Difference between revisions of "Team B"

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The [[Teanm B]] exercise was an alternative review of the [[CIA]]'s National Intelligence Estimates commissioned by [[George H.W. Bush]] when he became [[CIA]] director in 1976, at the behest of the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]]. It has been described by Tom Barry as a a "classic case of threat escalation by hawks determined to increase military budgets and step up the U.S. offensive in the cold war".<ref>Tom Barry, [http://rightweb.irc-online.org/rw/843.html Remembering Team B]], Right Web, 12 February 2004.</ref>
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The [[Team B]] exercise was an alternative review of the [[CIA]]'s National Intelligence Estimates commissioned by [[George H.W. Bush]] when he became [[CIA]] director in 1976, at the behest of the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]]. It has been described by Tom Barry as a "classic case of threat escalation by hawks determined to increase military budgets and step up the U.S. offensive in the cold war".<ref>Tom Barry, [http://rightweb.irc-online.org/rw/843.html Remembering Team B], Right Web, 12 February 2004.</ref>
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==Summary==
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The National Security Archive gives the following summary:
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<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">In the last few years of Kissinger's tenure in government, Nixon/Ford détente policies experienced strong criticism from Republicans on the right, led by Ronald Reagan, as well as from some liberal democrats and former socialists. Some of these tendencies began to crystallize into what later became known as "neo-conservatism." Reflecting the failure or the inability of the Ford administration to build a national consensus in favor of détente, critics of détente in and out of government began to take on the National Intelligence Estimates, arguing that they consistently underestimated the severity of the Soviet military threat to the United States. Conservatives on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) asked DCI George H.W. Bush to establish a special panel to assess the NIEs and develop an alternative analysis. Headed by Harvard Sovietologist Richard Pipes, the Team B panel included Paul Nitze, who played an active part. Other participants were Seymour Weiss and Paul Wolfowitz. Given Team B's ominous assumptions about Soviet intentions and capabilities, Raymond Garthoff later argued, "it [was] not surprising that it came up with more ominous findings." After Ford and Kissinger left office Nitze continued to play a role as a critic by helping to establish the Committee for the Present Danger, which brought together "neo-cons" and Republican conservatives, a number of whom would work for the Reagan administration four years later.<ref>William Burr and Robert Wampler, [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB139/index.htm "The Master of the Game": Paul H. Nitze and U.S. Cold War Strategy from Truman to Reagan], National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 139, 202/994-7000, Posted October 27, 2004</ref></blockquote>
  
 
==Members==
 
==Members==
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*[http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/2822.html Team B Strategic Objectives Panel] Right Web profile.
 
*[http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/2822.html Team B Strategic Objectives Panel] Right Web profile.
 
*[http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Team_B Team B Strategic Initiatives Panel] Sourcewatch profile.
 
*[http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Team_B Team B Strategic Initiatives Panel] Sourcewatch profile.
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*Tom Barry, [http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/Remembering_Team_B Remembering Team B], Right Web, 11 February 1984.
  
 
==Notes==
 
==Notes==
 
<references/>
 
<references/>
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[[Category:Neocons]]

Latest revision as of 06:31, 22 February 2011

The Team B exercise was an alternative review of the CIA's National Intelligence Estimates commissioned by George H.W. Bush when he became CIA director in 1976, at the behest of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. It has been described by Tom Barry as a "classic case of threat escalation by hawks determined to increase military budgets and step up the U.S. offensive in the cold war".[1]

Summary

The National Security Archive gives the following summary:

In the last few years of Kissinger's tenure in government, Nixon/Ford détente policies experienced strong criticism from Republicans on the right, led by Ronald Reagan, as well as from some liberal democrats and former socialists. Some of these tendencies began to crystallize into what later became known as "neo-conservatism." Reflecting the failure or the inability of the Ford administration to build a national consensus in favor of détente, critics of détente in and out of government began to take on the National Intelligence Estimates, arguing that they consistently underestimated the severity of the Soviet military threat to the United States. Conservatives on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) asked DCI George H.W. Bush to establish a special panel to assess the NIEs and develop an alternative analysis. Headed by Harvard Sovietologist Richard Pipes, the Team B panel included Paul Nitze, who played an active part. Other participants were Seymour Weiss and Paul Wolfowitz. Given Team B's ominous assumptions about Soviet intentions and capabilities, Raymond Garthoff later argued, "it [was] not surprising that it came up with more ominous findings." After Ford and Kissinger left office Nitze continued to play a role as a critic by helping to establish the Committee for the Present Danger, which brought together "neo-cons" and Republican conservatives, a number of whom would work for the Reagan administration four years later.[2]

Members

Strategic Objectives Panel

Advisory Panel

Missile Accuracy Panel

Air Defense Panel

External Resources

Notes

  1. ↑ Tom Barry, Remembering Team B, Right Web, 12 February 2004.
  2. ↑ William Burr and Robert Wampler, "The Master of the Game": Paul H. Nitze and U.S. Cold War Strategy from Truman to Reagan, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 139, 202/994-7000, Posted October 27, 2004
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