Difference between revisions of "B. Hugh Tovar"
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| − | [[B. Hugh Tovar]] was a [[CIA]] officer who head the station in Indonesia at the time of the 1965 coup, and later the head of station in Laos.<ref>John Prados, ''Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA'', p.xxviii.</ref> | + | [[B. Hugh Tovar]] was a [[CIA]] officer who head the station in Indonesia at the time of the 1965 coup, and later the head of station in Laos.<ref>John Prados, ''Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA'', Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, p.xxviii.</ref> |
At the inaugural meeting of the [[Consortium for the Study of Intelligence]] in April 1979, Tovar presented an essay on covert action which argued, in [[Roy Godson]]'s summary, that "US covert action capabilities had been eroded seriously during the upheaval of the 1970s."<ref name="Elements15">Roy Godson, ed., ''Intelligence requirements for the 1980s: Elements of Intelligence'', National Strategy Information Center, 1983, pp.15-16.</ref> | At the inaugural meeting of the [[Consortium for the Study of Intelligence]] in April 1979, Tovar presented an essay on covert action which argued, in [[Roy Godson]]'s summary, that "US covert action capabilities had been eroded seriously during the upheaval of the 1970s."<ref name="Elements15">Roy Godson, ed., ''Intelligence requirements for the 1980s: Elements of Intelligence'', National Strategy Information Center, 1983, pp.15-16.</ref> | ||
Revision as of 22:11, 1 December 2012
B. Hugh Tovar was a CIA officer who head the station in Indonesia at the time of the 1965 coup, and later the head of station in Laos.[1]
At the inaugural meeting of the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence in April 1979, Tovar presented an essay on covert action which argued, in Roy Godson's summary, that "US covert action capabilities had been eroded seriously during the upheaval of the 1970s."[2]
