Difference between revisions of "Consortium for the Study of Intelligence"

From Powerbase
Jump to: navigation, search
(Conferences)
m (Founding Members, 1979: disambig Richard E. Bissell)
Line 16: Line 16:
  
 
*[[Richard Betts]], Columbia University
 
*[[Richard Betts]], Columbia University
*[[Richard Bissell]], Foreign Policy Research Institute
+
*[[Richard E. Bissell]], Foreign Policy Research Institute
 
*[[Adda Bozeman]], Sarah Lawrence College
 
*[[Adda Bozeman]], Sarah Lawrence College
 
*[[Ray Cline]], Georgetown University
 
*[[Ray Cline]], Georgetown University

Revision as of 19:25, 27 February 2011

The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence was founded in 1979 as a project of the National Strategy Information Center.

"It acted as a catalyst in the founding of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association; the Security and Intelligence Studies Group of the UK Political Studies Association; and the Canadian Association for the Security and Intelligence Studies. Hundreds of faculty members from universities and military colleges throughout the United States, Canada, and the UK have attended Consortium faculty seminars. The Consortium also sponsored numerous publications and studies, and its members continue to make significant individual contributions to the literature on intelligence." [1]

The Future of US Intelligence

In 1996, two senior associates at the National Strategy Information Center, Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt produced a report for the Consortium entitled The Future of US Intelligence.

The document recommended the establishment of "competing analytic centers" with "different points of view" that could "provide policymakers better protection against new 'Pearl Harbors', ie, against being surprised". Rather than a narrow focus on information collection, "intelligence analysis must ... make it more relevant to policymakers by emphasizing the forces that shape a given situation", the authors contend.
The study's overall conclusion was that the "future of intelligence" depended on building a new model that would offer "greater flexibility in the collection process" and produce the "big picture" of security threats. Ultimately, Shulsky and Schmitt concluded, the purpose of analysis is to help the policymaker shape the future, not predict it. Intelligence analysis should go beyond simply identifying security threats and assessing the military capabilities of a present or future enemy or a competitor nation; it should be "opportunity analysis" that anticipates chances to advance US interests. [2]

The report's recommendations have been seen as prefiguring the strategy which Shulsky would pursue as director of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans.

Founding Members, 1979

Staff

Director of Research

Conferences

Notes