS as their ‘scientific adviser’, ‘stressed that the PCB and dioxin levels found in Scottish salmon were significantly lower than the thresholds set by international watchdogs such as the European Union, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) or even the US FDA.’ This is almost true but entirely irrelevant. It is the level of dioxins and ‘dioxin like PCBs’ that were lower than the WHO and EU standards. This is quite different to PCBs as a whole. In fact, neither the WHO nor the EU has established standards for consumption levels of PCBs as a whole or for toxaphene and Dieldrin. So the SQS approach was entirely irrelevant too.

The erroneous response of the FSA and the salmon industry set the tone for other official agencies in the UK, which explicitly rested on the FSA as lead advisor. Thereafter all official agencies presented a united front downplaying the risk as being inside WHO, EU and FDA guidelines. This was simply false. At best this approach was irresponsible, incompetent and scientifically illiterate. At worst, it was a calculated deception.

FSA officials pro-corporate links

Sir John Krebs has not been alone among the FSA's top officials in attracting criticism. As the Sunday Herald reported in March 2003, 'The credibility and independence of Scotland's food safety watchdog have been thrown into doubt in the wake of accusations that its top official is in favour of genetically modified food and a friend of big business.' The 'top official' was Dr George Paterson, director of the Scottish arm of the FSA and former director general of Health Canada's Food Directorate, the Canadian government's food safety watchdog. Paterson has been linked to major food safety scandals in Canada involving both fast-track approval for a Monsanto GM crop and the overriding of internal government scientists' health warnings on a Monsanto GM product.

Hutton

• Deirdre Hutton the chair of the FSA from July 2005 has strong corporate links including shares in GlaxoSmithKline, Tesco, Unilever, BskyB, and Scottish Radio to a value of approximately £43,500. [2]

Board members corporate links

There have also been concerns about a number of members of the FSA board who have been part of organisations with an avowedly pro-GM agenda. These include:

• Prof Jeya Henry [3], an FSA board member from April 2000 - April 2003, who is on the advisory board of the pro-GM Social Issues Research Centre.
• Prof Andrew Miller[4], an FSA board member from April 2003, who as General Secretary of the Royal Society of Edinburgh took the lead role in seeking to reassure the Scottish Parliament's Health and Community Care Committee over the safety of GM Crop Trials - the Committee were not convinced by his evidence.
• Richard Ayre [5], an FSA board member from September 2001, who is a member of the advisory council of the pro-GM lobby group Sense About Science.
• Vernon Sankey, an FSA board member from September 2001, who is a former Board member of the Grocery Manufacturers of America and a former Council member of the UK's Food and Drink Federation.
• Graham Millar a former vice-Chair of Quality Meat Scotland a meat industry promotional group; with shares in Unilever and Cadbury Schweppes [6];
• Maureeen Edmondson a former Mars executive and an active member of the International Life Sciences Institute, the leading food industry front group) [7];
• Alan Gardner A vice president of the Farmers Union of Wales.[8]
• Nelisha Wickremasinghe

FSA PR agencies

Edelman

In 2003/4 the global PR firm Edelman reported the FSA as a client. Among its other clients in the UK were a list of fast food and pharma companies including:

Aventis Pharma, Burger King International, Merck Sharp & Dohme, Novartis, PepsiCo, Pfizer Health Solutions, Pfizer Consumer Health, Procter & Gamble, Roche Diagnostics, Snack Nut and Crisp Manufacturers Association (SNACMA). The Toy Industries of Europe is also listed as a client which has a direct interest in the FSA's work on advertising to children. These clients raise questions of a potential conflict of interest.

Luther Pendragon

In 2006 the PR firm Luther Pendragon listed the FSA as a client. Also listed are the following media and fast food/alcohol clients which present a potential conflict of interest:

• Bloomberg Television
• BMG
• British Phonographic Industry
• British Video Association
• Broadcasting Policy Group
• Cable & Wireless
• Guinness Ireland Group
• History Channel
• McDonald's
• Telewest
• Warner Bros
• Wrigley

Freshwater UK

In 2008, The FT list the FDA as a client of Freshwater UK