Difference between revisions of "End of Play Summaries (Information Policy)"

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The head of Information Policy (IP), Colonel [[Maurice Tugwell]] described their role to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry:
 
The head of Information Policy (IP), Colonel [[Maurice Tugwell]] described their role to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry:
  
::Inside HQNI, we held periodic meetings of the [[Information Policy Working Party]] composed, to the best of my memory, of the Information Adviser to GOC, the GSO1 (Liaison), a representative from PR, reps from other branches such as
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::Inside HQNI, we held periodic meetings of the [[Information Policy Working Party]] composed, to the best of my memory, of the Information Adviser to GOC, the GSO1 (Liaison), a representative from PR, reps from other branches such as Operations, Plans or Intelligence as and when required, and me-as Colonel GS (Information Policy). Minutes were taken by the GSO1 and these formed the basis of Periodic Reviews These reviews gradually gave way to daily 'End of Play' (EOP) summaries, dealing with information activities on a day-to-day basis, although the periodic Working Party meetings continued. The Working Party was able to brain-storm issues and coordinate the efforts of its members, and the effectiveness of IP rested on such co-operation.<ref>Maurice Tugwell, [http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/B/B1316.pdf 1333.065 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry], 24 October, 2000.</ref>
Operations, Plans or Intelligence as and when required, and me-as Colonel GS
 
(Information Policy). Minutes were taken by the GSO1 and these formed the
 
basis of Periodic Reviews These reviews gradually gave way to daily 'End of
 
Play' (EOP) summaries, dealing with information activities on a day-to-day basis,
 
although the periodic Working Party meetings continued. The Working Party was
 
able to brain-storm issues and coordinate the efforts of its members, and the
 
effectiveness of IP rested on such co-operation.<ref>Maurice Tugwell, [http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/B/B1316.pdf 1333.065 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry], 24 October, 2000.</ref>
 
  
 
According to Colonel Tugwell, "IP messages had 'EOP' numbers and MOD replies used 'IPR'.<ref>Maurice Tugwell, [http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/B/B1316.pdf 1333.069 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry], 24 October, 2000.</ref>
 
According to Colonel Tugwell, "IP messages had 'EOP' numbers and MOD replies used 'IPR'.<ref>Maurice Tugwell, [http://report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/evidence/B/B1316.pdf 1333.069 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry], 24 October, 2000.</ref>
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<references/>
 
<references/>
  
[[Category:Northern Ireland]]
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[[Category:Northern Ireland]][[Category:State Violence and Collusion Project]]

Latest revision as of 13:44, 23 August 2012

End of Play Summaries (EOPs) were communications issued by the British Army's Information Policy Unit in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s.

The head of Information Policy (IP), Colonel Maurice Tugwell described their role to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry:

Inside HQNI, we held periodic meetings of the Information Policy Working Party composed, to the best of my memory, of the Information Adviser to GOC, the GSO1 (Liaison), a representative from PR, reps from other branches such as Operations, Plans or Intelligence as and when required, and me-as Colonel GS (Information Policy). Minutes were taken by the GSO1 and these formed the basis of Periodic Reviews These reviews gradually gave way to daily 'End of Play' (EOP) summaries, dealing with information activities on a day-to-day basis, although the periodic Working Party meetings continued. The Working Party was able to brain-storm issues and coordinate the efforts of its members, and the effectiveness of IP rested on such co-operation.[1]

According to Colonel Tugwell, "IP messages had 'EOP' numbers and MOD replies used 'IPR'.[2]

List of known EOPS and IPRs

  • EOP 40 - 2 February 1972[3]
  • IPR 8 - 16 March 1972[4]
  • EOP 84[5]
  • EOP 85[6]
  • IPR 13 - circa 10 April 1972[7]
  • EOP 86 - circa 10 April 1972[8][9]
  • EOP 87[10]
  • IPR 14 - 13 April 1972[11]
  • IPR 15 - circa 24 April 1972[12]
  • EOP 95 - circa 24 April 1972[13]

Notes

  1. Maurice Tugwell, 1333.065 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 24 October, 2000.
  2. Maurice Tugwell, 1333.069 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 24 October, 2000.
  3. Maurice Tugwell, 1333.070 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 24 October, 2000.
  4. Maurice Tugwell, 1333.070 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 24 October, 2000.
  5. National Archives file CJ4/135.
  6. National Archives file CJ4/135.
  7. National Archives file CJ4/135.
  8. Maurice Tugwell, 1333.070 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 24 October, 2000.
  9. National Archives file CJ4/135.
  10. Maurice Tugwell, 1333.069 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 24 October, 2000.
  11. Maurice Tugwell, 1333.069 Statement to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, 24 October, 2000.
  12. National Archives file CJ4/135.
  13. National Archives file CJ4/135.