Room 40
The British Admiralty's First World War codebreaking section (1914–1919), which read German naval and diplomatic traffic, decrypted the Zimmermann telegram and was merged into the Government Code and Cypher School, the forerunner of GCHQ
| Room 40
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| Logo | The enciphered Zimmermann telegram of January 1917 as forwarded from Washington to the German minister in Mexico. Room 40 obtained this version from Mexico City so that the telegram could be shown to the Americans without revealing that British codebreakers were reading diplomatic cables. Source: US National Archives (record 302025); public domain |
| Type | Naval signals-intelligence and codebreaking section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Admiralty; later designated I.D. 25[1] |
| Founded | 1914, shortly after the outbreak of the First World War[2] |
| Founder(s) | Sir Alfred Ewing, at the invitation of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear-Admiral Henry Oliver[2][1] |
| Dissolved | 1919, merged with the War Office's MI1(b) into the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), which came into being on 1 November 1919[3] |
| Headquarters | Room 40, first floor of the Old Building, Admiralty, Whitehall, London[1] |
| Services | Interception and decryption of German naval, and from 1915 diplomatic, communications[4] |
| Key people | Alfred Ewing (head from 1914); Reginald Hall, Director of Naval Intelligence; Alastair Denniston; Nigel de Grey[2][5][6] |
| Remarks | Successors: Government Code and Cypher School (1919); Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)[3] |
Room 40 was the codebreaking section of the British Admiralty during the First World War, named after the room it occupied in the Admiralty's Old Building in Whitehall. Created in 1914 under the engineer and Director of Naval Education Sir Alfred Ewing, it read German naval wireless traffic and, from 1915, German diplomatic telegrams. Its best-known achievement was the decryption in January 1917 of the Zimmermann telegram, which helped bring the United States into the war. In 1919 it was merged with the War Office's codebreakers to form the Government Code and Cypher School, the organisation later renamed Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).[2][4][3]
Origins
According to GCHQ's official history, there was no British organisation responsible for producing intelligence from intercepted communications before 1914, and the Admiralty had done even less than the War Office to prepare for it; one officer of the Naval Intelligence Division, Fleet Paymaster Rotter, had tried without success to break German naval ciphers between 1910 and 1912. Soon after the outbreak of war the Director of Naval Intelligence invited Sir Alfred Ewing, the Director of Naval Education, to lead the Admiralty's effort, and Ewing "drew together a small team of German speakers".[2] In a letter of 7 March 1919 the former Director, Rear-Admiral Henry Oliver, wrote that he had chosen Ewing because the task needed "a very good knowledge of the German language, an expert knowledge of radio-telegraphy and very great brain power", and that he had "started him organising his department without consulting any of my superiors". In later recollections Oliver said that Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, gave Ewing "a free hand" to set up intercept and direction-finding stations and to recruit staff, and that Churchill would not allow anyone to know of the decyphering ability without his permission.[1]
The team's early work of sorting and classifying intercepted messages "laid the foundations for traffic analysis". Its first breakthrough came when the Russian Navy found copies of the German High Seas Fleet codebook on the German light cruiser Magdeburg and sent one to London; within days the method of re-enciphering messages had been worked out, and Room 40 "began to provide a quick turnaround service of decrypted messages".[2] A minute by Churchill of 8 November 1914, which a member of the section later called the "charter of Room 40", ordered that the decoded intercepts be studied continuously "to penetrate the German mind & movements", kept in a locked book, and all other copies "collected & burnt".[1]
The War Office's own section, MO5b (later MI1(b)), initially worked with Room 40 but the two separated in early November 1914. In 1915 Room 40 took over responsibility for German diplomatic traffic. The National Archives' historians note that the Army did most of its cryptology in the field, whereas the Admiralty's was centralised in Whitehall, and that the section's location was long the subject of "uncertainty and misinformation".[4] Research by The Dreadnought Project places it on the first floor of the Old Building, on the same corridor as the old Board Room, rather than in the "obscure little room" of popular accounts.[1]
Under Reginald Hall
The historians Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac describe Room 40, "directed by Reginald 'Blinker' Hall", as the more effective of Britain's two wartime codebreaking units, one that "pioneered many of the scientific methods used by Bletchley Park two decades later".[6] GCHQ notes, however, that secrecy about the source was then thought more valuable than using it, and that the Battle of Jutland in 1916 "might have been a decisive victory for the Royal Navy if its commanders at sea had access to the same information as Room 40 had".[2]
Aldrich and Cormac write that Room 40 intercepted more than thirty cables about German help for Irish nationalists in the first two years of the war and gave full warning of the Easter Rising of 1916, including Germany's plan to send arms; the intelligence allowed the Royal Navy to intercept the U-boat carrying Roger Casement to Ireland, but it went only to a small military circle and seemingly did not reach the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, or the authorities in Dublin. They also record that in late 1916 David Lloyd George misread a Room 40 decrypt of an American message as evidence of American–German collaboration and alluded to the secret material in Parliament.[6]
The Zimmermann telegram
On 16 January 1917 the German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, sent a telegram, via the German embassy in Washington, proposing an alliance with Mexico if the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare brought the United States into the war, and offering Mexico the return of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona.[4] Germany sent part of its diplomatic traffic through American diplomatic channels, which President Woodrow Wilson had opened to it to help his peace efforts, and all such traffic between Europe and North America had to transit Britain. According to GCHQ the message was read on 17 January "by a team including Nigel de Grey".[5]
Using it was difficult: showing it to the Americans risked revealing that their own diplomatic telegrams were being read, and publishing it risked telling Germany that its codes were broken. Hall solved the first problem by obtaining in Mexico City a copy of the version relayed from Washington to the German legation in Mexico, and it was this copy that was shown to the US embassy in London.[5] The British government passed the message to Wilson on 24 February 1917; when American newspapers published it, some suspected Allied propaganda, but Zimmermann acknowledged authorship. The United States declared war on Germany on 6 April.[4] GCHQ's own assessment is that the telegram did not by itself bring the United States into the war, but that "the Germans never realised that their diplomatic codes were readable".[5] Aldrich and Cormac call it "a rare example of a single piece of intelligence changing the course of history", a cooperative venture between Room 40 and the Foreign Office in which Lloyd George was "a mere observer"; in his memoirs Lloyd George thanked the codebreakers for their "uncanny efficiency in the unearthing of German secrets".[6]
Merger into GC&CS
Aldrich and Cormac write that Room 40's product "proved too valuable for it to disband once the guns fell silent": during the armistice negotiations Lloyd George could read everything sent between Wilson and his adviser Colonel Edward House, and a committee on secret service set up in 1919, in which Churchill was the leading figure, decided to keep the wartime codebreaking effort in a single unit.[6] Within a year of the war's end the naval and military sections had merged as the Government Code and Cypher School, whose overt function was to protect British government communications and whose secret mission was to decrypt foreign messages. Under its first head, the former Room 40 codebreaker Alastair Denniston, it was given space in Watergate House and officially came into being on 1 November 1919.[3]
See also
- Alastair Denniston
- Government Code and Cypher School
- Government Communications Headquarters
- Naval Intelligence Division
- Reginald Hall
- Secret Service Committee
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 "N.I.D. 25", The Dreadnought Project, quoting H. F. Oliver to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 7 March 1919 (Oliver Papers, National Maritime Museum, OLV/8), Oliver's unpublished memoirs, and "The Charter of Room 40" (The National Archives, HW 3/3), accessed 21 November 2026.
- ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 "The birth of Signals Intelligence", GCHQ, 20 May 2016, accessed 21 November 2026.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 "Our origins & WWI", GCHQ, accessed 21 November 2026.
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Tara Finn, "The Zimmermann telegram and Room 40", History of government blog (Foreign Office historians), 16 January 2017, accessed 21 November 2026.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 "Real World Impact: How GCHQ's predecessors contributed to the US entering World War I", GCHQ, accessed 21 November 2026.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 Richard J. Aldrich and Rory Cormac, The Black Door: Spies, Secret Intelligence and British Prime Ministers, London: William Collins, 2016, chapter 1, "Herbert Asquith, David Lloyd George and Andrew Bonar Law (1908–1923)".