Difference between revisions of "Gavin Bulloch"
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| + | Although retired Bulloch was active in redrafting the British Army's countinsurgency doctrine in 2007 Described by the leader of the team Col. [[Alexander Alderson]] as the Army's 'pre-eminent doctrine writer'<ref>Alderson, A. 'Revising the British Army's Counter-indurgency doctrine', RUSI Journal August 2007, 152(4)</ref> he is associated with the [[Land Warfare Centre]], where Alderson is also based.<ref>http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/05_Programme.doc</ref> | ||
| + | ==Career== | ||
| + | Bulloch 'served as an infantry officer for 36 years and was involved in counterinsurgency operations in several theaters during his service. He is a graduate of the Army Staff College and the National Defence College. Brigadier Bulloch commanded a battalion on duties in Northern Ireland, served at NATO Headquarters on the Strategic Plans Staff, and finally served in Greece as a Defence attaché before retirement.'<ref>[http://www.mitchellphoenix.com/client/Interview_Gavin_BullochV3.pdf Interview with Gavin Bulloch], no longer available online. Version posted here: [[Interview with Gavin Bulloch]]</ref> | ||
| + | ==Views on counterinsurgency== | ||
| + | :Brigadier Gavin Bulloch (British Army, Ret.), goes even further and suggests that, "Commanders should seek 'soft' methods of destroying the enemy; by arrest, physical isolation, or subversion, for example. The use of the minimum necessary force is a well-proven counterinsurgency lesson." In other words, while engaging in OOTW [Operations Other Than War], military personnel may increasingly find themselves engaging what appear to be "law enforcement duties" -- actually, in furtherance of larger counterinsurgency goals.<ref>"Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective," Brigadier Gavin Bulloch (British Army, Ret.), From Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 4-16, Available on-line at: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96summer/bulloch.htm, cited in [http://www.emergency.com/2000/roe2000.htm Rules of Engagement; The Reality, not the movie...] By C. L. Staten, Sr. National Security Analyst Emergency Response & Research Institute 28 November 2000</ref> | ||
| + | Randall G. Bowdish argues<ref> Chapter 5 [ Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces], Randall G. Bowdish in Sam J. Tangredi (Ed.), Globalization and Maritime Power, Institute for National strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002</ref>: | ||
| − | : | + | :British counterinsurgency doctrine is based upon maneuver warfare, in which one strives to attack the enemy’s “system” from a position of advantage rather than head on through cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal.<ref>U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, June 20, 1997), 37</ref> Nonetheless, Bulloch recognizes that: |
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| + | ::Physical destruction of the enemy still has an important role to play. A degree of attrition will be necessary, but the number of insurgents killed should be no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve success. Commanders should seek “soft” methods of destroying the enemy; by arrest, physical isolation, or subversion, for example. The use of the minimum necessary force is a well-proven counterinsurgency lesson. In an era of intense media intrusiveness—one in which legality, from domestic and international viewpoints, will become ever more important—sound judgment and close control will need to be exercised over the degree of physical destruction which it is possible, necessary, or desirable to inflict. For example, the killing of a teenage gunman could be justifiable in military terms, but its possible effect on his community could jeopardize a potentially far more significant though less spectacular Hearts and Minds operation.<ref>Gavin Bulloch, “Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective,” Parameters 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996), 4–16.</ref> | ||
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| + | ==Publications== | ||
| + | *Gavin Bulloch, '[http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96summer/bulloch.htm Military Doctrine and Counter-Insurgency: A British Perspective],' ''Parameters'' 26 (Summer 1996). | ||
| + | *Operations in Troubled States: Post-Cold War Operations and Peace Talks by Gavin Bulloch, Robert H. Dorff, Andrew S. Natsios, Anthony D. Marley, Publisher: DIANE Publishing Company February 1998 ISBN-13: 9780788138775 | ||
==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
Latest revision as of 09:02, 3 May 2008
Although retired Bulloch was active in redrafting the British Army's countinsurgency doctrine in 2007 Described by the leader of the team Col. Alexander Alderson as the Army's 'pre-eminent doctrine writer'[1] he is associated with the Land Warfare Centre, where Alderson is also based.[2]
Career
Bulloch 'served as an infantry officer for 36 years and was involved in counterinsurgency operations in several theaters during his service. He is a graduate of the Army Staff College and the National Defence College. Brigadier Bulloch commanded a battalion on duties in Northern Ireland, served at NATO Headquarters on the Strategic Plans Staff, and finally served in Greece as a Defence attaché before retirement.'[3]
Views on counterinsurgency
- Brigadier Gavin Bulloch (British Army, Ret.), goes even further and suggests that, "Commanders should seek 'soft' methods of destroying the enemy; by arrest, physical isolation, or subversion, for example. The use of the minimum necessary force is a well-proven counterinsurgency lesson." In other words, while engaging in OOTW [Operations Other Than War], military personnel may increasingly find themselves engaging what appear to be "law enforcement duties" -- actually, in furtherance of larger counterinsurgency goals.[4]
Randall G. Bowdish argues[5]:
- British counterinsurgency doctrine is based upon maneuver warfare, in which one strives to attack the enemy’s “system” from a position of advantage rather than head on through cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal.[6] Nonetheless, Bulloch recognizes that:
- Physical destruction of the enemy still has an important role to play. A degree of attrition will be necessary, but the number of insurgents killed should be no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve success. Commanders should seek “soft” methods of destroying the enemy; by arrest, physical isolation, or subversion, for example. The use of the minimum necessary force is a well-proven counterinsurgency lesson. In an era of intense media intrusiveness—one in which legality, from domestic and international viewpoints, will become ever more important—sound judgment and close control will need to be exercised over the degree of physical destruction which it is possible, necessary, or desirable to inflict. For example, the killing of a teenage gunman could be justifiable in military terms, but its possible effect on his community could jeopardize a potentially far more significant though less spectacular Hearts and Minds operation.[7]
Publications
- Gavin Bulloch, 'Military Doctrine and Counter-Insurgency: A British Perspective,' Parameters 26 (Summer 1996).
- Operations in Troubled States: Post-Cold War Operations and Peace Talks by Gavin Bulloch, Robert H. Dorff, Andrew S. Natsios, Anthony D. Marley, Publisher: DIANE Publishing Company February 1998 ISBN-13: 9780788138775
Notes
- ↑ Alderson, A. 'Revising the British Army's Counter-indurgency doctrine', RUSI Journal August 2007, 152(4)
- ↑ http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/05_Programme.doc
- ↑ Interview with Gavin Bulloch, no longer available online. Version posted here: Interview with Gavin Bulloch
- ↑ "Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective," Brigadier Gavin Bulloch (British Army, Ret.), From Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 4-16, Available on-line at: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/96summer/bulloch.htm, cited in Rules of Engagement; The Reality, not the movie... By C. L. Staten, Sr. National Security Analyst Emergency Response & Research Institute 28 November 2000
- ↑ Chapter 5 [ Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces], Randall G. Bowdish in Sam J. Tangredi (Ed.), Globalization and Maritime Power, Institute for National strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002
- ↑ U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, June 20, 1997), 37
- ↑ Gavin Bulloch, “Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency: A British Perspective,” Parameters 26, no. 2 (Summer 1996), 4–16.
