Saudi media and propaganda
The Saudi elites have sought to influence opinion in the Middle East, and, to a far lesser extent, in Europe and the United States. Their efforts have gone through several phases: (1) pet projects; (2) attacking influences they don't approve of, e.g., Arab nationalism and religious currents inimical to them; and (3) post 9-11, a total alignment with US policy in the region. The common trend throughout the past few decades has been an attempt to smother any criticism of Saudi Arabia in general, and the Saudi elites in particular.
The curious elements of the Saudi-controlled media are: (1) its association with right-wing Lebanese Christians who happen to be anti-Arab; (2) a partnership with US propaganda efforts in the Middle East via its Al Hurra TV station; and (3) the use of the Saudi media for the placement of content that is later used by MEMRI or other pro-Israeli propaganda operations.
Contents
Early history
The Saudi forays into media were reactive to nationalist movements in the Arab world (1970s) and a function of the Saudi new-found wealth. Oifi relates the early motivation for Saudi-media control:
The drive to establish Saudi control over the Arab media started in the 1970s in an attempt to counter Nasser's Sawt al-Arab (voice of the Arabs) radio. Prince Salman was one of the first to realise what was at stake and acquired Asharq Al-Awsat, started in 1978 in London by two brothers of Saudi origin, Hisham and Muhammad Ali Hafiz. Their assistants were Kamal Adham and Turki al-Faisal, both prominent figures in Saudi intelligence.[1]
Around the same time Saudis acquired publishing and news interests in Lebanon. The distinguishing characteristic of their publishing business was its emphasis on promoting the Saudi image and sabotaging anything remotely critical of Saudi elites -- Edward Said once described how these Saudi-related groups had worked to block the publications of one of his books. The output of those publishing houses was all directed outside Saudi Arabia. Also in evidence at this time was the alignment of Saudi interests in Lebanon with Lebanese Christian businessmen and journalists.
Al Hayat
In 1946, Kamil Mroue started a conservative daily opposing Arab nationalism. It ceased publication in 1976 due to the assassination of its founder and the Lebanese civil war. Oifi relates the relationship between the Saudis-US and Lebanese Christian groups:
Jamil Mroue, Kamil's son, relaunched Al-Hayat in London in October 1988 with the financial support of the Saudi prince, Khaled bin Sultan, the son of the defence minister, who subquently took over ownership. Al-Hayat played a decisive role during the first Gulf war, demonising the regime of Saddam Hussein and justifying US intervention. It opened its pages to Iraqi opposition movements, in particular the Kurds and Shia. As it was directed by Lebanese Christians, its critics took to referring to Al-Hayat as a minority newspaper in the service of a prince.
It nevertheless remains a pluralist paper in which journalists evenly distributed between the pro-Arab and western camps coexist. But although it purports to provide a pan-Arab view of the news, the Lebanese perspective prevails: praise for the nation-state generally goes hand-in-hand with tough criticism of any sense of Arab solidarity.
The Americans turned to the pro-western camp when they needed recruits to run their media strategy targeting the Arab world, especially Iraq. For instance the former head of Al-Hayat's Washington bureau, Mouaffaq Harb, a Lebanese writer, is now in charge of the Amman-based Radio Sawa and the US-sponsored satellite television channel Al-Hurra. Earlier, in 1998, when Washington set up Radio Free Baghdad in Prague, it appointed another journalist from Al-Hayat, Kamaran Qura Dhari, a militant Iraqi Kurd, to head the outfit. In 2004, just before his departure from Iraq, the US administrator Paul Bremer put two Al-Hayat journalists, Jalal al-Mashta and Dhari, in charge of Iraqi radio and television.[2]
Post Gulf War 1991
El Oifi provides a good overview of the trends in Saudi propaganda:
Since the Gulf war of 1990-91 Saudi diplomacy has succeeded in imposing its own spin on events in the region, helped by the media monopoly enjoyed by several princes, particularly since Iraq’s decline in influence. But the situation has now changed and the Saudis’ power is gradually waning.
In November 1996 Al-Jazeera started broadcasting news and comment from the Qatari capital, Doha, which ended the Saudi-Lebanese monopoly of pan-Arab news. Then came the attacks of 9/11. The aftermath undermined Saudia Arabia’s diplomatic position: the limits imposed by the United States on its Arab and Islamic policies forced it to withdraw inside its borders, proclaiming “Saudi Arabia first”, a slogan that runs counter to the pan-Arab ambitions of the Saudi media.
The neoliberal line taken by Saudi pan-Arab media has grown more radical since 9/11; it is led by a core group of journalists and writers referred to by their critics as kutab al- marines, meaningthe [US] Marines’ penpushers. They defend US strategy in the Middle East and advocate religious and social reform in the Arab world but avoid any reference to political change. This radical stance benefits Saudi Arabia in two ways. At home it helps to counter Islamist opposition and attract recruits to the neoliberal camp close to the regime. Abroad it sends a positive message to the US, portraying the Saudi princes as the promoters of a moderate line in favour of Washington’s Middle East policies.[3]
Post 9-11
After 9-11 Saudi Arabia was put under severe pressure by the United States; it was forced to change many of its policies of funding extreme religious groups, change its foreign policy to assist the U.S. in the area, and also to realign its media-propaganda to be more in tune with U.S. interests. Oifi relates how the Saudi press changed:
The increasingly radical line adopted by pan-Arab Saudi media is particularly valuable to US policy in the Middle East now that its own communication strategy for the Arab world has failed (11). The convergence between Saudi and US media interests explains why the Middle East Media Research Institute [MEMRI], an Israeli thinktank that translates extracts from the Arab press, is so keen on journalists writing for the Saudi press. The widespread distribution of such translations is part of a sophisticated strategy to manipulate information.
The Saudi pan-Arab press, with the protection of Saudi diplomacy, financing and broadcasting resources, makes it difficult for most Arab public opinion to make itself heard. At times of crisis the rest of the world often assumes that the minority opinions of its columnists reflect the views of the majority. On the contrary, these journalists are busy inventing an imaginary Arab world that supported the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Israeli attempt to eradicate Hizbullah in Lebanon. They are increasing the flow of misleading signals to US politicians and media framing US Middle East policy.[4]
News organizations in the Saudi orbit
Notes
- ↑ Mohammed El Oifi, Not the voice of the street, Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).
- ↑ Mohammed El Oifi, Not the voice of the street, Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).
- ↑ Mohammed El Oifi, Not the voice of the street, Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).
- ↑ Mohammed El Oifi, Not the voice of the street, Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).
