Stewart Menzies
SIS chief with overall wartime responsibility for GC&CS
| Stewart Menzies
| |
|---|---|
| Image | Keith and Stewart Menzies in 1914. Group photograph; photographer unknown. |
| Born | 30 January 1890[1] |
| Died | 29 May 1968[1] |
| Nationality | British[2] |
| Occupation | Army officer; Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1939–1952[3][4] |
| Known for | Overall direction of the Government Code and Cypher School during the Second World War[5] |
| Education | Eton College[2] |
| Predecessor | Hugh Sinclair (as SIS chief)[6] |
| Website | SIS history |
Sir Stewart Menzies (30 January 1890 – 29 May 1968) was head of the Secret Intelligence Service from 1939 to 1952.[1][3][4]
Early life and military career
Menzies was educated at Eton. According to the writer Nigel West, he won the Consort's Prize for French and German there, captained the First XI, was Master of the Eton Beagles and was President of Pop, the Eton Society.[7] Keith Jeffery describes him as 'an Old Etonian cavalryman from a very privileged social background'.[8] He was first commissioned into the Grenadier Guards. After his widowed mother married Colonel Sir George Holford, commanding officer of the Life Guards, he transferred to his stepfather's regiment.[7] He went to France with the regiment in October 1914 and won the DSO near Ypres. The King presented it to him on 2 December 1914. He then won the Military Cross for rallying his regiment near Ypres on 13 May 1915, after his commanding officer had been wounded.[7] Jeffery records that he was gassed, and was then given a security intelligence post at General Headquarters.[8] West dates his posting to Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters at Montreuil to 18 December 1915. He worked there under Brigadier-General John Charteris in MI1(b), the section responsible for 'secret service and security', and never returned to regimental duties.[7]
In November 1918 Menzies married Lady Alice Sackville, daughter of the 8th Earl De La Warr. West writes that they divorced thirteen years later and that the following year he married Pamela Beckett, daughter of the banker Rupert Beckett. His club was White's.[7]
Career
Menzies was Deputy Chief of SIS and became 'C' when Hugh Sinclair died in November 1939.[6] During the war the Chief of SIS was also Director of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park.[9] 'Ultra' intelligence went out to commanders in the field from MI6 through Special Liaison Units.[10]
His time as Chief overlapped with Kim Philby's rise in the service, including Philby's posting as head of the anti-Soviet Section IX.[11]
Joining the Secret Service
By 1918 Menzies was liaison officer between the Directorate of Military Intelligence and Mansfield Cumming's MI1(c). He was paid by the army but worked mainly inside Cumming's organisation. In early 1919 he spent a period in Paris on Basil Thomson's security staff with the British delegation to the peace conference. He then succeeded Claude Dansey as head of the Service's Military Section IV. He moved from the War Office to the SIS payroll on 1 April 1923 and stayed on it for nearly thirty years.[8] In 1922, when the Treasury pressed for budget cuts, he went with Cumming to put the Service's case to the Secret Service Committee.[8]
In April 1969 his former colleague Desmond Morton claimed that Menzies had posted a copy of the Zinoviev Letter to the Daily Mail in 1924. Jeffery says the claim was greeted inside SIS with 'amazement and disbelief'.[12]
Appointment as Chief
When Sinclair died on 4 November 1939, Menzies was his de facto deputy and the obvious internal candidate. But the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Alexander Cadogan, wrote in his diary that he was 'not satisfied that Menzies is the man'.[13] Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed a naval candidate, Captain Gerard Muirhead-Gould, in what Cadogan called a 'tiresome' letter criticising SIS. At a meeting on 28 November attended by the Prime Minister and the three service ministers, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, 'played his hand well and won the trick'. Menzies was appointed, subject to 'some enquiry' into the Service.[13] West names the Chief Whip, David Margesson, and Halifax among his supporters, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, John Godfrey, as the most likely rival candidate.[7]
Second World War
Venlo
In his first weeks as acting Chief, Menzies dealt with the approach to SIS officers in the Netherlands by supposed German opposition figures. According to West, Menzies told Richard Stevens and Sigismund Payne Best to proceed with caution.[7] The two officers were captured at Venlo on 9 November 1939 (the Venlo incident). Jeffery writes that for the rest of the war the experience coloured British opinion, and Menzies's in particular, about responding to apparent German opposition elements.[14]
Signals intelligence and Bletchley Park
Menzies was nominally Director of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). Alastair Denniston had been its operational head since 1919. According to Jeffery, Menzies saw the importance of GC&CS early, gave it resources and let it expand 'with exponential rapidity'. He fought off two bids by the armed services, chiefly the Directorate of Military Intelligence, to take it over, in spring 1941 and in winter 1941–2.[15] In October 1941 four cryptanalysts wrote directly to Churchill about staff shortages, and Churchill ordered that their needs be met with top priority. In February 1942 Menzies brought in reforms. Diplomatic and commercial code-breaking moved to London under Denniston, and Edward Travis took sole charge at Bletchley Park. In February 1944 Travis became Director of GC&CS, with Menzies as Director-General.[15]
John Ferris gives a qualified assessment of Menzies’s management of GC&CS in 1940–41. The cover story that Ultra came from an agent codenamed “Boniface”, and arrangements routing material through the SIS, initially obstructed integration between producers, service interception organisations and intelligence consumers. Ferris nevertheless credits Menzies with using funds outside normal audited channels to finance bombes and expansion at Bletchley Park, avoiding delays that could have followed ordinary procedures.[5]
Ferris places the eventual settlement within a struggle among Menzies, the service intelligence directors and their subordinates, rather than simply a personal displacement of Alastair Denniston. After the Chiefs of Staff Committee intervened in December 1941, William van Cutsem proposed clearer command, closer integration with army interception and traffic analysis, and direct dissemination without the Boniface disguise. Menzies adopted the proposals, while John Godfrey helped establish the new priority for signals intelligence. Ferris argues that the changes of January–March 1942 produced a more effective settlement between GC&CS and service intelligence.[5]
| Responsibility | Holder | Relationship |
|---|---|---|
| Overall direction | Stewart Menzies | Succeeded Hugh Sinclair in 1939; retained direction after the 1942 division of civil and service work.[16] |
| Working head before the division | Alastair Denniston | Managed GC&CS until 1942, under the overall director.[17] |
| Deputy Director (Services) | Edward Travis | Operational head at Bletchley Park from February 1942, reporting to Menzies.[18] |
| Deputy Director (Civil) | Alastair Denniston | Diplomatic and commercial code-breaking in London, 1942–1945.[17] |
Richard J. Aldrich describes Menzies as retaining overall direction after the 1942 division while being an “absentee landlord” in relation to day-to-day administration. These arrangements distinguished the supervisory position from the working heads of the civil and military organisations.[16]
Cadogan recorded one night in November 1942 when Churchill sent Menzies to bed, then telephoned him at 2.15 a.m. with an unnecessary question. His appointment diaries show no breaks longer than the occasional long weekend during the whole war.[15]
The American connection
According to the writer Michael Smith, Menzies played a leading part in building the wartime intelligence alliance with the United States. With Churchill's permission, he agreed in early 1941 that visiting American code-breakers could be shown the work on Enigma. The senior code-breaker John Tiltman had pressed him on the point.[19] In 1940 he sent William Stephenson to New York as his representative. Stephenson set up a personal channel between Menzies and J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI, with the codenames SCOTT and JONES. When William 'Wild Bill' Donovan visited London in the summer of 1940, Menzies and the Director of Naval Intelligence, John Godfrey, went out of their way to persuade him that the United States needed its own equivalent of MI6.[20]
Whitehall rivalries
Menzies saw the Special Operations Executive (SOE) as a rival. In March 1941 he told the Secret Service Committee that the practice of 'SO' (special operations) was frequently 'quite inimical' to that of 'SI' (secret intelligence).[13] In April 1942 the head of MI5, Sir David Petrie, bid to take over SIS's counter-espionage Section V. On 11 May Menzies rejected the proposal in a long and forthright reply.[21] He built a close alliance with Cadogan, and Jeffery credits it with protecting SIS's autonomy and with the assumption that SOE would be only a temporary wartime body.[15]
Post-war Service
Menzies began planning the post-war Service in spring 1945, in response to the Bland Report. He chaired a committee on SIS organisation, whose members included Kim Philby.[22] On Jeffery's account, Menzies's contribution to the Bland discussions had more in common with Cumming than with Sinclair. He insisted that the final report include 'a remarkable manifesto of political neutrality': SIS must never be suspected of serving any particular political creed in Britain.[15] In March 1947 Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, tried to move the Secret Service from the Foreign Office to the Ministry of Defence. Jeffery writes that the attempt came to 'a shuddering halt' against the 'more subtle and feline skills of veteran Whitehall warriors like Menzies'.[22]
In April 1949 William Hayter, head of the Foreign Office's Services Liaison Department, suggested that after ten years it was time for a new Chief. The Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, decided to leave Menzies in post for another year or so. Menzies stayed until July 1952, when Major-General John Sinclair succeeded him.[15] Thomas says Menzies wrote his resignation in green ink on 14 July 1952, aged sixty-two. Thomas attributes the decision to personal reasons after the death of his second wife, Pamela, and his remarriage, rather than the Soviet spy scandals. He says Menzies died in May 1968.[23]
In April 1952 the Foreign Office's head of security, George Carey-Foster, wrote to Menzies proposing that files of unarchived material should be partly registered and partly destroyed. The former MI5 officer Annie Machon writes that these included the most sensitive CX documents on the Zinoviev Letter. Menzies replied that he saw 'no harm whatsoever' in the proposals being carried out. Machon notes that Menzies had long been suspected of leaking the letter.[24]
Philby
Menzies trusted Kim Philby highly. On 15 March 1943 he refused a Foreign Office request from Peter Loxley to transfer Philby. Michael Holzman writes that he 'would remain impressed by, and loyal to, Philby to the end'.[25] After the defection of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in 1951, Menzies told Philby, with much regret, that the Americans would not accept his return to Washington. According to Michael Smith, Menzies felt that Philby's association with Burgess had damned him unfairly.[26]
Assessments
Jeffery calls Menzies 'a great survivor'. From November 1939 to the end of the war SIS had a single Chief, whereas MI5 and SOE each had three.[15] Critics included Hugh Trevor-Roper, who served in SIS during the war. He admired Menzies personally but called him 'a bad judge of men' who chose his advisers from a narrow social circle. The SIS officer John Bruce Lockhart said Menzies 'didn't know much about spying but had a good instinct for Whitehall politics'.[15] His wartime personal assistant Patrick Reilly acknowledged that he had no gift for administration and could not control his feuding chief assistants Dansey and Vivian. Even so, Reilly thought him 'a fundamentally honest man in a position of great potential power'.[15] Jeffery rejects as 'simply preposterous' Trevor-Roper's claim that SIS had been 'an irrelevancy' to the war effort.[15]
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Life story: Stewart Graham Menzies, Lives of the First World War, Imperial War Museums, accessed 20 October 2026.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 John Ferris, Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency, London: Bloomsbury, 2020, chapter 7, “Cheltenham: GCHQ, Britain and Whitehall, 1945–92”, section “The Directors”.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, Touchstone, 2002, p.4.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, Touchstone, 2002, p.494.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 John Ferris, Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain’s Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency, London: Bloomsbury, 2020, chapter 5, “Bletchley”, sections “The Struggle for Sigint” and “A Crisis in Comint”.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Government Communications Headquarters, Denniston’s support for a culture of individualism and ingenuity, 29 August 2017, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 Nigel West, MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 1909–1945, Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2019 (first published 1983), ch. 6.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949, London: Bloomsbury, 2010, ch. 5.
- ↑ E184 – The SIS at Bletchley Park, Bletchley Park Trust.
- ↑ The Path of a Message 4 – Dissemination, Bletchley Park Trust.
- ↑ Richard Norton-Taylor, How Kim Philby infiltrated MI6, with a lot of help from his friends, guardian.co.uk, 27 September 2012.
- ↑ Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949, London: Bloomsbury, 2010, ch. 7.
- ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949, London: Bloomsbury, 2010, ch. 10.
- ↑ Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949, London: Bloomsbury, 2010, ch. 11.
- ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949, London: Bloomsbury, 2010, ch. 22.
- ↑ 16.0 16.1 Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, London: William Collins, revised electronic edition, 2019 (first published 2010), chapter 1, “Schooldays”.
- ↑ 17.0 17.1 Government Communications Headquarters, Alastair Denniston, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Government Communications Headquarters, Edward Travis, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Michael Smith, The Real Special Relationship, New York: Arcade Publishing, 2023, ch. 1.
- ↑ Michael Smith, The Real Special Relationship, New York: Arcade Publishing, 2023, ch. 3.
- ↑ Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949, London: Bloomsbury, 2010, ch. 14.
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949, London: Bloomsbury, 2010, ch. 19.
- ↑ Gordon Thomas, Inside British Intelligence, London: JR Books, 2009, ch. 7.
- ↑ Annie Machon, Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers: MI5, MI6 and the Shayler Affair, Lewes: The Book Guild, 2005, pp. 267–268.
- ↑ Michael Holzman, Spies and Traitors: Kim Philby, James Angleton and the Friendship and Betrayal that Would Shape MI6, the CIA and the Cold War, New York: Pegasus Books, 2021, p. 81.
- ↑ Michael Smith, The Real Special Relationship, New York: Arcade Publishing, 2023, ch. 7.