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| | degree of public criticism by the former First Sea Lord which it would be perilous to | | degree of public criticism by the former First Sea Lord which it would be perilous to |
| | ignore. | | ignore. |
| − |
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| − | ==The SDR Blueprint==
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| − |
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| − | In July 1998, the Strategic Defence Review promised the replacement of “our current
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| − | carriers from around 2012 by two larger, more versatile carriers capable of carrying a more
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| − | powerful force”. On the other hand, it was decided to reduce the number of attack
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| − | submarines “over the next few years from 12 to 10” and the destroyer and frigate fleet
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| − | from 35 to 32. It was also decided that “22 modern Sandown and Hunt class mine-hunters
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| − | will be sufficient rather than 25 as previously planned” (paras. 115-6). The then First Sea Lord
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| − | reluctantly accepted these reductions, given the promise of new carriers.
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| − | In a supporting essay to the Review, it was concluded that “the ability to deploy offensive
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| − | air power will be central to future force projection operations. But we cannot be certain that
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| − | we will always have access to suitable air bases” (Essay six, para. 26). Therefore, the two
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| − | proposed new carriers would constitute a seaborne base from which a combined force of
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| − | RN and RAF aircraft would be able to operate.
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| − | The reduction in the destroyer and frigate total to 32 was based on the numbers needed
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| − | for “two concurrent medium scale deployments, which is the most demanding
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| − | requirement for the destroyer and frigate force”; and the loss of two boats from the
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| − | 12-strong attack submarine force was excused on the basis that:
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| − | “All ten attack submarines will, however, be equipped to fire Tomahawk land attack
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| − | missiles to increase their utility in force projection operations (this compares with
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| − | previous plans to fit only seven submarines for the Tomahawk system) … This
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| − | rebalancing will be matched by adjustments to peacetime tasks where necessary to
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| − | ensure that overstretch is addressed. At the same time, we will take action to remedy
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| − | longstanding undermanning within the Royal Navy. In the first instance, most personnel
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| − | released by the changes set out above will be redeployed across the Service to
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| − | ameliorate current shortfalls. Once manpower problems have been solved the net effect
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| − | of the Review on the Navy’s Regular manpower requirement will be a reduction of some
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| − | 1,400.”(Essay six, paras. 24-5)
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| − |
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| − | ==The Hoon Excuse==
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| − |
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| − | In December 1999, a Defence White Paper duly noted that the Type 22 frigates HMS
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| − | Boxer, HMS Beaver and HMS London had been paid off – after only 16, 15 and 12 years’
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| − | service – and that the submarines HMS Splendid and HMS Spartan would follow suit in
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| − | 2003 and 2006 respectively. Subsequently, the destroyer and frigate force was quietly cut
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| − | from 32 to 31, on the grounds that the greater power and time at sea of the remaining
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| − | vessels would compensate for the extra ship which had been lost.
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| − | This devious technique was elevated into a doctrine by the Secretary of State, Geoff
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| − | Hoon, in a lecture at the Royal United Services Institute on 26 June 2003. He concluded
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| − | that “advances in technology” and “the astonishing speed with which we can
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| − | increasingly operate” meant that:
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| − | “Measuring the capability of our Armed Forces by the number of units or platforms in their
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| − | possession will no longer be significant”. (RUSI Journal, August 2003)
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| − |
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| − | ==The Plan Abandoned==
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| − |
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| − | In December 2003, another Defence White Paper – entitled “Delivering Security in a
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| − | Changing World” – again stressed the role of the Royal Navy in projecting force “from
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| − | the sea onto the land”. It predicted that:
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| − | “The introduction of the two new aircraft carriers with the Joint Combat Aircraft early in
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| − | the next decade will offer a step increase in our ability to project air power from the sea.
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| − | The Type 45 destroyer will enhance protection of joint and maritime forces and assist
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| − | force projection.”
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| − | However, a hint of what was to come was clearly visible:
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| − | “Some of our older vessels contribute less well to the pattern of operations that we
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| − | envisage, and reductions in their numbers will be necessary.” (Cm 6041-I, para. 4.10)
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| − | A supporting essay to this White Paper – entitled “Scales of Effort and Military Tasks” –
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| − | conceded that:
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| − | “Since SDR our Armed Forces have conducted operations that have been more complex
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| − | and greater in number than we had envisaged. We have effectively been conducting
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| − | continual concurrent operations, deploying further afield, to more places, more
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| − | frequently and with a greater variety of missions than set out in the SDR planning
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| − | assumptions. We expect to see a similar pattern of operations in the future, with the
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| − | emphasis on multiple, concurrent Medium and Small Scale deployments. A major lesson
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| − | of the last five years is that the Department and the Armed Forces as a whole have to be
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| − | structured and organised to support a fairly high level of operational activity at all times,
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| − | not as a regular interruption to preparing for a Large Scale conflict. (Cm 6041-II, para. 2.9)
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| − | … Building on the methodologies used during SDR New Chapter, we now divide military
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| − | capability into six key capability elements: Maritime, Land, Air, C4ISR, Special Forces (SF)
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| − | and Logistics. (Cm 6041-II, para. 2.11)
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| − | … Our analysis suggests that in some respects – particularly for enabling assets such as
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| − | deployable HQs, communications and deployed logistical support – several Small Scale
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| − | operations are potentially more demanding than one or two more substantial operations.
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| − | This is particularly the case if they are in locations that are geographically remote from each
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| − | other and the UK. Given the signs that multiple concurrent smaller operations are
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| − | becoming the norm, our concurrency and endurance assumptions need to focus on each
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| − | of the six capability elements to ensure that our force structures can cope with this
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| − | pattern.” (Cm 6041-II, para. 2.12)
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| − |
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| − | ==The Axe Falls==
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| − | Despite the White Paper’s admission that operations had been more numerous and varied
| |
| − | than the SDR had expected, on 21 July 2004 a Supplement to the White Paper was
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| − | published, slashing the size of the Fleet. Once again, the praises were sung of the
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| − | yet-to-be-ordered future carriers and Joint Combat Aircraft, as well as the new assault
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| − | ships, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, and the forthcoming Bay class landing ships. It was
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| − | then argued that:
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| − | “In the light of the reduced conventional threat, our revised concurrency assumptions
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| − | and improved networked capability, we assess that we need fewer … platforms.
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| − | Consequently we have a requirement for 8 Type 45 destroyers and will need 25
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| − | destroyers and frigates overall … We judge in the light of the reduced threat that an
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| − | attack submarine fleet of 8 SSNs will be sufficient to meet the full range of tasks.”
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| − | (Cm 6269, paras. 2.6-7)
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| − | The Nimrod MR2, with a less important anti-submarine role, could be reduced from a
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| − | total of 21 to only 16 – and, because of the anticipated “greater range and endurance” of
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| − | the future MRA4 aircraft, only “about 12” of these would be required to replace the
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| − | current Nimrods in their surveillance role. As for the mine counter-measures fleet, the
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| − | total of 22 set out in the SDR would now be cut to just 16. (Cm 6269, paras. 2.8-9)
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| − | THE STORY SO FAR
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| − | The logic of the Government’s treatment of the Royal Navy up to this point runs as
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| − | follows: all the Armed Forces were scaled down at the end of the Cold War, but
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| − | adjustments were needed to reflect the strategic shift from a defensive role in Europe to
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| − | the mounting of far-flung operations from a sea base. This required large strike carriers
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| − | as its centrepiece and a loss of five frigates and submarines was a price apparently worth
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| − | paying in 1998.
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| − | 4
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| − | However, instead of being reduced from 35 to 32, the frigate and destroyer force has
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| − | been slashed from 35 to 25. Instead of being reduced from 12 to 10, the submarine force
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| − | is being slashed from 12 to a maximum of eight. The carriers – one of which was
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| − | supposed to be in service by 2012 – have not yet been firmly ordered, and no target
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| − | in-service dates are now given by the Government, despite its previous willingness to
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| − | do so. The 12 Type 45 destroyers which were projected, and which have a key role in the
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| − | air defence of the sea base, have been reduced to a programme of eight; but only six of
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| − | these have been ordered and ships seven and eight may never be built.
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| − | Such massive reductions might have been expected if events since the publication of the
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| − | Strategic Defence Review in July 1998 had shown it to be over-pessimistic in estimating the
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| − | future threats to our country and its interests. Yet, the opposite is the case: as was
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| − | admitted in the December 2003 White Paper, the number and variety of operational
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| − | deployments exceeded the assumptions of the SDR. What has the Government’s response
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| − | been? It has been drastically to weaken the Royal Navy by reducing the total of its major
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| − | warships whilst disingenuously arguing that their replacements need be fewer in number
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| − | because each of them will be more powerful than its predecessor.
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| − | Such an argument is wholly untenable, given that the capability of the new generation
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| − | destroyers, submarines and surveillance aircraft was perfectly well known when the
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| − | original totals required were agreed in the SDR in 1998 – before the Kosovo campaign,
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| − | before 11 September, before the invasion of Afghanistan and before the overthrow of
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| − | Saddam Hussein. In the case of the Type 45 destroyers, in particular, not only may the total
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| − | be as low as half-a-dozen, but the repeated requests of the Royal Navy for these to be fitted
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| − | with Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles have been flatly refused by the Government.
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| − |
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| − | ==The Verdict of the Service Chiefs==
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| − |
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| − | There is only one rationale for the devastation brought by the Government to the size of
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| − | the Royal Navy: money. The First Sea Lord at the time of the 2004 cuts was Admiral Sir Alan
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| − | West. In 2003, he told the magazine Warships International Fleet Review that “no matter how
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| − | good a ship is, it can only be in so many places at any one time” – a specific rebuttal of the
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| − | Hoon argument that the number of “units
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