Iraq Communication Group
Committee chaired by Alastair Campbell that commissioned the February 2003 Iraq dossier
The Iraq Communication Group (also referred to as the Iraq Communications Group) was a committee chaired by Alastair Campbell, the Prime Minister's Director of Communications and Strategy, in the period before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It commissioned the February 2003 briefing paper Iraq – Its Infrastructure of Concealment, Deception and Intimidation, which became known as the "dodgy dossier".[1]
Membership and meetings
The Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sir Michael Jay, told the Foreign Affairs Committee in 2003 that the Coalition Information Centre "were asked, or tasked, by Alastair Campbell and the Iraq Communication Group to produce the briefing note".[1] In a supplementary memorandum dated 24 June 2003, Campbell told the Committee that John Scarlett, then Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, "attended the four meetings at which the issue of Iraq's infrastructure of concealment was one of several items discussed", but "was not consulted on the paper, and nor did he see it in draft or final form"; "Other more junior representatives of the Cabinet Office were also present".[2]
The February 2003 dossier
The Foreign Affairs Committee reported that the dossier "began as a proposal of the Iraq Communications Group chaired by Alastair Campbell", who described its purpose as being "to get our media to cover this issue of the extent to which Saddam Hussein was developing his programme of concealment and intimidation of the United Nations' inspectors". In January 2003 new intelligence on Iraqi obstruction of UNMOVIC inspectors was cleared for public use by the Secret Intelligence Service, and "the Iraq Communications Group tasked the Communications and Information Centre (which later became the Coalition Information Centre, CIC) with producing a background briefing paper for the press".[1] The CIC, which the Committee said "appears to have operated as an autonomous unit within the FCO, chaired by a senior FCO official but reporting to Alastair Campbell", drew on departmental and intelligence material and on published work; the Committee found that "almost the entire second part was taken from three articles", chief among them a 2002 journal article by Ibrahim al-Marashi, which was used without attribution and altered; al-Marashi told the Committee that the alterations "changed the meaning" of his piece.[1] (See Coalition Information Centre.)
The Committee found that the intelligence material "was provided to the Iraq Communications Group and cleared for public use by the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), without clearance by the Joint Intelligence Committee", a procedure it called inadequate. It concluded "that the degree of autonomy given to the Iraqi Communications Group chaired by Alastair Campbell and the Coalition Information Centre which reported to him, as well as the lack of procedural accountability, were contributory factors to the affair of the 'dodgy dossier'".[1]
Analysis
David Miller describes the group as a "cross-departmental committee at No. 10", from which, he argues, "the campaign to mislead the media about the existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was directed"; in his account it "oversaw the September dossier on WMD and the second 'dodgy' dossier of February 2003".[3]
See also
- Alastair Campbell
- Coalition Information Centre
- Iraq dossier
- Joint Intelligence Committee
- Secret Intelligence Service
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, The Decision to go to War in Iraq: The genesis of the February dossier Ninth Report of Session 2002–03, HC 813-I, July 2003, paras 108–133, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ Alastair Campbell, Supplementary memorandum, 24 June 2003, written evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, HC 813-II, accessed 7 November 2026.
- ↑ David Miller, Propaganda and the 'Terror Threat' in the UK, in Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson (eds), Muslims and the News Media, London: I.B. Tauris, 2006, ch. 4.