Difference between revisions of "State Violence and Collusion Timeline 1986"
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*'''3''' A note produced for the Joint Intelligence Committee Chair entitled ''Loyalist Paramilitary Activity'' stated that: "… staff [in the Security Service] have commented that if the [[UDA]] had obtained these weapons, it would have represented a significant increase in its available arsenal and operational capabilities."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref> | *'''3''' A note produced for the Joint Intelligence Committee Chair entitled ''Loyalist Paramilitary Activity'' stated that: "… staff [in the Security Service] have commented that if the [[UDA]] had obtained these weapons, it would have represented a significant increase in its available arsenal and operational capabilities."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref> | ||
*'''26''' - 'Directive for the Force Research Unit (Northern Ireland)' promulgated by Major General [[A. S. Jeapes]], Commander Land Forces.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch4">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter004/ Volume 1 - Chapter 4: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref> | *'''26''' - 'Directive for the Force Research Unit (Northern Ireland)' promulgated by Major General [[A. S. Jeapes]], Commander Land Forces.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch4">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter004/ Volume 1 - Chapter 4: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref> | ||
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| + | ==December== | ||
| + | *'''11''' - a report of the [[Joint Intelligence Committee]] states that [[RUC]] and [[Security Service]] action had frustrated a number of further loyalist arms procurement operations, with [[Ulster Defence Association]] (UDA) members and sympathisers - including three members of the Territorial Army - having been arrested. According to this report, the seizure "represents a severe setback for UDA efforts to procure arms on the mainland, disrupting a hitherto safe route from Scotland to Belfast".<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref> | ||
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
Revision as of 22:17, 14 December 2012
Events related to state violence and collusion in Northern Ireland in 1986.
Contents
April
- 25 - A letter from the Director General of the Security Service Sir Antony Duff to the Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert Armstrong, in April 1986 outlined operations to frustrate loyalist attempts to purchase weapons in Scotland and London, with two further investigations into possible future attempts continuing.[1]
- 29 - Sir Antony Duff's briefing is circulated to Sir Percy Cradock at the Prime Minister's office under the title, Loyalist Paramilitary Activity.[1]
July
- 3 A note produced for the Joint Intelligence Committee Chair entitled Loyalist Paramilitary Activity stated that: "… staff [in the Security Service] have commented that if the UDA had obtained these weapons, it would have represented a significant increase in its available arsenal and operational capabilities."[1]
- 26 - 'Directive for the Force Research Unit (Northern Ireland)' promulgated by Major General A. S. Jeapes, Commander Land Forces.[2]
December
- 11 - a report of the Joint Intelligence Committee states that RUC and Security Service action had frustrated a number of further loyalist arms procurement operations, with Ulster Defence Association (UDA) members and sympathisers - including three members of the Territorial Army - having been arrested. According to this report, the seizure "represents a severe setback for UDA efforts to procure arms on the mainland, disrupting a hitherto safe route from Scotland to Belfast".[1]
Notes
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Sir Desmond de Silva, Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Agent-handling, Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.
- ↑ Sir Desmond de Silva, Volume 1 - Chapter 4: Agent-handling, Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.
