Difference between revisions of "Saudi media and propaganda"

From Powerbase
Jump to: navigation, search
m (grammo fix)
(some history)
Line 2: Line 2:
  
 
The curious elements of the Saudi-controlled media are: (1) its association with right-wing Lebanese Christians who happen to be anti-Arab; (2) a partnership with US propaganda efforts in the Middle East via its Al Hurra TV station; and (3) the use of the Saudi media for the placement of content that is later used by [[MEMRI]] or other pro-Israeli propaganda operations.
 
The curious elements of the Saudi-controlled media are: (1) its association with right-wing Lebanese Christians who happen to be anti-Arab; (2) a partnership with US propaganda efforts in the Middle East via its Al Hurra TV station; and (3) the use of the Saudi media for the placement of content that is later used by [[MEMRI]] or other pro-Israeli propaganda operations.
 +
 +
==Early history==
 +
The Saudi forays into media were reactive to nationalist movements in the Arab world (1970s) and a function of the Saudi new-found wealth.  Oifi relates the early motivation for Saudi-media control:
 +
<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The drive to establish Saudi control over the Arab media started in the 1970s in an attempt to counter Nasser's ''Sawt al-Arab'' (voice of the Arabs) radio. Prince Salman was one of the first to realise what was at stake and acquired ''Asharq Al-Awsat'', started in 1978 in London by two brothers of Saudi origin, Hisham and Muhammad Ali Hafiz. Their assistants were Kamal Adham and Turki al-Faisal, both prominent figures in Saudi intelligence.</blockquote>
 +
Around the same time Saudis acquired publishing and news interests in Lebanon.  The distinguishing characteristic of their publishing business was its emphasis on promoting the Saudi image and sabotaging anything remotely critical of Saudi elites -- Edward Said once described how these Saudi-related groups had worked to block the publications of one of his books. The output of those publishing houses was all directed outside Saudi Arabia (most Saudis don't like to read). Also in evidence at this time was the alignment of Saudi interests in Lebanon with Lebanese Christian businessmen and journalists. 
 +
 +
==Post Gulf War 1991==
 +
El Oifi provides a good overview of the trends in Saudi propaganda:
 +
<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">Since the Gulf war of 1990-91 Saudi diplomacy has succeeded in imposing its own spin on events in the region, helped by the media monopoly enjoyed by several princes, particularly since Iraq&rsquo;s decline in influence. But the situation has now changed and the Saudis&rsquo; power is gradually waning.<br>In November 1996 Al-Jazeera started broadcasting news and comment from the Qatari capital, Doha, which ended the Saudi-Lebanese monopoly of pan-Arab news. Then came the attacks of 9/11. The aftermath undermined Saudia Arabia&rsquo;s diplomatic position: the limits imposed by the United States on its Arab and Islamic policies forced it to withdraw inside its borders, proclaiming &ldquo;Saudi Arabia first&rdquo;, a slogan that runs counter to the pan-Arab ambitions of the Saudi media.<br>The neoliberal line taken by Saudi pan-Arab media has grown more radical since 9/11; it is led by a core group of journalists and writers referred to by their critics as kutab al- marines, meaningthe [US] Marines&rsquo; penpushers. They defend US strategy in the Middle East and advocate religious and social reform in the Arab world but avoid any reference to political change. This radical stance benefits Saudi Arabia in two ways. At home it helps to counter Islamist opposition and attract recruits to the neoliberal camp close to the regime. Abroad it sends a positive message to theUS, portraying the Saudi princes as the promoters of a moderate line in favour of Washington&rsquo;s Middle East policies.{{ref|oifi}}</blockquote>
  
 
==News organizations in the Saudi orbit==
 
==News organizations in the Saudi orbit==
Line 8: Line 17:
  
 
==Resources==
 
==Resources==
*Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).
+
*{{note|oifi}}Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).

Revision as of 11:15, 13 December 2006

The Saudi elites have sought to influence opinion in the Middle East, and to a far lesser extent in Europe and the United States. Their efforts have gone through several phases: (1) pet projects; (2) attacking influences they don't approve of, e.g., nationalism; and (3) post 9-11, a total alignment with US policy in the region. The common trend throughout the past few decades has been an attempt to smother any criticism of Saudi Arabia in general, and the Saudi elites in particular.

The curious elements of the Saudi-controlled media are: (1) its association with right-wing Lebanese Christians who happen to be anti-Arab; (2) a partnership with US propaganda efforts in the Middle East via its Al Hurra TV station; and (3) the use of the Saudi media for the placement of content that is later used by MEMRI or other pro-Israeli propaganda operations.

Early history

The Saudi forays into media were reactive to nationalist movements in the Arab world (1970s) and a function of the Saudi new-found wealth. Oifi relates the early motivation for Saudi-media control:

The drive to establish Saudi control over the Arab media started in the 1970s in an attempt to counter Nasser's Sawt al-Arab (voice of the Arabs) radio. Prince Salman was one of the first to realise what was at stake and acquired Asharq Al-Awsat, started in 1978 in London by two brothers of Saudi origin, Hisham and Muhammad Ali Hafiz. Their assistants were Kamal Adham and Turki al-Faisal, both prominent figures in Saudi intelligence.

Around the same time Saudis acquired publishing and news interests in Lebanon. The distinguishing characteristic of their publishing business was its emphasis on promoting the Saudi image and sabotaging anything remotely critical of Saudi elites -- Edward Said once described how these Saudi-related groups had worked to block the publications of one of his books. The output of those publishing houses was all directed outside Saudi Arabia (most Saudis don't like to read). Also in evidence at this time was the alignment of Saudi interests in Lebanon with Lebanese Christian businessmen and journalists.

Post Gulf War 1991

El Oifi provides a good overview of the trends in Saudi propaganda:

Since the Gulf war of 1990-91 Saudi diplomacy has succeeded in imposing its own spin on events in the region, helped by the media monopoly enjoyed by several princes, particularly since Iraq’s decline in influence. But the situation has now changed and the Saudis’ power is gradually waning.
In November 1996 Al-Jazeera started broadcasting news and comment from the Qatari capital, Doha, which ended the Saudi-Lebanese monopoly of pan-Arab news. Then came the attacks of 9/11. The aftermath undermined Saudia Arabia’s diplomatic position: the limits imposed by the United States on its Arab and Islamic policies forced it to withdraw inside its borders, proclaiming “Saudi Arabia first”, a slogan that runs counter to the pan-Arab ambitions of the Saudi media.
The neoliberal line taken by Saudi pan-Arab media has grown more radical since 9/11; it is led by a core group of journalists and writers referred to by their critics as kutab al- marines, meaningthe [US] Marines’ penpushers. They defend US strategy in the Middle East and advocate religious and social reform in the Arab world but avoid any reference to political change. This radical stance benefits Saudi Arabia in two ways. At home it helps to counter Islamist opposition and attract recruits to the neoliberal camp close to the regime. Abroad it sends a positive message to theUS, portraying the Saudi princes as the promoters of a moderate line in favour of Washington’s Middle East policies.[1]

News organizations in the Saudi orbit

Resources