Globalisation:First Defence:Activities

The Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt Hon Liam Fox was speaker at a Conference on October 5th 2010, the eve of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. The conference specifically addressed how the government views defence, Britain’s future role in the world, and what the outcomes may be.

The following section reports the main points of Rt. Hon Liam Fox's speech.

Introduction

I would first like to thanks Caroline, First Defence and EADS for sponsoring this event. First Defence has done so much over the years to advance the defence debate in the UK. Each and every year the First Defence Fringe becomes more and more popular and I am happy to have been invited once again to speak here.

Today, I am going to speak on the future challenges facing defence in the United Kingdom. Here I see two main challenges.

First, configuring national security structures in such a way that will allow us to be prepared for 21st Century Threats.

Second, being able to do so in what is the most challenging financial environment since the Second World War.

I will take each of these in turn.

Future Threats

As we carry out the much needed Strategic Defence and Security Review, it is important to consider what types of threats we may face in the future and how we can best counter these threats.

We know from bitter historical experience the difficulty of predicting future conflict- either its nature or its location. We cannot base our future security on the assumption that future wars will be like the current ones.

That is why we must maintain generic capability able to adapt to any changing threats as they emerge. This is the adaptive posture the NCS decided on in July.

Since the last Strategic Defence Review in 1998 the world has become a more dangerous place. Trans-national terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the battle for cyberspace and the effects of climate change are all playing a part in destabilising the delicate equilibrium of global security.

The terrorists attacks of 9/11 completely altered the Western view of global security. An attack that cost only $250,000 to stage ended up costing the U.S. economy $80bn.

International terrorism continues to pose a real threat.

Although largely defeated in Iraq, Al-Qa'ida is challenging the stability of Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula-notably Yemen and the Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

While some countries like Libya have given up their WMD ambitions, North Korea has successfully tested two nuclear bombs.

Iran is still intent on acquiring a nuclear weapon and continues to be a net exporter of terrorism.

The nature and behaviour of the regime and the risk of triggering a nuclear arms race in the Middle East makes this a cause of growing anxiety.

Climate Change is forcing us to address new threats. For example, with Polar ice caps melting and piracy rife in some of the world's busiest and warmest shipping lanes; maritime transport in the High North is not only becoming a reality but is also looking attractive for commerce. It is also a potential source of political and military tension.

The possibility of state-on-state warfare, most recently demonstrated by the Russian invasion of Georgia and the subsequent occupation of 20 per cent of its territory, cannot be ruled out. Especially as the competition for scarce resources heats up in some of the world's most unstable regions.

Other threats may seem remote but if they became a reality would have a devastating effect on our way of life:

• biological weapons proliferation and their use by terrorist organisations and other non-state actors;

• nuclear terrorism and dirty bombs;

• and the use of an electromagnetic pulse device which could destroy all electronic and communications infrastructure over a distance of hundreds of miles.

Like it or not, Cyber Warfare is a modern-day reality-not something that 'might' occur in the future as some commentators suggest.

And these threats are occurring on top of our contingent overseas operations like Afghanistan, maritime security in the Gulf, or reacting to natural disasters like the recent floods in Pakistan where the key priorities of the UK aid effort in Pakistan were air transport of relief stores and restoring damaged or destroyed bridges—both provided by the British military.

The multi polarity of the post Cold War era and the speed of globalisation mean that Britain's economic and security interests are increasingly interlinked to others with an unavoidable shared set of interests and the shared importation of strategic risk.

As recent events have shown with the economic crisis, instability in one corner of the globe can quickly affect us all.

Britain's national interests no longer stop at the White Cliffs of Dover, Gibraltar or the Falklands.

This global interdependence has major implications on how we must organise our national (and international) security structures and identify our threats. It goes without saying that the challenges this presents to our Armed Forces are numerous and complex.

The Twenty-first Century strategic environment demands that Western militaries are able to simultaneously conduct war fighting, peacekeeping, continuous deterrence-both conventional and nuclear, and humanitarian disaster relief operations.

Furthermore, it requires Western Governments to supplement these military operations through an array of soft power tools, such as international aid, defence diplomacy, and the spread of information and ideas.

This is why the creation of the National Security Council under the leadership of the Prime Minister is so important.

The NSC recognises how issues like foreign relations, international development, homeland security, energy security and the structure of our Armed Forces themselves are all interlinked and require joined up thinking if we are to both protect our own citizens at home and contribute to global security abroad.

But if the nature of the Twenty-first century forces us- the West- to re-evaluate current war fighting we should assume that our enemies are forced to do the same. It is in this context that we can understand the types of threats we are likely to face in the future.

There is an on-going debate inside in the UK on what form the future of warfare will take. Usually there are two schools of thought. On one side we are told that future conflicts will be asymmetric and irregular in nature-similar to what we commonly experience in Afghanistan today.

On the other side we are told that state-on-state warfare in the traditional sense cannot be ruled out and if anything, however remote the possibility may seem, this form of warfare is likely to pose the biggest threat to UK sovereignty.

The choice between the two schools of thought is not binary and mutually exclusive. It is no more true to say that we will face only asymmetric threats than it is to say we face only state on state threats. The truth lies somewhere in between-in a hybrid form of warfare-that will require an adaptable Britain requiring generic and flexible defence capabilities.

State-on-state warfare is viewed by many as an anachronism in the Twenty-first Century but until there is a radical change in the Westphalian nation-state system that has been around since 1648, state-on-state warfare remains a possibility-and one that we must be prepared for regardless of how unlikely it may seem today. There is always the possibility of the UK being dragged into state on state warfare between other nations.

But even state-on-state warfare may not necessarily take the same linear, symmetric, and conventional form as it did in the Twenty-first century.

The present superiority of Western conventional military might, coupled with the advantages offered by globalisation, have led our adversaries to look beyond the approach of choosing between conventional and asymmetrical types of warfare and adopt a hybrid warfare approach.

Potential adversaries may confront us with conventional military might that is at, on occasions, equal to Western technology.

But it is more likely that, knowing that they cannot match our technology, resources or conventional firepower our adversaries will resort to strategic and tactical asymmetric measures in an attempt to defeat us.

With hybrid warfare we should assume that our adversaries will simultaneously employ a mix of conventional weapons and irregular tactics that may even include organised crime and acts of terrorism.

We must understand that the conflicts of the future will go beyond the conventional arena and threaten our social well-being, our domestic infrastructure and our economic capabilities. Russia's invasion of Georgia, with heavy armour, air strikes and ground troops-all very conventional- was augmented by a surgical cyber attack on the Georgian Government and a sophisticated information operations campaign aimed at the Georgian people and the international community.

The changing scope and nature of these threats have implications for our procurement plans. We need to focus more on capability and less on specific equipment.

Saying that we can only focus on one particular type of threat is not good enough for the British people and would be an easy way out for any government whose first and foremost responsibility is the defence of the realm.

Financial Situation

If we learned anything from the Cold War it was that the stronger your economy the more secure your national security. We defeated the Soviet threat because we prevailed in the ideological battle but we also out spent largely because of the strength of the Western economies. Today, we find ourselves in the appalling situation where the out going Labour Chief Secretary actually leaves a note that says “Sorry, there is no money left”.

Labour’s failed economic policies saw our national debt double.

Now, I didn't come into politics wishing to see a reduction in our Defence budget.

Neither did David Cameron.

Indeed, we have both often argued in the past that in a dangerous world – the world in which we live - there is a strong case to increase our spending on national security.

But while we can never predict where events will take us or the unavoidable bills we will have to pay as a consequence, we must confront the ghastly truth of Labour's legacy.

Next year the interest bill alone for Labour’s debt will be over £46bn – more than the entire Defence budget for the UK.

There is an unfunded liability in Defence of around £38 billion over the next 10 years.

During their time in office Labour pushed projects ever more desperately into future years to try to make an impossible budget balance in year, only to increase the overall cost of the Defence programme still further.

They behaved like someone who has just received a catalogue in the post and who keeps ordering more and more items from it without once considering whether they might have the income to pay for any of them when the goods arrive.

The price of this irresponsibility will ultimately be paid for by short-term reductions as we try to return Defence to a sound footing.

So we face the SDSR with unavoidably constrained finances.

Conclusion

We will not be able to do all that we would like at least not in the short term but we will create better stability for planning for both the military and the defence industry.

The Defence Reform Unit which I recently established will radically reform the MoD itself and along with the service chiefs look at issues such as rank structure and force generation where review is long over due.

Regular defence reviews will mean more incremental changes better matched through the changing nature of the threats we face.

The one thing I am determined to do whatever the frustrations and whatever the difficulties is that no future defence secretary will inherit the shambles that I have inherited from Labour and that our national security will take its full place in the country’s political priorities.

Summary of the Argument

l Eight years after emerging apparently victorious from the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the Royal Navy is bloodied, battered and on the ropes. l An initial sacrifice of three frigates and two submarines has turned into the devastating loss of 14 major frontline vessels – with a prospect of even more being run down or mothballed. l There is a serious prospect of 19 destroyers and frigates having to do the work of 30. l These reckless reductions have been based on the strategic falsehood – the ‘Hoon Excuse’ – that numbers no longer matter in an era of more capable ships. l The reluctant acquiescence of the Admirals has been bought by the promise – as yet unfulfilled – that two Future Aircraft Carriers will be ordered. In the meantime, their target in-service dates of 2012 and 2015 have been abandoned in all but name. l Having admitted that the Armed Forces are involved in more complex and more numerous operations than were anticipated in the Strategic Defence Review, the Government have betrayed the Royal Navy by inflicting massive damage to the front line instead of augmenting it. l The next step in this betrayal is a threat to close one of the United Kingdom’s only three Naval Bases. l The Type 45 destroyer-building programme has been slashed from 12 to eight; only six of these have been ordered; and none is to be fitted with the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles requested by the Naval Staff. l The final size of the future submarine fleet is uncertain, but seems likely to consist of only eight, or for a period just seven, boats – apart from those carrying the nuclear deterrent. l This whole sorry saga has provoked a level of concern at the top of the Service unprecedented since the East of Suez controversy in the 1960s, and has led to a degree of public criticism by the former First Sea Lord which it would be perilous to ignore.

The SDR Blueprint

In July 1998, the Strategic Defence Review promised the replacement of “our current carriers from around 2012 by two larger, more versatile carriers capable of carrying a more powerful force”. On the other hand, it was decided to reduce the number of attack submarines “over the next few years from 12 to 10” and the destroyer and frigate fleet from 35 to 32. It was also decided that “22 modern Sandown and Hunt class mine-hunters will be sufficient rather than 25 as previously planned” (paras. 115-6). The then First Sea Lord reluctantly accepted these reductions, given the promise of new carriers. In a supporting essay to the Review, it was concluded that “the ability to deploy offensive air power will be central to future force projection operations. But we cannot be certain that we will always have access to suitable air bases” (Essay six, para. 26). Therefore, the two proposed new carriers would constitute a seaborne base from which a combined force of RN and RAF aircraft would be able to operate. 1 First defence text pages-FEB 07 8/3/07 10:47 Page 1 2 The reduction in the destroyer and frigate total to 32 was based on the numbers needed for “two concurrent medium scale deployments, which is the most demanding requirement for the destroyer and frigate force”; and the loss of two boats from the 12-strong attack submarine force was excused on the basis that: “All ten attack submarines will, however, be equipped to fire Tomahawk land attack missiles to increase their utility in force projection operations (this compares with previous plans to fit only seven submarines for the Tomahawk system) … This rebalancing will be matched by adjustments to peacetime tasks where necessary to ensure that overstretch is addressed. At the same time, we will take action to remedy longstanding undermanning within the Royal Navy. In the first instance, most personnel released by the changes set out above will be redeployed across the Service to ameliorate current shortfalls. Once manpower problems have been solved the net effect of the Review on the Navy’s Regular manpower requirement will be a reduction of some 1,400.”(Essay six, paras. 24-5)

The Hoon Excuse

In December 1999, a Defence White Paper duly noted that the Type 22 frigates HMS Boxer, HMS Beaver and HMS London had been paid off – after only 16, 15 and 12 years’ service – and that the submarines HMS Splendid and HMS Spartan would follow suit in 2003 and 2006 respectively. Subsequently, the destroyer and frigate force was quietly cut from 32 to 31, on the grounds that the greater power and time at sea of the remaining vessels would compensate for the extra ship which had been lost. This devious technique was elevated into a doctrine by the Secretary of State, Geoff Hoon, in a lecture at the Royal United Services Institute on 26 June 2003. He concluded that “advances in technology” and “the astonishing speed with which we can increasingly operate” meant that: “Measuring the capability of our Armed Forces by the number of units or platforms in their possession will no longer be significant”. (RUSI Journal, August 2003)

The Plan Abandoned

In December 2003, another Defence White Paper – entitled “Delivering Security in a Changing World” – again stressed the role of the Royal Navy in projecting force “from the sea onto the land”. It predicted that: “The introduction of the two new aircraft carriers with the Joint Combat Aircraft early in the next decade will offer a step increase in our ability to project air power from the sea. The Type 45 destroyer will enhance protection of joint and maritime forces and assist force projection.” However, a hint of what was to come was clearly visible: “Some of our older vessels contribute less well to the pattern of operations that we envisage, and reductions in their numbers will be necessary.” (Cm 6041-I, para. 4.10) A supporting essay to this White Paper – entitled “Scales of Effort and Military Tasks” – conceded that: “Since SDR our Armed Forces have conducted operations that have been more complex and greater in number than we had envisaged. We have effectively been conducting First defence text pages-FEB 07 8/3/07 10:47 Page 2 3 continual concurrent operations, deploying further afield, to more places, more frequently and with a greater variety of missions than set out in the SDR planning assumptions. We expect to see a similar pattern of operations in the future, with the emphasis on multiple, concurrent Medium and Small Scale deployments. A major lesson of the last five years is that the Department and the Armed Forces as a whole have to be structured and organised to support a fairly high level of operational activity at all times, not as a regular interruption to preparing for a Large Scale conflict. (Cm 6041-II, para. 2.9) … Building on the methodologies used during SDR New Chapter, we now divide military capability into six key capability elements: Maritime, Land, Air, C4ISR, Special Forces (SF) and Logistics. (Cm 6041-II, para. 2.11) … Our analysis suggests that in some respects – particularly for enabling assets such as deployable HQs, communications and deployed logistical support – several Small Scale operations are potentially more demanding than one or two more substantial operations. This is particularly the case if they are in locations that are geographically remote from each other and the UK. Given the signs that multiple concurrent smaller operations are becoming the norm, our concurrency and endurance assumptions need to focus on each of the six capability elements to ensure that our force structures can cope with this pattern.” (Cm 6041-II, para. 2.12) THE AXE FALLS Despite the White Paper’s admission that operations had been more numerous and varied than the SDR had expected, on 21 July 2004 a Supplement to the White Paper was published, slashing the size of the Fleet. Once again, the praises were sung of the yet-to-be-ordered future carriers and Joint Combat Aircraft, as well as the new assault ships, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, and the forthcoming Bay class landing ships. It was then argued that: “In the light of the reduced conventional threat, our revised concurrency assumptions and improved networked capability, we assess that we need fewer … platforms. Consequently we have a requirement for 8 Type 45 destroyers and will need 25 destroyers and frigates overall … We judge in the light of the reduced threat that an attack submarine fleet of 8 SSNs will be sufficient to meet the full range of tasks.” (Cm 6269, paras. 2.6-7) The Nimrod MR2, with a less important anti-submarine role, could be reduced from a total of 21 to only 16 – and, because of the anticipated “greater range and endurance” of the future MRA4 aircraft, only “about 12” of these would be required to replace the current Nimrods in their surveillance role. As for the mine counter-measures fleet, the total of 22 set out in the SDR would now be cut to just 16. (Cm 6269, paras. 2.8-9) THE STORY SO FAR The logic of the Government’s treatment of the Royal Navy up to this point runs as follows: all the Armed Forces were scaled down at the end of the Cold War, but adjustments were needed to reflect the strategic shift from a defensive role in Europe to the mounting of far-flung operations from a sea base. This required large strike carriers as its centrepiece and a loss of five frigates and submarines was a price apparently worth paying in 1998. First defence text pages-FEB 07 8/3/07 10:47 Page 3 4 However, instead of being reduced from 35 to 32, the frigate and destroyer force has been slashed from 35 to 25. Instead of being reduced from 12 to 10, the submarine force is being slashed from 12 to a maximum of eight. The carriers – one of which was supposed to be in service by 2012 – have not yet been firmly ordered, and no target in-service dates are now given by the Government, despite its previous willingness to do so. The 12 Type 45 destroyers which were projected, and which have a key role in the air defence of the sea base, have been reduced to a programme of eight; but only six of these have been ordered and ships seven and eight may never be built. Such massive reductions might have been expected if events since the publication of the Strategic Defence Review in July 1998 had shown it to be over-pessimistic in estimating the future threats to our country and its interests. Yet, the opposite is the case: as was admitted in the December 2003 White Paper, the number and variety of operational deployments exceeded the assumptions of the SDR. What has the Government’s response been? It has been drastically to weaken the Royal Navy by reducing the total of its major warships whilst disingenuously arguing that their replacements need be fewer in number because each of them will be more powerful than its predecessor. Such an argument is wholly untenable, given that the capability of the new generation destroyers, submarines and surveillance aircraft was perfectly well known when the original totals required were agreed in the SDR in 1998 – before the Kosovo campaign, before 11 September, before the invasion of Afghanistan and before the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In the case of the Type 45 destroyers, in particular, not only may the total be as low as half-a-dozen, but the repeated requests of the Royal Navy for these to be fitted with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles have been flatly refused by the Government.

The Verdict of the Service Chiefs

There is only one rationale for the devastation brought by the Government to the size of the Royal Navy: money. The First Sea Lord at the time of the 2004 cuts was Admiral Sir Alan West. In 2003, he told the magazine Warships International Fleet Review that “no matter how good a ship is, it can only be in so many places at any one time” – a specific rebuttal of the Hoon argument that the number of “units