Fusion Doctrine

UK national security doctrine emphasising integration of all government capabilities

Fusion Doctrine is a UK national security policy framework introduced in March 2018 as part of the National Security Capability Review (NSCR). It promotes a "whole-of-government" approach to national security, integrating diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence, development, and influence capabilities to deliver coordinated responses to complex threats, particularly hybrid warfare, terrorism, and state-based challenges from actors such as Russia and China.

Origins and adoption

Multi-agency all-source intelligence initiatives in the UK (2001–2010)

The intelligence fusion doctrine in the United Kingdom prior to the creation of the National Security Council in 2010 referred to early multi-agency efforts to integrate all-source intelligence (combining data from multiple agencies and disciplines) through co-location, shared analysis and joint assessment centres. These initiatives aimed to break down institutional silos in response to the post-9/11 terrorist threat.

Although the formal term "Fusion Doctrine" was introduced in 2018 as part of the National Security Capability Review, the underlying concept of fused, all-source intelligence was operationalised in practice from 2001 through dedicated centres that co-located specialists from MI5, police, military and other bodies to produce integrated threat assessments.

Evidence of fusion thinking in pre-2010 initiatives

The provided initiatives demonstrate fusion in practice through co-location, cross-agency staffing and all-source analysis:

• October 2001 Counter-Terrorism Analysis Centre (CTAC): Established by MI5 post-9/11 as a threat assessment section. Evidence of fusion thinking: “In October 2001… MI5 quickly established a threat assessment section known as the Counter-Terrorism Analysis Centre or CTAC… [expanded to] act as a clearing house for threat assessment” with specialist staff from other security services.

• June 2003 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC): Replaced CTAC as an early multi-agency "fusion" hub. Evidence: JTAC was created “to break down institutional barriers between intelligence agencies by the process of co-locating […] and creating a new shared identity through JTAC membership.” It fused specialists from 16 organisations to produce all-source national terrorism assessments.

• 10 June 2006 Defence Geographic and Imagery Intelligence Agency renamed Intelligence Collection Group (ICG): Consolidated geospatial, imagery and signals units under a single defence intelligence structure to improve joint collection and fusion.

• 2006/2007 NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) at RAF Molesworth: UK-hosted multinational body for fused NATO intelligence.

• 2008 Tactical Land Intelligence Fusion Centre (LIFC) in Afghanistan: Established by 4 Military Intelligence Battalion in Helmand to fuse tactical intelligence for operational advantage.

In practice, fusion meant co-located analysts from disparate agencies produced single, authoritative all-source products (threat levels, assessments) rather than siloed reports, enabling faster decision-making on counter-terrorism and operations.

Adoption of fusion post-2001

Fusion was adopted rapidly after the 11 September 2001 attacks as a direct response to perceived intelligence-sharing failures. The UK anticipated US 9/11 Commission recommendations by creating CTAC within weeks and JTAC in 2003.

Key influencers included:

• Eliza Manningham-Buller (MI5 Director General 2002–2007), who initiated the MI5-based assessment group that evolved into JTAC.
• David Omand (Security and Intelligence Coordinator 2002–2005), who drove centralisation of threat assessment, visited the US and collaborated with John Brennan (then US TTIC head) to model joint all-source working.

Stephen Lander (MI5 Director General until 2002) commented post hoc on the value of increased international and inter-agency cooperation but was not the primary decision-maker for JTAC.

Origins of the concept

The model was primarily influenced by US post-9/11 reforms (Terrorist Threat Integration Center / National Counterterrorism Center) rather than Israel. UK officials explicitly referenced US lessons on breaking silos through fused centres. No primary sources link early UK fusion centres directly to Israeli models; the driver was the global jihadist threat and 9/11/Bali attacks.

These pre-2010 centres laid the practical foundation for the later formal "Fusion Doctrine" mainstreamed by the National Security Council after 2010.

After 2010

The doctrine was developed under National Security Adviser Sir Mark Sedwill and formally launched by Prime Minister Theresa May in the NSCR. It built on the National Security Council (established 2010) and lessons from the Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Report), aiming to move beyond siloed departmental working towards "strategy-led design of policy and planning" with clear accountability.

Key mechanisms include Senior Responsible Owners (SROs) at three-star level leading National Strategy Implementation Groups for NSC priorities, annual posture reviews, and cross-government coordination of economic and influence tools alongside traditional security levers.

The UK's Fusion Doctrine, introduced in the 2018 National Security Capability Review (NSCR), was a "whole-of-government" approach aimed at better orchestrating all national capabilities—from economic to military to diplomatic—to achieve national security objectives.

Its main changes and innovations included:

• Integrated use of all national levers: The core innovation was the explicit commitment to using the full spectrum of state power in a joined-up way to achieve objectives, rather than relying on individual departmental efforts. This meant leveraging economic, security, and influence capabilities in concert to make the UK's response "greater than the sum of its parts". In other words this gave the intelligence services markedly increased power and oversight over the whole of rlevant government departments and areas of activity.
• Breaking down silos: The doctrine aimed to move away from a "federated system" of policy delivery towards genuine "teamwork" across government departments and agencies, breaking down traditional organizational boundaries. Again this allows enhanced intelligence power and control over government.
• Formalised coordination mechanisms: It embedded the use of the Fusion Doctrine framework in all National Security Council (NSC) meetings and introduced specific structures for delivery.
• Senior Responsible Officials (SROs) were appointed for specific national security priorities, personally accountable to the NSC for coordinating cross-departmental work.
• National Security Strategy Implementation Groups (NSSIGs) were created as cross-government working groups under the NSC Secretariat to develop and deliver strategies for specific geographic or thematic areas.
• Emphasis on the private sector: The doctrine was a notable departure from previous approaches in fully recognizing that the private sector is a core, integral component of national security, not just a provider of technical solutions.
• Addressing 'hybrid' threats: It was designed to address complex, ambiguous threats, such as 'hybrid warfare' and state-based disinformation campaigns, which blur the lines between war and peace, domestic and foreign policy, and require a multi-agency response. This allowed the intelligence services to gain more power and control over propaganda and communications in government.

While the specific term "Fusion Doctrine" has largely been superseded by the language of "integration" in the subsequent 2021 Integrated Review and 2025 National Security Strategy, the underlying principles of a whole-of-government, integrated approach to national security have been retained and deepened.

According to a 2019 account published by RUSI:

The end of this month marks the first anniversary of the UK’s Fusion Doctrine. Launched as a central component of last year’s National Security and Capability Review (NSCR), Fusion Doctrine is Mark Sedwill’s National Security Council (NSC) initiative to fuse capabilities, across ‘economic, security, social and the rest’, to deliver strategy-led design of policy and planning. The latest conceptual evolution of the old administrative coordination doctrine, Fusion’s aim should not be a surprise given Sedwill’s diplomatic and economic background.

To improve decision-making, the NSC has appointed three-star Senior Responsible Owners (SRO) taken from across government departments to lead National Security Strategy and Implementation Groups. The individual groups focus on clearly defined thematic/regional areas of interest and risks, while recognising that the different areas will have some intersecting commonalities. The developing structure drives cross-department engagement, inputs and leadership to examine the multifaceted NSC priorities. It also requires agility to rapidly adapt as the UK’s strategic context evolves. In short, Sedwill is leading a mindset change across understanding, accountability, interdepartmental practices and capability decisions. This is a significant improvement on previous sofa government deliberations.

Fusion Doctrine

Fusion Doctrine is the UK national security policy framework formally launched in the National Security Capability Review (NSCR) on 28 March 2018. It promotes a "whole-of-government" approach that integrates diplomatic, military, economic, intelligence, development and influence capabilities to deliver coordinated responses to complex threats, particularly hybrid warfare, terrorism and state-based challenges.

The doctrine was developed under National Security Adviser Sir Mark Sedwill and explicitly built on lessons from the Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Report) and earlier concepts such as the "Comprehensive Approach", "Integrated Approach" and "Full Spectrum Approach" used in UK strategy since the early 2000s.

Pre-2018 use of the term "Fusion"

The specific term "Fusion Doctrine" was not officially adopted before 2018, but the underlying idea of fusing capabilities across government departments had been developing for several years. From 2015 onward, cross-government "fusion" initiatives appeared in counter-terrorism and hybrid-threat work, though without the formal doctrine label. The National Security Council (established 2010) provided the structural foundation for these efforts.

A quintessential early example of "fusion thinking" is the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), established in June 2003 following the 11 September attacks. JTAC was explicitly designed to break down "silos" by fusing all-source intelligence into a single, independent national assessment. It is a multi-agency hub drawing personnel from MI5, MI6, GCHQ, Defence Intelligence and the Police, and produces the UK's National Terrorism Threat Levels.

Timeline of Fusion-related bodies and doctrine

• October 2001 Counter-Terrorism Analysis Centre (CTAC): October 2001 - Established by MI5 post-9/11 as threat assessment section. Evidence of fusion thinking: “In October 2001… MI5 quickly established a threat assessment section known as the Counter-Terrorism Analysis Centre or CTAC… [expanded to] act as a clearing house for threat assessment” with specialist staff from other security services.

• June 2003: Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) established, replacing CTAC, as an early multi-agency "fusion" hub to break down silos and produce all-source national terrorism assessments.

• 10 June 2006 Defence Geographic and Imagery Intelligence Agency renamed Intelligence Collection Group (ICG).

• 2006/2007: NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) created at RAF Molesworth (UK-hosted, NATO-chartered multinational intelligence fusion body).

• 2008: Tactical origins of the Land Intelligence Fusion Centre (LIFC). 4 Military Intelligence Battalion established a Land Intelligence Fusion Centre (Afghanistan) to transform tactical intelligence delivery in Helmand Province.

• 2010: National Security Council (NSC) established – the central body through which Fusion Doctrine is now applied.

• April 2011: National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC): April 2011 - Interagency body for maritime safety/security threats. Evidence of fusion thinking: “In 2011, the UK established the National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC), which fuses together all-source data to create the most complete picture of daily maritime activity that the UK has ever had.”

• 1 April 2012: Formation of the Joint Forces Intelligence Group (JFIG) (renamed from the Intelligence Collection Group). - moved into the Pathfinder Building, RAF Wyton in January 2013. JFIG was the superior umbrella organisation that included the DGIFC as a key component; the DGIFC was relocated to RAF Wyton under JFIG. Davies writes: Headquartered at the Pathfinder facility at RAF Wyton, JFIG overseas a range of specialist collection and processing units such as the Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre (formerly the Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre, DGIFC, [2013-2015], formerly the Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre, JARIC, [1947-2013]); the Defence Geographic Centre, DGC, (formerly the Military Survey); the Joint Service Signals Organisation (JSSO, a resuscitated version of the Cold War Composite Signals Organisation) and a geospatial Engineers unit designation with the Joint Aeronautic and Geospatial Organisation or JAGO.

• 13 July 2012: Renamed the Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre (DGIFC) from JARIC.

• March 2013 A suite of UK-based single service fusion centres opened (Denison Barracks, Hermitage) -established as part of Army 2020 reforms for reach-back intelligence. Evidence of fusion thinking: “The result has been establishment of a suite of single-Service intelligence fusion centres (the Air Warfare Intelligence Centre, Land Intelligence Fusion Centre and Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centre)”. 'Following last week's Government announcement that bases in Germany will be closing , defence secretary Philip Hammond promised £10m to expand Denison Barracks to house the Military Stabilisation Support Unit, the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit, Land Intelligence Fusion Centre and 15 Psychological Operations Group. An MoD Basing Plan dated 5 March 2013, does state, however, that the Land Intelligence Fusion Centre already existed at Bulford, Devizes and was estimated to move to Denison Barracks in 2015. The other two single service fusion centres are not mentioned. The MIFC is mentioned in 2022 as winning the 'Fleet Intelligence Trophy'. A 2019 comment states: 'MIFC in RAF Wyton, MIXG in Collingwood.' A 2025 comment states: 'On the RN side, you have the MIFC Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centre ( not the FIOC I named earlier , I used the old name. ) which is part of the MIXG. Maritime Intelligence Exploitation Group. ( There are several of these “Exploitation” Groups in the RN now…. The MIXG itself is an “umbrella org” for RN Int elements and reports to the OAC, Operational Advantage Centre, itself under Commander Ops. So in effect intell data is passed directly to the Fleet Commander at Northwood.'

• 17 September 2014: DGIFC renamed the Defence Intelligence Fusion Centre (DIFC) to reflect its broader multi-source fusion role.

• 2016: National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) established as a fusion hub for cyber intelligence.

• 2016: JFIG disbanded; DIFC’s core geospatial capabilities re-roled to form the National Centre for Geospatial Intelligence (NCGI).

• 2018 (28 March): Fusion Doctrine formally launched in the NSCR, introducing Senior Responsible Owners (SROs) and National Strategy Implementation Groups (NSIGs).

• 2018 onward: National Strategy Implementation Groups (NSIGs) created as cross-government structures led by SROs.

• 2020/2021: National Cyber Force (NCF) established as a GCHQ–Ministry of Defence partnership for offensive cyber operations.

• 2021: Counter Terrorism Operations Centre (CTOC) became operational, co-locating JTAC, Counter-Terrorism Policing and intelligence agencies.

• Late 2025: Launch of Military Intelligence Services (MIS). The Land Intelligence Fusion Centre (LIFC) — the British Army’s specialist “Intelligence Engine” providing reach-back intelligence for land operations — was integrated into the new MIS structure. It is part of the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Group within the British Army and is co-located at MOD Chicksands with the Intelligence Corps headquarters and other intelligence bodies.

The National Centre for Geospatial Intelligence (NCGI) at RAF Wyton serves as the lead body for GEOINT and OSINT and acts as the central hub for many of these fusion capabilities.

Fusion doctrine and counter disinformation

In March 2018 the Telegraph reported that the counter disinformation and soft power aspects of the fusion doctrine were being directed by the intelligence services:

British spies will launch a counter-propaganda war against the Russians as part of a major overhaul of the UK's security capabilities announced by Theresa May.

The Prime Minister has instructed the intelligence services to use social media to disrupt misinformation as she promised to use "every capability at our disposal" to defeat the new threat facing Britain...

The plan, dubbed the Fusion Doctrine, aims to tackle the evolving threats posed by cyber warfare and so-called fake news as well as bombs.

Security experts on Tuesday warned President Putin's Government has pumped out over 20 different stories to explain the Salisbury attack so far in a bid to "confuse the picture and confuse the charge sheet."

They said the UK's soft-power capabilities and ability to counter propaganda online will form part of the new front line...

The UK must also employ "soft power" and counter-propaganda on social media - including by "suffocating" hashtags on Twitter to prevent Isil from getting its messaging out and disseminating alternative narratives online.

Boosting the role of the BBC's World Service to promote British values abroad, ensuring Ofcom shuts down media organisations which do not meet high British standards and funding units to counter fake news are all part of the plan, sources said.

One security source said the Government had not done enough in the past to deter multi-layered threats, allowing countries like Russia to evolve their action against the UK without major recriminations...

Communications will play an integral role in the new mission, the report states, and countering misinformation will be an important weapon in the armory.

Russia is adept at pumping out narratives which support its version of events and officials said over 20 different explanations for the poison attack in Salisbury have so far been identified in a bid to "confuse" experts.

A senior Whitehall official said: "It's sometimes easy to think about hard-edge direct delivery capabilities but actually, in the modern era, particularly with social media in the era of cyber space, those other capabilities, communications, some of the soft power, these are important too."

Parliamentary and external views

The Joint Committee on National Security Strategy welcomed the doctrine in principle as strengthening NSC authority and whole-of-government working, but noted implementation challenges, including limited private-sector and ally engagement, and questioned the separation of the defence strand from the NSCR.

Critics described it as evolutionary rather than revolutionary, with some labelling it the "confusion doctrine" due to its broad scope. RUSI and others viewed it positively as a step towards better accountability but cautioned on delivery.

International adoption

No other country has formally adopted a doctrine named "Fusion Doctrine". Similar whole-of-government or "integrated" approaches exist elsewhere (e.g., US "integrated deterrence" and NATO emphasis on hybrid threats), but these differ in structure and terminology. The UK concept remains distinctive in its explicit linkage of economic/influence tools with security under NSC-led SRO accountability.

Resources

• https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5af1991040f0b642e2d8fa06/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf
• https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-guidance-for-integrated-working
• https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtnatsec/2072/207206.htm
• https://www.saferworld-global.org/downloads/fusionreportonlinedocument.pdf
• https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/60521238d3bf7f04591df707/20210316-OMSE_new_web-O.pdf