Difference between revisions of "Northern Ireland Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee"

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===IPCC Meeting 11 September 1974, Stormont Castle===
 
===IPCC Meeting 11 September 1974, Stormont Castle===
*Present: Mr [[Michael Cudlipp|M Cudlipp]] NIO Chairman | Brigadier [[HEML Garrett]] HQNI | Mr [[Peter Broderick|P Broderick]] HQNI Information | Mr [[James Allan|J N Allan]] NIO | Mr [[David Gilliland|D Gilliland]] NIO Information Belfast | Mr [[B M Webster]] NIO | Mr [[Fred Corbett|F Corbett]] Central Secretariat Information | Mr [[Robert Ramsay|R Ramsay]] Central Secretariat | Mr [[S Andrews]] NIO Information London | Mr [[D Revolta]] NIO (Secretariat)
+
*Present: Mr [[Michael Cudlipp|M Cudlipp]] NIO Chairman | Brigadier [[HEML Garrett]] HQNI | Mr [[Peter Broderick|P Broderick]] HQNI Information | Mr [[James Allan|J N Allan]] NIO | Mr [[David Gilliland|D Gilliland]] NIO Information Belfast | Mr [[Brian Webster|B M Webster]] NIO | Mr [[Fred Corbett|F Corbett]] Central Secretariat Information | Mr [[Robert Ramsay|R Ramsay]] Central Secretariat | Mr [[S Andrews]] NIO Information London | Mr [[D Revolta]] NIO (Secretariat)
  
 
This meeting decided against appointing a special coordinator of information on public opinion. It was agreed that 'Army IP paper (IRA Annex)' would be considered by a subcommittee of information officers, who would report on its feasibility. As some numbered points are missing from the report of the meeting in National Archives file CJ 4/887 it is possible other conclusions have been redacted.<ref>Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee: Second Meeting, 11 September 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.</ref>  
 
This meeting decided against appointing a special coordinator of information on public opinion. It was agreed that 'Army IP paper (IRA Annex)' would be considered by a subcommittee of information officers, who would report on its feasibility. As some numbered points are missing from the report of the meeting in National Archives file CJ 4/887 it is possible other conclusions have been redacted.<ref>Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee: Second Meeting, 11 September 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.</ref>  
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It was also recorded that "Brigadier Campbell thought that some use could be made of material from intelligence sources as dirty propaganda."<ref>Note of IPCC Meeting held in Stormont Castle on 2 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref> it was agreed that the NIO would write down their ideas on ceasefire strategy for the next meeting.<ref>Note of IPCC Meeting held in Stormont Castle on 2 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
 
It was also recorded that "Brigadier Campbell thought that some use could be made of material from intelligence sources as dirty propaganda."<ref>Note of IPCC Meeting held in Stormont Castle on 2 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref> it was agreed that the NIO would write down their ideas on ceasefire strategy for the next meeting.<ref>Note of IPCC Meeting held in Stormont Castle on 2 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
  
===Cudlipp meeting with the GOC,1 April 1975===
+
===Cudlipp meeting with the GOC, 1 April 1975===
On 1 April 1975, Cudlipp met with the [[General Officer Commanding, Northern Ireland]]. In a report on the meeting to Sir [[Frank Cooper]], Cudlipp stated:
+
On 1 April 1975, Cudlipp met with the [[General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland]]. In a report on the meeting to Sir [[Frank Cooper]], Cudlipp stated:
 
::IP: The GOC admits frankly his concern here arises from the fact that we now have effective control of his PR Department. All sensitive issues are referred to Stormont Castle.<ref>Meeting with the GOC, Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, 4 April 1975.  National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
 
::IP: The GOC admits frankly his concern here arises from the fact that we now have effective control of his PR Department. All sensitive issues are referred to Stormont Castle.<ref>Meeting with the GOC, Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, 4 April 1975.  National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
  
He went on to report that the ceasefire believed the approach to propaganda was too cautious:
+
He went on to report that the GOC believed the approach to propaganda was too cautious:
 
::He believes strongly that we do not retaliate sufficiently against the Provisional's propaganda and suggests more use should be made of Army intelligence reports (community relations reports?) that come into Mr Payne's Department to provide regular briefing material. Is this a sound idea? Should an intelligence brief be produced for NIO information officers?<ref>Meeting with the GOC, Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, 4 April 1975.  National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
 
::He believes strongly that we do not retaliate sufficiently against the Provisional's propaganda and suggests more use should be made of Army intelligence reports (community relations reports?) that come into Mr Payne's Department to provide regular briefing material. Is this a sound idea? Should an intelligence brief be produced for NIO information officers?<ref>Meeting with the GOC, Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, 4 April 1975.  National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
  
 
===Foreign Office Meeting, 3 April 1975===
 
===Foreign Office Meeting, 3 April 1975===
*Present: [[P R Metcalfe]] (CIPD, FCO) in the chair | [[G W Harding]] (RID, FCO) | J D N Hartland-Swann | (RID, FCO) | [[T C Barker]] | [[I Knight Smith]] (IRD, FCO) | [[AGL Turner]] (CIPD, FCO) | Michael Cudlipp (NIO) | [[J Seaman]] (NIO) | [[J D Groves]] (MOD) | Major [[C J Winand]] (MOD) | Mr [[D F Kerr]] (MOD) | Mr [[G Holt]]
+
*Present: [[P R Metcalfe]] (CIPD, FCO) in the chair | [[William Harding|G W Harding]] (RID, FCO) | [[Julian Hartland-Swann|J D N Hartland-Swann]] | (RID, FCO) | [[Thomas Christopher Barker|T C Barker]] | [[Ian Knight-Smith|I Knight Smith]] (IRD, FCO) | [[AGL Turner]] (CIPD, FCO) | [[Michael Cudlipp]] (NIO) | [[Richard Seaman|R J Seaman]] (NIO) | [[John Groves|J D Groves]] (MOD) | Major [[C J Winand]] (MOD) | Mr [[D F Kerr]] (COI) | Mr [[G Holt]] (COI).<ref>Northern Ireland: Overseas Information Activities, 11 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
 +
 
 +
Members of the IPCC were among the NIO officials who took part in a meeting at the Foreign Office on 3 April 1975. Among the conclusions reached it was agreed that:
 +
::The FCO ([[Information Research Department]]) would keep under review the production of unattributable material and briefing on "fund-raising".<ref>Northern Ireland: Overseas Information Activities, 11 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
  
 
===IPCC Meeting, 7 April 1975, Stormont Castle===
 
===IPCC Meeting, 7 April 1975, Stormont Castle===
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===IPPC Subcommmittee meeting, 15 April 1975===
 
===IPPC Subcommmittee meeting, 15 April 1975===
Messrs Webster Cudlipp and Gilliland met the Army and Police on 15 April 1975 to discuss a draft information policy paper. It was favourably received with the proviso that the RUC sought to emphasise their sovereignty vis-a-vis the NIO.
+
*Present Mrr [[Michael Cudlipp|Cudlipp]] NIO | Mr [[Kenneth Newman|Newman]] RUC | Brigadier Campbell HQNI | Mr Gilliland NIO | Mr McDine HQNI | Mr Webster NIO | Mr McGookin RUC | Lt Col [[Jeremy Railton|Railton]] | Mr [[T J Oyler|Oyler]]<ref>Note of a Meeting of the IPCC Subcommittee held at HQNI on 15 April 1975, T.J. Oyler, 22 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
 +
Messrs Webster Cudlipp and Gilliland met the Army and Police on 15 April 1975 to discuss a draft information policy paper. It was favourably received with the proviso that the RUC sought to emphasise their sovereignty vis-a-vis the NIO.<ref>Draft information Policy Paper, Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, 16 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
  
 
Paragraph 4 of the draft paper stated:
 
Paragraph 4 of the draft paper stated:
 
::There is also the question of an aggressive information policy attacking and denigrating extremist organisations. This can only be effective in the right political climate; a climate which is always difficult to discern (see Para 6 below) and which certainly does not exist now.<ref>Draft Information Policy Paper. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
 
::There is also the question of an aggressive information policy attacking and denigrating extremist organisations. This can only be effective in the right political climate; a climate which is always difficult to discern (see Para 6 below) and which certainly does not exist now.<ref>Draft Information Policy Paper. National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
 +
 +
===Army Comment on Draft Information Policy Paper, 2 May 1975===
 +
Brigadier Campbell wrote to Cudlipp on 2 May 1975 with the Army's comments on the draft paper. This included the following paragraph:
 +
 +
::b. The Denigration of Extremist Organisations. I am afraid we find your para 4 rather confusing. Until extremist organisations can be divorced from their grassroots support, we will never achieve the sort of political climate you seem to describe. Your suggestion, therefore, takes us round in a circle. Obviously, in the present climate, any aggressive information policy would need to be very carefully handled but I do not see that it needs to be ruled out. There is no reason at all why a skilful policy could not be effective even in the present climate. Obviously a general information attack on extremist organisations would be unlikely to succeed but in those areas where it can be shown that fringe elements (their connection with an established para-military organisation would not be claimed) are acting outside the law and against the interests of the community, it would seem possible to direct some most useful publicity. The Mafia/Chicago style extortion and protection rackets at present being operated in the Shankill and Andersonstown are examples.<ref>Peter Campbell to M Cudlipp, Draft Information Policy Paper, 2 May 1975.  National Archives file CJ4/887.</ref>
  
 
==External resources==
 
==External resources==

Latest revision as of 15:09, 16 February 2015

The Northern Ireland Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee (IPCC) was formed in 1974 to establish a uniform approach to news and policy guidance among senior representatives and chief information officers of the Northern Ireland Office, the then Northern Ireland Executive, the Army, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.[1]

It was partly intended to rein in Army information policy activities.[2]

Prior to the formation of the IPCC there existed a Joint Information Policy Committee which appeared to consist primarily of information officers.[3]

History

IPCC Meeting 27 August 1974, Stormont Castle

The meeting concluded that it would concern itself with information policy in a strategic context, and would promote and co-ordinate a positive public relations policy. Meetings would not normally be minuted. Mr Broderick was tasked to produce a paper on 'the Army view of a positive Public Relations Policy for the Province' ahead of the next meeting.[5]

Army Information Policy Paper, 6 September 1974

On 6 September 1974, Broderick circulated a paper entitled 'Information Policy: Its use in Northern Ireland.[6] This called for 'a strong, determined psychological operation' under the cover name 'information policy'. It recommended the appointment of a Belfast-based Co-ordinator of Information Policy, the creation of an IP Policy Committee, and the confirmation of the Joint IP Executive Committee, (this last perhaps a reference to the Joint Information Policy Committee).[7] The latter two recommendations appear to have been carried out within the IPCC structure.

Broderick also circulated an annexe entitled 'The Undermining of the IRA's will to fight'.[8] This called for 'the strongest possible personal attacks and smear campaigns on members of the leadership and middle management with a view to separating the leadership from their followers.'[9] It went on to argue that no 'information policy campaign will have a chance of succeeding unless certain political decisions are taken by Government and publicised'. Convincing the public that there would be no amnesty for special category prisoners was seen as central to this.[10]

IPCC Meeting 11 September 1974, Stormont Castle

This meeting decided against appointing a special coordinator of information on public opinion. It was agreed that 'Army IP paper (IRA Annex)' would be considered by a subcommittee of information officers, who would report on its feasibility. As some numbered points are missing from the report of the meeting in National Archives file CJ 4/887 it is possible other conclusions have been redacted.[11]

A letter from BN Webster to David Gilliland suggests that the meeting also concluded that a subcommittee of Gilliland, Webster, Broderick and McGookin should examine Broderick's paper as a whole in order to devise proposals to put to ministers.[12]

Subcommittee Meeting on Army Information Policy paper Annexe "A", 13 September 1974

A Subcommittee chaired by David Gilliland did not accept that an information policy campaign had no chance of succeeding 'unless certain political decisions are taken', but agreed that it should be clear that there would be no amnesty for special category prisoners. It also accepted that the paper set out the necessary groundwork, if the full committee 'agree that the time is right for an all-out assault on the IRA on the propaganda front'.[13]

Subcommittee Meeting on Army Information Policy paper, 24 September 1974

A subcommittee chaired by David Gilliland met on 24 September 1974 to consider Broderick's paper 'Information Policy: Its Use in Northern Ireland'.[14] It's report concluded:

The Sub-Committee accepted the hypothesis put forward in the paper and in the main the exposition of the nature of "Psyops". It was emphatic, as is the Paper itself, that in such operations credibility is of the essence. It therefore accepts the "armoury" listed at para 8 but recommends the deletion of (g) and (k).[15]
It would not be the Committee's view that in a submission to Ministers an exposition of this nature or length should be included, nor would it be anxious to have the word "psyops" as from now freely used either internally or externally. The term information policy is considered to be less emotive.[16]

The report concluded that with the existence of the IPCC the committee structures envisaged were already in existence. It suggested that information policy should focus on supporting the Government's proposals for political development, and suggested a campaign of professionally organised market research.[17]

IPCC Meeting, 22 October 1974

A meeting on 22 October 1974 produced a redrafted version of 'Information Policy: Its Use in Northern Ireland' for submission to the Northern Ireland Secretary. In the new draft, reference to 'at the extreme - front organisations, peace festivals, rumour, etc,' was replaced with 'The creation of independent organisations which will support moderate policies, peace festivals and other uncommitted groupings.'[18]

The new draft envisaged the following membership of the IPCC: Brigadier HEML Garrett, HQNI | D McDine HQNI | Dept CC K Newman, RUC HQ | Mr W McGookin RUC HQ | Mr R J Seaman NIO London | Mr J Allan Laneside | Mr D Gilliland NIO | Mr T M Roberts (Central Sec) | Mr R Ramsay | Mr B M Webster NIO D/D House | Mr W Adler NIO D/D House | Mr D Wyatt Liaison Staff | Mr M Cudlipp (Chairman).[19]

IPCC Meeting, 25 November 1974

This meeting included a lengthy discussion of the paper on 'The Undermining of the IRA's Will to Fight'.[20]

Cudlipp's report on Meeting the Northern Ireland Secretary, 13 December 1974

Michael Cudlipp reported in a draft minute of 13 December 1974 on two meetings with the Northern Ireland Secretary, who was said to have approved the IPCC paper on a coordinated information campaign, and to have agreed with point 3a of an earlier minute by Cudlipp which called for 'an attacking and expanded information policy campaign'.

he agrees with point 3a but emphasises there must be no attempts at "black propaganda" without Ministerial authority. He is extremely concerned at the blowback effect of such methods. He emphasised however that this did not mean he was not greatly in favour of a vigorous and attacking information policy and indeed he is anxious that we should be far more on the attack than on the defence.[21]

IPCC Meeting, 27 January 1975

An IPCC meeting held on 27 January 1975 decided to submit the paper on undermining the IRA's will to fight to the Northern Ireland Secretary, emphasizing that it was a contingency measure in event of the breakdown of the ceasefire. It was also suggested that in this uncertain situation, the committee should focus on IRA propaganda in America.[22]

IPCC Meeting, 3 February 1975

At a meeting on 3 February 1975, it was reported that the paper on 'Undermining the IRA' had gone to the the Permanent Under Secretary of the NIO. The main subject of discussion was a paper on 'Propaganda Overseas' by Mr Roberts, and it was agreed that a meeting would be sought with FCO officials.[23]

Cudlipp-Cooper letter, 24 March 1975

In a letter to Sir Frank Cooper reviewing the activities of the Committee, Michael Cudlipp stated:

The point of the Committee was partly co-ordination of public relations effort and partly cosmetic, particularly in relation to the Army who had rather wild ideas of IP, insufficiently thought through in professional and political term.

He went on to add:

I understand the Army has again begun to get itchy feet about their version of IP and this is reflected in the latest manual you sent me...

Cudlipp suggested a regular meeting between himself P.T.E. England and John Bourn 'while the current Army situation lasts'. An annotation of the file by England suggested that he agreed with Cudlipp's assessment.[24]

IPCC Meeting, 2 April 1975, Stormont Castle

  • present: Mr Cudlipp NIO | Mr Roberts (NIO) | Mr Gilliland (NIO) | Mr Webster (NIO) | Mr Montgomery (Central Secretariat) | Mr Newman (RUC) | Brigadier Campbell HQNI | Mr McDine HQNI | Mr Hill (NIO).[25]

The Committee discussed the problem of information policy during the ceasefire:

Brigadier Campbell commented that the reports made every day by COs in Northern Ireland contained useful factual information of which more use could be made. Was it Government policy at present to lie low.
Mr Cudlipp replied that this was the case.[26]

It was also recorded that "Brigadier Campbell thought that some use could be made of material from intelligence sources as dirty propaganda."[27] it was agreed that the NIO would write down their ideas on ceasefire strategy for the next meeting.[28]

Cudlipp meeting with the GOC, 1 April 1975

On 1 April 1975, Cudlipp met with the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland. In a report on the meeting to Sir Frank Cooper, Cudlipp stated:

IP: The GOC admits frankly his concern here arises from the fact that we now have effective control of his PR Department. All sensitive issues are referred to Stormont Castle.[29]

He went on to report that the GOC believed the approach to propaganda was too cautious:

He believes strongly that we do not retaliate sufficiently against the Provisional's propaganda and suggests more use should be made of Army intelligence reports (community relations reports?) that come into Mr Payne's Department to provide regular briefing material. Is this a sound idea? Should an intelligence brief be produced for NIO information officers?[30]

Foreign Office Meeting, 3 April 1975

Members of the IPCC were among the NIO officials who took part in a meeting at the Foreign Office on 3 April 1975. Among the conclusions reached it was agreed that:

The FCO (Information Research Department) would keep under review the production of unattributable material and briefing on "fund-raising".[32]

IPCC Meeting, 7 April 1975, Stormont Castle

  • Present: Mr M Cudlipp NIO | Mr D Wyatt NIO | Mr J Allan NIO | Mr T Roberts NIO | Mr E Montgomery Central Secretariat | Mr R Ramsay Central Secretariat | Brigadier P Campbell HQNI | Mr D McDine HQNI | Mr K Newman RUC | Mr W McGookin RUC | Mr D Hill NIO.[33]

Brigadier Campbell said that the previous minutes were inaccurate and should read: "Brigadier Campbell thought that account should be taken of information from terrorist sources which indicate what para-military groups intend to do in the propaganda field.[34]

Campbell sought a paper outlining what action would be taken in the event of a return to violence. It was agreed that a subcommittee of Cudlipp, Wyatt, Campbell and McDine would draft a new paper.[35]

IPPC Subcommmittee meeting, 15 April 1975

  • Present Mrr Cudlipp NIO | Mr Newman RUC | Brigadier Campbell HQNI | Mr Gilliland NIO | Mr McDine HQNI | Mr Webster NIO | Mr McGookin RUC | Lt Col Railton | Mr Oyler[36]

Messrs Webster Cudlipp and Gilliland met the Army and Police on 15 April 1975 to discuss a draft information policy paper. It was favourably received with the proviso that the RUC sought to emphasise their sovereignty vis-a-vis the NIO.[37]

Paragraph 4 of the draft paper stated:

There is also the question of an aggressive information policy attacking and denigrating extremist organisations. This can only be effective in the right political climate; a climate which is always difficult to discern (see Para 6 below) and which certainly does not exist now.[38]

Army Comment on Draft Information Policy Paper, 2 May 1975

Brigadier Campbell wrote to Cudlipp on 2 May 1975 with the Army's comments on the draft paper. This included the following paragraph:

b. The Denigration of Extremist Organisations. I am afraid we find your para 4 rather confusing. Until extremist organisations can be divorced from their grassroots support, we will never achieve the sort of political climate you seem to describe. Your suggestion, therefore, takes us round in a circle. Obviously, in the present climate, any aggressive information policy would need to be very carefully handled but I do not see that it needs to be ruled out. There is no reason at all why a skilful policy could not be effective even in the present climate. Obviously a general information attack on extremist organisations would be unlikely to succeed but in those areas where it can be shown that fringe elements (their connection with an established para-military organisation would not be claimed) are acting outside the law and against the interests of the community, it would seem possible to direct some most useful publicity. The Mafia/Chicago style extortion and protection rackets at present being operated in the Shankill and Andersonstown are examples.[39]

External resources

  • National archives CJ 4/887. Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee. Chief Press Officer's file. Setting-up. Working papers. Future policy. 1974 Aug 13 - 1975 May 23.
  • National Archives FCO 26/1570 Northern Ireland: Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee; papers and correspondence. 1974 Jan 01 - 1974 Dec 31.

Notes

  1. Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee, F.W. Armstrong to R. Seaman, 16 August 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  2. Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee', 24 March 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  3. Joint Information Policy Committee Meeting, 2 August 1974, National archives file CJ 4/887.
  4. Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee: First Meeting, 27 August 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  5. Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee: First Meeting, 27 August 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  6. Information Policy: Its Use in Northern Ireland, 6 September 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  7. Information Policy: Its Use in Northern Ireland, 6 September 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  8. The undermining of the IRA's Will to Fight, 6 September 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  9. The undermining of the IRA's Will to Fight, 6 September 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  10. The undermining of the IRA's Will to Fight, 6 September 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  11. Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee: Second Meeting, 11 September 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  12. Information Policy, BN Webster to Gilliland, 13 September 1974. National archives file CJ 4/887.
  13. David Gilliland, Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee: Report on Army Information Policy Paper (Annexe "A"). National Archives file CJ4/887.
  14. David Gilliland, 'Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee Subcommittee Report on Army Information Policy Paper, September 1974. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  15. David Gilliland, 'Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee Subcommittee Report on Army Information Policy Paper, September 1974. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  16. David Gilliland, 'Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee Subcommittee Report on Army Information Policy Paper, September 1974. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  17. David Gilliland, 'Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee Subcommittee Report on Army Information Policy Paper, September 1974. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  18. Michael Cudlipp to R.J. Seaman, Information Policy: Its Use in Northern Ireland, 23 October 1974. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  19. Information Policy: Its Use in Northern Ireland, 23 October 1974 draft, p.8. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  20. Michael Cudlipp to R.J. Seaman, The Undermining of the IRA's Will to Fight, 10 December 1974. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  21. Michael Cudlipp, Draft Minute, 13 December 1974. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  22. D. Petch, Minutes of a Meeting Held at 12.00 on Monday 27 January 1975 in the Stormont Castle Dining Room, 28 January 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  23. Minutes of a Meeting held at 3pm on 3 February 1975 held in Stormont Castle, Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee, February 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  24. Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, Information Policy Co-ordinating Committee', 24 March 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  25. Note of IPCC Meeting held in Stormont Castle on 2 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  26. Note of IPCC Meeting held in Stormont Castle on 2 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  27. Note of IPCC Meeting held in Stormont Castle on 2 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  28. Note of IPCC Meeting held in Stormont Castle on 2 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  29. Meeting with the GOC, Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, 4 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  30. Meeting with the GOC, Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, 4 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  31. Northern Ireland: Overseas Information Activities, 11 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  32. Northern Ireland: Overseas Information Activities, 11 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  33. Note of IPPC Meeting held on 7 April 1975 in Stormont Castle, National Archives file CJ4/887.
  34. Note of IPPC Meeting held on 7 April 1975 in Stormont Castle, National Archives file CJ4/887.
  35. Note of IPPC Meeting held on 7 April 1975 in Stormont Castle, National Archives file CJ4/887.
  36. Note of a Meeting of the IPCC Subcommittee held at HQNI on 15 April 1975, T.J. Oyler, 22 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  37. Draft information Policy Paper, Michael Cudlipp to Sir Frank Cooper, 16 April 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  38. Draft Information Policy Paper. National Archives file CJ4/887.
  39. Peter Campbell to M Cudlipp, Draft Information Policy Paper, 2 May 1975. National Archives file CJ4/887.