HN76

This article is part of the Undercover Research Portal at Powerbase - investigating corporate and police spying on activists

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Part of a series on undercover police officers
'HN76'
Alias:	unknown
Deployment:	'last years of SDS'
Unit:	Special Demonstration Squad
Targets:	one group, unknown

HN76 is the cipher given to a former undercover officer with the Special Demonstration Squad who was deployed in the 'last years of the SDS' into one group and reporting on others. The Chair of the Undercover Policing Inquiry, Sir John Mitting, has restrict publishing the real and cover names, as HN76 is a serving police officer 'engaged in sensitive duties', so it would not be in the public interest to 'put performance of those duties at risk'.

• For details of the N-numbers cipher system see the N officers page.

As a SDS undercover

According to the risk assessment:

N76 had an informal interview with another UCO and a later formal interview with others. N76 undertook a psychometric test, a meeting with a psychiatrist and a further informal interview with a former SOS UCO. N76 was recommended for the SOS. N76 spent time after selection but before deployment building his legend and training. N76 received a home visit from three other UCOs.

N76 states that anonymity was clearly inferred and there was a culture of secrecy. N76 states that there was a guarantee of anonymity because there were discussions about keeping N76 safe post-deployment

It goes on to say of his time undercover:

There were positive assessments of N76's deployment throughout. N76 received praise. N76's intelligence reports were considered of a high quality, and of benefit. There is recognition of the potentially serious ramifications of N76's deployment. N76 provided significant quantities of reporting upon N76's target group(s). No security concerns arose during N76's deployment. N76 states that the concept of sexual relationships was covered during an SOS meeting, and it was clear that UCO's would not be allowed to continue on the SOS if they were involved in such relationships. N76 states they did not have any inappropriate relationships. There is no evidence to suggest the contrary. N76 was not arrested during their deployment. There were prominent successes during N76's deployment. N76 had a number of visits during their deployment with a mental health professional as part of N76's support and welfare. N76 had twice weekly meetings with managers and other UCOs. N76 also had monthly meetings with their manager. N76 received multiple commendations and various letters of thanks.

Of the group(s) targeted, the risk assessor says:

Some members of the group(s) infiltrated were known for violence, demonstrations, fundraising, intimidation, leafleting, recruiting, pickets and assaulting/verbally abusing police.

The risk of physical harm if real name disclosed is considered high, but lower scores if only cover names released.

Additional material released by the Inquiry:

• There were positive assessments of HN76’s deployment, and HN76 received praise for setting high standards and a professional approach. HN76’s intelligence reports were considered to be of a high quality, and of benefit. HN76 provided significant quantities of reporting upon HN76’s target group(s). However, a review of SDS operations in the last years of existence of the SDS was highly critical of SDS UCOs, including HN76 who was criticised for lacking communication skills and being unwilling to answer the author’s questions. There is recognition of the potentially serious ramifications of HN76’s deployment.
• HN76 received multiple commendations, the majority of which do not relate to undercover work. HN76 also received letters of thanks in connection with his/her work as a UCO.

In the Undercover Policing Inquiry

• 19 April 2018: directed to file any anonymity application by 24/27 April 2018.

• 23 March 2018: application to restrict real and cover name made by Metropolitan Police.

• 23 May 2018: Mitting indicates he is minded to restrict real and cover names.>

• 9 July 2018: provisional ruling to restrict both real and cover names, with some application material released.

• Open application, 23 March 2018.
• Open risk assessment, 14 June 2018 (David Reid).
• Additional information to be read further to the gisted risk assessment for HN76
• Inquiry's gist of additional information from HN76’s application - which simply wrote: 'A letter in support of this officer’s application was supplied. It was dated 26/3/18 from a senior officer confirming the importance of HN76’s current sensitive duties.'

It was also directed that any objections to Mitting's intention to grant the restriction order to be made by 20 July 2018.

• 30 July 2018: final ruling that real and cover name cannot be published.

It is submitted that HN76 is a potentially significant officer in respect of whom it is important for the Inquiry to get at the truth. I agree. If it is submitted that the review of SDS operations in the last years of its existence, which was highly critical of undercover officers and specifically criticised HN76 for lacking communication skills and being unwilling to answer the author's questions requires that the real or cover name of HN76 is published, I disagree.