Difference between revisions of "State Violence and Collusion Timeline 1972"

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==January==
 
==January==
*'''7''' In a memo addressed to the [[General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland
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*'''7''' In a memo addressed to the [[General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland|General Officer Commanding British Forces]], Lt. Gen. Sir [[Harry Tuzo]], and headed 'The situation in Londonderry as at 7th January 1972', the [[Commander Land Forces (Northern Ireland)|Commander of Land Forces]] in the North, General [[Robert Ford]], wrote "I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected ring leaders among the DYH [Derry Young Hooligans], after clear warnings have been issued… In other words, we would be reverting to the methods of IS found successful on many occasions overseas."<ref name="McCann25years">Eamonn McCann, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1999/sep/19/bloodysunday.northernireland Bloody Sunday truth 'was known 25 years ago'], ''The Guardian'', 19 September 1999.</ref>
|General Officer Commanding British Forces]], Lt. Gen. Sir [[Harry Tuzo]], and headed 'The situation in Londonderry as at 7th January 1972', the [[Commander Land Forces (Northern Ireland)|Commander of Land Forces]] in the North, General [[Robert Ford]], wrote "I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected ring leaders among the DYH [Derry Young Hooligans], after clear warnings have been issued… In other words, we would be reverting to the methods of IS found successful on many occasions overseas."<ref name="McCann25years">Eamonn McCann, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1999/sep/19/bloodysunday.northernireland Bloody Sunday truth 'was known 25 years ago'], ''The Guardian'', 19 September 1999.</ref>
 
  
 
*'''27''' In a paper on 'Marches in 1972', a senior Army planner in the North, Lt Col [[Harry Dalzell-Payne]], tried to 'anticipate some of the problems we may face on Monday 31 Jan 72, if events on Sunday prove our worst fears'. He wrote: 'We must take stronger military measures which will inevitably lead to further accusations of "brutality and ill-treatment of non-violent demonstrators".' The paper concludes: "The only additional measure left for physical control is the use of firearms i.e. "Disperse or we fire". Inevitably, it would not be the gunmen who would be killed but "innocent members of the crowd". This would be tantamount to saying "all else has failed", and for this reason must be rejected except in extremis. It cannot, however, be ruled out. We must await the outcome of the events planned for the weekend of 29/30 Jan 72."<ref name="McCann25years">Eamonn McCann, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1999/sep/19/bloodysunday.northernireland Bloody Sunday truth 'was known 25 years ago'], ''The Guardian'', 19 September 1999.</ref>
 
*'''27''' In a paper on 'Marches in 1972', a senior Army planner in the North, Lt Col [[Harry Dalzell-Payne]], tried to 'anticipate some of the problems we may face on Monday 31 Jan 72, if events on Sunday prove our worst fears'. He wrote: 'We must take stronger military measures which will inevitably lead to further accusations of "brutality and ill-treatment of non-violent demonstrators".' The paper concludes: "The only additional measure left for physical control is the use of firearms i.e. "Disperse or we fire". Inevitably, it would not be the gunmen who would be killed but "innocent members of the crowd". This would be tantamount to saying "all else has failed", and for this reason must be rejected except in extremis. It cannot, however, be ruled out. We must await the outcome of the events planned for the weekend of 29/30 Jan 72."<ref name="McCann25years">Eamonn McCann, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1999/sep/19/bloodysunday.northernireland Bloody Sunday truth 'was known 25 years ago'], ''The Guardian'', 19 September 1999.</ref>

Revision as of 21:43, 18 June 2012

Events related to state violence and collusion in Northern Ireland in 1972.

January

  • 7 In a memo addressed to the General Officer Commanding British Forces, Lt. Gen. Sir Harry Tuzo, and headed 'The situation in Londonderry as at 7th January 1972', the Commander of Land Forces in the North, General Robert Ford, wrote "I am coming to the conclusion that the minimum force necessary to achieve a restoration of law and order is to shoot selected ring leaders among the DYH [Derry Young Hooligans], after clear warnings have been issued… In other words, we would be reverting to the methods of IS found successful on many occasions overseas."[1]
  • 27 In a paper on 'Marches in 1972', a senior Army planner in the North, Lt Col Harry Dalzell-Payne, tried to 'anticipate some of the problems we may face on Monday 31 Jan 72, if events on Sunday prove our worst fears'. He wrote: 'We must take stronger military measures which will inevitably lead to further accusations of "brutality and ill-treatment of non-violent demonstrators".' The paper concludes: "The only additional measure left for physical control is the use of firearms i.e. "Disperse or we fire". Inevitably, it would not be the gunmen who would be killed but "innocent members of the crowd". This would be tantamount to saying "all else has failed", and for this reason must be rejected except in extremis. It cannot, however, be ruled out. We must await the outcome of the events planned for the weekend of 29/30 Jan 72."[1]
  • 30 - The Bloody Sunday massacre took place in Derry when soldiers from the Parachute Regiment opened fire on a civil rights march. 13 people died on the day, and a 14th, John Johnston, died later as a result of his injuries.[2]

July

  • 10 - Northern Ireland Secretary William Whitelaw presides over a Stormont meeting which concludes that "The Army should not be inhibited in its campaign by the threat of court proceedings and should therefore be suitably indemnified." It was also decided that "The GOC would see UDA leaders that afternoon and impress upon them that while their efforts as vigilantes in their own areas were acceptable, their presence in any riot or shooting situation would not be tolerated.[3]

Notes

  1. 1.0 1.1 Eamonn McCann, Bloody Sunday truth 'was known 25 years ago', The Guardian, 19 September 1999.
  2. HISTORY – BLOODY SUNDAY – EVENTS OF THE DAY, Museum of Free Derry, accessed 7 April 2011.
  3. State Impunity was Official Policy, Relatives for Justice, 18 June 2012.