Matthew Collins

British intelligence officer and national security official

Matthew Collins
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Occupation	Intelligence officer, national security official, Deputy National Security Adviser, Cabinet Office
Known for	former head of Prevent and RICU
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Matthew Collins is a British intelligence officer and national security official. He has served in senior roles within the UK's national security apparatus, including as Executive Director for National Security (DNSA) under multiple Prime Ministers. The Telegraph notably dubbed him a "street fighter" civil servant, highlighting his reputation as an operationally aggressive and highly effective official. Former colleagues quoted in The Times profile of Matthew Collins described him as a "doer not decider". This meant he was highly regarded for executing complex government operations, but was historically not the overarching political decision-maker.

Career

Matthew Collins is a senior UK civil servant with extensive experience in counter-terrorism and national security. He held roles in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in which he served as Director of Prevent and the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) around 2016 (SCS2 level).

Early career (to mid-2010s)

Collins worked as Operational Lead in Counter-Terrorism and Digital Security. He spearheaded efforts to remove terrorist propaganda from online platforms, pioneering public-private partnerships to dismantle Daesh/ISIS content. For these contributions he was awarded a CBE.

Late 2010s to 2022

Senior Director on tech-driven security and public-private partnerships, deploying automated systems to intercept hostile content in collaboration with organisations like Faculty.

Collins career timeline

Period	Role	Organisation	Details
Pre-2016	Operational Lead Counter-Terrorism & Digital Security	Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)	Led anti-propaganda initiatives against Daesh.
c. 2016	Director of Prevent and RICU	OSCT, Home Office	Senior role (SCS2) overseeing counter-extremism.
Late 2010s–2022	Senior Director Tech Partnerships	UK Government	Public-private AI for content moderation.
2022–Present	Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) Intelligence, Defence & Security	National Security Secretariat (Cabinet Office)	Senior role under multiple Prime Ministers.

Testimony on career trajectory and NSS role

In oral evidence to Parliament in 2025, Matthew Collins described his career trajectory, noting he was recruited into senior national security roles by former National Security Adviser Mark Sedwill.

On the role and function of the National Security Secretariat (NSS):

"The NSS supports the National Security Council and the Prime Minister on national security matters. We coordinate across government to ensure a joined-up approach to threats."

Collins referenced collaboration with colleagues including Dame Barbara Woodward and emphasised the NSS's function in providing strategic advice and ensuring coherence in intelligence, defence and security policy.

Involvement in Chinese spy case

In 2025, Matthew Collins, as Deputy National Security Adviser, was identified as the key civil servant whose decisions and delayed witness statement contributed to the collapse of a high-profile prosecution against two men accused of spying for China. The case collapse led to scrutiny of government handling of sensitive intelligence in prosecutions. Prosecutors said they had waited over 14 months for a statement from Collins regarding the national security threat posed by the suspects. The case, which involved allegations of espionage against the UK, collapsed amid controversy over government handling of sensitive intelligence in legal proceedings.

Collins' witness statement (Statement 1) addressed the government's position on the case. The collapse led to questions about coordination between the Crown Prosecution Service, intelligence agencies, and senior officials under the Starmer government.

Involvement in Chinese spy case

In April 2024, the Crown Prosecution Service authorised charges against Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry under section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act 1911 relating to activities between December 2021 and February 2023 which were uncovered, in conjunction with Counter-Terrorism Policing, by MI5 detection and disruption. The case against Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry was supported by three witness statements from the Deputy National Security Adviser, Matthew Collins, which included the Government's assessment of the threat of espionage by the Chinese state. On 15 September 2025, the Crown Prosecution Service dropped the charges.

On 16 October 2025, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament announced that it would investigate issues relating to the discontinuation of the prosecution, focusing on the use of classified material in relation to the case. The Committee received the initial intelligence background in November 2025, commissioned further written evidence and took oral evidence from the Intelligence Community, including the National Security Adviser and Deputy National Security Adviser. This included information about a 1 September 2025 meeting of senior officials chaired by the National Security Adviser. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office refused the Committee's request for the minutes of a 28 August 2025 meeting.

The Committee concluded that the choice of Matthew Collins as the Government witness was the wrong choice. The Deputy National Security Adviser agreed to be a witness despite other options having been discussed with lawyers and senior members of MI5 and the Homeland Security Group. Matthew Collins had been clear that he would need to speak to Government policy at the time of the case and, as a result, would not be able to state that China was an active and ongoing threat to UK national security since that was not then the Government position. The Committee stated that the Government case should nevertheless have been able to state that intelligence reports demonstrate that China poses a threat to the UK’s security — a threat that the Committee has repeatedly sought to highlight. If the Deputy National Security Adviser was unable to say this, then MI5 should have.

MI5 told the Committee that the decision of who should have been the witness was for Counter-Terrorism Policing and the Crown Prosecution Service. In the Committee’s opinion, MI5 should have pushed, through lawyers and seniors, for a witness that could have seen the case to trial. MI5’s further argument was that the Deputy National Security Adviser was the correct choice for Government witness on the same basis as in a separate case known as the “Roussev” case. The Committee found that this showed a lack of understanding of the situation, as the “Roussev” case centred around activities on behalf of the Russian state, where Government policy was that Russia was an active threat to the UK. The Committee could not understand how the Senior Civil Servants involved — the Deputy National Security Adviser, Deputy Director General MI5 and Director General Homeland Security, and their associated lawyers — relied on a precedent which clearly did not match the circumstances before them. The Committee was unimpressed that the Government was not more proactive in ensuring that it fielded a witness who could state that China did pose a threat to the UK’s national security.

Given that the statements provided by the Deputy National Security Adviser were unable to express the balance — that China can represent both an economic opportunity for the UK whilst also being a security risk — the Committee questioned why a second witness could not have been provided in addition to Matthew Collins so as to provide that second, critical element. The Committee was not convinced by the Intelligence Community and Crown Prosecution Service argument that a second witness would have undermined the Deputy National Security Adviser’s original statement. The Committee also noted that there was no strategic coordination of the Government’s approach to the case, which might have enabled those involved to take a more holistic approach and spot these obvious gaps.

In the broader context, the Committee reiterated that China is a strategic threat and that the fundamental problem was that the prosecution was being brought under antiquated legislation. The Committee had been calling for reform of the Official Secrets Act 1911 since its 2020 Russia Report and described the delay in modernising the legislation as “unconscionable” in its 2023 China Report. That delay was a substantial reason as to why the Government were unable to take this case to trial. The legislation has now been reformed in the form of the National Security Act 2023, which was used effectively in May 2026 when two men were convicted for illegally gathering information for the benefit of China. However, the Official Secrets Act 1989 remains in place and requires urgent modernisation.