Difference between revisions of "Consortium for the Study of Intelligence"

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(The Future of US Intelligence)
(The Future of US Intelligence)
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==The Future of US Intelligence==
 
==The Future of US Intelligence==
  
In 1996, two senior associates at the [[National Strategy Operations Centre]], [[Abram Shulsky]] and  [[Gary Schmitt]] produced a report for the Consortium entitled The Future of US Intelligence.
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In 1996, two senior associates at the [[National Strategy Information Centre]], [[Abram Shulsky]] and  [[Gary Schmitt]] produced a report for the Consortium entitled The Future of US Intelligence.
  
 
::The document recommended the establishment of "competing analytic centers" with "different points of view" that could "provide policymakers better protection against new 'Pearl Harbors', ie, against being surprised". Rather than a narrow focus on information collection, "intelligence analysis must ... make it more relevant to policymakers by emphasizing the forces that shape a given situation", the authors contend.
 
::The document recommended the establishment of "competing analytic centers" with "different points of view" that could "provide policymakers better protection against new 'Pearl Harbors', ie, against being surprised". Rather than a narrow focus on information collection, "intelligence analysis must ... make it more relevant to policymakers by emphasizing the forces that shape a given situation", the authors contend.

Revision as of 23:04, 16 December 2007

The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence was founded in 1979 as a project of the National Strategy Information Center.

The Future of US Intelligence

In 1996, two senior associates at the National Strategy Information Centre, Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt produced a report for the Consortium entitled The Future of US Intelligence.

The document recommended the establishment of "competing analytic centers" with "different points of view" that could "provide policymakers better protection against new 'Pearl Harbors', ie, against being surprised". Rather than a narrow focus on information collection, "intelligence analysis must ... make it more relevant to policymakers by emphasizing the forces that shape a given situation", the authors contend.
The study's overall conclusion was that the "future of intelligence" depended on building a new model that would offer "greater flexibility in the collection process" and produce the "big picture" of security threats. Ultimately, Shulsky and Schmitt concluded, the purpose of analysis is to help the policymaker shape the future, not predict it. Intelligence analysis should go beyond simply identifying security threats and assessing the military capabilities of a present or future enemy or a competitor nation; it should be "opportunity analysis" that anticipates chances to advance US interests. [1]

The report's recommendations have been as prefiguring the strategy which Shulsky would pursue as director of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans.

Founding Members, 1979

Staff

Director of Research

Notes