HN91

This article is part of the Undercover Research Portal at Powerbase - investigating corporate and police spying on activists

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Part of a series on undercover police officers
'HN91'
Alias:	unknown
Deployment:	short period in 'last period' of the SDS
Unit:	Special Demonstration Squad
Targets:	two groups, unknown

HN91 is the cipher given to a former undercover officer with the Special Demonstration Squad who was deployed against two groups in the 'last period of existence of the SDS'.

The Chair of the Undercover Policing Inquiry, John Mitting, has ruled the Inquiry restrict both real and cover names of HN91 on the basis that they are currently serving in a 'valuable and sensitive role'.

• For the N cipher system see N officers page.

As an SDS undercover officer

Joined police in early 1990s and into Special Branch in late 1990s. Late 1990s / early 2000s joined the SDS. Spent several months to build their legend.

From risk assessment:

• On recruitment: N91 was first approached and then signposted towards other field officers to find out more about the unit.
• 'N91 was not explicitly promised anonymity. However it was explained to N91 that the SDS operated under conditions of absolute secrecy and they would be expected to maintain their anonymity. Nothing was put in writing for N91 but they say that it was made clear that this was a reciprocal arrangement.'
• No arrests during deployment.
• 'The risk assessor notes that N91 felt they had good support from some other UCO operatives. N91 also states that they had visits with a psychiatrist during their time in deployment.'

Claims that a number of people associated with the group they targeted were violent, and are likely to still be. They state that if the inquiry revealed either cover or real name, they are likely to move abroad. They went on to say (in their personal statement):

I would never have become a UCO if I had been told that my anonymity would not be protected for life. I have always been discrete about my work and expected that this would operate both ways. I never engaged in any criminal acts while deployed and I did not have a relationship with any activists. After my relationship with my first partner ended, I started a new relationship towards the end of my deployment with my current partner, who was not involved in any activism or campaigning. For the first few months of this relationship, my current partner knew me by my cover name but I then told him/her that I was in fact a UCO and we have remained together since then. I did not have any other relationships while deployed.

Risk assessor believes impact of revealing HN91's cover name is low to medium, and real name is medium to high.

In the Undercover Policing Inquiry

• 19 April 2018: directed that applications for HN91 were to be filed by 24 April 2018 by MPS legal team, or 27 April for the Designated Lawyers team.

• 23 May 2018: awaiting further information required to make a decision.

• 21 June 2018: Application over real and cover name made which the Chair of the Inquiry, John Mitting, is minded to grant. Open material to be published in due course to allowing responses to Mitting's position. In his 'Minded To' note, Mitting wrote:

HN91 was deployed against two groups in the last period of existence of the Special Demonstration Squad. None of the members of the target groups posed or pose a threat to the safety of HN91. But for the factor referred to below, I would not have made a restriction order in respect of the cover name. Evidence about the deployments must be received to permit the Inquiry to fulfil its terms of reference. Some, at least, of it will have to be given in closed session.

HN91 is a serving police officer, performing a valuable and sensitive role. If the cover name were to be published, there is a high risk that the real identity would be disclosed, in which event, HN91 could not continue to perform current duties. The risk of disclosure, by itself, would be likely to lead senior officers to transfer HN91 to other duties. It would not be in the public interest that this should occur. That interest outweighs the interests of the Inquiry in receiving public evidence about all aspects of the deployments of HN91.

Publication of the real name of HN91 is, in any event, not required to permit the Inquiry to fulfil its terms of reference.

There was also a closed note accompanying this.

• 9 July 2018: provisional decision to restrict real and cover names with the open application material also being published.

• Open application for a restriction order (anonymity) re: HN91, Metropolitan Police, 23 Apr 2018 - over both real and cover names.
• N91 - Risk Assessment, 21 June 2018 (Duncan Hodge).
• Impact Statement, 25 April 2018.

It was also directed that any objections to Mitting's intention to grant the restriction order to be made by 20 July 2018.

• 30 July 2018: final ruling that real and cover name cannot be published, with Mitting writing:.

It is submitted that I should not accept HN91 's "untested" assertion that during the deployment HN91 entered into one relationship in the cover identity (only) "albeit not, he says, with a protester". It is submitted that I "should not unquestioningly accept HN91 's account". I do not intend to do so. If appropriate, I can and will ask for the account of the officer's relationship to be confirmed by the person identified - the officer's long-term partner. It is also submitted that I have attached undue importance to the countervailing factor of the officer's current deployment. That is a matter of judgement for me. I stand by the judgement expressed in paragraph 13 of 'Minded to' note 11 and in the accompanying closed note.