Key Leader Engagement
Key Leader Engagement is a key part of Counterinsurgency and Information Operations doctrine as developed by Western powers such as the US and UK.
It inclusion in Information Operations (or I-Ops) is described by the UK Ministry of Defence:
- Information operations will on occasions require an aggressive and manipulative approach to delivering messages (usually through the PSYOPS tool). This is essential in order to attack, undermine and defeat the will, understanding and capability of insurgents.[1]
I-Ops is also said to include ‘PSYOPS, electronic warfare, presence posture profile, computer network operations, deception, physical destruction, information security, Key Leader Engagement (KLE) and the handling of visitors’.[2] KLE is a strategy which suggests cultivating and/or managing the ‘leaders’ in local communities’.
A US produced guide for military commanders (also available via the UK government Stabilisation Unit[3]) cites General Stanley McChrystal on KLE:
- “Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. Earning the trust of the people is a large part of our mission. Build relationships with tribal, community, and religious leaders. Success requires communication, collaboration, and cooperation.” GEN Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander ISAF ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance[4]
It also notes that:
- Building relationships to the point of effective engagement and influence usually takes time. Understanding cultural context, cognitive orientation patterns, and communication methods is essential to any CS approach. For personal relationships, it may also require and understanding of their cultural/social background, perspectives, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, authorities, spheres of influence, and motivators. KLE is not about engaging key leaders when a crisis arises, it is about building relationships over time with enough strength and depth, so that they can then support our interests during times of crisis.[4]
The Ministry of Defence Manual[5] notes that there is a ‘requirement for intelligence staffs to support KLE’.[6] ‘At battlegroup level’, it says, ‘the commander should focus on KLE and the use of tactical PSYOPS to influence the local population and affect the will and understanding of the insurgent.’[7] This is accomplished by a variety of means including ‘deception’. ‘The primary aim of deception’, the manual notes ‘is to mislead the adversary, guard our real intentions and thus persuade him to adopt a disadvantageous course of action. Deception has great utility in tactical counterinsurgency operations and requires effective OPSEC in order to succeed.’[1]
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Ministry of Defence (2009) British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10 Countering Insurgency, Army Code 71876, October 2009: p. 6-5 <http://www.scribd.com/doc/28411813/British-Army-Field-Manual-Counterinsurgency-2009?in_collection=2383030>, accessed 12 January 2011
- ↑ Ministry of Defence 2009: 6-3
- ↑ Stabilisation Unit Details for Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication, accessed 7 april 2011
- ↑ 4.0 4.1 Commander’s Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy Version 3.0 US Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center 116 LAKE VIEW PARKWAY, SUFFOLK, VA 23435-2697, 24 June 2010, p. III-7 Cite error: Invalid
<ref>tag; name "KLE" defined multiple times with different content - ↑ 2009, 5-11
- ↑ Ibid, 5-11
- ↑ Ministry of Defence 2009, 6-3
