State Violence and Collusion Timeline 1986 - Revision history

Melissa Jones at 23:48, 26 December 2012

2012-12-26T23:48:54Z

Tom Griffin: /* December */

2012-12-15T11:27:09Z

December

Tom Griffin: may

2012-12-15T10:56:52Z

may

Tom Griffin: /* April */

2012-12-15T10:55:47Z

April

Tom Griffin: /* January */

2012-12-15T10:52:45Z

January

Tom Griffin: february

2012-12-15T02:43:52Z

february

Tom Griffin: December

2012-12-14T22:17:57Z

December

Tom Griffin: /* July */

2012-12-14T22:14:52Z

July

Tom Griffin: /* April */

2012-12-14T22:14:17Z

April

Tom Griffin: /* July */

2012-12-14T22:13:52Z

July

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:48, 26 December 2012
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−	Events related to state violence and collusion in Northern Ireland in 1986.	+	Events related to [[State Violence and Collusion Project\|state violence and collusion in Northern Ireland]] in 1986.

	==January==		==January==

@@ Line 22: / Line 22: @@
 ==December==
 *'''11''' - a report of the [[Joint Intelligence Committee]] states that [[RUC]] and [[Security Service]] action had frustrated a number of further loyalist arms procurement operations, with [[Ulster Defence Association]] (UDA) members and sympathisers - including three members of the Territorial Army - having been arrested. According to this report, the seizure "represents a severe setback for UDA efforts to procure arms on the mainland, disrupting a hitherto safe route from Scotland to Belfast".<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Action taken by the security forces to tackle loyalist terrorism], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 ==Notes==

@@ Line 4: / Line 4: @@
 *'''3''' -  An [[FRU]] contact form states that loyalist: "[L/28] … admitted that the 'Int' had 'gone down hill' since source's departure. In actual fact the UDA are still unable to use the Intelligence files created by … [Nelson] on the computer because he withheld part of the password."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 *'''15''' - A [[Security Service]] internal note recorded that [[Brian Nelson]] could provide the Service with "top level access" to the [[UDA]]. The intelligence that he could potentially provide was seen to be particularly important given the "increasing political links between unionists and paramilitaries".<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
-*'''23''' - In an internal [[Security Service]] note, [[MI5 F Branch|F Branch]] responsible for dealing with Irish-related terrorism suggested that "ASP [Assistant Secretary Political] take soundings of the [[FRU]] to establish their willingness to handover … [Nelson].<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref> ".
+*'''23''' - In an internal [[Security Service]] note, [[MI5 F Branch|F Branch]] responsible for dealing with Irish-related terrorism suggested that "ASP [Assistant Secretary Political] take soundings of the [[FRU]] to establish their willingness to handover … [Nelson]."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref> .
 ==February==
@@ Line 14: / Line 14: @@
 ==May==
-*'''c. 21''' - [[FRU]] and [[Security Service]] officers flew to West Germany in May 1986 to seek to meet [[Brian Nelson]]. One of these officers, A/11, noted that the FRU's rationale for re-establishing contact with Nelson was the "deteriorating attitude of certain loyalist elements within Northern Ireland towards the British Government as well as the RUC". Nelson's potential as an agent was described as "enormous" and he was thought to possess "the potential to go far should he return and carry on from where he left off".[54] However, the meeting was ultimately aborted when the intelligence officers unexpectedly encountered Nelson's family.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Action taken by the security forces to tackle loyalist terrorism], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
+*'''c. 21''' - [[FRU]] and [[Security Service]] officers flew to West Germany in May 1986 to seek to meet [[Brian Nelson]]. One of these officers, A/11, noted that the FRU's rationale for re-establishing contact with Nelson was the "deteriorating attitude of certain loyalist elements within Northern Ireland towards the British Government as well as the RUC". Nelson's potential as an agent was described as "enormous" and he was thought to possess "the potential to go far should he return and carry on from where he left off".[54] However, the meeting was ultimately aborted when the intelligence officers unexpectedly encountered Nelson's family.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 ==July==

@@ Line 12: / Line 12: @@
 *'''25''' - A letter from the Director General of the [[Security Service]] Sir [[Antony Duff]] to the Cabinet Secretary Sir [[Robert Armstrong]], in April 1986 outlined operations to frustrate loyalist attempts to purchase weapons in Scotland and London, with two further investigations into possible future attempts continuing.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Action taken by the security forces to tackle loyalist terrorism], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 *'''29''' - Sir [[Antony Duff]]'s briefing is circulated to Sir [[Percy Cradock]] at the [[Prime Minister's office]] under the title, ''Loyalist Paramilitary Activity''.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Action taken by the security forces to tackle loyalist terrorism], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 ==July==

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 ==January==
 *'''3''' -  An [[FRU]] contact form states that loyalist: "[L/28] … admitted that the 'Int' had 'gone down hill' since source's departure. In actual fact the UDA are still unable to use the Intelligence files created by … [Nelson] on the computer because he withheld part of the password."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch6">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter006/ Volume 1 - Chapter 6: The recruitment of Brian Nelson], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 ==February==

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 Events related to state violence and collusion in Northern Ireland in 1986.
 ==April==
-*'''25''' - A letter from the Director General of the [[Security Service]] Sir [[Antony Duff]] to the Cabinet Secretary Sir [[Robert Armstrong]], in April 1986 outlined operations to frustrate loyalist attempts to purchase weapons in Scotland and London, with two further investigations into possible future attempts continuing.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
+*'''25''' - A letter from the Director General of the [[Security Service]] Sir [[Antony Duff]] to the Cabinet Secretary Sir [[Robert Armstrong]], in April 1986 outlined operations to frustrate loyalist attempts to purchase weapons in Scotland and London, with two further investigations into possible future attempts continuing.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Action taken by the security forces to tackle loyalist terrorism], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
-*'''29''' - Sir [[Antony Duff]]'s briefing is circulated to Sir [[Percy Cradock]] at the [[Prime Minister's office]] under the title, ''Loyalist Paramilitary Activity''.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
+*'''29''' - Sir [[Antony Duff]]'s briefing is circulated to Sir [[Percy Cradock]] at the [[Prime Minister's office]] under the title, ''Loyalist Paramilitary Activity''.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Action taken by the security forces to tackle loyalist terrorism], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 ==July==
-*'''3''' A note produced for the Joint Intelligence Committee Chair entitled ''Loyalist Paramilitary Activity'' stated that: "… staff [in the Security Service] have commented that if the [[UDA]] had obtained these weapons, it would have represented a significant increase in its available arsenal and operational capabilities."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
+*'''3''' A note produced for the Joint Intelligence Committee Chair entitled ''Loyalist Paramilitary Activity'' stated that: "… staff [in the Security Service] have commented that if the [[UDA]] had obtained these weapons, it would have represented a significant increase in its available arsenal and operational capabilities."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Action taken by the security forces to tackle loyalist terrorism], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 *'''26''' - 'Directive for the Force Research Unit (Northern Ireland)' promulgated by Major General [[A. S. Jeapes]], Commander Land Forces.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch4">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter004/ Volume 1 - Chapter 4: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 ==December==
-*'''11''' - a report of the [[Joint Intelligence Committee]] states that [[RUC]] and [[Security Service]] action had frustrated a number of further loyalist arms procurement operations, with [[Ulster Defence Association]] (UDA) members and sympathisers - including three members of the Territorial Army - having been arrested. According to this report, the seizure "represents a severe setback for UDA efforts to procure arms on the mainland, disrupting a hitherto safe route from Scotland to Belfast".<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
+*'''11''' - a report of the [[Joint Intelligence Committee]] states that [[RUC]] and [[Security Service]] action had frustrated a number of further loyalist arms procurement operations, with [[Ulster Defence Association]] (UDA) members and sympathisers - including three members of the Territorial Army - having been arrested. According to this report, the seizure "represents a severe setback for UDA efforts to procure arms on the mainland, disrupting a hitherto safe route from Scotland to Belfast".<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Action taken by the security forces to tackle loyalist terrorism], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
 ==Notes==

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:13, 14 December 2012
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	==July==		==July==
		+	*'''3''' A note produced for the Joint Intelligence Committee Chair entitled ''Loyalist Paramilitary Activity''' stated that:"… staff [in the Security Service] have commented that if the [[UDA]] had obtained these weapons, it would have represented a significant increase in its available arsenal and operational capabilities."<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch5">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter005/ Volume 1 - Chapter 5: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>
	*'''26''' - 'Directive for the Force Research Unit (Northern Ireland)' promulgated by Major General [[A. S. Jeapes]], Commander Land Forces.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch4">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter004/ Volume 1 - Chapter 4: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>		*'''26''' - 'Directive for the Force Research Unit (Northern Ireland)' promulgated by Major General [[A. S. Jeapes]], Commander Land Forces.<ref name="DeSilvavol1Ch4">Sir Desmond de Silva, [http://www.patfinucanereview.org/report/volume01/chapter004/ Volume 1 - Chapter 4: Agent-handling], Pat Finucane Review, 12 December 2012.</ref>