David Petraeus

Petraeus wrote the new "counter-insurgency" manual for the US army, a guide that puts a heavy emphasis on propaganda. Petraeus says that the army must "remember the global audience," because "the decisive battle is for the people's minds."

For Petraeus "every action, including uses of force, must be wrapped in a bodyguard of information."

Petraeus believes that the US was only defeated in Vietnam because the US population lost its will to fight. He thinks that US troops did well in the Vietnamese battlefields, but that the war was lost in the minds of US voters.

So, shaping the perceptions of the "global audience," including the US population, is as important as winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis.

There is a small strain of thought that celebrates the Iraq war not only as a muscular battle with Islamic fanatics but also as a vigorous antidote to postmodern weakness. They will be disappointed that Petraeus has a bit of a "pomo" tinge.

Like any modern academic, he loves to talk about "narratives." Petraeus recommends that "the most important cultural form for counter-insurgents to understand is the narrative.

"A cultural narrative is a story recounted in the form of a causally linked set of events that explains an event in a group's history and expresses the values, character or self-identity of the group."

Faced with the insurgents' narrative, Petraeus troops must "develop countermessages and counternarratives." Bear in mind, when Petraeus finally delivers his report, that the general recommends changing the story as much as changing reality.

Like any good PR man, he also demands that his soldiers stay "on message," stick to the same story and "exploit a single narrative" against the enemy.

Sometimes, Petraeus's manual says, changing the words is more important than changing the tactics.

He tells soldiers to "consider word choices carefully. Words are important - they have specific meanings and describe policy. For example, are counter-insurgents liberators or occupiers? Occupiers generate a "resistance," whereas liberators may be welcomed for a time." So it's not what the soldiers do, it's what you call them.

Petraeus also seems to think that calling a battlefield by any other name makes it a nicer place. He writes: "In a conflict among the people, terms like 'battlefield' influence perceptions and confuse the critical nature of a synchronised approach. Refrain from referring to and considering the area of operations as a 'battlefield' or it may continue to be one."

Petraeus has some very specific advice on how to deal with the media. Arguing that 'some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot," he suggests making the newspapers and television into US weapons.

"Treat the media as an ally. Help reporters get their story. That helps them portray military actions favourably. Trade information with media representatives," he writes.

The general is enthusiastic about embedding, but only if reporters are embedded long enough to lose their independence. "Media representatives should be embedded for as long as practicable. Representatives embedded for weeks become better prepared to present informed reports. Embedding for days rather than weeks risks media representatives not gaining a real understanding of the context of operations ... such short exposure may actually lead to unintended misinformation."

Petraeus recommends that troops should understand the reality of the insurgency. His manual distinguishes between "terrorist tactics (that) employ violence primarily against noncombatants" and guerilla tactics which, "in contrast, feature hit-and-run attacks by lightly armed groups. The primarily targets are ... government activities, security forces and other counter-insurgency elements."

He knows that the US faces a guerilla war in Iraq as well as terrorism. He also knows that some insurgents "are not the psychopathic terrorists of the movies; rather, they are charismatic warriors who would excel in any armed force."

However, he does not recommend passing these truths on to the global audience. His message is straightforward propaganda - "publicise insurgent violence and use of terror to discredit the insurgency. Identify barbaric actions by extremists and insurgents' disregard for civilian losses"

So, bear in mind when Petraeus delivers his report that the general is a propagandist as well as a fighter. He sees counter-insurgency as a "competition for government."

He is competing with the insurgents for hearts and minds of Iraqi's in Iraq, but it sometimes seems that he is also fighting to win the minds of the British and US population. The propaganda war or, to give its proper military-bureaucratic name, "the information operations logical line of operations" extends to Washington and London.

Petraeus says: "Command themes and messages based on policy should be distributed simultaneously or as soon as possible using all available media. Radio, television, newspapers, flyers, billboards and the internet are all useful dissemination means.

"Polling and analysis should be conducted to determine which media allow the widest dissemination of themes to the desired audiences at the local, regional, national and international levels."

So, when he delivers his report, Petraeus will not be just trying to tell the truth about Iraq, he will also be trying to send "command themes" to 'shape the populace's expectations."