Saudi media and propaganda - Revision history

Melissa Jones: /* Early history */ links added

2016-09-23T02:35:14Z

Early history: links added

Melissa Jones: /* Post 9-11 */

2016-09-23T02:28:25Z

Post 9-11

Melissa Jones: /* Early history */

2016-09-23T02:27:03Z

Early history

David at 07:32, 24 September 2009

2009-09-24T07:32:59Z

Paul: explanation expansion

2006-12-13T12:18:52Z

explanation expansion

Paul: grammo fix

2006-12-13T12:18:06Z

grammo fix

Paul: add a bit of history + typo fix

2006-12-13T11:37:13Z

add a bit of history + typo fix

Paul: change format

2006-12-13T11:17:28Z

change format

Paul: some history

2006-12-13T11:15:03Z

some history

Paul: grammo fix

2006-12-12T23:45:10Z

grammo fix

@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 ==Early history==
 The Saudi forays into media were reactive to nationalist movements in the Arab world (1970s) and a function of the Saudi new-found wealth.  Oifi relates the early motivation for Saudi-media control:
-<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The drive to establish Saudi control over the Arab media started in the 1970s in an attempt to counter Nasser's ''Sawt al-Arab'' (voice of the Arabs) radio. Prince Salman was one of the first to realise what was at stake and acquired ''[[Asharq Al-Awsat]]'', started in 1978 in London by two brothers of Saudi origin, Hisham and Muhammad Ali Hafiz. Their assistants were Kamal Adham and Turki al-Faisal, both prominent figures in Saudi intelligence.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], ''Le monde diplomatique'', Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
+<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The drive to establish Saudi control over the Arab media started in the 1970s in an attempt to counter Nasser's ''Sawt al-Arab'' (voice of the Arabs) radio. Prince Salman was one of the first to realise what was at stake and acquired ''[[Asharq Al-Awsat]]'', started in 1978 in London by two brothers of Saudi origin, Hisham and Muhammad Ali Hafiz. Their assistants were [[Kamal Adham]] and [[Turki al-Faisal]], both prominent figures in Saudi intelligence.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], ''Le monde diplomatique'', Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
-Around the same time Saudis acquired publishing and news interests in Lebanon.  The distinguishing characteristic of their publishing business was its emphasis on promoting the Saudi image and sabotaging anything remotely critical of Saudi elites -- Edward Said once described how these Saudi-related groups had worked to block the publications of one of his books. The output of those publishing houses was all directed outside Saudi Arabia (most Saudis don't like to read). Also in evidence at this time was the alignment of Saudi interests in Lebanon with Lebanese Christian businessmen and journalists.
+Around the same time Saudis acquired publishing and news interests in Lebanon.  The distinguishing characteristic of their publishing business was its emphasis on promoting the Saudi image and sabotaging anything remotely critical of Saudi elites -- Edward Said once described how these Saudi-related groups had worked to block the publications of one of his books. The output of those publishing houses was all directed outside Saudi Arabia. Also in evidence at this time was the alignment of Saudi interests in Lebanon with Lebanese Christian businessmen and journalists.
 ===Al Hayat===
-In 1946, Kamil Mroue started a conservative daily opposing Arab nationalism.  It ceased publication in 1976 due to the assassination of the founder and the Lebanese civil war. Oifi relates the relationship between the Saudis-US and Lebanese Christian groups:
+In 1946, [[Kamil Mroue]] started a conservative daily opposing Arab nationalism.  It ceased publication in 1976 due to the assassination of its founder and the Lebanese civil war. Oifi relates the relationship between the Saudis-US and Lebanese Christian groups:
-<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">Jamil Mroue, Kamil's son, relaunched ''Al-Hayat'' in London in October 1988 with the financial support of the Saudi prince, Khaled bin Sultan, the son of the defence minister, who subquently took over ownership. ''Al-Hayat'' played a decisive role during the first Gulf war, demonising the regime of Saddam Hussein and justifying US intervention. It opened its pages to Iraqi opposition movements, in particular the Kurds and Shia. As it was directed by Lebanese Christians, its critics took to referring to ''Al-Hayat'' as a minority newspaper in the service of a prince.<br>It nevertheless remains a pluralist paper in which journalists evenly distributed between the pro-Arab and western camps coexist. But although it purports to provide a pan-Arab view of the news, the Lebanese perspective prevails: praise for the nation-state generally goes hand-in-hand with tough criticism of any sense of Arab solidarity.<br>The Americans turned to the pro-western camp when they needed recruits to run their media strategy targeting the Arab world, especially Iraq. For instance the former head of ''Al-Hayat'''s Washington bureau, Mouaffaq Harb, a Lebanese writer, is now in charge of the Amman-based Radio Sawa and the US-sponsored satellite television channel Al-Hurra. Earlier, in 1998, when Washington set up Radio Free Baghdad in Prague, it appointed another journalist from ''Al-Hayat'', Kamaran Qura Dhari, a militant Iraqi Kurd, to head the outfit. In 2004, just before his departure from Iraq, the US administrator Paul Bremer put two ''Al-Hayat'' journalists, Jalal al-Mashta and Dhari, in charge of Iraqi radio and television.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
+<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">Jamil Mroue, Kamil's son, relaunched ''Al-Hayat'' in London in October 1988 with the financial support of the Saudi prince, [[Khaled bin Sultan]], the son of the defence minister, who subquently took over ownership. ''Al-Hayat'' played a decisive role during the first Gulf war, demonising the regime of Saddam Hussein and justifying US intervention. It opened its pages to Iraqi opposition movements, in particular the Kurds and Shia. As it was directed by Lebanese Christians, its critics took to referring to ''Al-Hayat'' as a minority newspaper in the service of a prince.<br>It nevertheless remains a pluralist paper in which journalists evenly distributed between the pro-Arab and western camps coexist. But although it purports to provide a pan-Arab view of the news, the Lebanese perspective prevails: praise for the nation-state generally goes hand-in-hand with tough criticism of any sense of Arab solidarity.<br>The Americans turned to the pro-western camp when they needed recruits to run their media strategy targeting the Arab world, especially Iraq. For instance the former head of ''Al-Hayat'''s Washington bureau, [[Mouaffaq Harb]], a Lebanese writer, is now in charge of the Amman-based [[Radio Sawa]] and the US-sponsored satellite television channel [[Al-Hurra]]. Earlier, in 1998, when Washington set up Radio Free Baghdad in Prague, it appointed another journalist from ''Al-Hayat'', [[Kamaran Qura Dhari]], a militant Iraqi Kurd, to head the outfit. In 2004, just before his departure from Iraq, the US administrator [[Paul Bremer]] put two ''Al-Hayat'' journalists, [[Jalal al-Mashta]] and Dhari, in charge of Iraqi radio and television.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
 ==Post Gulf War 1991==

@@ Line 18: / Line 18: @@
 ==Post 9-11==
 After 9-11 Saudi Arabia was put under severe pressure by the United States; it was forced to change many of its policies of funding extreme religious groups, change its foreign policy to assist the U.S. in the area, and also to realign its media-propaganda to be more in tune with U.S. interests.  Oifi relates how the Saudi press changed:
-<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The increasingly radical line adopted by pan-Arab Saudi media is particularly valuable to US policy in the Middle East now that its own communication strategy for the Arab world has failed (11). The convergence between Saudi and US media interests explains why the Middle East Media Research Institute [MEMRI], an Israeli thinktank that translates extracts from the Arab press, is so keen on journalists writing for the Saudi press. The widespread distribution of such translations is part of a sophisticated strategy to manipulate information.<br>The Saudi pan-Arab press, with the protection of Saudi diplomacy, financing and broadcasting resources, makes it difficult for most Arab public opinion to make itself heard. At times of crisis the rest of the world often assumes that the minority opinions of its columnists reflect the views of the majority. On the contrary, these journalists are busy inventing an imaginary Arab world that supported the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Israeli attempt to eradicate Hizbullah in Lebanon. They are increasing the flow of misleading signals to US politicians and media framing US Middle East policy.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
+<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The increasingly radical line adopted by pan-Arab Saudi media is particularly valuable to US policy in the Middle East now that its own communication strategy for the Arab world has failed (11). The convergence between Saudi and US media interests explains why the [[Middle East Media Research Institute]] [MEMRI], an Israeli thinktank that translates extracts from the Arab press, is so keen on journalists writing for the Saudi press. The widespread distribution of such translations is part of a sophisticated strategy to manipulate information.<br>The Saudi pan-Arab press, with the protection of Saudi diplomacy, financing and broadcasting resources, makes it difficult for most Arab public opinion to make itself heard. At times of crisis the rest of the world often assumes that the minority opinions of its columnists reflect the views of the majority. On the contrary, these journalists are busy inventing an imaginary Arab world that supported the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Israeli attempt to eradicate Hizbullah in Lebanon. They are increasing the flow of misleading signals to US politicians and media framing US Middle East policy.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
 ==News organizations in the Saudi orbit==

@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 ==Early history==
 The Saudi forays into media were reactive to nationalist movements in the Arab world (1970s) and a function of the Saudi new-found wealth.  Oifi relates the early motivation for Saudi-media control:
-<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The drive to establish Saudi control over the Arab media started in the 1970s in an attempt to counter Nasser's ''Sawt al-Arab'' (voice of the Arabs) radio. Prince Salman was one of the first to realise what was at stake and acquired ''Asharq Al-Awsat'', started in 1978 in London by two brothers of Saudi origin, Hisham and Muhammad Ali Hafiz. Their assistants were Kamal Adham and Turki al-Faisal, both prominent figures in Saudi intelligence.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
+<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The drive to establish Saudi control over the Arab media started in the 1970s in an attempt to counter Nasser's ''Sawt al-Arab'' (voice of the Arabs) radio. Prince Salman was one of the first to realise what was at stake and acquired ''[[Asharq Al-Awsat]]'', started in 1978 in London by two brothers of Saudi origin, Hisham and Muhammad Ali Hafiz. Their assistants were Kamal Adham and Turki al-Faisal, both prominent figures in Saudi intelligence.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], ''Le monde diplomatique'', Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
 Around the same time Saudis acquired publishing and news interests in Lebanon.  The distinguishing characteristic of their publishing business was its emphasis on promoting the Saudi image and sabotaging anything remotely critical of Saudi elites -- Edward Said once described how these Saudi-related groups had worked to block the publications of one of his books. The output of those publishing houses was all directed outside Saudi Arabia (most Saudis don't like to read). Also in evidence at this time was the alignment of Saudi interests in Lebanon with Lebanese Christian businessmen and journalists.

@@ Line 5: / Line 5: @@
 ==Early history==
 The Saudi forays into media were reactive to nationalist movements in the Arab world (1970s) and a function of the Saudi new-found wealth.  Oifi relates the early motivation for Saudi-media control:
-<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The drive to establish Saudi control over the Arab media started in the 1970s in an attempt to counter Nasser's ''Sawt al-Arab'' (voice of the Arabs) radio. Prince Salman was one of the first to realise what was at stake and acquired ''Asharq Al-Awsat'', started in 1978 in London by two brothers of Saudi origin, Hisham and Muhammad Ali Hafiz. Their assistants were Kamal Adham and Turki al-Faisal, both prominent figures in Saudi intelligence.</blockquote>
+<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The drive to establish Saudi control over the Arab media started in the 1970s in an attempt to counter Nasser's ''Sawt al-Arab'' (voice of the Arabs) radio. Prince Salman was one of the first to realise what was at stake and acquired ''Asharq Al-Awsat'', started in 1978 in London by two brothers of Saudi origin, Hisham and Muhammad Ali Hafiz. Their assistants were Kamal Adham and Turki al-Faisal, both prominent figures in Saudi intelligence.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
 Around the same time Saudis acquired publishing and news interests in Lebanon.  The distinguishing characteristic of their publishing business was its emphasis on promoting the Saudi image and sabotaging anything remotely critical of Saudi elites -- Edward Said once described how these Saudi-related groups had worked to block the publications of one of his books. The output of those publishing houses was all directed outside Saudi Arabia (most Saudis don't like to read). Also in evidence at this time was the alignment of Saudi interests in Lebanon with Lebanese Christian businessmen and journalists.
 ===Al Hayat===
 In 1946, Kamil Mroue started a conservative daily opposing Arab nationalism.  It ceased publication in 1976 due to the assassination of the founder and the Lebanese civil war. Oifi relates the relationship between the Saudis-US and Lebanese Christian groups:
-<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">Jamil Mroue, Kamil's son, relaunched ''Al-Hayat'' in London in October 1988 with the financial support of the Saudi prince, Khaled bin Sultan, the son of the defence minister, who subquently took over ownership. ''Al-Hayat'' played a decisive role during the first Gulf war, demonising the regime of Saddam Hussein and justifying US intervention. It opened its pages to Iraqi opposition movements, in particular the Kurds and Shia. As it was directed by Lebanese Christians, its critics took to referring to ''Al-Hayat'' as a minority newspaper in the service of a prince.<br>It nevertheless remains a pluralist paper in which journalists evenly distributed between the pro-Arab and western camps coexist. But although it purports to provide a pan-Arab view of the news, the Lebanese perspective prevails: praise for the nation-state generally goes hand-in-hand with tough criticism of any sense of Arab solidarity.<br>The Americans turned to the pro-western camp when they needed recruits to run their media strategy targeting the Arab world, especially Iraq. For instance the former head of ''Al-Hayat'''s Washington bureau, Mouaffaq Harb, a Lebanese writer, is now in charge of the Amman-based Radio Sawa and the US-sponsored satellite television channel Al-Hurra. Earlier, in 1998, when Washington set up Radio Free Baghdad in Prague, it appointed another journalist from ''Al-Hayat'', Kamaran Qura Dhari, a militant Iraqi Kurd, to head the outfit. In 2004, just before his departure from Iraq, the US administrator Paul Bremer put two ''Al-Hayat'' journalists, Jalal al-Mashta and Dhari, in charge of Iraqi radio and television.{{ref|oifi}}</blockquote>
+<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">Jamil Mroue, Kamil's son, relaunched ''Al-Hayat'' in London in October 1988 with the financial support of the Saudi prince, Khaled bin Sultan, the son of the defence minister, who subquently took over ownership. ''Al-Hayat'' played a decisive role during the first Gulf war, demonising the regime of Saddam Hussein and justifying US intervention. It opened its pages to Iraqi opposition movements, in particular the Kurds and Shia. As it was directed by Lebanese Christians, its critics took to referring to ''Al-Hayat'' as a minority newspaper in the service of a prince.<br>It nevertheless remains a pluralist paper in which journalists evenly distributed between the pro-Arab and western camps coexist. But although it purports to provide a pan-Arab view of the news, the Lebanese perspective prevails: praise for the nation-state generally goes hand-in-hand with tough criticism of any sense of Arab solidarity.<br>The Americans turned to the pro-western camp when they needed recruits to run their media strategy targeting the Arab world, especially Iraq. For instance the former head of ''Al-Hayat'''s Washington bureau, Mouaffaq Harb, a Lebanese writer, is now in charge of the Amman-based Radio Sawa and the US-sponsored satellite television channel Al-Hurra. Earlier, in 1998, when Washington set up Radio Free Baghdad in Prague, it appointed another journalist from ''Al-Hayat'', Kamaran Qura Dhari, a militant Iraqi Kurd, to head the outfit. In 2004, just before his departure from Iraq, the US administrator Paul Bremer put two ''Al-Hayat'' journalists, Jalal al-Mashta and Dhari, in charge of Iraqi radio and television.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
 ==Post Gulf War 1991==
 El Oifi provides a good overview of the trends in Saudi propaganda:
-<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">Since the Gulf war of 1990-91 Saudi diplomacy has succeeded in imposing its own spin on events in the region, helped by the media monopoly enjoyed by several princes, particularly since Iraq&rsquo;s decline in influence. But the situation has now changed and the Saudis&rsquo; power is gradually waning.<br>In November 1996 Al-Jazeera started broadcasting news and comment from the Qatari capital, Doha, which ended the Saudi-Lebanese monopoly of pan-Arab news. Then came the attacks of 9/11. The aftermath undermined Saudia Arabia&rsquo;s diplomatic position: the limits imposed by the United States on its Arab and Islamic policies forced it to withdraw inside its borders, proclaiming &ldquo;Saudi Arabia first&rdquo;, a slogan that runs counter to the pan-Arab ambitions of the Saudi media.<br>The neoliberal line taken by Saudi pan-Arab media has grown more radical since 9/11; it is led by a core group of journalists and writers referred to by their critics as kutab al- marines, meaningthe [US] Marines&rsquo; penpushers. They defend US strategy in the Middle East and advocate religious and social reform in the Arab world but avoid any reference to political change. This radical stance benefits Saudi Arabia in two ways. At home it helps to counter Islamist opposition and attract recruits to the neoliberal camp close to the regime. Abroad it sends a positive message to the US, portraying the Saudi princes as the promoters of a moderate line in favour of Washington&rsquo;s Middle East policies.{{ref|oifi}}</blockquote>
+<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">Since the Gulf war of 1990-91 Saudi diplomacy has succeeded in imposing its own spin on events in the region, helped by the media monopoly enjoyed by several princes, particularly since Iraq&rsquo;s decline in influence. But the situation has now changed and the Saudis&rsquo; power is gradually waning.<br>In November 1996 Al-Jazeera started broadcasting news and comment from the Qatari capital, Doha, which ended the Saudi-Lebanese monopoly of pan-Arab news. Then came the attacks of 9/11. The aftermath undermined Saudia Arabia&rsquo;s diplomatic position: the limits imposed by the United States on its Arab and Islamic policies forced it to withdraw inside its borders, proclaiming &ldquo;Saudi Arabia first&rdquo;, a slogan that runs counter to the pan-Arab ambitions of the Saudi media.<br>The neoliberal line taken by Saudi pan-Arab media has grown more radical since 9/11; it is led by a core group of journalists and writers referred to by their critics as kutab al- marines, meaningthe [US] Marines&rsquo; penpushers. They defend US strategy in the Middle East and advocate religious and social reform in the Arab world but avoid any reference to political change. This radical stance benefits Saudi Arabia in two ways. At home it helps to counter Islamist opposition and attract recruits to the neoliberal camp close to the regime. Abroad it sends a positive message to the US, portraying the Saudi princes as the promoters of a moderate line in favour of Washington&rsquo;s Middle East policies.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
 ==Post 9-11==
 After 9-11 Saudi Arabia was put under severe pressure by the United States; it was forced to change many of its policies of funding extreme religious groups, change its foreign policy to assist the U.S. in the area, and also to realign its media-propaganda to be more in tune with U.S. interests.  Oifi relates how the Saudi press changed:
-<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The increasingly radical line adopted by pan-Arab Saudi media is particularly valuable to US policy in the Middle East now that its own communication strategy for the Arab world has failed (11). The convergence between Saudi and US media interests explains why the Middle East Media Research Institute [MEMRI], an Israeli thinktank that translates extracts from the Arab press, is so keen on journalists writing for the Saudi press. The widespread distribution of such translations is part of a sophisticated strategy to manipulate information.<br>The Saudi pan-Arab press, with the protection of Saudi diplomacy, financing and broadcasting resources, makes it difficult for most Arab public opinion to make itself heard. At times of crisis the rest of the world often assumes that the minority opinions of its columnists reflect the views of the majority. On the contrary, these journalists are busy inventing an imaginary Arab world that supported the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Israeli attempt to eradicate Hizbullah in Lebanon. They are increasing the flow of misleading signals to US politicians and media framing US Middle East policy.{{ref|oifi}}</blockquote>
+<blockquote style="background-color:beige;border:1pt solid Darkgoldenrod;padding:1%">The increasingly radical line adopted by pan-Arab Saudi media is particularly valuable to US policy in the Middle East now that its own communication strategy for the Arab world has failed (11). The convergence between Saudi and US media interests explains why the Middle East Media Research Institute [MEMRI], an Israeli thinktank that translates extracts from the Arab press, is so keen on journalists writing for the Saudi press. The widespread distribution of such translations is part of a sophisticated strategy to manipulate information.<br>The Saudi pan-Arab press, with the protection of Saudi diplomacy, financing and broadcasting resources, makes it difficult for most Arab public opinion to make itself heard. At times of crisis the rest of the world often assumes that the minority opinions of its columnists reflect the views of the majority. On the contrary, these journalists are busy inventing an imaginary Arab world that supported the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Israeli attempt to eradicate Hizbullah in Lebanon. They are increasing the flow of misleading signals to US politicians and media framing US Middle East policy.<ref>Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).</ref></blockquote>
 ==News organizations in the Saudi orbit==
@@ Line 24: / Line 24: @@
 *[[Asharq Al-Awsat]]
-==Resources==
+==Notes==
-#{{note|oifi}}Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).
+<references/>

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:18, 13 December 2006
Line 1:		Line 1:
−	The Saudi elites have sought to influence opinion in the Middle East, and, to a far lesser extent, in Europe and the United States. Their efforts have gone through several phases: (1) pet projects; (2) attacking influences they don't approve of, e.g., nationalism; and (3) post 9-11, a total alignment with US policy in the region. The common trend throughout the past few decades has been an attempt to smother any criticism of Saudi Arabia in general, and the Saudi elites in particular.	+	The Saudi elites have sought to influence opinion in the Middle East, and, to a far lesser extent, in Europe and the United States. Their efforts have gone through several phases: (1) pet projects; (2) attacking influences they don't approve of, e.g., Arab nationalism and religious currents inimical to them; and (3) post 9-11, a total alignment with US policy in the region. The common trend throughout the past few decades has been an attempt to smother any criticism of Saudi Arabia in general, and the Saudi elites in particular.

	The curious elements of the Saudi-controlled media are: (1) its association with right-wing Lebanese Christians who happen to be anti-Arab; (2) a partnership with US propaganda efforts in the Middle East via its Al Hurra TV station; and (3) the use of the Saudi media for the placement of content that is later used by [[MEMRI]] or other pro-Israeli propaganda operations.		The curious elements of the Saudi-controlled media are: (1) its association with right-wing Lebanese Christians who happen to be anti-Arab; (2) a partnership with US propaganda efforts in the Middle East via its Al Hurra TV station; and (3) the use of the Saudi media for the placement of content that is later used by [[MEMRI]] or other pro-Israeli propaganda operations.

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:17, 13 December 2006
Line 17:		Line 17:

	==Resources==		==Resources==
−	*{{note\|oifi}}Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).	+	#{{note\|oifi}}Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 The curious elements of the Saudi-controlled media are: (1) its association with right-wing Lebanese Christians who happen to be anti-Arab; (2) a partnership with US propaganda efforts in the Middle East via its Al Hurra TV station; and (3) the use of the Saudi media for the placement of content that is later used by [[MEMRI]] or other pro-Israeli propaganda operations.
 ==News organizations in the Saudi orbit==
@@ Line 8: / Line 17: @@
 ==Resources==
-*Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).
+*{{note|oifi}}Mohammed El Oifi, [http://mondediplo.com/2006/12/08arabworld Not the voice of the street], Le monde diplomatique, Dec 2006. (subscription required).

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:45, 12 December 2006
Line 1:		Line 1:
−	The Saudi elites have sought to influence opinion in the Middle East, and to a far lesser extent in Europe and the United States. Their efforts have gone through several phases: (1) pet projects; (2) attacking influences they don't approve of, e.g., nationalism; and post 9-11 a total alignment with US policy in the region. The common trend throughout the past few decades has been an attempt to smother any criticism of Saudi Arabia in general, and the Saudi elites in particular.	+	The Saudi elites have sought to influence opinion in the Middle East, and to a far lesser extent in Europe and the United States. Their efforts have gone through several phases: (1) pet projects; (2) attacking influences they don't approve of, e.g., nationalism; and (3) post 9-11, a total alignment with US policy in the region. The common trend throughout the past few decades has been an attempt to smother any criticism of Saudi Arabia in general, and the Saudi elites in particular.

	The curious elements of the Saudi-controlled media are: (1) its association with right-wing Lebanese Christians who happen to be anti-Arab; (2) a partnership with US propaganda efforts in the Middle East via its Al Hurra TV station; and (3) the use of the Saudi media for the placement of content that is later used by [[MEMRI]] or other pro-Israeli propaganda operations.		The curious elements of the Saudi-controlled media are: (1) its association with right-wing Lebanese Christians who happen to be anti-Arab; (2) a partnership with US propaganda efforts in the Middle East via its Al Hurra TV station; and (3) the use of the Saudi media for the placement of content that is later used by [[MEMRI]] or other pro-Israeli propaganda operations.