Difference between revisions of "Fusion Doctrine"

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:Russia is adept at pumping out narratives which support its version of events and officials said over 20 different explanations for the poison attack in Salisbury have so far been identified in a bid to "confuse" experts.  
 
:Russia is adept at pumping out narratives which support its version of events and officials said over 20 different explanations for the poison attack in Salisbury have so far been identified in a bid to "confuse" experts.  
 
:A senior Whitehall official said: "It's sometimes easy to think about hard-edge direct delivery capabilities but actually, in the modern era, particularly with social media in the era of cyber space, those other capabilities, communications, some of the soft power, these are important too." <ref>https://archive.is/XG7M9</ref>
 
:A senior Whitehall official said: "It's sometimes easy to think about hard-edge direct delivery capabilities but actually, in the modern era, particularly with social media in the era of cyber space, those other capabilities, communications, some of the soft power, these are important too." <ref>https://archive.is/XG7M9</ref>
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== Parliamentary and external views ==
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The Joint Committee on National Security Strategy welcomed the doctrine in principle as strengthening NSC authority and whole-of-government working, but noted implementation challenges, including limited private-sector and ally engagement, and questioned the separation of the defence strand from the NSCR.<ref name="JCNSS2019">Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, "Revisiting the UK's national security strategy", 21 July 2019, [https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201719/jtselect/jtnatsec/2072/207206.htm].</ref>
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Critics described it as evolutionary rather than revolutionary, with some labelling it the "confusion doctrine" due to its broad scope. RUSI and others viewed it positively as a step towards better accountability but cautioned on delivery.<ref name="RUSI2019">RUSI, "Fusion Doctrine: One Year On", 8 March 2019.</ref>
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== International adoption ==
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No other country has formally adopted a doctrine named "Fusion Doctrine". Similar whole-of-government or "integrated" approaches exist elsewhere (e.g., US "integrated deterrence" and NATO emphasis on hybrid threats), but these differ in structure and terminology. The UK concept remains distinctive in its explicit linkage of economic/influence tools with security under NSC-led SRO accountability.<ref name="Hybrid2023">Various analyses, including hybrid warfare studies, note the UK's approach as distinctive but not directly replicated.</ref>
  
 
==Resources==
 
==Resources==

Revision as of 12:08, 8 May 2026

The UK's Fusion Doctrine, introduced in the 2018 National Security Capability Review (NSCR), was a "whole-of-government" approach aimed at better orchestrating all national capabilities—from economic to military to diplomatic—to achieve national security objectives.[1][2]

Its main changes and innovations included:

  • Integrated use of all national levers: The core innovation was the explicit commitment to using the full spectrum of state power in a joined-up way to achieve objectives, rather than relying on individual departmental efforts. This meant leveraging economic, security, and influence capabilities in concert to make the UK's response "greater than the sum of its parts". In other words this gave the intelligence services markedly increased power and oversight over the whole of rlevant government departments and areas of activity.[3]
  • Breaking down silos: The doctrine aimed to move away from a "federated system" of policy delivery towards genuine "teamwork" across government departments and agencies, breaking down traditional organizational boundaries. Again this allows enhanced intelligence power and control over government.
  • Formalised coordination mechanisms: It embedded the use of the Fusion Doctrine framework in all National Security Council (NSC) meetings and introduced specific structures for delivery.
  • Senior Responsible Officials (SROs) were appointed for specific national security priorities, personally accountable to the NSC for coordinating cross-departmental work.
  • National Security Strategy Implementation Groups (NSSIGs) were created as cross-government working groups under the NSC Secretariat to develop and deliver strategies for specific geographic or thematic areas.
  • Emphasis on the private sector: The doctrine was a notable departure from previous approaches in fully recognizing that the private sector is a core, integral component of national security, not just a provider of technical solutions.[4]
  • Addressing 'hybrid' threats: It was designed to address complex, ambiguous threats, such as 'hybrid warfare' and state-based disinformation campaigns, which blur the lines between war and peace, domestic and foreign policy, and require a multi-agency response. This allowed the intelligence services to gain more power and control over propaganda and communications in government.

While the specific term "Fusion Doctrine" has largely been superseded by the language of "integration" in the subsequent 2021 Integrated Review[5][6] and 2025 National Security Strategy, the underlying principles of a whole-of-government, integrated approach to national security have been retained and deepened. [7]

According to a 2019 account published by RUSI:

The end of this month marks the first anniversary of the UK’s Fusion Doctrine. Launched as a central component of last year’s National Security and Capability Review (NSCR), Fusion Doctrine is Mark Sedwill’s National Security Council (NSC) initiative to fuse capabilities, across ‘economic, security, social and the rest’, to deliver strategy-led design of policy and planning. The latest conceptual evolution of the old administrative coordination doctrine, Fusion’s aim should not be a surprise given Sedwill’s diplomatic and economic background.
To improve decision-making, the NSC has appointed three-star Senior Responsible Owners (SRO) taken from across government departments to lead National Security Strategy and Implementation Groups. The individual groups focus on clearly defined thematic/regional areas of interest and risks, while recognising that the different areas will have some intersecting commonalities. The developing structure drives cross-department engagement, inputs and leadership to examine the multifaceted NSC priorities. It also requires agility to rapidly adapt as the UK’s strategic context evolves. In short, Sedwill is leading a mindset change across understanding, accountability, interdepartmental practices and capability decisions. This is a significant improvement on previous sofa government deliberations.[8]

Fusion doctrine and counter disinformation

In March 2018 the Telegraph reported that the counter disinformation and soft power aspects of the fusion doctrine were being directed by the intelligence services:

British spies will launch a counter-propaganda war against the Russians as part of a major overhaul of the UK's security capabilities announced by Theresa May.
The Prime Minister has instructed the intelligence services to use social media to disrupt misinformation as she promised to use "every capability at our disposal" to defeat the new threat facing Britain...
The plan, dubbed the Fusion Doctrine, aims to tackle the evolving threats posed by cyber warfare and so-called fake news as well as bombs.
Security experts on Tuesday warned President Putin's Government has pumped out over 20 different stories to explain the Salisbury attack so far in a bid to "confuse the picture and confuse the charge sheet."
They said the UK's soft-power capabilities and ability to counter propaganda online will form part of the new front line...
The UK must also employ "soft power" and counter-propaganda on social media - including by "suffocating" hashtags on Twitter to prevent Isil from getting its messaging out and disseminating alternative narratives online.
Boosting the role of the BBC's World Service to promote British values abroad, ensuring Ofcom shuts down media organisations which do not meet high British standards and funding units to counter fake news are all part of the plan, sources said.
One security source said the Government had not done enough in the past to deter multi-layered threats, allowing countries like Russia to evolve their action against the UK without major recriminations...
Communications will play an integral role in the new mission, the report states, and countering misinformation will be an important weapon in the armory.
Russia is adept at pumping out narratives which support its version of events and officials said over 20 different explanations for the poison attack in Salisbury have so far been identified in a bid to "confuse" experts.
A senior Whitehall official said: "It's sometimes easy to think about hard-edge direct delivery capabilities but actually, in the modern era, particularly with social media in the era of cyber space, those other capabilities, communications, some of the soft power, these are important too." [9]

Parliamentary and external views

The Joint Committee on National Security Strategy welcomed the doctrine in principle as strengthening NSC authority and whole-of-government working, but noted implementation challenges, including limited private-sector and ally engagement, and questioned the separation of the defence strand from the NSCR.[10]

Critics described it as evolutionary rather than revolutionary, with some labelling it the "confusion doctrine" due to its broad scope. RUSI and others viewed it positively as a step towards better accountability but cautioned on delivery.[11]

International adoption

No other country has formally adopted a doctrine named "Fusion Doctrine". Similar whole-of-government or "integrated" approaches exist elsewhere (e.g., US "integrated deterrence" and NATO emphasis on hybrid threats), but these differ in structure and terminology. The UK concept remains distinctive in its explicit linkage of economic/influence tools with security under NSC-led SRO accountability.[12]

Resources

Notes